L. B. v. Pierce
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA187275
JudgeShorr
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
218 November 18, 2026 No. 1139
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
L. B.,
aka L. L. H., aka L. V., aka L. L. C., aka L. H., aka L. P.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
KIP PIERCE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Clackamas County Circuit Court
CV12020690; A187275
Thanh H. Tran, Judge.
Argued and submitted April 8, 2026.
Kip Pierce argued the cause and filed the brief pro se.
No appearance for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
Vacated in part; affirmed in part; remanded for further
proceedings.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 218 (2026) 219
SHORR, P. J.
Respondent, representing himself, appeals from
an April 2025 order that denied his motion to set aside,
vacate, or terminate a 2012 stalking protective order (SPO).1
Petitioner does not appear. Respondent seemingly raises six
assignments of error. We agree that the trial court erred in
one respect and that the error was not harmless. For the
reasons discussed below, we vacate the order to the extent
that it denied respondent’s motion to terminate the SPO but
affirm the aspects of the order that denied the request to set
aside or vacate the SPO based on what happened at the 2012
SPO hearing.2 We remand for further proceedings.
We do not recite all of the facts in this nonpreceden-
tial memorandum.3 The parties are aware of the facts and
providing a full recitation would not benefit the bench, the
bar, or the public. The key facts are procedural. Petitioner
obtained the SPO against respondent in 2012 after respon-
dent failed to appear at the hearing. Over the years, respon-
dent has repeatedly moved to set aside that SPO. Those
attempts have been consistently denied by the trial court.
Indeed, in 2023 alone, respondent moved at least five times
to set aside or vacate the 2012 SPO and sought reconsider-
ation once. On at least three of those occasions, respondent
filed a motion that was identical in all material respects and
is, in fact, a nearly verbatim copy of the motion that he filed
that led to the appeal that is before us. The five motions filed
in 2023 were all denied. The motions filed then—and the
one that lead to this appeal—have generally attacked what
happened at the 2012 hearing. Respondent has contended,
among other things, that there was no evidence presented
at the 2012 hearing; that respondent either had not been
properly served or he was informed by the court prior to the
1
In civil stalking cases we refer to the parties by their designation in the
trial court and not those on appeal. See J. D. K. v. W. T. F., 276 Or App 533, 534
n 1, 369 P3d 1181 (2016).
2
To be clear, our decision to vacate part of the order denying respondent’s
motion does not change the continued validity of the 2012 SPO. Rather, it pro-
vides the opportunity on remand for respondent to renew his arguments seeking
to terminate that order.
3
Respondent requests de novo review. This is not an exceptional case that
justifies such review. ORAP 5.40(8)(c).
220 L. B. v. Pierce
hearing that he did not have to appear; or that the court
had indicated it might set aside the SPO. As noted, the trial
courts have repeatedly rejected those rehashed arguments.
And, as noted, respondent repeated those arguments nearly
verbatim in the motion that the trial court denied, which is
now on appeal before us.
In denying the motion, the trial court recited the
many times that respondent’s motion had been rejected by
prior trial courts and further listed instances where we
either previously affirmed those decisions or dismissed the
appeal. The court noted that it would not reconsider those
rulings. After the trial court orally denied the motion,
respondent pointed out that he had alternatively argued
in his motion that the court could also terminate the SPO
based on A. M. E. v. J. B., 203 Or App 271, 124 P3d 1256
(2005). Respondent noted that there had not been any con-
tact with petitioner for several years, arguing that the SPO
was no longer needed and should be terminated based on
A. M. E. The trial court denied that request, stating that
it understood the argument but would not terminate the
SPO. Respondent continued to object, pointing again to the
court’s authority to terminate the SPO, and then stated, “[s]o
I’m stuck with a permanent stalking order, basically, * * *
for the rest of my life, is that what the Court is suggesting?”
The court responded, “[c]orrect.”
As noted, respondent appears to raise six assign-
ments of error.4 In his first assignment, he contends that
the trial court erred in concluding that the 2012 SPO was
“permanent” and could not be terminated. We agree that
the trial court so erred. We have concluded that “[o]nce an
SPO has been entered, it may later be terminated if, on
respondent’s motion, the court finds that the criteria for
issuing the order under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B) [the SPO stat-
ute] are no longer present.” J. A. S. v. Morris, 231 Or App
26, 29, 217 P3d 1080 (2009) (citing A. M. E., 203 Or App at
4
Respondent lists different numbers of assignments of error in separate
parts of the brief, making identifying the precise number difficult. Those assign-
ments within the brief also differ in some respects. We have provided our own
numbering to each assignment that mirrors respondent’s list when possible.
Nevertheless, we have addressed each of the developed arguments that we under-
stand to contend that the trial court erred.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 218 (2026) 221
277 (stating same)); see also J. S. E. v. Cubic, 305 Or App
826, 829-30, 473 P3d 117 (2020) (stating that the issue on
a motion to terminate an SPO is whether, “in view of all of
the circumstances,” the criteria for issuing the order are no
longer present and not whether the original order was prop-
erly issued or a new SPO could be issued). Faced with such a
motion, a trial court should focus primarily on whether the
petitioner continues to suffer reasonable apprehension as to
their safety due to the past acts of the respondent. J. A. S.,
231 Or App at 29. Respondent raised that authority to the
trial court and argued that there was a basis for termi-
nation due to the lack of contact over the years. The court
responded that it would not terminate the SPO and then
incorrectly agreed with respondent’s statement that he was
stuck with a permanent SPO “for the rest of [his] life.” That
was error.
We will affirm despite an error if it was harmless,
meaning the error had little likelihood of affecting the
result. State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77 P3d 1111 (2003).
That presents a slightly closer question. As the trial court
recognized, respondent, for the most part, was simply
repeating arguments relating to the original SPO and the
evidence and proceedings back in 2012, arguments that had
been rejected numerous times by earlier courts. Respondent
did not present much evidence of what had changed since
that time that would allow for termination of the SPO under
A. M. E., or why petitioner would no longer have a reason-
able apprehension as to their safety. Nevertheless, there was
at least some evidence of the changed circumstances since
2012, and we cannot say that the error was harmless. The
court had indicated at the outset that it would not consider
any new evidence, which is inconsistent with a respondent’s
right to seek termination based on evidence that the con-
ditions for the issuance of the SPO are no longer present.
Despite that, respondent attempted to introduce new evi-
dence. Respondent attempted to argue and present evidence
that there had not been contact with petitioner in years.
Further, there was evidence that respondent now lives in
California. The trial court did not consider that evidence
and incorrectly concluded as a matter of law that it could
not terminate the SPO, and that respondent was “stuck
222 L. B. v. Pierce
with a permanent stalking order” for life. That error was
not harmless. On remand, the court can consider whether
respondent can meet his burden to establish by evidence the
test set forth in A. M. E. and applied in the case law cited
above, namely, whether the conditions for the issuance of
the SPO are no longer present.
The trial court perhaps moved too quickly at the
hearing when it moved past respondent’s objection and
agreed that respondent was stuck with the SPO. We appreci-
ate that respondent’s repeated motions over the years, which
are nearly verbatim refilings, may have played a role in that
speedy conclusion. Indeed, respondent’s conduct in simply
repeatedly refiling the same motion raising identical argu-
ments that have been consistently rejected raises questions
about whether respondent’s litigation conduct has been vexa-
tious in at least that respect. However, respondent also raised
a potentially legitimate basis for terminating the SPO and
highlighted that issue for the court at oral argument. That is
more than he had to do to preserve the issue, and the court
summarily rejected that argument based on a mischaracter-
ization of the law. The trial court on remand now has the
opportunity to reconsider respondent’s motion that seeks ter-
mination of the SPO and to consider new evidence since 2012.
We briefly address respondent’s remaining assign-
ments of error. In his second assignment of error, respondent
argues that the trial court erred in not issuing an order that
had findings of fact and conclusions of law following respon-
dent’s request under ORCP 62 A for such findings and con-
clusions. That rule requires that the trial court issue find-
ings and conclusions when requested by a party appearing
in a “civil action tried by the court.” We agree that this is
a civil action, but respondent has not adequately developed
any argument explaining why a hearing on a motion to set
aside or terminate an SPO is a “trial.” See A. L. T. v. O’Dell,
352 Or App 112, 121, ___ P3d ___ (2026) (concluding that it
was at least “not obvious” that an SPO hearing is a trial by
the court). We do not reach that issue here as the argument
is undeveloped.
In respondent’s third and fourth assignments of
error, respondent claims that the trial court did not properly
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 218 (2026) 223
weigh the evidence and failed to consider the proper evi-
dence. In his fifth and sixth assignments of error, respon-
dent contends that the 2012 SPO court did not have juris-
diction over him and the resulting SPO was void. With one
exception noted below, most of those arguments are directed
at issues arising at the 2012 SPO hearing and are collat-
eral attacks on that hearing that have been repeatedly
rejected before. Having considered those arguments, we do
not see any error in the trial court’s decision to the extent
that respondent simply refiled identical arguments that the
trial court had rejected in the past. As explained in connec-
tion with respondent’s first assignment of error, however, we
agree that the trial court erred in not considering new evi-
dence of changes since the 2012 SPO insofar as it related to
respondent’s request to terminate that SPO.
In sum, we vacate the order to the extent that it
denied respondent’s motion to terminate the SPO but affirm
those parts of the order that denied the request to set aside
or vacate the SPO based on what happened at the 2012 hear-
ing. We remand for further proceedings, limited to whether
the criteria for the SPO are no longer present under the test
set forth in A. M. E.
Vacated in part; affirmed in part; remanded for fur-
ther proceedings.