Ressler v. Grimes

612 November 12, 2026 No. 1095 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Jessica RESSLER, fka Jessica Webb, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Kaela GRIMES, Travis Arvin, and all others, Defendants-Appellants. Marion County Circuit Court 24LT11775; A185101 En Banc Drew P. Taylor, Judge pro tempore. Argued and submitted August 8, 2025; resubmitted en banc April 1, 2026. Rachael A. Federico argued the cause for appellants. Also on the brief was Jacob K. Sweet. No appearance for respondent. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, Ortega, Egan, Tookey, Shorr, Aoyagi, Powers, Kamins, Pagán, Joyce, Hellman, Jacquot, and O’Connor, Judges. AOYAGI, J. Affirmed. Tookey, J., dissented and filed an opinion in which Egan, J., Powers, J., Kamins, J., and Jacquot J., joined. Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 613 614 Ressler v. Grimes AOYAGI, J. In this forcible entry and detainer (FED) action involving a residential dwelling unit subject to the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA), tenants appeal a general judgment returning possession of the unit to land- lord. Landlord is herself a renter, who sublet a room to ten- ants beginning in December 2023. Landlord mailed two separate notices of termination to tenants in April 2024, one terminating the tenancy without cause under ORS 90.427 and the other terminating it for nonpayment of rent under ORS 90.392. Landlord later brought this FED action to evict tenants from the property. Tenants moved for judgment on the pleadings under ORCP 21 B, asserting that the termi- nation notices were invalid as a matter of law because the notices did not include a representation by landlord as to when they were mailed. The FED court denied the motion, concluding as a matter of statutory construction that the ORLTA did not require the notices to include such a state- ment. The case proceeded to trial, and the court found for landlord on both termination theories. On appeal, tenants challenge the denial of their ORCP 21 B motion and the court’s decision to proceed to trial. Landlord has not appeared. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court did not err. The ORLTA sets forth in detail the specific requirements for different types of termination notices, provides how much notice must be given in different situations, and specifies the service meth- ods that may be used. The ORLTA does not contain any generally applicable requirement that a termination notice include a certificate of service, nor does it contain any gener- ally applicable requirement that the notice itself contain an unsworn statement as to when and how it was served. Any such requirement would therefore have to lie in a specific notice statute within the ORLTA. Here, as a matter of statu- tory construction, we hold that ORS 90.427 (regarding termi- nation without cause) does not contain such a requirement. It follows that the notice given to tenants under ORS 90.427 was valid, as the trial court ruled. And, given that the ORS 90.427 notice was valid, we need not address the alternative notice given under ORS 90.392 (regarding termination for Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 615 cause), as both notices would have to be invalid for tenants to be entitled to judgment on the pleadings. Accordingly, we affirm. In doing so, we emphasize that policy decisions are for the legislature. The dissent argues that it is a small thing to “date” a termination notice and that reading such a requirement into the statute would serve important pol- icy goals. But accurately representing the date and method of service requires more than simply writing a date on the notice. And there are very real downsides to appellate courts reading “implied” procedural requirements into highly detailed statutory schemes intended for use by nonlawyers. It also bears noting that tenants were found at trial to have received timely notice—it is difficult to see how they were denied access to justice by having the case decided on the evidence instead of the pleadings. See 354 Or App at 628- 29 (Tookey, J., dissenting) (describing this case as “impli- cati[ng] an important access to justice issue”). Ultimately, we decline to get into a policy debate on the matter, however, because our role is limited to construing the statute as writ- ten by the legislature. The legislature did not include the requirement for which tenants advocate, which is the end of the analysis. We affirm. FACTS The relevant facts are undisputed. Landlord sublet to tenants a room in a house that she herself rented from its owner. In April 2024, landlord mailed two separate notices of termination to tenants, one terminating without cause under ORS 90.427 and the other terminating for nonpayment of rent under ORS 90.392. The without-cause notice indicated that landlord was terminating the tenancy “with 30 days’ notice,” plus “a 3-day extension required for mailing,” and that the tenancy would terminate “on May 29, 2024.” The nonpayment-of-rent notice stated that the monthly rent was $1,200, that tenants had failed to pay the rent within seven days of its due date of April 1, 2024, that landlord would ter- minate the rental agreement if the rent “is not paid within 30 days,” and that “[t]he rent must be paid by 11:59 P.M. on May 29, 2024 (date must be at least 33 days after date of mailing; includes a 3-day extension required for mailing).” 616 Ressler v. Grimes In June 2024, landlord filed this FED action to evict tenants and thus regain possession of the subletted room. The complaint was in substantially the form required by ORS 105.124. See ORS 105.124(1) (providing that, when the ORLTA applies, an FED complaint “must be in substantially the [specified] form”). Landlord alleged that defendants “entered upon the premises with force or are unlawfully holding with force” and that she was entitled to possession of the premises based on both the termination without cause and the termination with cause (nonpayment). Landlord attached both termination notices to the complaint. See ORS 105.124(3) (“A copy of the notice relied upon, if any, must be attached to the complaint.”). Tenants initially did not appear and were at risk of being defaulted, but the matter was ultimately set for trial. At the beginning of trial, tenants moved for judgment on the pleadings under ORCP 21 B. They asked that the FED action be dismissed “because the pleadings on their face demonstrate that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for possession.” Tenants argued that the ORLTA requires a written notice of termination to include on the face of the notice the date that it was mailed or otherwise served on the other party. Absent such a statement, tenants argued, the notice is legally invalid, requiring dismissal of the FED action, regardless of whether the statutorily required amount of notice was given. The FED court disagreed that the ORLTA imposes such a requirement. It denied tenants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings and proceeded to trial. After hearing the evidence, the court entered judgment in favor of landlord. Tenants appeal, raising three assignments of error. They claim that the FED court erred by (1) denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings under ORCP 21 B; (2) entering the general judgment; and (3) “ruling that ORCP 21 B allows the court to consider extrinsic evidence outside the face of the pleadings to supplement an otherwise facially defective pleading.” The first assignment of error properly challenges the denial of the ORCP 21 B motion, and we address it first. We do not address the second assignment of error, which is not properly its own assignment of error but Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 617 instead appears to be intended as an alternative statement of the first assignment of error. See generally ORAP 5.45 (regarding assignments of error). As for the third assign- ment of error, it is largely derivative of the first assignment of error, but we address it separately as it does raise a slightly distinct issue, even though defendant has presented a com- bined argument on all three assignments of error, which is to be done only when they raise “essentially the same legal question.” ORAP 5.45(6). DENIAL OF JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS We begin with tenants’ claim that the FED court erred in denying their motion for judgment on the pleadings under ORCP 21 B. Because tenants’ argument is inextrica- bly tied to the notice requirements in the ORLTA, we first provide a brief overview of the law, before turning to the specifics of tenants’ motion. The ORLTA “governs the rights and obligations of landlords and tenants of residential properties in Oregon.” Jackson v. KA-3 Associates, LLC, 374 Or 1, 7, 573 P3d 396 (2025). It “imposes general and specific obligations on both landlords and tenants * * *.” Jared v. Harmon, 374 Or 381, 389, 578 P3d 655 (2025). Oregon courts take those obliga- tions seriously, including demanding strict compliance with the requirements to terminate a tenancy. See Hickey v. Scott, 370 Or 97, 110, 515 P3d 368 (2022) (recognizing “the impor- tance of strict adherence to the statutory requirements for a notice of termination”). The ORLTA generally requires both landlords and tenants to give written notice to terminate a tenancy and contains different notice provisions for different fact scenar- ios. At issue in this case are two specific termination stat- utes within the ORLTA. First, ORS 90.427 governs termi- nation without cause and requires a landlord or tenant to give at least 10, 30, 60, or 90 days’ written notice of termina- tion, depending on the circumstances and type of tenancy. Second, ORS 90.392 governs termination for cause based on nonpayment of rent and other material violations and requires the landlord to give a written notice that specifies the violation, allows the tenant at least 14 days to cure, and 618 Ressler v. Grimes notifies the tenant that the rental agreement will otherwise terminate on a designated date not less than 30 days after delivery of the notice. Like most written notices under the ORLTA, a notice of termination may be “executed” by one or more of four methods: (1) personal delivery to the landlord or tenant; (2) first-class mail to the landlord or tenant; (3) both first-class mail and attachment to a designated location, if allowed under a written rental agreement and subject to certain requirements; and (4) electronic mail, if allowed under a written addendum to the rental agreement that meets certain requirements. ORS 90.155(1). If a notice of termination is sent by first-class mail, then, to allow for mailing time, the landlord or tenant must set the termination date and any cure deadline three days further out than would otherwise be statutorily required: “If a notice is served by mail under subsection (1)(b) of this section, the minimum period for compliance or termination of tenancy, as appropriate, shall be extended by three days, and the notice shall include the extension in the period provided.” ORS 90.155(2). Thus, for example, a landlord or tenant required to give 30 days’ notice of termination with- out cause under ORS 90.427 must set the termination date at least 33 days out if notice is given by first-class mail. Or, a landlord required to give 30 days’ notice of termination for cause under ORS 90.392, with 14 days to cure, must set the termination date at least 33 days out, and the cure deadline at least 17 days out, if notice is given by first-class mail. Once the time period provided in the termination notice has expired, if the tenant remains in possession of the property, the landlord may file an FED action. ORS 105.115(2) (a)(B). FED actions are a legal means to regain possession of premises from someone who entered or is holding the prem- ises “by force.” ORS 105.110 (“When a forcible entry is made upon any premises, or when an entry is made in a peaceable manner and possession is held by force, the person entitled to the premises may maintain in the county where the property is situated an action to recover the possession of the premises in the circuit court or before any justice of the peace of the county.”). In the case of a dwelling unit subject to the ORLTA, Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 619 a person holds “by force” by “fail[ing] or refus[ing] to pay rent within the time period required by a notice under ORS 90.392 or 90.394”; by retaining possession after the rental agreement has expired and not been renewed; by retaining possession “after a valid notice terminating the tenancy pur- suant to ORS chapter 90”; or by holding “contrary to any valid condition or covenant of the rental agreement or ORS chapter 90.” ORS 105.115(2)(a)(A) - (B). The FED complaint must be in substantially the form provided in ORS 105.124. In the resulting FED action, “ORS chapter 90 shall be applied to determine the rights of the parties, including * * * [w]hether a tenancy or rental agreement has been val- idly terminated[.]” ORS 105.115(3)(b). The action is subject to dismissal if the notice of termination does not comply with the statutory notice requirements. See Hickey, 370 Or at 112 (“[A]n FED action based on an invalid termination notice is subject to dismissal, i.e., the claim itself is invalid.”); C.O. Homes, LLC v. Cleveland, 366 Or 207, 218-19, 460 P3d 494 (2020) (similar). The action is also subject to dismissal if the notice was not served by a means authorized in ORS 105.155. See ORS 105.120(3) (“An action for the recovery of the possession of a dwelling unit to which ORS chapter 90 applies may be maintained in situations described in ORS 105.115(2) when the notice to terminate the tenancy or to quit has been served by the tenant upon the landlord or by the landlord upon the tenant or person in possession in the manner prescribed by ORS 90.155.”). We now turn to the specifics of this case. Before trial, tenants moved for judgment on the pleadings, assert- ing that the notices attached to the complaint were facially invalid, such that landlord could not prevail in the action. A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought by any party “[a]fter the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial.” ORCP 21 B. In ruling on the motion, the court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and liberally construe them in the plain- tiff’s favor, and it cannot go outside the pleadings. Kramer v. Conatser, 341 Or App 568, 570-71, 576 P3d 507 (2025). The motion “should be granted only when the pleadings, taken together, affirmatively show that plaintiff has no cause of 620 Ressler v. Grimes action against the defendant or when defendant affirma- tively alleges a complete defense which is admitted or not denied by a reply.” Id. at 570 (internal quotation marks omit- ted). “The strict requirements for granting motions on the pleadings reflect their disfavor.” Id.; Thompson v. Telephone Data Systems, Inc., 130 Or App 302, 309, 881 P2d 819, adh’d to as modified on recons, 132 Or App 103, 888 P2d 16 (1994) (“Motions for judgment on the pleadings are not generally well-regarded by the courts, because hasty or imprudent use of the procedure can conflict with the policy of ensur- ing litigants a full and fair opportunity to try their claim or defense.”). We review the grant or denial of an ORCP 21 B motion for legal error. Kramer, 341 Or App at571. The crux of tenants’ argument (both below and on appeal) is that, because the ORLTA dictates the minimum amount of notice required to terminate a tenancy, it logically follows that the method and date of service must be stated on the face of the notice, so that the recipient can determine from the notice itself, without needing to consider any other knowledge or information, whether the notice period was properly calculated. In tenants’ view, regardless of whether the legally required amount of notice is given, if the number of days cannot be mathematically checked using the infor- mation on the face of the notice, then the notice is legally invalid, does not terminate the tenancy, and cannot support an FED action. Tenants thus essentially read a certificate of service requirement into the ORLTA. They argue that such a requirement is logically necessary, both for notice recipi- ents and for FED courts, who will be unable to decide mat- ters on the pleadings without such information. Tenants’ argument presents a question of statu- tory construction and, as such, must necessarily be tied to specific statutory language. Although tenants seem to posit a requirement for ORLTA notices generally, they have not identified any generally applicable requirement that any notice given under the ORLTA include a certificate of ser- vice or unsworn statement regarding the date and method of service, nor have we found any such generally applica- ble requirement in the ORLTA. We therefore necessarily look to the specific statutes under which notice was given Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 621 in this case—ORS 90.427, regarding termination without cause, and ORS 90.392, regarding termination for cause— to determine if either contains such a requirement for that specific type of notice. Here, as explained below, we conclude that ORS 90.427 does not contain such a requirement. That conclusion makes it unnecessary to address ORS 90.392, as the two termination notices were given in the alternative, so both notices would have to be facially invalid for tenants to have been entitled to judgment on the pleadings.1 The correct meaning of a statute is a question of law. State v. Ramoz, 367 Or 670, 704, 483 P3d 615 (2021). In construing a statute, our “paramount goal” is to discern the enacting legislature’s intent. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). We follow a three-step methodol- ogy to do so. Id. at 171-72. First, we examine the disputed text in context, which “must be given primary weight in the analysis” because “[o]nly the text of a statute receives the consider- ation and approval of a majority of the members of the leg- islature, as required to have the effect of law.” Id. at 171. In construing text, unless a word or phrase has a specialized meaning, we typically give “words of common usage” their “plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.” PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). Second, we consider any pertinent legislative history that the parties have identified or that we have found.2 Gaines, 346 Or at 172, 177-78. “Legislative history may be used to confirm seemingly plain meaning and even to illuminate it” or to show that “superficially clear language actually is not 1 We express no opinion as to the proper construction of ORS 90.392 or any other ORLTA notice provision other than ORS 90.427. The dissent criticizes us for not construing ORS 90.392, see 354 Or App 628-29 (Tookey, J., dissenting) (slip op at 1), but it is a common practice of this court not to decide issues unnec- essarily. Given that we have already construed ORS 90.427 and have no need to construe ORS 90.392, we decline to do so. 2 Under Gaines, neither the parties nor the court is “obligated” to do legisla- tive history research. 346 Or at 166. If parties are aware of pertinent legislative history, however, we expect them to bring it to our attention. Moreover, although Gaines allows us to limit our consideration of legislative history to that provided by the parties, id., we have an independent obligation to construe statutes cor- rectly, State v. Wimmer, 325 Or App 372, 376 n 1, 529 P3d 307, rev den, 371 Or 509 (2023), which may sometimes lead us to research legislative history even when the parties have not provided any. 622 Ressler v. Grimes so plain at all—that is, that there is a kind of latent ambigu- ity in the statute.” Id. at 172. But “[w]hen the text of a statute is truly capable of having only one meaning, no weight can be given to legislative history that suggests—or even con- firms—that legislators intended something different.” Id. at 173; see also Halperin v. Pitts, 352 Or 482, 495, 287 P3d 1069 (2012) (“Legislative history may be used to identify or resolve ambiguity in legislation, not to rewrite it.”). Finally, if the legislative intent “remains unclear after examining text, context, and legislative history,” then we may “resort to gen- eral maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving the remaining uncertainty.” Gaines, 346 Or at 172. In this instance, following that methodology leads us to reject tenants’ argument that ORS 90.427 requires a notice of termination to state on its face the method and date of service. This case involves a month-to-month tenancy ter- minated by the landlord in the first year. As to that situa- tion, ORS 90.427(3)(b) provides: “If a tenancy is a month-to-month tenancy[,] * * * [a]t any time during the first year of occupancy, the landlord may terminate the tenancy by giving the tenant notice in writ- ing not less than 30 days prior to the date designated in the notice for the termination of the tenancy.” (Emphasis added.) The plain text thus provides that, to validly ter- minate such a tenancy, the written notice must state the termination date set by the landlord (“the date designated in the notice for the termination of tenancy”), and the land- lord must serve that written notice on the tenant (“giv[e] the tenant notice in writing”) at least 30 days prior to the designated termination date (“not less than 30 days prior to the date designated in the notice for the termination of the tenancy”).3 Nothing in the text of ORS 90.427(3)(b) can be 3 If the notice is served by first-class mail, the 30-day notice requirement in ORS 90.427(3)(b) is extended to 33 days by operation of ORS 90.155. That is, the notice must be mailed at least 33 days before the designated termination date. See ORS 90.155(2) (“If a notice is served by mail under subsection (1)(b) of this section, the minimum period for compliance or termination of tenancy, as appro- priate, shall be extended by three days, and the notice shall include the extension in the period provided.”). Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 623 read to impose a requirement that the person giving notice include in the notice a statement regarding the method and date of service used. The text of ORS 90.427 is clear and direct as to what is required in the notice, and it simply does not say that. Tenants have not identified, nor have we found, anything in the statutory context that supports their argu- ment. And the legislative history, which is discussed in the dissent, contains nothing of note, and certainly nothing that reveals a latent ambiguity in the text of ORS 90.427. The text is therefore dispositive. Tenants’ argument is really a policy argument, rather than a textual argument. In tenants’ view, requir- ing a notice of termination to include a representation as to how and when the notice was served would make it eas- ier for recipients to determine whether they were given the statutorily required amount of notice and would facilitate dismissing more actions on the pleadings without needing a trial. The problem for tenants is that it is the legislature’s job to make policy, not ours. “In the construction of a stat- ute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted[.]” ORS 174.010. Thus, even if we agreed with ten- ants about the merits of imposing something akin to a cer- tificate-of-service requirement, it would not follow that we could or would construe ORS 90.427 to contain one. We can only enforce the statute as written, and reading “implied” requirements into a highly detailed statutory scheme is a risky endeavor. Not only does it risk contravening the leg- islative intent, but it risks creating a situation in which landlords and tenants would be unable to rely on the plain language of the ORLTA. See Testimony, Senate Committee on Rules, HB 2524A, June 1, 2005, Ex H (statement of John VanLandingham) (one goal of the significant 2005 revisions to the ORLTA was to make “landlord-tenant law clear to non-attorney landlords and tenants, who typically have access to the ORLTA statutes but not to case law”); Audio Recording, Senate Committee on Consumer Protection and 624 Ressler v. Grimes Public Affairs, SB 771, Mar 19, 2009, at 00:09:50 (comments of John VanLandingham), https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov (accessed Feb 19, 2026) (envisioning the ORLTA “as a guide” for “lay people”). The dissent endorses tenants’ “implied requirement” approach, reasoning that tenants cannot know whether they received enough notice unless the notice states on its face the method and date of service (which then can be used to run a calculation against the termination date), so the leg- islature must have intended to impose such a requirement, even if it failed to say so in the statute. 354 Or App at 637-38 (Tookey, J., dissenting). We disagree with that approach. Even if there were a statutory gap, it would not be ours to fill. See State v. Garcia-Cisneros, 285 Or App 252, 258-59, 397 P3d 49, rev den, 361 Or 886 (2017) (stat- ing, in context of rejecting an argument to read an implied requirement into a statute: “The state may be right in iden- tifying a statutory gap, but it is not our role to fill that gap for the legislature. We are required to interpret the stat- ute based on the words that the legislature used.”); see also North Marion School Dist. v. Acstar, 343 Or 305, 325, 169 P3d 1224 (2007) (“This court has no license to imply differ- ent or further rights and liabilities where the legislature has fashioned them expressly.” (Emphasis omitted.)). And it is not clear that a statutory gap even exists. Each service method authorized for written notices under the ORLTA— personal delivery, first-class mail, first-class mail and attachment, and email—has a built-in way to determine the date of service: • If a notice is personally delivered, ORS 90.155(1)(a), the person to whom it is personally delivered necessarily knows the service date. • If a notice is sent by first-class mail, ORS 90.155(1)(b), there will be a postmark on the envelope. The leg- islature has relied on first-class mail postmarks to establish the date of mailing in other statutes. E.g., ORS 19.260(1)(b)(B) (providing that notices of appeal may be mailed, that the date of filing is the “date of mailing,” and that “[i]f the notice is mailed via the United States Postal Service first class mail, the date Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 625 shown on the postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service constitutes sufficient proof of mailing or dispatch”). • If a notice is sent by first-class mail and attached at a designated location, ORS 90.155(1)(c), there will be a postmark on the envelope of the mailed copy, and the other copy must be securely attached “to the main entrance to that portion of the premises of which the tenant has possession,” if it is notice to a tenant, ORS 90.155(1)(c)(A), or “to the landlord’s designated location, which shall be described with particularity in the writ- ten rental agreement, reasonably located in relation to the tenant and available at all hours,” if it is notice to a landlord, ORS 90.155(1)(c)(B), thus ensuring that it will be promptly seen. • If a notice is sent by electronic mail, ORS 90.155(1)(d), the software program will generally add an electronic date and time stamp. There may be room to debate whether it would be “better” as a policy matter to require the notice of termi- nation to include an express statement as to when and how it was served, rather than relying on the foregoing built-in means of ensuring that enough notice was given. Adding a new statutory requirement would have pros and cons, just as the existing approach has pros and cons. But it is cer- tainly not necessary to read such a requirement into ORS 90.427 for the statute to function. The ORLTA has been in place for decades without the legislature deeming such a requirement necessary. Tenants’ arguments to add such a requirement should be directed to the legislature rather than the courts.4 As for tenants’ argument that trial courts will be unable to decide matters on the pleadings if notices do not include a statement on their face of the service method and 4 The dissent notes that landlord used commercially available Stevens- Ness forms for her termination notices, which included an option to check a box whether the notice was “mailed only,” “posted on the property and mailed,” or “personally delivered to tenant” and to write in the date and time. 354 Or App at 631-32 & n 2 (Tookey, J., dissenting). That an unknown commercial form author included an option to record service information if desired does not shed any light whatsoever on the statutory requirements for ORLTA notices. Nor does it tell us anything about common practices, as we have seen a single form in a single case, in which that line was left blank. 626 Ressler v. Grimes date, that is not a compelling argument, particularly when such motions are disfavored in any event. Kramer, 341 Or App at 570. The date that something was personally deliv- ered, mailed, attached, or emailed is ultimately a question of fact. Nothing in the ORLTA suggests that the legislature intended for every possible dispute regarding notice valid- ity to be resolved through an ORCP 21 B motion for judg- ment on the pleadings, versus some needing to be resolved through the normal process of factfinding. Here, after the motion was denied, landlord put on uncontested evidence at trial as to the amount of notice given, and the FED action was ultimately decided on the merits. Finally, we note that, before oral argument, ten- ants filed a memorandum of additional authorities regard- ing Johnson Mobile Park, Inc. v. Schoffstall, 341 Or App 264, 571 P3d 230, rev den, 374 Or 379 (2025), a case in which we held that a notice of termination under ORS 90.632 based on the condition of a manufactured home was invalid due to an ambiguity in the stated termination date. That case is not of assistance to tenants. The notice in that case was required to state the termination date and failed to do so clearly, instead stating it in an ambiguous way that failed to “provide precise and accurate information” as to when the tenancy would terminate. Id. at 268. By contrast, ORS 90.427 contains no requirement to state the method and date of service in the notice itself, so it can hardly be said that landlord failed to precisely and accurately comply with that requirement. If anything, Johnson Mobile Park, Inc. underscores how strictly we enforce statutory require- ments—and why we should not read in requirements that the legislature has not chosen to impose and then enforce them against parties who would not know they exist from reading the statute. The FED court did not err in denying tenants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. PROCEEDING TO TRIAL In their third assignment of error, tenants argue that the FED court “also legally erred by allowing Landlord to offer evidence to cure two termination notices that were Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 627 insufficient on their face to state a claim for possession, after denying Tenants’ ORCP 21 B motion.” Tenants view it as incongruous that the FED court agreed with tenants that landlord was not entitled to a default judgment but agreed with landlord that tenants were not entitled to judgment on the pleadings. Tenants describe the trial that occurred after the denial of the ORCP 21 B motion as the FED court allowing landlord to offer “extrinsic evidence” as to when the notices were mailed and to “supplement[ ] the notices with testimony at trial,” and they suggest that proceeding to trial somehow violated the prohibition on going outside the plead- ings to decide an ORCP 21 B motion, even though the court had already denied the ORCP 21 B motion. We note that tenants have presented a combined argument on all three assignments of error, indicating that they view them all as involving the same legal issue. See ORAP 5.45(6) (allowing the argument on different assignments of error to be com- bined “[i]f several assignments of error present essentially the same legal question”). Tenants’ third assignment of error is largely deriv- ative of their first, insofar as it is premised on the ORLTA requiring all notices, including termination notices under ORS 90.427, to state on their face the method and date of service. If such a requirement existed, then tenants would be correct that the case should have been resolved on the pleadings, without going to trial. Such a requirement does not exist, however, as explained in the last section. It was therefore proper to proceed to trial. In doing so, the FED court did not improperly go outside the pleadings. To the con- trary, by definition, trial is an exercise in going outside the pleadings to find the actual facts. The FED court did not decide on the pleadings that landlord gave tenants the statu- torily required amount of notice; rather, in denying tenants’ motion, it concluded only that the written notice contained the statutorily required information and that any remaining dispute regarding the adequacy of notice could be litigated at trial. There was no error in proceeding to trial and taking evidence on all pertinent issues, including notice issues. As part of their third assignment of error, tenants suggest that, even if the notices attached to the complaint 628 Ressler v. Grimes were statutorily valid, the complaint itself was deficient due to not containing an allegation regarding the service date. Tenants have not developed any legal argument on that issue, however, and it is not our role to “make or develop a party’s argument.” Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 700 n 2, 64 P3d 1193, adh’d to as clarified on recons, 187 Or App 472, 68 P3d 259 (2003). Although tenants describe the complaint as “facially deficient” and work that point into their third assignment of error, they have not developed any actual argument regard- ing the requirements for an FED complaint, including, notably, the requirement in ORS 105.124 that “[t]he com- plaint must be in substantially the [form specified in ORS 105.124] and be available from the clerk of the court.” Any issue regarding the sufficiency of the allegations in the com- plaint, independent of the validity of the attached notices, is therefore not properly before us on appeal.5 Affirmed. TOOKEY, J., dissenting. The statutory construction question presented in this case implicates an important access to justice issue in that it involves the ability of residential tenants who are being evicted by a landlord to enforce their right to timely notice under the Oregon Residential Landlord Tenant Act (ORLTA). The majority of the court in this case “hold[s] that ORS 90.427 (regarding termination without cause) does not” require that a notice terminating a tenancy “contain an unsworn statement as to when and how it was served.” 354 Or App at 614-15. Thus, the majority concludes that landlords need not date notices terminating residential ten- ancies without cause under ORS 90.427. Further, and as a result of that conclusion, the majority does not address whether notices terminating a residential tenancy for cause under ORS 90.392 must be dated, instead expressing “no opinion as to the proper construction” of ORS 90.392. 354 Or 5 The dissent takes no position on whether the complaint is “facially defi- cient” for not including an allegation regarding the service date, but it takes the view that the issue is properly before us and should be decided. 354 Or App at 630 (Tookey, J., dissenting). We disagree. Cite as 354 Or App 612 (2026) 629 App at 621 n 1. As I understand the majority, it leaves open the possibility that the legislature intended the incongruous result that some eviction notices must be dated (i.e., those issued under ORS 90.392) but not others (i.e., those issued under ORS 90.427). After reviewing the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 90.427 and ORS 90.392, I disagree with the majority’s analysis. I would conclude that the trial court erred when it denied tenants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings under ORCP 21 B. I would do so because I would conclude that, to be valid, the written notices terminating a residen- tial tenancy required by ORS 90.392(1) and ORS 90.427(3)(b) must include the date that they were mailed to or delivered to the tenant. That is, I would conclude that notices terminat- ing residential tenancies under those statutes must be dated to be valid. That conclusion is rooted in consideration of the text, context, and legislative history of ORS 90.392 and ORS 90.427, as required by State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009), rather than, as the majority suggests, a policy preference. 354 Or App at 614-15. Particularly in view of the potential for an incon- gruous result left open by the majority opinion, I encourage the legislature to amend ORS 90.392 and ORS 90.427 to clarify what is required by those statutes and whether it is actually the case, as the majority concludes, that it does not intend landlords to be required to date notices terminating residential tenancies without cause. Before turning to the statutory construction ques- tion, however, I pause to point out that the complaint filed by landlord in this matter, like the notices themselves, also did not provide the date that the notices were mailed or deliv- ered to tenants. Thus, in my view, landlord’s complaint may have failed to state a claim for possession, because it failed to sufficiently allege, even when considered in conjunction with the notices, that the notices were mailed at least 33 days before the termination date provided in the notices. Hickey v. Scott, 370 Or 97, 110, 515 P3d 368 (2022) (“As we see it, there are two requirements that a landlord must establish to succeed on a claim for possession: (1) the landlord must have delivered a valid termination notice that complied with 630 Ressler v. Grimes the statutory requirements; and (2) the tenant then must have remained in possession of the premises after the expi- ration date specif