Casillas v. Gerstenfeld

No. 796 August 26, 2026 389 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Gloria CASILLAS, Kristina Onshus-Womble, Momo Hurley, Dawn Thompson, Felix Valadez, and Kelly Chudler, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Respondents, and Jameka GIBSON, Plaintiff Cross-Respondent, v. David GERSTENFELD, in his official capacity as Director of the Oregon Employment Department, Defendant-Respondent Cross-Appellant, and OREGON EMPLOYMENT DEPARTMENT, Defendant Cross-Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 22CV18836; A184620 Eric L. Dahlin, Judge. Argued and submitted October 28, 2025. Kelsey Heilman argued the cause for appellants-cross- respondents. Also on the briefs were Emily Teplin Fox, Oregon Law Center, and Divine Zheng. Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent-cross-appellant and cross-appellant. Also on the briefs were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General. No appearance for cross-respondent. 390 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld Jane L. Moisan and People’s Law Project filed the brief amicus curiae for National Employment Law Project. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. TOOKEY, P. J. On appeal, affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded; on cross-appeal affirmed. Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 391 TOOKEY, P. J. This case requires us to consider, among other legal points, whether certain practices of the Oregon Employment Department (OED) related to purported overpayments of unemployment insurance benefits violate the due process rights of plaintiffs, who were recipients of such benefits.1 Plaintiffs appeal a general judgment granting sum- mary judgment in favor of OED on certain of plaintiffs’ claims. OED cross-appeals the general judgment, which also granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on cer- tain claims. On appeal, plaintiffs raise four assignments of error. In the first, they assert that the trial court erred in “finding that due process does not require OED to tell claim- ants what ‘type’ has been assigned to their overpayment.” In the second, they assert that the trial court erred in “find- ing Plaintiff-Appellants’ third claim for relief, concerning the use of a two-notice system to establish overpayments of unemployment benefits, was moot.” In the third, they assert the trial court erred in “finding that the use of the two-no- tice system to establish overpayments of unemployment benefits was not ‘capable of repetition’ within the meaning of ORS 14.175.” In the fourth, they assert that the trial court erred in “finding that OED’s overpayment notices contained sufficient individualized reasons to support the agency’s decision.” We conclude, with respect to plaintiffs’ first and fourth assignments of error, that the trial court erred. We also conclude, with respect to plaintiffs’ second and third assignments of error, that the trial court did not err. Thus, on plaintiffs’ appeal, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. On cross-appeal, OED seeks reversal of the trial court’s entry of partial summary judgment in favor of 1 Plaintiffs sued David Gerstenfeld, in his official capacity, as Director of OED and OED. As plaintiffs do in their brief, we refer to the defendants in this case as OED. We also note that amicus curiae the National Employment Law Project has filed a brief in support of plaintiffs. 392 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld plaintiffs, raising six assignments of error. In the first two assignments, OED asserts that the trial court erred in grant- ing partial summary judgment to plaintiffs and in “denying OED’s motion for summary judgment on Claim #1.C.,” which alleged that OED violated due process by continuing to collect overpayments when it had been determined that a claimant had good cause to file a late hearing request, and the appeal had not been resolved on the merits. In the third through sixth assignments, OED asserts that the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment to plaintiffs and in deny- ing OED summary judgment on “Claim #2” and “Claim #6.” As to those claims, the trial court determined that certain notices sent to claimants by OED were “unconstitutional as to Spanish readers who cannot read English because the notices use partial, but not complete, English-to-Spanish translation.” We conclude, as to OED’s assignments of error on cross-appeal, that the trial court did not err. Thus, on OED’s cross-appeal, we affirm. Before proceeding with our discussion of this case, we pause to note that in considering the due process issues presented, we address what the United States Constitution requires; that is, our job is to determine only what OED must do to comply with its obligations under the United States Constitution. In our review, we do not consider whether OED’s practices constitute “best practices.” Put another way, our legal conclusions that certain OED practices com- plied with due process are only that; those conclusions are not an endorsement of OED’s practices. I. BACKGROUND In 1935, “in response to rampant unemployment associated with the Great Depression, Congress established an unemployment compensation program.” Newport Church of Nazarene v. Hensley, 335 Or 1, 5, 56 P3d 386 (2002). In doing so, it “impos[ed] a federal payroll tax upon employ- ers,” but in order to “induce states to maintain their own unemployment compensation programs, * * * Congress also provided that employers could offset as much as 90 percent of the federal tax by paying into a qualified state unem- ployment compensation program.” Id. “Shortly after the Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 393 enactment of the federal payroll tax, every state adopted qualifying programs.” Id. Today, “[u]nemployment compensation exists under a federal-state scheme of unemployment insurance leg- islation.” Unemployment Compensation, 76 Am Jur 2d § 2 (2025). Thus, “[f]ederal and state unemployment compensa- tion statutes are designed to operate together as a coopera- tive endeavor.” Id. OED is the agency responsible for “[a]dminis- ter[ing] the unemployment insurance laws of this state to support Oregonians during periods of unemployment.” ORS 657.601(1). Ultimately, the purpose of Oregon’s unemploy- ment insurance scheme is simple: “[T]o provide a means of living for an unemployed worker.” McPherson v. Employment Div., 285 Or 541, 543, 591 P2d 1381 (1979). Like the unem- ployment insurance schemes in other states, Oregon’s scheme works to “insure a diligent worker against the vicissitudes of enforced unemployment not voluntarily created by the worker without good cause.” Unemployment Compensation, 76 Am Jur 2d § 1 (2025). The COVID-19 pandemic generated an increase in unemployment and unemployment benefit claims, and a resulting expansion of federal unemployment programs administered by OED pursuant to federal law. Specifically, in addition to administering Oregon’s unemployment insur- ance scheme, OED, during the COVID-19 pandemic, was charged with administering what OED calls “pandemic-era unemployment benefit programs,” including the Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA) program, the Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation program, and the Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation pro- gram. See generally Pub L 116-136, §§ 2101-2116, 134 Stat 281 (2020). Plaintiffs in this case are six Oregonians who received unemployment benefits through OED and whose benefits OED later sought to “claw back” on the grounds that, according to OED, plaintiffs were ineligible to receive the benefits, plaintiffs were paid too much, or both. Plaintiffs filed this action against OED asserting nine claims for relief 394 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld which, as described by the trial court, assert “OED’s sys- tem for notifying claimants of such overpayment decisions is unconstitutionally confusing and prevented Plaintiffs from being able to effectively challenge such decisions.” Plaintiffs’ claims, at least insofar as they are relevant to our analysis on appeal, are premised on their right to proce- dural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the trial court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims, and the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, in part, as to certain claims and in favor of OED as to other claims. As explained in more detail below, and as relevant to plaintiffs’ appeal, the trial court ruled: • In favor of OED on Claim #5 in plaintiffs’ com- plaint, which asserted that OED’s notices were defi- cient because they “do not tell claimants which type of overpayment has been assigned to them and the consequences of that classification.” (Plaintiffs chal- lenge this ruling in their first assignment of error.) • In favor of OED on Claim #3 in plaintiffs’ com- plaint, which asserted that “OED’s two-notice sys- tem is unconstitutional because it withholds essen- tial information.” (Plaintiffs challenge this ruling in their second and third assignments of error.) • In favor of OED, in part, on Claim #2 and Claim #6 in plaintiffs’ complaint, which asserted that OED’s notices were deficient because they “contained insufficient content and thus were not reasonably calculated to give plaintiffs the information needed to understand and challenge the decision” and “that there was insufficient content in the administrative decisions establishing overpayment.” (Plaintiffs challenge this ruling in their fourth assignment of error.) Additionally, as explained in more detail below, as relevant to OED’s cross-appeal, the trial court ruled: Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 395 • In favor of plaintiffs, in part, on Claim #1 in plain- tiffs’ complaint, which asserted, in relevant part, that “OED should halt efforts to recover overpay- ments if the Office of Administrative Hearings has found good cause for the late hearing request because at that point the validity of the overpay- ment is in legal question.” (OED challenges this rul- ing in its first and second assignments of error.) • In favor of plaintiffs, in part, on Claim #2 and Claim #6 in plaintiffs’ complaint, which are described above, on the basis that OED’s provision of a par- tial translation of certain documents into Spanish violated due process. (OED challenges this ruling in their third through sixth assignments of errors.) And, as noted, plaintiffs appeal and OED cross- appeals the resulting judgment. We provide additional detail about the historical facts, plaintiffs’ claims, and the trial court’s rulings in our discussion of each assignment of error. II. ANALYSIS “On review of cross-motions for summary judgment, we view the record for each motion in the light most favor- able to the party opposing it to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” O’Kain v. Landress, 299 Or App 417, 419, 450 P3d 508 (2019).2 Plaintiffs’ claims are rooted in their right to proce- dural due process, which has two components: “notice and an opportunity for a hearing.” State v. Sanchez-Cacatzun, 2 We note that, in deciding the summary judgment motions in this case, the trial court applied what it referred to during argument on the parties’ summary judgment motions as a “modified” summary judgment standard, where it was “effectively weighing some evidence.” And the trial court’s letter opinion reflects that the parties believed that, on appellate review, “the record would effectively be reviewed de novo because all the submissions are in writing.” On appeal, no party addresses how the trial court’s use of a “modified” sum- mary judgment standard should impact the standard we use in reviewing the parties’ assignments of error. In the absence of argument from the parties on that point, we use the standard that we usually use on review of cross-motions for summary judgment as articulated in O’Kain. 396 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld 304 Or App 650, 664, 468 P3d 964 (2020), rev den, 367 Or 559 (2021); see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306, 313, 70 S Ct 652, 94 L Ed 865 (1950) (“The fundamental requisites of due process are adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). “Though right to a hearing is interrelated to having received adequate notice, those rights are dis- tinct.” Sanchez-Cacatzun, 304 Or App at 664. In this case, plaintiffs’ first and fourth assignments of error on appeal and OED’s third through sixth assign- ments of error on cross-appeal concern whether OED pro- vided adequate notice to plaintiffs to satisfy due process. We address those six assignments of error first, concluding that plaintiffs’ first and fourth assignments of error are, at least in part, well taken. We also conclude that the trial court did not err with regard to the rulings underlying OED’s third through sixth assignments of error on cross-appeal. We next address OED’s first and second assign- ments of error on cross-appeal, which concern the opportu- nity for a hearing. With regard to those assignments of error, we conclude that the trial court did not err. After that we turn to plaintiffs’ second and third assignments of error, which seek reversal of the trial court’s determination that Claim #3 in plaintiffs’ complaint was moot and was not capable of repetition yet evading review within the meaning of ORS 14.175. As to those assignments, we conclude that the trial court did not err. A. Adequate Notice As noted, plaintiffs’ first and fourth assignments of error on appeal and OED’s third through sixth assignments of error on cross-appeal concern whether OED provided ade- quate notice to plaintiffs to satisfy due process. “The guidelines for determining whether a partic- ular notice procedure comports with the requirements of due process were established in Mullane v. Central Hanover [Bank & Trust] Co, 339 US 306, 70 S Ct 652, 94 L Ed 865 (1950).” Egge v. Davis, 27 Or App 383, 386-87, 556 P2d 153 (1976), rev den, 277 Or 99, cert den, 434 US 820 (1977). In Mullane, the Supreme Court explained: Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 397 “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitu- tional requirements are satisfied. The criterion is not the possibility of conceivable injury but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to the sub- ject with which the statute deals.” 339 US at 314-15 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “As with other aspects of due process, the extent of notice required by the Due Process Clause varies with the type of proceeding and the type of interest involved.” Hayes Oyster Co. v. DEQ, 316 Or App 186, 197, 504 P3d 15 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 507 (2022); see also Walker v. Hutchinson, 352 US 112, 115, 77 S Ct 200, 1 L Ed 2d 178 (1956) (noting the “notice required will vary with circumstances and condi- tions”). That is, “[i]n determining what notice is appropriate under the Mullane standard, we must balance the interest of the State and the individual interest sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Grimm v. City of Portland, 125 F4th 920, 925 (9th Cir 2025), cert den, ___ US ___, 146 S Ct 1513 (2026) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 Thus, ultimately, the “due process right to fair notice is a general rule of law that demands a substantial element of judgment and that can hardly be implemented mechanically.” Oneida Indian Nation of New York v. Madison County, 665 F3d 408, 434-35 (2d Cir 2011) (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and brackets omitted). And, although it has been stated that what amounts to constitutionally adequate notice is “fairly low,” Espinosa v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F3d 1193, 1202-03 (9th Cir 2008), aff’d, 559 US 260, 130 S Ct 3 We are, of course, “not bound by the decisions of the Ninth Circuit—or any other federal circuit—even on questions of federal law.” State v. Breedwell, 323 Or App 172, 195, 522 P3d 876 (2022), rev den, 371 Or 106 (2023). Nevertheless, in this opinion, “we consider such cases for their persuasive value.” Id. 398 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld 1367, 176 L Ed 2d 158 (2010), it is also true that “[d]ue pro- cess requires the fullest notice where litigation over a plain- tiff’s individual rights occurs,” Hayes Oyster Co., 316 Or App at 197. At bottom, “[t]he purpose of notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate preparation for, an impending ‘hearing.’ ” Long v. Board, 189 Or App 56, 60, 73 P3d 934 (2003). And “the constitutionality of a particular procedure for notice is assessed ex ante, rather than post hoc.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 US 220, 231, 126 S Ct 1708, 164 L Ed 2d 415 (2006). Our decision in Long, although it is distinguishable in certain respects, is instructive as to how we have con- sidered whether notice was adequate under the due process clause. In that case, the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision notified the petitioner of its “preliminary deter- mination” that the petitioner was a “predatory sex offender” based on the petitioner’s “history of sex crimes,” that his “current sex offense conviction” involved “multiple victims,” and that petitioner had used “weapons or threats.” Long, 189 Or App at 58-59. It also informed petitioner that he could “respond in writing if he disagreed with the board’s preliminary determination.” Id. at 59. We concluded that that notice was constitutionally insufficient under the Due Process Clause, explaining: “The board notified petitioner that it had made a prelimi- nary decision to designate him as a predatory sex offender because, among other things, he had a ‘history of sex crimes.’ The board, however, did not tell petitioner (until after it had made its final decision) what sex crimes he allegedly had committed, when those crimes allegedly occurred, or with whom. Without that information or some process that would permit him to discover that information, petitioner was in no position to respond-in writing or otherwise-to the board’s determination that he had a history of sex crimes.” Id. at 60. Similarly, in Long, with regard to the board’s “preliminary determination that petitioner used weapons or threats,” we explained that the “same problem inheres” because the board told petitioner “that it based its designa- tion on the ‘use of weapons or threats,’ but it did not tell him Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 399 when he allegedly had used any weapons or threats, whom petitioner allegedly had threatened, or what he supposedly had said.” Id. at 61 & n 2. With that legal context in mind, we turn to plain- tiffs’ first and fourth assignments of error and OED’s third through sixth assignments of error. We ultimately conclude, as set forth below, given the circumstances of this case, that certain notices used by OED were constitutionally inadequate, where they failed to provide information about agency determinations that could have significant consequences for claimants or where they failed to provide individualized reasons that accurately cap- tured the agency’s decision-making. 1. Overpayment type (plaintiffs’ first assignment of error) We begin with plaintiffs’ first assignment of error, which asserts that the trial court erred “in finding that due process does not require OED to tell claimants what ‘type’ has been assigned to their overpayment.” As noted, this assignment relates to Claim #5 in plaintiffs’ complaint. By way of background, the summary judgment record reflects that OED classifies overpayments of unem- ployment benefits into three “types”: (1) “Type A,” (2) “Type B,” and (3) “Type F.” Those types determine the limitations period for collection of the debt generated by the overpay- ment, available methods of collection for the debt, and whether the debt is eligible for waiver. “Type A” overpayments occur where the claim- ant “did something that caused the overpayment to occur, but they didn’t do it fraudulently.” Type A overpayments are subject to various collection methods, including offset of future unemployment benefits, wage garnishment, and interception of state and local tax refunds. The allowable timeframe for collection of Type A overpayments is five years. See ORS 657.310(2)(c). Type A overpayments can be waived by OED if the claimant can show that recovery would be against “equity and good conscience,” see ORS 657.317(2)(a), and OED has adopted criteria to guide such 400 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld determinations, including provisions for “automatic” waiver in certain circumstances. “Type B” overpayments occur when the overpay- ment was a “non-claimant fault” overpayment. Such over- payments could be caused by, for example, an OED error, the claimant’s former employer not providing timely infor- mation, or the “Department of Labor [coming] out with guid- ance and then [coming] out with retroactive guidance” that changed eligibility requirements. Type B overpayments can only be collected through the offset of unemployment bene- fits received during the five-year period after the overpay- ment is established. See ORS 657.315(1)(a). And, like Type A overpayments, waiver is possible if recovery by the state is against “equity and good conscience.” See ORS 657.317(2)(a). “Type F” overpayments occur where the agency determines that there was a “misrepresentation” by a claim- ant or a claimant “intentionally with[held] information in order to obtain benefits.” Like Type A overpayments, Type F overpayments are subject to collection via offset of future unemployment benefits, wage garnishment, and intercep- tion of state and local tax refunds. However, Type F over- payments differ from Type A overpayments in that they can be collected “until the debt is extinguished”—i.e., there is not five-year limit for recovery. Type F overpayments are also subject to a penalty of 15 to 30 percent of the overpay- ment, see ORS 657.310(3)(a), and they cannot be waived by OED, see ORS 657.317(2)(b). Federally funded pandemic benefits add an addi- tional layer of classification regarding overpayments: At least for certain benefits, the state is required to determine “who is at fault for the overpayment (i.e., the individual, employer, state, or a combination thereof) and whether the overpayment is a result of claimant fraud.” Waiver of the recovery of overpayment of federal funds is available only if the overpayment was made “without fault” of the claimant. In sum, the permutations of overpayment “types” and the effect of that determination by OED is as follows, at least as a general matter4: 4 Plaintiffs’ briefing notes that “[s]ome federally funded benefits are subject to a shorter recovery timeframe for certain collection methods.” Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 401 Type/ Eligible Eligible Recovery Recovery Claimant for State for Federal Methods Time Limit Fault Waiver? Waiver? Type A, Yes No Offset of 5 years for Claimant benefits, wage/ state benefits Fault bank account garnishment, tax refund offset Type A, Yes Yes Offset of 5 years for Not Claimant benefits, wage/ state benefits Fault bank account garnishment, tax refund offset Type B Yes Yes Offset of bene- 5 years for (Never fits only state benefits Claimant Fault) Type F No No Offset of None (Always benefits, wage/ Claimant bank account Fault) garnishment, tax refund offset Notwithstanding the differences in waiver eligibil- ity, permissible collection methods, and the applicable time limits for recovery, the overpayment notices sent by OED do not reflect what “type” has been assigned by OED to the overpayment. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of OED on this claim, determining that “Mullane does not require OED to include overpayment types in its admin- istrative decisions, and that the administrative decisions meet the constitutional floor.” The trial court reasoned that if a claimant is informed of the reasons “why OED believes the claimant is at fault, the claimant can then challenge the fault determination as a factual matter.” On appeal, plaintiffs argue that OED’s “overpay- ment notices have three constitutional deficiencies with respect to their explanation of overpayment type”: (1) “the notices fail to identify the type of overpayment and its conse- quences”; (2) “the decisions do not explain that a successful 402 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld challenge to overpayment type at a hearing could have important practical implications”; and (3) “the decisions do not contain sufficient individualized reasons to support the overpayment classification.” Plaintiffs ask this court to hold that “OED is required to include in each overpayment notice”: “(1) a clear statement of the overpayment’s type and its practical conse- quences (waiver eligibility, recovery options, and limitations period); (2) a clear statement that the claimant may chal- lenge the overpayment type at a hearing with potentially impactful consequences; and (3) individualized facts to sup- port the type assigned.” OED responds that its overpayment decisions sat- isfied constitutional notice requirements because they “pro- vided notice to plaintiffs that they had been overpaid, the bases of that decision, the amount, the consequences, the availability of a waiver, and appeal deadlines.” And that, because due process only requires OED to notify plaintiffs of “the ‘pendency of the action’ and their opportunity to object to that decision,” the requirements of due process were satisfied. Even though the threshold for constitutionally ade- quate notice is “fairly low,” Espinosa, 553 F3d at 1202, we conclude that the trial court erred when it granted sum- mary judgment to OED on Claim #5 in plaintiffs’ complaint. That is, we agree with plaintiffs that due process requires notice of the “type” OED has assigned to an overpayment and its consequences on “waiver eligibility, recovery options, and limitations period,” a statement “that the claimant may challenge the overpayment type at a hearing with poten- tially impactful consequences,” and “individualized facts to support the type assigned.” Ultimately, “[f]or notice to be effective, it must inform the affected party of what ‘critical issue’ will be determined at the hearing,” as “part of the function of notice is to give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his defense.” Nnebe v. Daus, 931 F3d 66, 88 (2d Cir 2019) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Or put dif- ferently, “[s]o as to comport with due process, the notice of Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 403 hearing provided to an unemployment compensation claim- ant must adequately convey the required information to allow the claimant to participate in the hearing, including the purpose and scope of the hearing.” Constitutional Law, 16D CJS § 2239 (2026). As explained above, the “type” assigned to an overpayment has significant consequences to claimants, including whether claimants are eligible for a waiver of overpayment recovery (including automatic waiver in some circumstances); whether the overpayments can be collected by the government by means other than offsetting future benefits, such as wage garnishment; and the limitations period for such collections. And although the notices OED uses inform claimants that they can request a hearing, they do not tell claimants the type that OED has determined to be associated with the overpayment and the significant con- sequences associated with that determination by OED. In our view, absent information concerning the type that OED has assigned to an overpayment, the notices lack information necessary for a party to make “adequate prepa- ration for[ ] an impending hearing.” Long, 189 Or App at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching that conclu- sion, we note that OED has not proffered any reason that would support the conclusion that informing claimants of the “type” that it has assigned to an overpayment by OED would impose a burden on OED. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting relief to OED on Claim #5 and in denying relief to plaintiffs on that claim. 2. Individualized reasons (plaintiffs’ fourth assignment of error) In plaintiffs’ fourth assignment of error, they assert that the trial court erred in “finding that OED’s overpay- ment notices contained sufficient individualized reasons to support the agency’s decision.” That assignment relates to Claim #2 and Claim #6 in plaintiffs’ complaint, in which they contended, respectively, as framed by the trial court, that “eligibility decisions contained insufficient content and thus were not reasonably calculated to give Plaintiffs the 404 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld information needed to understand and challenge the deci- sion” and that “there was insufficient content in the admin- istrative decisions establishing overpayment.” Specifically, as framed by the briefing, this assign- ment relates to three types of notices of administrative deci- sions sent by OED: • “Amended Notices of Determination for PUA,” which informed plaintiffs of a change to a prior PUA eligibility determination by OED; • “Wrong Program Overpayment Notices,” which were sent by OED when “claimants applied for and were initially found eligible for a variety of benefits across multiple programs but were later found ineligible for a program or a particular claim,” and an “overpayment resulted when OED moved a claimant’s benefits from an incorrect claim or program to a correct one”; • “Second Notices in the 2-Notice Series,” which informed claimants of the amount of benefits that OED believed claimants had been overpaid, after an earlier adverse determination of eligibility had already been made by OED. Additionally, plaintiffs’ fourth assignment concerns the “Schedules of Adjustments,” which accompanied certain notices of administrative decisions by OED, and consists of a table showing, among other information, the amount of the overpayment (as calculated by OED) for specified weeks. The trial court determined that the notices of administrative decisions and “Schedules of Adjustments” sent by OED “did satisfy the constitutional floor.”5 On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred because the three types of notices of administrative decisions and the “Schedules of Adjustments” did not satisfy due process. Specifically, regarding the “Amended Notices of Determination for PUA,” plaintiffs contend that “the notices are insufficient because they provide a list of possible rea- sons for the denial without specifying which one applies.” 5 There was one exception to that ruling by the trial court. As discussed below, it determined that the notices of administrative decisions did not “satisfy the constitutional floor” for certain Spanish language speakers. We address that ruling below in our discussion of OED’s third through sixth assignments of error. Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 405 Regarding the “Wrong Program Overpayment Notices,” plaintiffs contend they are “full of jargon, [and] are not rea- sonably calculated to allow claimants to decide if they even have objections to the decision, much less to present those objections.” (Emphasis in plaintiffs’ brief.) And, regarding the “Second Notices in the 2-Notice Series,” plaintiffs con- tend that the notices “contain a cross-reference to the date of the first notice in the series (Underlying Eligibility Decision) instead of providing individualized reasons for the eligibil- ity denial.” Finally, regarding the Schedules of Adjustments, plaintiffs contend that they are deficient because they are “not reasonably calculated to enable claimants to under- stand and present objections to OED’s calculation of over- payment amounts.” As OED sees it, the trial court did not err in the manner asserted by plaintiffs in their fourth assignment of error. It contends that its “overpayment decisions provided plaintiffs with a determination that they had been overpaid, the bases of that decision (i.e., that they had been previously found ineligible), the amount of the overpayment, the poten- tial consequences of the decision (i.e., repayment), the avail- ability of a waiver, and appeal deadlines,” and also that the decisions were supplemented by a “table that showed the overpayment amount by comparing the benefits paid to the correct benefit amount for specified weeks.” Specifically, OED contends that the “Amended Notices of Determination satisfy due process because they inform a claimant that they have been deemed ineligible for one of two reasons and that they may challenge that deter- mination”; the “Wrong Program Overpayment Notices,” were “not perfect, [but] they satisfied the requirements of due process by alerting claimants that they had been deter- mined ineligible, that they may be subject to an overpay- ment, and they had the right to appeal that determination”; and the “Second Notices in the 2-Notice Series” do “not sim- ply contain a cross-reference to the previous decision[, but also] they summarize the findings from those decisions.” Additionally, OED contends, regarding the Schedules of Adjustments, that due process “only requires notice that is ‘reasonably calculated’ to inform a party of the ‘pendency of 406 Casillas v. Gerstenfeld an action,’ not a comprehensive explanation of everything relevant to that action.” Having reviewed the record, in connection with plaintiffs’ fourth assignment of error, we conclude that the Amended Notices of Determination for PUA and the Wrong Program Overpayment Notices failed to satisfy due process because they did not provide adequate notice, but that the Schedules of Adjustments and the Second Notices in the 2-Notice Series did satisfy due process. a. Amended Notices of Determination for PUA We start with the Amended Notices of Determination for PUA, which, as noted, informed plaintiffs of a change to a prior PUA eligibility determination by OED. Where a deter- mination was made that claimants were not eligible for PUA, those notices inform claimants that they are “NOT ENTITLED to PUA Benefits” and provide one of two statements regard- ing the ineligibility determination: (1) that claimant was “not unemployed, unable to work, or unavailable to work for a qualifying reason related to the COVID-19 pandemic” or (2) that claimant was eligible for “a regular unemployment claim, extension, or extended benefits in Oregon or another state.” In our view, the Amended Notices of Determination of PUA fail to satisfy due process, because they do not pro- vide information necessary for plaintiffs to understand the basis for the agency’s determination that they are ineligible for PUA and information about how to prepare evidence to rebut that determination if they decided to do so, but instead largely just restate the eligibility criteria for PUA. Nnebe, 931 F3d at 88 (noting that “part of the function of notice is to give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his defense” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)); see also Watkins v. Greene Metro. Hous. Auth., 397 F Supp 3d 1103, 1108-09 (SD Ohio 2019) (“Courts routinely find notice insufficient where such notice simply parrots the broad lan- guage of applicable regulations. This is because such notices do not alert individuals of the specific behavior that led to the termination of their benefits, and they are thus unpre- pared to combat the charges against them.” (Internal quo- tation marks and citation omitted.)). In essence, the notices Cite as 352 Or App 389 (2026) 407 inform plaintiffs that they were ineligible because a reason for ineligibility applies, but they do not provide plaintiffs any individualized reasons to support the determination: A claimant would not know from the notices, for example, in which state OED determined that the claimant was eligible for “a regular unemployment claim, extension, or extended benefits,” or what kind of benefits OED had determined the claimant would be eligible for. See Long, 189 Or App at 61 n 2 (concluding notice informing petitioner that he had been designated a “predatory sex offender” in part based on peti- tioner’s “use of weapons or threats” insufficient where it did not “tell him when he allegedly had used any weapons or threats, whom petitioner allegedly had threatened, or what he supposedly had said”). b. Wrong Program Overpa