Full Opinion

36 November 18, 2026 No. 1120 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of the Henry A. Meyer Revocable Living Trust. Mary Ann Meyer SANTANA, Appellant, v. Michelle MORROW; Peter Meyer; Molly Meyer; James L. Meyer; John K. Meyer; Jane Meyer; Quinn Meyer; Annabelle Ahouiyek; Miranda Spackman; Ian Meyer; John P. Santana; J. Kevin Shuba; Garrett Hemann Robertson, P.C.; Heather O. Gilmore, P.C.; Jan Kitchel; and Kehoe Properties Northwest LLC, Respondents. Marion County Circuit Court 19PB06270; A183973 In the Matter of the Henry A. Meyer Revocable Living Trust. John MEYER, Appellant, v. Michelle MORROW; Molly Meyer; James L. Meyer; Mary Ann Meyer Santana; Jane Meyer; Quinn Meyer; Annabelle Ahouiyek; Miranda Spackman; John P. Santana; J. Kevin Shuba, Garrett Hemann Robertson, P.C.; Heather O. Gilmore, P.C.; Jan Kitchel; and Kehoe Properties Northwest LLC, and Ian Meyer, Respondents. Marion County Circuit Court 19PB06270; A183641 Thomas M. Hart, Judge. Argued and submitted September 10, 2025. Thomas M. Christ argued the cause for appellant-respon- dent John Meyer. Also on the briefs was Sussman Shank LLP. Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 37 Jan K. Kitchel argued the cause and filed the brief pro se. Bryce M. Brown and Stephen J. Odell filed the briefs for respondent-appellant Mary Ann Meyer Santana. Gina Anne Johnnie and Sherman Sherman Johnnie & Hoyt, LLP, filed the brief for respondent Jane Meyer. J. Kevin Shuba, Jentry E. Lanza, and Garrett Hemann Robertson P.C. filed the brief for respondent Ian Meyer. Heather O. Gilmore and Heather O. Gilmore, P.C., filed the brief for respondent Molly Meyer. Brooks M. Foster, Bradley T. Crittenden, and Chenoweth Law Group, PC, filed the brief for respondent Kehoe Northwest Properties, LLC. No appearance for respondents Michelle Morrow, Peter Meyer, James L. Meyer, John P. Santana, Quinn Meyer, Annabelle Ahouiyek, and Miranda Spackman. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. SHORR, P. J. In Case No. A183973, affirmed. In Case No. A183641, affirmed. 38 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow SHORR, P. J. These consolidated cases are both appeals from a limited judgment granting declaratory relief and making reviewable a number of orders issued in the administration of this family trust. Two of the beneficiaries of the trust filed these appeals from the limited judgment, raising nine dis- crete issues related to the court’s interpretation of the trust, trust debts, the powers of the trustee, the validity of the plan to sell trust property, and the award of attorney fees. We affirm on all assignments of error. I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY We offer this brief summary of the background, the parties, and the procedural history in order to frame our discussions, but recount further facts and procedural his- tory below as it relates to each assignment of error. The Henry A. Meyer Revocable Living Trust (trust) was established by Henry Meyer in 1979. The trust benefi- ciaries were his six children: Mary Ann, John, Peter, James, Tim, and Molly.1 The trust was intended to continue for 20 years after Henry’s death, at which point the trust assets were to be distributed at the sole discretion of the trustees.2 The trust document contained various provisions regard- ing its administration, including that there would be two co-trustees, and if they were ever deadlocked on a decision, then one of the trustees could declare a deadlock by giving notice to the beneficiaries and the issue would be decided by the majority vote of the beneficiaries. Henry passed away in 2000. Therefore, the trust was intended to end in 2020. The primary asset at that point was the family farm in Salem, consisting of the family 1 Most of the parties to this action share a last name. We therefore refer to all family members by their first names to avoid confusion. We also refer to the six beneficiaries as “the siblings.” 2 A 1985 amendment to the trust stated, in part: “Upon termination of the trust, Trustees shall have absolute discretion whether to sell trust assets and distribute proceeds, distribute assets wholly or partly in kind, or to distribute to an entity formed to continue the trust property as a unit with each beneficiary receiving an equal interest in such business entity.” Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 39 home, some farm outbuildings, a plant business run by Molly called the Glass Barn, and roughly 25 acres of addi- tional land.3 In 2018, Tim and Molly were co-trustees. In anticipation of the approaching end date of the trust, Tim began conversations regarding the siblings’ preferences for the future of the farm. In March 2018, he sent an email to his siblings laying out three options and asking for each beneficiary’s choice as to what they would like to see done.4 Most of the siblings expressed a preference that they form a family-owned business entity, transfer the trust prop- erty to that entity, and keep the farm under family control, although there was not consensus as to the details of such a plan. Tim then suddenly passed away.5 His son, Ian, replaced him as a trustee, while Molly continued as the other trustee. No steps were taken to form the proposed family-owned business. In July 2019, the co-trustees noti- fied the beneficiaries of their intent to sell the property. In the years that followed, every step of the trust administration became contentious, with one faction of the family intent on stopping the sale of the property and the other intent on proceeding with it. Petitions for instruc- tion were filed with the probate court by multiple parties. The court ultimately removed the family co-trustees and appointed an independent trustee, Morrow, due to the dis- agreements of family members. A forensic accounting report was completed at the direction of the court, and the court issued an order regarding the claims of various family mem- bers, including significant money Tim had advanced to the trust over the decades and trustee fees that were owed to Ian and Molly. 3 Throughout the litigation, the home and farm portions have been referred to as the South Portion or the Heritage Parcel, and the remaining undeveloped acreage has been referred to as the North Portion. 4 The proposed options were (1) sell the property and distribute net proceeds after satisfying the trust’s debts; (2) divide the property and house into individ- ual parcels for the beneficiaries and debt holders; or (3) create a new company and divide ownership of the company among the six siblings and transfer the trust assets into that company. 5 Tim’s estate’s interest in this litigation is represented by Tim’s surviving spouse Jane. 40 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow In October 2023, Morrow filed a petition for declar- atory relief, seeking declarations from the court that would allow the sale of the property to finally be completed. The court issued the requested declarations in a February 2024 limited judgment. Entry of that judgment also made a num- ber of the court’s prior orders reviewable. Both Mary Ann and John filed separate notices of appeal, raising some over- lapping and some independent issues. The cases were con- solidated for oral argument and opinion. II. EXISTENCE OF A DEADLOCK IN 2018 We begin with Mary Ann and John’s first assign- ments of error, which concern whether the trustees had been deadlocked regarding the disposition of the trust property back in 2018, and we set forth the procedural facts relevant to that issue. Following the notice in 2019 that the co-trustees had decided to sell the property, Peter filed a petition for instruc- tions with the probate court, seeking to stop the sale and compel the trustees to carry out the wishes of the siblings to transfer the property to a family-owned entity. Peter’s posi- tion was that the email correspondence started by Tim in March 2018 had been the declaration of a deadlock between the co-trustees, and that the vote of the siblings was bind- ing on the trustees, per the trust directions on the break- ing of a deadlock. He maintained that the current trustees therefore did not have authority to sell the property. The trustees cross-petitioned for instructions from the court as to the proper interpretation of the trust and powers of the trustees. The court concluded that the email correspondence had not bound the trustees in any way and they therefore had the authority to move forward with selling the property: “The court finds that the March 31, 2018 deadline was never fully complied with, nor was it a vote to resolve a deadlock. The credible testimony before the court was that there was not a deadlock. The court has no evidence of any- body communicating to the rest of the beneficiaries that a deadlock between the two trustees ever existed which would trigger the calling of a vote.” Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 41 In Mary Ann’s and John’s first assignments of error they argue that the vote by the beneficiaries in response to Tim’s March 2018 email was binding on the trustees, and that the trustees were obligated to transfer the trust assets into a newly created, family-run entity. Both Mary Ann and John cast the issue as a question of law regarding the trial court’s erroneous interpretation of the trust terms and con- clusions about the binding nature of the vote. However, the questions of whether the trustees had been deadlocked and whether either of them had declared a deadlock and called for a vote are questions of fact. We are bound by the trial court’s factual findings if there is any evidence to support them. Lynch v. Romano, 285 Or App 243, 244, 396 P3d 267, rev den, 361 Or 800 (2017). We readily conclude that the court’s finding that there was no deadlock is supported by evidence in the record. The March 2018 emails from Tim establish that he did not consider himself and Molly to be deadlocked regarding the future of the farm. His March 22 email to Peter confirmed that Peter would vote in favor of the new family entity “if necessary” and noted that there would be a majority vote for that option “should Molly and I become ‘deadlocked.’ ” Tim’s March 23 email to all of the siblings noted that if he and Molly agreed about what to do, their choice would be imple- mented; and if they disagreed, the majority would prevail. The use of the conditional “if” supports the court’s finding that no deadlock existed and the email was not a call for a formal vote to resolve a deadlock. The record also contains testimony from Molly that she had not yet made up her mind as to the best course of action at the time the email was sent. We are unconvinced by John’s argument that Molly’s inde- cision at a particular time meant that the trustees “did not agree” and that a deadlock therefore existed. Because the court’s fact findings are supported by evidence in the record, we reject Mary Ann’s and John’s first assignments of error. No deadlock had been reached or declared. The trustees therefore retained absolute discre- tion and authorization to sell the property, and they contin- ued to possess all powers granted by the trust to manage the trust’s business and assets. 42 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow III. TRUSTEE FEES FOR IAN AND MOLLY We now turn to the assignments of error related to the court’s order resolving various accounting issues of the trust, beginning with the court’s award of trustee fees to Ian and Molly. As noted above, upon Tim’s death, his son Ian was appointed as co-trustee with Molly. The two of them con- tinued to serve as co-trustees from April 2018 until October 2020 when the court removed them on its own initiative and appointed an independent trustee, Morrow. The court made clear that it was making no findings of fault or liability on the part of Ian and Molly. Following the appointment of Morrow as trustee, and the completion of a forensic accountant’s report, Morrow filed a Petition for Instructions and Approval, seeking autho- rization from the court to pay the claims that were identi- fied in the forensic report and otherwise wrap up the trust and distribute appropriate shares. The siblings filed various responses to the petition, and a trial was held in August 2022. The court issued a letter opinion in November and an order in December 2022, which adopted the letter opinion, and ordered that “the Trustee shall pay to Ian Meyer and Molly Meyer each the sum of $82,000.00 as Trustee fees for their period of service as trustees of the Trust.” The letter opinion clarified that the compensation was for the period from when Ian was made a trustee until the court appointed Morrow as successor trustee. In Mary Ann’s second assignment of error and John’s sixth assignment of error they argue that the trial court erred in awarding Ian and Molly trustee fees. Mary Ann and John assert that ORS 130.710(2)(d) requires a trustee to notify beneficiaries in advance of any change in the rate or method of compensation, and because Ian and Molly failed to notify the beneficiaries that there would be a change in trustee compensation from the previous tradition of trustees not collecting a fee, they were not legally entitled to trustee fees and the trial court therefore erred as a matter of law in awarding any trustee fee to either Molly or Ian. We conclude that the court did not err as urged by Mary Ann and John. Whether the trial court correctly understood the former trustees’ legal entitlement to trustee compensation Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 43 is a question of law that we review for legal error. Allco Enterprises v. Goldstein Family Living Trust, 183 Or App 328, 330, 51 P3d 1275 (2002). As relevant to the arguments raised here, ORS 130.710(2)(d) states, “A trustee shall notify the qualified ben- eficiaries in advance of any change in the method or rate of the trustee’s compensation.” Mary Ann and John maintain that ORS 130.710(2)(d) prohibited Molly and Ian from seek- ing trustee fees as a part of the settling of the trust’s claims, because they did not inform the beneficiaries in advance of a change in the “rate or method” of compensation—i.e., the change from collecting no compensation to requesting any fee at all. Ian raises a number of arguments as to why the amount of compensation awarded was reasonable; asserts that there was no change in the method or rate of compen- sation, because trustees had always been entitled to reason- able compensation, and had simply waived it in the past; disputes the assertion that they did not provide notice; and argues that the court had discretion to deny fees, but was not required to do so. Molly argues that the court has broad statutory authority to resolve any matter involving trust administration, and asserts that ORS 130.710 addresses a trustee’s duty to notify the beneficiaries before the trustee acts to change their own compensation, through their power as a trustee, but does not impose any limitation on the court or eliminate the court’s authority to award a reasonable fee pursuant to the terms of the trust and statutory authority. We agree with the arguments advanced by Molly. ORS 130.710 addresses a trustee’s duty to inform and report. ORS 130.710 is included in a larger series of the Oregon Uniform Trust Code addressing the duties and powers of a trustee. ORS 130.650 - 130.730; see Valerie J. Vollmar, The Oregon Uniform Trust Code and Comments, 42 Willamette L Rev 187, 341 (2006) (Oregon UTC & Comments) (noting that “ORS 130.650 through 130.730 state the fundamen- tal duties of a trustee and list the trustee’s powers”).6 ORS 6 The Oregon UTC & Comments was a special issue of the Willamette Law Review, compiling the final official explanatory comments of the Oregon Uniform Trust Code Study Committee, explaining the newly adopted Oregon version of the Uniform Trust Code. It noted that the Comments “serve as a tool to under- standing what the provisions of the Code mean.” 42 Willamette L Rev at 189; 44 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow 130.710 addresses a number of duties of a trustee, including to “keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for those beneficiaries to protect their interests.” ORS 130.710(1). The Comments to ORS 130.710 discuss the operation of the trustee’s duties in the regular course of the administration of the trust and do not mention the role of the court in such duties. Oregon UTC & Comments, 42 Willamette L Rev at 360-63. Specific to ORS 130.710(2)(d), the Comment states: “Subsection (2)(d) deals with the sensitive issue of changes, usually increases, in trustee compensation. Changes can include changes in a periodic base fee, rate of percentage compensation, hourly rate, termination fee, or transaction charge. Regarding the standard for setting trustee compensation, see ORS 130.635 and Comment.” Id. at 361. Turning to ORS 130.635, that statute states: “(1) If the terms of a trust do not specify the trustee’s compensation, a trustee is entitled to compensation that is reasonable under the circumstances. “(2) If the terms of a trust specify the trustee’s com- pensation, the trustee is entitled to be compensated as specified, but the court may allow more or less compensa- tion if: “(a) The duties of the trustee are substantially differ- ent from those contemplated when the trust was created; or “(b) The compensation specified by the terms of the trust would be unreasonably low or high.” That statute reflects “the court’s inherent equity power to make adjustments downward or upward in appropriate cir- cumstances.” Oregon UTC & Comments, 42 Willamette L see Downs v. Binn, 336 Or App 665, 678, 562 P3d 261 (2024), rev den, 373 Or 712 (2025) (referring to the Oregon UTC & Comments as “setting forth the offi- cial commentary to the Oregon Uniform Trust Code”). We have previously relied on the Comments as legislative history for statutory interpretation. See Hunt v. Goffman, 343 Or App 268, 272, 578 P3d 1265 (2025) (citing the Oregon UTC & Comments as legislative history for interpretation of trust statutes); Tseng v. Tseng, 271 Or App 657, 664-65, 668-71, 352 P3d 74, rev den, 358 Or 69 (2015) (same). Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 45 Rev at 338; see also ORS 130.050 (“A court may intervene in the administration of a trust to the extent the court’s juris- diction is invoked by an interested person or as provided by law. * * * A judicial proceeding may relate to any matter involving a trust’s administration[.]”). There is nothing in ORS 130.710(2)(d) that constrains the power of the court to make such adjustments when it has exerted oversight in the administration of a trust. We agree with Molly that the provision in ORS 130.710(2)(d) is intended to function as a check on a trustee who is operating without court oversight. A Comment to ORS 130.635 states: “ORS 130.725(15) grants the trustee authority to fix and pay the trustee’s compensation without the necessity of prior court review, subject to the right of a beneficiary to object to the compensation in a later judicial proceed- ing. Allowing the trustee to pay the trustee’s compensa- tion without prior court approval promotes efficient trust administration but does place a significant burden on a beneficiary who believes the compensation is unreason- able. To provide a beneficiary with time to take action, and because of the importance of trustee’s fees to the benefi- ciaries’ interests, ORS 130.710(2)(d) requires a trustee to provide the qualified beneficiaries with advance notice of any change in the method or rate of the trustee’s compen- sation. Failure to provide such advance notice constitutes a breach of trust, which, if sufficiently serious, would jus- tify the trustee’s removal under ORS 130.625.” Oregon UTC & Comments, 42 Willamette L Rev at 339. Here, Molly and Ian were no longer in a position to set their own compensation. The court had taken control of the trust administration, had removed the family trustees, had appointed a professional fiduciary and a forensic accountant, and was making determinations about the proper manage- ment of the trust, payment of claims and debts, and dispo- sition of the trust assets. All of that was within the court’s inherent authority under ORS 130.050, and, with respect to trustee compensation, ORS 130.635. Finally, we address Mary Ann and John’s argu- ments regarding other states’ interpretation of similar provisions. ORS 130.710 is modeled on the Uniform Trust 46 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow Code Rule 813, approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. We have been able to locate only one appellate case nationally that has com- mented on the corresponding provision as adopted by other states.7 See Stout v. Arwood, No 313063, 2014 WL 265553 (Mich Ct App 2014). In that case, similar to the situation here, the trustee had previously collected no fee, but upon the initiation of litigation, began accounting for his time and requested that the probate court award him a trustee fee. Id. at *2. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that “[b]ecause a change from not collecting trustee compensa- tion to requesting compensation constitutes a change in the rate of the trustee’s compensation—from a rate of nothing to the requested rate—respondent had a duty to notify the petitioners in advance,” pursuant to the Michigan version of ORS 130.710(2)(d). Id. at *13. The court held that was a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty to keep the bene- ficiaries reasonably informed about the administration of the trust. Id. In light of that breach, the court vacated the award and remanded the case to the probate court to consider whether the trustee should be denied fees, or at a minimum to recalculate the fee to include only those hours incurred after the beneficiaries had notice of his intent to collect a fee. Id. Despite the similarity in facts, we are unconvinced that we should follow the path established in the Michigan case. The opinion is unpublished and contains no analysis of the purpose behind the provision or its role in the greater context of court supervision of trusts and court authority to set reasonable trustee fees. We are more convinced that the notice required by ORS 130.710(2)(d) relates to a trust- ee’s ability to change their own compensation, outside of the oversight of the court system. Because we conclude that the court did not err under these circumstances regarding Molly and Ian’s legal entitlement to fees in light of ORS 130.710(2)(d), we affirm 7 We identified one additional case interpreting the provision, from a trial court in Virginia. Higgerson v. Farthing, 96 Va Cir 58 (2017) (unpublished letter opinion) (concluding that the trustee’s increase of his own compensation by four and one-half times the prior rate without adequate notice or explanation as to the method and rate violated his duty of care). Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 47 on Mary Ann’s second assignment of error and John’s sixth assignment of error.8 IV. FUNDS ADVANCED BY TIM In her third assignment of error, Mary Ann asserts that the trial court erred in determining that funds advanced to the trust by Tim were loans, and not gifts. We state the relevant undisputed procedural history that led to that determination. In the same December 2022 order that awarded trustee fees to Ian and Molly, the court also resolved disputes surrounding funds Tim had advanced to the trust over the years, and that Tim’s estate claimed were debts owed by the trust. Other family members argued that the funds had been gifts, and therefore no repayment to Tim’s estate was required. In its order, the court stated: “The Court finds that the funds advanced to the Trustees and/or the Trust by Tim Meyer were not gifts to the Trustor, the Trustee, or the beneficiaries of the Trust. The Court adopts [the forensic accountant’s] analysis regarding the claim(s) of Tim Meyer’s Estate and approves the claim in the amount of $2,108,061.00, plus interest thereon at a rate of 2.5% per annum from January 1, 2022 until paid.” In the accompanying letter opinion, the court stated that “these were clearly loans to the Trust and not gifts.” As noted, Mary Ann asserts that the trial court erred in determining that funds advanced by Tim were loans, and not gifts. Mary Ann argues that Tim repeatedly promised that the funds did not need to be repaid, and that his estate should be bound by those promises under the doc- trine of promissory estoppel. 8 We note that John explicitly stated that he was not challenging the amount of the fees, only the legal entitlement to fees at all. We therefore need not address the reasonableness of the amount of fees awarded. In her reply brief, Mary Ann advances an additional argument that the court erred in awarding any fees to Molly in light of other alleged breaches of duty Molly committed as a trustee. Because that argument was not advanced in the opening brief, we decline to reach it. State v. Murga, 291 Or App 462, 468, 422 P3d 417 (2018) (“We have long held that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief normally will not be considered.”). 48 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow Although Mary Ann casts her argument as an issue of law to be reviewed for legal error, as presented, it is actu- ally an issue of fact—what was the nature of the money advanced by Tim? See Neel v. Lee, 316 Or App 159, 172-73, 504 P3d 26 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 733 (2022) (treating the question of whether funds were a gift or not as a question of fact to be resolved by the fact finder). Mary Ann does not advance any argument regarding the legal distinction between gifts and loans, and roots her argument in factual assertions regarding the conversations and understanding between the siblings at the time the monies were advanced and in the years and decades following. We review issues of fact for any evidence. Lynch, 285 Or App at 244. We readily conclude that the record contains evi- dence supporting the trial court’s findings. The report from the forensic accountant included six pages analyzing the claims of Tim’s estate, referencing trust ledgers, deeds, promissory notes, and other financial documents, as well as emails, memoranda and declarations of various family members. The forensic accountant concluded that the funds constituted loans and not gifts. The court adopted that analysis and that fact finding is supported by evidence. With respect to Mary Ann’s assertion that the doc- trine of promissory estoppel should preclude Tim’s estate from reneging on Tim’s promise that the funds did not need to be repaid, we conclude that the doctrine does not apply. Mary Ann’s argument is premised on her assertion that Tim made those promises. We interpret the trial court’s factual finding as rejecting that assertion, in that it concluded that the funds were “clearly loans.” Absent a promise, the doctrine of promis- sory estoppel does not apply. See Bixler v. First National Bank, 49 Or App 195, 199-200, 619 P2d 895 (1980) (establishing the four criteria for determining when action renders a promise enforceable, with the first being the existence of a promise). We therefore reject Mary Ann’s third assignment of error. V. THE FEBRUARY 2024 LIMITED JUDGMENT We next address the assignments of error that chal- lenge the court’s declaration of rights relating to the trustees’ Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 49 actions and the proposed sale of the property. In August 2020, when Ian and Molly were still co-trustees, they entered into a purchase agreement for the sale of the property to Kehoe Northwest Properties, LLC (Kehoe). Over the years, the trust and Kehoe executed a number of amendments to the purchase agreement, but due to ongoing litigation and land use challenges, the sale had not been completed. In October 2023, Morrow petitioned the court for declaratory relief on a number of issues relating to the finalization of the sale of the property to Kehoe. In her petition Morrow noted that, due to assertions by the beneficiaries and other family members that the trustee did not have the authority or right to sell the property, or that doing so would be a breach of fiduciary duties, the title company designated to close the transaction had declined to issue title insurance without a declaration of rights from the court. Morrow therefore requested that the court enter a judgment resolving the issues so that the sale could move forward. Various family members filed objec- tions, and a hearing was held on December 6, 2023. On February 15, 2024, the trial court issued a lim- ited judgment granting the requested declaratory relief. The court declared that the trustee had the power and approval to sell the property to Kehoe for the agreed upon sales price and terms; that the purchase agreement as amended was valid, binding, and in full force and effect; that neither party was in default under the purchase agreement; that neither the current nor former trustees had breached any fiduciary duty to the trust or the beneficiaries with respect to the sale, and would not commit a breach by completing the sale; and that the trust would be in default for failing to close and could potentially incur significant damages or a suit for specific performance by failing to abide by the purchase agreement. Both Mary Ann and John challenge various ele- ments of the court’s declaration of rights. We conclude that the trial court did not err in any of the ways urged by Mary Ann or John. A. Purchase Agreement is Valid In her fourth assignment of error, Mary Ann chal- lenges the court’s declaration that the purchase agreement 50 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow was valid, binding, and in full force and effect. She asserts that the purchase agreement was void for vagueness because it lacked certainty on material terms, including exactly which portions of the property were being sold, the purchase price, and the closing date. Kehoe responds that Mary Ann is not a party to the contract and therefore has no right to nullify the agreement when neither party to the agreement is trying to avoid performance. Alternatively, Kehoe asserts that the contract is not vague. Assuming without deciding that Mary Ann can challenge the validity of a contract to which she is not a party, we conclude that the trial court did not err in declaring that the purchase agreement was valid, binding, and in full force and effect. “Declaratory judgment proceedings seeking the construction of a contract are legal in nature, and the fac- tual determinations of the trier of fact are binding on appeal if there is evidence to support them. We review the construc- tion of a contract, including whether it is ambiguous, as a matter of law.” Harris v. Warren Family Properties, LLC, 207 Or App 732, 737, 143 P3d 548 (2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Whether a contract existed is a question of law. Ken Hood Construction v. Pacific Coast Construction, 201 Or App 568, 577, 120 P3d 6 (2005), adh’d to as modified on recons, 203 Or App 768, 126 P3d 1254, rev den, 341 Or 366 (2006). It is well-established that formation of a contract requires offer and acceptance—a so-called “meeting of the minds.” Dalton v. Robert Jahn Corp., 209 Or App 120, 132, 146 P3d 399 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 416 (2007) (“At least as to a contract’s essential terms, a valid contract exists only when there is a meeting of the minds and where all terms are either agreed upon or there is a method agreed upon by which open and disputed terms can be settled, such that nothing is left for future negotiation.”). Upon finding that a contract exists, a court has the power to construe the parties’ rights with respect to that contract. Ken Leahy Construction, Inc. v. Cascade General, Inc., 329 Or 566, 574, 994 P2d 112 (1999). The situation before us is unique in that neither party to the contract has alleged a breach on the part of the other, and no particular remedy has been sought Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 51 nor performance requested. It is simply a matter of the court declaring that a contract existed and was binding and in full force. The court did not declare what any of the terms were. We therefore understand Mary Ann’s challenge to be to the formation of a contract at all—that the terms laid out in the purchase agreement and amendments thereto were too indefinite to establish an enforceable contract. We disagree. The purchase agreement identifies the property at issue and establishes the purchase price. Both parties to the agreement—the trust and Kehoe—agreed to the terms, and to subsequent amendments. Some of those terms are conditional, depending on how future events and decisions play out; but the material terms are established in the purchase agreement and reflect the parties’ intention to enter into an agreement for the sale of the property. The fact that all details of performance have not been established— largely due to the uncertainty brought about by this con- tinuing litigation—does not mean that the parties did not reach an enforceable agreement. We acknowledge that, in some circumstances, the lack of specificity in an agreement may be enough to prevent a court from being able to order specific performance. See, e.g., Phillips v. Johnson, 266 Or 544, 556-57, 514 P2d 1337 (1973) (concluding that a lack of agreement on certain pro- visions regarding the sale of land meant the document was “not an enforceable contract in a court of equity by the rem- edy of specific performance,” but noting that the court was not without power to provide some remedy); Booras v. Uyeda, 295 Or 181, 193, 666 P2d 791 (1983) (“A court of equity can- not, under the guise of ‘filling gaps’ make the contract which it thinks the parties would have agreed to.”). However, when a contract contains ambiguities in some particular details, or when the parties disagree about the meaning of terms, it is the court’s role to interpret the contract and determine the obligations of the parties. See generally, Yogman v. Parrott, 325 Or 358, 937 P2d 1019 (1997) (laying out the analytical framework for contract interpretation). In those situations, ambiguity or a lack of certainty in some particulars does not mean that no contract exists. 52 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow The parties to this particular agreement have not sought a declaration of each of their rights under the con- tract, and no one has requested specific performance. Any uncertainty in the specific terms of how the contract is to be carried out is not fatal to declaring that a valid contract was entered into for the sale of the property. The trial court therefore did not err in declaring that the purchase agree- ment is valid, binding, and in full force and effect. B. No Default by Either Party In addition to her argument that the agreement is unenforceable, Mary Ann argues in her fourth assignment of error that the court erred when it declared that neither party was in default under the purchase agreement. She asserts that Kehoe was in fact in default, based on its fail- ure to meet key milestones and obtain the necessary docu- ments to close. Kehoe asserts that it is not in default in any of the ways identified by Mary Ann and also maintains that it is up to the parties to a contract to assert their rights and hold the other party accountable for breaches of contract. Kehoe argues that because the trust—the only other party to the contract—has not taken any steps to hold Kehoe in default, there was no basis for the court to be required to declare Kehoe in default. We conclude that the trial court did not err by declaring that neither party was in default. The contract contains terms relating to the breach of provisions, the waiver of or failure to enforce rights, and procedures for holding a party accountable for breach, including notice of default and opportunity for the offending party to cure. All such provisions are worded in permissive language, in that a party may take steps to cancel the sale in the event of a qualifying breach by the other party, but in no way is a party required to cancel based on a breach by the other side. It is undisputed that neither of the parties to the purchase agreement had taken steps at that point in time to hold the other party in default. Therefore, there is no mechanism for the court to declare either party in default absent a request by the other party to enforce the terms of the contract. We therefore reject Mary Ann’s fourth assignment of error. Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 53 C. No Violation of Trustee Duty Regarding the Sale In his seventh assignment of error, John takes issue with the following declaration by the court: “5. The current trustee and former co-trustees did not, and will not by completing the sale, breach any of their fiduciary duties to the Trust or the beneficiaries thereof in connection with the sale of the real property, to Kehoe Northwest Properties LLC, including without limitation, when determining the amount of property to be sold, the sales price for such property; and entering into, modifying, and administering the purchase agreement[.]” John argues that the court erred in issuing that declaration because it improperly commented on hypothetical future actions that are nonjusticiable in a declaratory action and because it deprived the beneficiaries of their right to a jury determination on the fact question of whether any trustee had breached their duties to the beneficiaries in connection with the sale. We affirm on both arguments. 1. Justiciability The issue of justiciability is a question of law that we review for legal error. Board of Cty. Comm. of Columbia Cty. v. Rosenblum, 324 Or App 221, 231, 526 P3d 798 (2023). The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act confers on Oregon courts of record the power to “declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” ORS 28.010. In order for a court to entertain a declaratory action, “the complaint must present