Dept. of Human Services v. J. T. P.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledJuly 15, 2026
DocketA189461
JudgeTookey
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 664 July 15, 2026 469
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of A. P.,
a Child.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
J. T. P.,
Appellant.
Baker County Circuit Court
24JU04376; A189461
Matthew B. Shirtcliff, Judge.
Submitted May 21, 2026.
Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief
for appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor
General, and Ariel Ashtamker, Assistant Attorney General,
filed the brief for respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot,
Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Vacated and remanded.
470 Dept. of Human Services v. J. T. P.
TOOKEY, P. J.
In this juvenile dependency case, father appeals
the judgment in which the juvenile court changed the
permanency plan for his then-four-year-old child A from
reunification to adoption. Father assigns error to the court
(1) “conducting the permanency hearing without having ear-
lier provided both parents * * * a separate pre-hearing notice
of the date, time, and place of the hearing”; (2) “denying par-
ents’ motion for a continuance and proceeding in mother’s
and father’s absence thereby depriving them of their right to
participate”; and (3) “changing [A’s] permanency plan from
reunification to adoption.” As set out below, we conclude
that the juvenile court erroneously determined that father
received notice of the permanency hearing as required by
ORS 419B.473 and, therefore, erred in denying father’s
motion for a continuance, proceeding with the permanency
hearing in his absence, and changing A’s permanency plan.
We therefore vacate the permanency judgment and remand
for further proceedings.
We review the denial of a motion for a continuance
for abuse of discretion. Dept. of Human Services v. E. M., 268
Or App 332, 335, 341 P3d 216 (2014). “Where, as here, the
exercise of discretion turns on a predicate question of law,
we review the legal question for legal error.” Dept. of Human
Services v. E. L. P., 336 Or App 751, 756, 562 P3d 303 (2024).
The relevant facts are procedural. The juvenile
court asserted jurisdiction over A in December 2024. The
jurisdiction judgment states that “[a]ll parties present were
notified of these court dates and are ordered to appear” and
lists a “Permanency hearing” on “12/2/2025” at “8:30 a.m.”
A year later, on December 2, 2025, the juvenile
court held the permanency hearing, and father and mother
were not present for the hearing. Father’s counsel noted that
he had “been in contact with [father]” and that he was “not
sure if [father] * * * was actually fully provided the date,
time, and means and methods of appearance.” Counsel then
asked the court for a continuance.1 Counsel for petitioner, the
Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS), responded
1
Mother’s counsel also asked for a continuance.
Cite as 351 Or App 469 (2026) 471
that, “statutorily, the notices should go to the parents’ last
addresses, as well as counsels’ obligation to notify their cli-
ents,” but noted, “however, in this particular case, Father
was present in the courtroom for disposition when today’s
date and time at 8:30 was given on the record.” ODHS did
not offer copies of any written notices of the permanency
hearing. ODHS’s counsel asked to “move forward” with the
permanency hearing.
The court stated:
“As far as Father, he was at the last hearing when this
hearing date was set and was aware of the hearing and
also the time. And well, he’s also been—attempts to send
this notice to his last address also has occurred.
“So I’m going to deny the continuances.”
The court proceeded with the permanency hearing, allow-
ing father’s attorney to participate in the hearing on father’s
behalf, and ultimately ruled to change A’s permanency plan
from reunification to adoption.
Father argues that the juvenile court erroneously
concluded that father received the notice of the hearing
required by ORS 419B.473 and therefore erred in proceed-
ing with the permanency hearing in his absence and chang-
ing A’s permanency plan. See Dept. of Human Services v.
G. S., 304 Or App 542, 543, 466 P3d 716 (2020) (vacating per-
manency judgment where the “parent received no notice of
[the] permanency hearing whatsoever,” as ORS 419B.473(2)
requires). Father contends that ORS 419B.473 “requires the
court to provide the parents with a written notice document,
not a verbal pronouncement” and that, “even if the court’s
notice at jurisdiction was sufficient as to father, the court
nonetheless lacked authority to conduct the hearing because
it had also failed to provide mother with ORS 419B.473 com-
pliant notice, or any notice whatsoever.”
ODHS does not dispute that ORS 419B.473(2)
required the court to provide notice to father of the perma-
nency hearing. Instead, ODHS contends that “the juvenile
court during a December 2024 jurisdiction hearing pro-
vided him with notice of the date and time of the December
2025 permanency hearing” and that this satisfied ORS
472 Dept. of Human Services v. J. T. P.
419B.473(2)’s notice requirement, because nothing in ORS
419B.473 requires that the notice be in writing. ODHS also
argues that father “cannot assert injury based on the court’s
alleged failure to provide mother with adequate notice.”
ORS 419B.473 provides:
“(1) The court may order that the child or ward or any
other person be present during the hearing.
“(2) The court shall notify the parties listed in ORS
419B.470 and any other interested parties of the hearing. The
notice shall state the time and place of the hearing. Upon
request of the court, the Department of Human Services or
other legal custodian of the child or ward shall provide the
court with information concerning the whereabouts and
identity of such parties.”
(Emphasis added.) The statute thus requires that the notice
of the permanency hearing include both the time and the
place of the hearing.
Even assuming that ORS 419B.473(2)’s notice
requirement could be satisfied by oral notice or a notation
of a future permanency hearing written in a judgment, we
conclude that the juvenile court’s oral notice at the December
2024 jurisdiction hearing and written notation regarding
the December 2025 permanency hearing in the December
2024 jurisdiction judgment in this case do not satisfy ORS
419B.473(2). We note that ODHS did not offer a transcript
or recording of the December 2024 jurisdiction hearing at
the permanency hearing and, instead, its counsel repre-
sented that father was present “when today’s date and time
at 8:30 was given on the record” at the jurisdiction hearing.
ODHS did not contend below that the juvenile court notified
father of the place where the permanency hearing would be
held, nor does ODHS make such an argument on appeal.
Moreover, as noted, the notation regarding the permanency
hearing that the court wrote into the December 2024 juris-
diction judgment states only that the permanency hearing
was scheduled for “12/2/2025” at “8:30 a.m.” Nothing in the
record before the juvenile court at the permanency hearing
and now before us on appeal indicates that the court notified
father of the place where the permanency hearing would be
held, which ORS 419B.473(2) by its plain text requires.
Cite as 351 Or App 469 (2026) 473
We therefore conclude that the juvenile court erred
in denying father’s motion for a continuance, proceeding
with the permanency hearing in father’s absence, and ulti-
mately in changing A’s permanency plan from reunification
to adoption. Accordingly, we vacate the permanency judg-
ment and remand for further proceedings.2
Vacated and remanded.
2
Given our disposition, we need not reach father’s arguments regarding the
lack of notice to mother of the permanency hearing.