Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA183973
JudgeShorr
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
36 November 18, 2026 No. 1120
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Henry A. Meyer Revocable Living Trust.
Mary Ann Meyer SANTANA,
Appellant,
v.
Michelle MORROW;
Peter Meyer; Molly Meyer; James L. Meyer; John K. Meyer;
Jane Meyer; Quinn Meyer; Annabelle Ahouiyek;
Miranda Spackman; Ian Meyer; John P. Santana;
J. Kevin Shuba; Garrett Hemann Robertson, P.C.;
Heather O. Gilmore, P.C.; Jan Kitchel;
and Kehoe Properties Northwest LLC,
Respondents.
Marion County Circuit Court
19PB06270; A183973
In the Matter of the Henry A. Meyer Revocable Living Trust.
John MEYER,
Appellant,
v.
Michelle MORROW;
Molly Meyer; James L. Meyer; Mary Ann Meyer Santana;
Jane Meyer; Quinn Meyer; Annabelle Ahouiyek;
Miranda Spackman; John P. Santana; J. Kevin Shuba,
Garrett Hemann Robertson, P.C.; Heather O. Gilmore, P.C.;
Jan Kitchel; and Kehoe Properties Northwest LLC,
and Ian Meyer,
Respondents.
Marion County Circuit Court
19PB06270; A183641
Thomas M. Hart, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 10, 2025.
Thomas M. Christ argued the cause for appellant-respon-
dent John Meyer. Also on the briefs was Sussman Shank
LLP.
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 37
Jan K. Kitchel argued the cause and filed the brief pro se.
Bryce M. Brown and Stephen J. Odell filed the briefs for
respondent-appellant Mary Ann Meyer Santana.
Gina Anne Johnnie and Sherman Sherman Johnnie &
Hoyt, LLP, filed the brief for respondent Jane Meyer.
J. Kevin Shuba, Jentry E. Lanza, and Garrett Hemann
Robertson P.C. filed the brief for respondent Ian Meyer.
Heather O. Gilmore and Heather O. Gilmore, P.C., filed
the brief for respondent Molly Meyer.
Brooks M. Foster, Bradley T. Crittenden, and Chenoweth
Law Group, PC, filed the brief for respondent Kehoe
Northwest Properties, LLC.
No appearance for respondents Michelle Morrow, Peter
Meyer, James L. Meyer, John P. Santana, Quinn Meyer,
Annabelle Ahouiyek, and Miranda Spackman.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
In Case No. A183973, affirmed. In Case No. A183641,
affirmed.
38 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
SHORR, P. J.
These consolidated cases are both appeals from a
limited judgment granting declaratory relief and making
reviewable a number of orders issued in the administration
of this family trust. Two of the beneficiaries of the trust filed
these appeals from the limited judgment, raising nine dis-
crete issues related to the court’s interpretation of the trust,
trust debts, the powers of the trustee, the validity of the
plan to sell trust property, and the award of attorney fees.
We affirm on all assignments of error.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
We offer this brief summary of the background, the
parties, and the procedural history in order to frame our
discussions, but recount further facts and procedural his-
tory below as it relates to each assignment of error.
The Henry A. Meyer Revocable Living Trust (trust)
was established by Henry Meyer in 1979. The trust benefi-
ciaries were his six children: Mary Ann, John, Peter, James,
Tim, and Molly.1 The trust was intended to continue for 20
years after Henry’s death, at which point the trust assets
were to be distributed at the sole discretion of the trustees.2
The trust document contained various provisions regard-
ing its administration, including that there would be two
co-trustees, and if they were ever deadlocked on a decision,
then one of the trustees could declare a deadlock by giving
notice to the beneficiaries and the issue would be decided by
the majority vote of the beneficiaries.
Henry passed away in 2000. Therefore, the trust
was intended to end in 2020. The primary asset at that
point was the family farm in Salem, consisting of the family
1
Most of the parties to this action share a last name. We therefore refer to
all family members by their first names to avoid confusion. We also refer to the
six beneficiaries as “the siblings.”
2
A 1985 amendment to the trust stated, in part:
“Upon termination of the trust, Trustees shall have absolute discretion
whether to sell trust assets and distribute proceeds, distribute assets wholly
or partly in kind, or to distribute to an entity formed to continue the trust
property as a unit with each beneficiary receiving an equal interest in such
business entity.”
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 39
home, some farm outbuildings, a plant business run by
Molly called the Glass Barn, and roughly 25 acres of addi-
tional land.3 In 2018, Tim and Molly were co-trustees. In
anticipation of the approaching end date of the trust, Tim
began conversations regarding the siblings’ preferences for
the future of the farm. In March 2018, he sent an email
to his siblings laying out three options and asking for each
beneficiary’s choice as to what they would like to see done.4
Most of the siblings expressed a preference that they form
a family-owned business entity, transfer the trust prop-
erty to that entity, and keep the farm under family control,
although there was not consensus as to the details of such a
plan.
Tim then suddenly passed away.5 His son, Ian,
replaced him as a trustee, while Molly continued as the
other trustee. No steps were taken to form the proposed
family-owned business. In July 2019, the co-trustees noti-
fied the beneficiaries of their intent to sell the property.
In the years that followed, every step of the trust
administration became contentious, with one faction of the
family intent on stopping the sale of the property and the
other intent on proceeding with it. Petitions for instruc-
tion were filed with the probate court by multiple parties.
The court ultimately removed the family co-trustees and
appointed an independent trustee, Morrow, due to the dis-
agreements of family members. A forensic accounting report
was completed at the direction of the court, and the court
issued an order regarding the claims of various family mem-
bers, including significant money Tim had advanced to the
trust over the decades and trustee fees that were owed to Ian
and Molly.
3
Throughout the litigation, the home and farm portions have been referred
to as the South Portion or the Heritage Parcel, and the remaining undeveloped
acreage has been referred to as the North Portion.
4
The proposed options were (1) sell the property and distribute net proceeds
after satisfying the trust’s debts; (2) divide the property and house into individ-
ual parcels for the beneficiaries and debt holders; or (3) create a new company and
divide ownership of the company among the six siblings and transfer the trust
assets into that company.
5
Tim’s estate’s interest in this litigation is represented by Tim’s surviving
spouse Jane.
40 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
In October 2023, Morrow filed a petition for declar-
atory relief, seeking declarations from the court that would
allow the sale of the property to finally be completed. The
court issued the requested declarations in a February 2024
limited judgment. Entry of that judgment also made a num-
ber of the court’s prior orders reviewable. Both Mary Ann
and John filed separate notices of appeal, raising some over-
lapping and some independent issues. The cases were con-
solidated for oral argument and opinion.
II. EXISTENCE OF A DEADLOCK IN 2018
We begin with Mary Ann and John’s first assign-
ments of error, which concern whether the trustees had been
deadlocked regarding the disposition of the trust property
back in 2018, and we set forth the procedural facts relevant
to that issue.
Following the notice in 2019 that the co-trustees had
decided to sell the property, Peter filed a petition for instruc-
tions with the probate court, seeking to stop the sale and
compel the trustees to carry out the wishes of the siblings to
transfer the property to a family-owned entity. Peter’s posi-
tion was that the email correspondence started by Tim in
March 2018 had been the declaration of a deadlock between
the co-trustees, and that the vote of the siblings was bind-
ing on the trustees, per the trust directions on the break-
ing of a deadlock. He maintained that the current trustees
therefore did not have authority to sell the property. The
trustees cross-petitioned for instructions from the court as
to the proper interpretation of the trust and powers of the
trustees.
The court concluded that the email correspondence
had not bound the trustees in any way and they therefore
had the authority to move forward with selling the property:
“The court finds that the March 31, 2018 deadline was
never fully complied with, nor was it a vote to resolve a
deadlock. The credible testimony before the court was that
there was not a deadlock. The court has no evidence of any-
body communicating to the rest of the beneficiaries that
a deadlock between the two trustees ever existed which
would trigger the calling of a vote.”
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 41
In Mary Ann’s and John’s first assignments of error
they argue that the vote by the beneficiaries in response to
Tim’s March 2018 email was binding on the trustees, and
that the trustees were obligated to transfer the trust assets
into a newly created, family-run entity. Both Mary Ann and
John cast the issue as a question of law regarding the trial
court’s erroneous interpretation of the trust terms and con-
clusions about the binding nature of the vote. However, the
questions of whether the trustees had been deadlocked and
whether either of them had declared a deadlock and called
for a vote are questions of fact. We are bound by the trial
court’s factual findings if there is any evidence to support
them. Lynch v. Romano, 285 Or App 243, 244, 396 P3d 267,
rev den, 361 Or 800 (2017).
We readily conclude that the court’s finding that
there was no deadlock is supported by evidence in the record.
The March 2018 emails from Tim establish that he did not
consider himself and Molly to be deadlocked regarding the
future of the farm. His March 22 email to Peter confirmed
that Peter would vote in favor of the new family entity “if
necessary” and noted that there would be a majority vote for
that option “should Molly and I become ‘deadlocked.’ ” Tim’s
March 23 email to all of the siblings noted that if he and
Molly agreed about what to do, their choice would be imple-
mented; and if they disagreed, the majority would prevail.
The use of the conditional “if” supports the court’s finding
that no deadlock existed and the email was not a call for a
formal vote to resolve a deadlock. The record also contains
testimony from Molly that she had not yet made up her mind
as to the best course of action at the time the email was sent.
We are unconvinced by John’s argument that Molly’s inde-
cision at a particular time meant that the trustees “did not
agree” and that a deadlock therefore existed.
Because the court’s fact findings are supported by
evidence in the record, we reject Mary Ann’s and John’s
first assignments of error. No deadlock had been reached or
declared. The trustees therefore retained absolute discre-
tion and authorization to sell the property, and they contin-
ued to possess all powers granted by the trust to manage
the trust’s business and assets.
42 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
III. TRUSTEE FEES FOR IAN AND MOLLY
We now turn to the assignments of error related to
the court’s order resolving various accounting issues of the
trust, beginning with the court’s award of trustee fees to
Ian and Molly. As noted above, upon Tim’s death, his son Ian
was appointed as co-trustee with Molly. The two of them con-
tinued to serve as co-trustees from April 2018 until October
2020 when the court removed them on its own initiative and
appointed an independent trustee, Morrow. The court made
clear that it was making no findings of fault or liability on
the part of Ian and Molly.
Following the appointment of Morrow as trustee,
and the completion of a forensic accountant’s report, Morrow
filed a Petition for Instructions and Approval, seeking autho-
rization from the court to pay the claims that were identi-
fied in the forensic report and otherwise wrap up the trust
and distribute appropriate shares. The siblings filed various
responses to the petition, and a trial was held in August
2022. The court issued a letter opinion in November and an
order in December 2022, which adopted the letter opinion,
and ordered that “the Trustee shall pay to Ian Meyer and
Molly Meyer each the sum of $82,000.00 as Trustee fees for
their period of service as trustees of the Trust.” The letter
opinion clarified that the compensation was for the period
from when Ian was made a trustee until the court appointed
Morrow as successor trustee.
In Mary Ann’s second assignment of error and John’s
sixth assignment of error they argue that the trial court
erred in awarding Ian and Molly trustee fees. Mary Ann
and John assert that ORS 130.710(2)(d) requires a trustee to
notify beneficiaries in advance of any change in the rate or
method of compensation, and because Ian and Molly failed
to notify the beneficiaries that there would be a change in
trustee compensation from the previous tradition of trustees
not collecting a fee, they were not legally entitled to trustee
fees and the trial court therefore erred as a matter of law in
awarding any trustee fee to either Molly or Ian. We conclude
that the court did not err as urged by Mary Ann and John.
Whether the trial court correctly understood the
former trustees’ legal entitlement to trustee compensation
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 43
is a question of law that we review for legal error. Allco
Enterprises v. Goldstein Family Living Trust, 183 Or App
328, 330, 51 P3d 1275 (2002).
As relevant to the arguments raised here, ORS
130.710(2)(d) states, “A trustee shall notify the qualified ben-
eficiaries in advance of any change in the method or rate of
the trustee’s compensation.” Mary Ann and John maintain
that ORS 130.710(2)(d) prohibited Molly and Ian from seek-
ing trustee fees as a part of the settling of the trust’s claims,
because they did not inform the beneficiaries in advance of
a change in the “rate or method” of compensation—i.e., the
change from collecting no compensation to requesting any
fee at all. Ian raises a number of arguments as to why the
amount of compensation awarded was reasonable; asserts
that there was no change in the method or rate of compen-
sation, because trustees had always been entitled to reason-
able compensation, and had simply waived it in the past;
disputes the assertion that they did not provide notice; and
argues that the court had discretion to deny fees, but was
not required to do so. Molly argues that the court has broad
statutory authority to resolve any matter involving trust
administration, and asserts that ORS 130.710 addresses a
trustee’s duty to notify the beneficiaries before the trustee
acts to change their own compensation, through their power
as a trustee, but does not impose any limitation on the court
or eliminate the court’s authority to award a reasonable fee
pursuant to the terms of the trust and statutory authority.
We agree with the arguments advanced by Molly.
ORS 130.710 addresses a trustee’s duty to inform and report.
ORS 130.710 is included in a larger series of the Oregon
Uniform Trust Code addressing the duties and powers of a
trustee. ORS 130.650 - 130.730; see Valerie J. Vollmar, The
Oregon Uniform Trust Code and Comments, 42 Willamette
L Rev 187, 341 (2006) (Oregon UTC & Comments) (noting
that “ORS 130.650 through 130.730 state the fundamen-
tal duties of a trustee and list the trustee’s powers”).6 ORS
6
The Oregon UTC & Comments was a special issue of the Willamette Law
Review, compiling the final official explanatory comments of the Oregon Uniform
Trust Code Study Committee, explaining the newly adopted Oregon version of
the Uniform Trust Code. It noted that the Comments “serve as a tool to under-
standing what the provisions of the Code mean.” 42 Willamette L Rev at 189;
44 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
130.710 addresses a number of duties of a trustee, including
to “keep the qualified beneficiaries of the trust reasonably
informed about the administration of the trust and of the
material facts necessary for those beneficiaries to protect
their interests.” ORS 130.710(1). The Comments to ORS
130.710 discuss the operation of the trustee’s duties in the
regular course of the administration of the trust and do not
mention the role of the court in such duties. Oregon UTC &
Comments, 42 Willamette L Rev at 360-63. Specific to ORS
130.710(2)(d), the Comment states:
“Subsection (2)(d) deals with the sensitive issue of
changes, usually increases, in trustee compensation.
Changes can include changes in a periodic base fee, rate
of percentage compensation, hourly rate, termination fee,
or transaction charge. Regarding the standard for setting
trustee compensation, see ORS 130.635 and Comment.”
Id. at 361. Turning to ORS 130.635, that statute states:
“(1) If the terms of a trust do not specify the trustee’s
compensation, a trustee is entitled to compensation that is
reasonable under the circumstances.
“(2) If the terms of a trust specify the trustee’s com-
pensation, the trustee is entitled to be compensated as
specified, but the court may allow more or less compensa-
tion if:
“(a) The duties of the trustee are substantially differ-
ent from those contemplated when the trust was created; or
“(b) The compensation specified by the terms of the
trust would be unreasonably low or high.”
That statute reflects “the court’s inherent equity power to
make adjustments downward or upward in appropriate cir-
cumstances.” Oregon UTC & Comments, 42 Willamette L
see Downs v. Binn, 336 Or App 665, 678, 562 P3d 261 (2024), rev den, 373 Or
712 (2025) (referring to the Oregon UTC & Comments as “setting forth the offi-
cial commentary to the Oregon Uniform Trust Code”). We have previously relied
on the Comments as legislative history for statutory interpretation. See Hunt
v. Goffman, 343 Or App 268, 272, 578 P3d 1265 (2025) (citing the Oregon UTC
& Comments as legislative history for interpretation of trust statutes); Tseng v.
Tseng, 271 Or App 657, 664-65, 668-71, 352 P3d 74, rev den, 358 Or 69 (2015)
(same).
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 45
Rev at 338; see also ORS 130.050 (“A court may intervene in
the administration of a trust to the extent the court’s juris-
diction is invoked by an interested person or as provided
by law. * * * A judicial proceeding may relate to any matter
involving a trust’s administration[.]”). There is nothing in
ORS 130.710(2)(d) that constrains the power of the court to
make such adjustments when it has exerted oversight in the
administration of a trust.
We agree with Molly that the provision in ORS
130.710(2)(d) is intended to function as a check on a trustee
who is operating without court oversight. A Comment to
ORS 130.635 states:
“ORS 130.725(15) grants the trustee authority to fix
and pay the trustee’s compensation without the necessity
of prior court review, subject to the right of a beneficiary
to object to the compensation in a later judicial proceed-
ing. Allowing the trustee to pay the trustee’s compensa-
tion without prior court approval promotes efficient trust
administration but does place a significant burden on a
beneficiary who believes the compensation is unreason-
able. To provide a beneficiary with time to take action, and
because of the importance of trustee’s fees to the benefi-
ciaries’ interests, ORS 130.710(2)(d) requires a trustee to
provide the qualified beneficiaries with advance notice of
any change in the method or rate of the trustee’s compen-
sation. Failure to provide such advance notice constitutes
a breach of trust, which, if sufficiently serious, would jus-
tify the trustee’s removal under ORS 130.625.”
Oregon UTC & Comments, 42 Willamette L Rev at 339.
Here, Molly and Ian were no longer in a position to set
their own compensation. The court had taken control of the
trust administration, had removed the family trustees, had
appointed a professional fiduciary and a forensic accountant,
and was making determinations about the proper manage-
ment of the trust, payment of claims and debts, and dispo-
sition of the trust assets. All of that was within the court’s
inherent authority under ORS 130.050, and, with respect to
trustee compensation, ORS 130.635.
Finally, we address Mary Ann and John’s argu-
ments regarding other states’ interpretation of similar
provisions. ORS 130.710 is modeled on the Uniform Trust
46 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
Code Rule 813, approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. We have been able
to locate only one appellate case nationally that has com-
mented on the corresponding provision as adopted by other
states.7 See Stout v. Arwood, No 313063, 2014 WL 265553
(Mich Ct App 2014). In that case, similar to the situation
here, the trustee had previously collected no fee, but upon
the initiation of litigation, began accounting for his time
and requested that the probate court award him a trustee
fee. Id. at *2. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that
“[b]ecause a change from not collecting trustee compensa-
tion to requesting compensation constitutes a change in the
rate of the trustee’s compensation—from a rate of nothing
to the requested rate—respondent had a duty to notify the
petitioners in advance,” pursuant to the Michigan version
of ORS 130.710(2)(d). Id. at *13. The court held that was
a breach of the trustee’s fiduciary duty to keep the bene-
ficiaries reasonably informed about the administration
of the trust. Id. In light of that breach, the court vacated
the award and remanded the case to the probate court to
consider whether the trustee should be denied fees, or at a
minimum to recalculate the fee to include only those hours
incurred after the beneficiaries had notice of his intent to
collect a fee. Id.
Despite the similarity in facts, we are unconvinced
that we should follow the path established in the Michigan
case. The opinion is unpublished and contains no analysis
of the purpose behind the provision or its role in the greater
context of court supervision of trusts and court authority
to set reasonable trustee fees. We are more convinced that
the notice required by ORS 130.710(2)(d) relates to a trust-
ee’s ability to change their own compensation, outside of the
oversight of the court system.
Because we conclude that the court did not err
under these circumstances regarding Molly and Ian’s legal
entitlement to fees in light of ORS 130.710(2)(d), we affirm
7
We identified one additional case interpreting the provision, from a trial
court in Virginia. Higgerson v. Farthing, 96 Va Cir 58 (2017) (unpublished letter
opinion) (concluding that the trustee’s increase of his own compensation by four
and one-half times the prior rate without adequate notice or explanation as to the
method and rate violated his duty of care).
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 47
on Mary Ann’s second assignment of error and John’s sixth
assignment of error.8
IV. FUNDS ADVANCED BY TIM
In her third assignment of error, Mary Ann
asserts that the trial court erred in determining that funds
advanced to the trust by Tim were loans, and not gifts. We
state the relevant undisputed procedural history that led
to that determination. In the same December 2022 order
that awarded trustee fees to Ian and Molly, the court also
resolved disputes surrounding funds Tim had advanced to
the trust over the years, and that Tim’s estate claimed were
debts owed by the trust. Other family members argued that
the funds had been gifts, and therefore no repayment to
Tim’s estate was required.
In its order, the court stated:
“The Court finds that the funds advanced to the
Trustees and/or the Trust by Tim Meyer were not gifts to
the Trustor, the Trustee, or the beneficiaries of the Trust.
The Court adopts [the forensic accountant’s] analysis
regarding the claim(s) of Tim Meyer’s Estate and approves
the claim in the amount of $2,108,061.00, plus interest
thereon at a rate of 2.5% per annum from January 1, 2022
until paid.”
In the accompanying letter opinion, the court stated that
“these were clearly loans to the Trust and not gifts.”
As noted, Mary Ann asserts that the trial court
erred in determining that funds advanced by Tim were
loans, and not gifts. Mary Ann argues that Tim repeatedly
promised that the funds did not need to be repaid, and that
his estate should be bound by those promises under the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel.
8
We note that John explicitly stated that he was not challenging the amount
of the fees, only the legal entitlement to fees at all. We therefore need not address
the reasonableness of the amount of fees awarded. In her reply brief, Mary Ann
advances an additional argument that the court erred in awarding any fees to
Molly in light of other alleged breaches of duty Molly committed as a trustee.
Because that argument was not advanced in the opening brief, we decline to
reach it. State v. Murga, 291 Or App 462, 468, 422 P3d 417 (2018) (“We have long
held that arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief normally will not be
considered.”).
48 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
Although Mary Ann casts her argument as an issue
of law to be reviewed for legal error, as presented, it is actu-
ally an issue of fact—what was the nature of the money
advanced by Tim? See Neel v. Lee, 316 Or App 159, 172-73,
504 P3d 26 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 733 (2022) (treating the
question of whether funds were a gift or not as a question
of fact to be resolved by the fact finder). Mary Ann does
not advance any argument regarding the legal distinction
between gifts and loans, and roots her argument in factual
assertions regarding the conversations and understanding
between the siblings at the time the monies were advanced
and in the years and decades following. We review issues of
fact for any evidence. Lynch, 285 Or App at 244.
We readily conclude that the record contains evi-
dence supporting the trial court’s findings. The report from
the forensic accountant included six pages analyzing the
claims of Tim’s estate, referencing trust ledgers, deeds,
promissory notes, and other financial documents, as well
as emails, memoranda and declarations of various family
members. The forensic accountant concluded that the funds
constituted loans and not gifts. The court adopted that
analysis and that fact finding is supported by evidence.
With respect to Mary Ann’s assertion that the doc-
trine of promissory estoppel should preclude Tim’s estate from
reneging on Tim’s promise that the funds did not need to be
repaid, we conclude that the doctrine does not apply. Mary
Ann’s argument is premised on her assertion that Tim made
those promises. We interpret the trial court’s factual finding
as rejecting that assertion, in that it concluded that the funds
were “clearly loans.” Absent a promise, the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel does not apply. See Bixler v. First National Bank,
49 Or App 195, 199-200, 619 P2d 895 (1980) (establishing the
four criteria for determining when action renders a promise
enforceable, with the first being the existence of a promise).
We therefore reject Mary Ann’s third assignment of
error.
V. THE FEBRUARY 2024 LIMITED JUDGMENT
We next address the assignments of error that chal-
lenge the court’s declaration of rights relating to the trustees’
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 49
actions and the proposed sale of the property. In August 2020,
when Ian and Molly were still co-trustees, they entered into
a purchase agreement for the sale of the property to Kehoe
Northwest Properties, LLC (Kehoe). Over the years, the
trust and Kehoe executed a number of amendments to the
purchase agreement, but due to ongoing litigation and land
use challenges, the sale had not been completed. In October
2023, Morrow petitioned the court for declaratory relief on a
number of issues relating to the finalization of the sale of the
property to Kehoe. In her petition Morrow noted that, due
to assertions by the beneficiaries and other family members
that the trustee did not have the authority or right to sell
the property, or that doing so would be a breach of fiduciary
duties, the title company designated to close the transaction
had declined to issue title insurance without a declaration
of rights from the court. Morrow therefore requested that
the court enter a judgment resolving the issues so that the
sale could move forward. Various family members filed objec-
tions, and a hearing was held on December 6, 2023.
On February 15, 2024, the trial court issued a lim-
ited judgment granting the requested declaratory relief. The
court declared that the trustee had the power and approval
to sell the property to Kehoe for the agreed upon sales price
and terms; that the purchase agreement as amended was
valid, binding, and in full force and effect; that neither party
was in default under the purchase agreement; that neither
the current nor former trustees had breached any fiduciary
duty to the trust or the beneficiaries with respect to the sale,
and would not commit a breach by completing the sale; and
that the trust would be in default for failing to close and could
potentially incur significant damages or a suit for specific
performance by failing to abide by the purchase agreement.
Both Mary Ann and John challenge various ele-
ments of the court’s declaration of rights. We conclude that
the trial court did not err in any of the ways urged by Mary
Ann or John.
A. Purchase Agreement is Valid
In her fourth assignment of error, Mary Ann chal-
lenges the court’s declaration that the purchase agreement
50 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
was valid, binding, and in full force and effect. She asserts
that the purchase agreement was void for vagueness because
it lacked certainty on material terms, including exactly
which portions of the property were being sold, the purchase
price, and the closing date. Kehoe responds that Mary Ann
is not a party to the contract and therefore has no right to
nullify the agreement when neither party to the agreement
is trying to avoid performance. Alternatively, Kehoe asserts
that the contract is not vague. Assuming without deciding
that Mary Ann can challenge the validity of a contract to
which she is not a party, we conclude that the trial court did
not err in declaring that the purchase agreement was valid,
binding, and in full force and effect.
“Declaratory judgment proceedings seeking the
construction of a contract are legal in nature, and the fac-
tual determinations of the trier of fact are binding on appeal
if there is evidence to support them. We review the construc-
tion of a contract, including whether it is ambiguous, as a
matter of law.” Harris v. Warren Family Properties, LLC,
207 Or App 732, 737, 143 P3d 548 (2006) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted). Whether a contract existed
is a question of law. Ken Hood Construction v. Pacific Coast
Construction, 201 Or App 568, 577, 120 P3d 6 (2005), adh’d
to as modified on recons, 203 Or App 768, 126 P3d 1254,
rev den, 341 Or 366 (2006).
It is well-established that formation of a contract
requires offer and acceptance—a so-called “meeting of the
minds.” Dalton v. Robert Jahn Corp., 209 Or App 120, 132,
146 P3d 399 (2006), rev den, 342 Or 416 (2007) (“At least
as to a contract’s essential terms, a valid contract exists
only when there is a meeting of the minds and where all
terms are either agreed upon or there is a method agreed
upon by which open and disputed terms can be settled, such
that nothing is left for future negotiation.”). Upon finding
that a contract exists, a court has the power to construe
the parties’ rights with respect to that contract. Ken Leahy
Construction, Inc. v. Cascade General, Inc., 329 Or 566, 574,
994 P2d 112 (1999). The situation before us is unique in that
neither party to the contract has alleged a breach on the
part of the other, and no particular remedy has been sought
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 51
nor performance requested. It is simply a matter of the court
declaring that a contract existed and was binding and in
full force. The court did not declare what any of the terms
were. We therefore understand Mary Ann’s challenge to be
to the formation of a contract at all—that the terms laid out
in the purchase agreement and amendments thereto were
too indefinite to establish an enforceable contract.
We disagree. The purchase agreement identifies the
property at issue and establishes the purchase price. Both
parties to the agreement—the trust and Kehoe—agreed to
the terms, and to subsequent amendments. Some of those
terms are conditional, depending on how future events and
decisions play out; but the material terms are established in
the purchase agreement and reflect the parties’ intention to
enter into an agreement for the sale of the property. The fact
that all details of performance have not been established—
largely due to the uncertainty brought about by this con-
tinuing litigation—does not mean that the parties did not
reach an enforceable agreement.
We acknowledge that, in some circumstances, the
lack of specificity in an agreement may be enough to prevent
a court from being able to order specific performance. See,
e.g., Phillips v. Johnson, 266 Or 544, 556-57, 514 P2d 1337
(1973) (concluding that a lack of agreement on certain pro-
visions regarding the sale of land meant the document was
“not an enforceable contract in a court of equity by the rem-
edy of specific performance,” but noting that the court was
not without power to provide some remedy); Booras v. Uyeda,
295 Or 181, 193, 666 P2d 791 (1983) (“A court of equity can-
not, under the guise of ‘filling gaps’ make the contract which
it thinks the parties would have agreed to.”). However, when
a contract contains ambiguities in some particular details,
or when the parties disagree about the meaning of terms, it
is the court’s role to interpret the contract and determine the
obligations of the parties. See generally, Yogman v. Parrott,
325 Or 358, 937 P2d 1019 (1997) (laying out the analytical
framework for contract interpretation). In those situations,
ambiguity or a lack of certainty in some particulars does not
mean that no contract exists.
52 Santana / Meyer v. Morrow
The parties to this particular agreement have not
sought a declaration of each of their rights under the con-
tract, and no one has requested specific performance. Any
uncertainty in the specific terms of how the contract is to
be carried out is not fatal to declaring that a valid contract
was entered into for the sale of the property. The trial court
therefore did not err in declaring that the purchase agree-
ment is valid, binding, and in full force and effect.
B. No Default by Either Party
In addition to her argument that the agreement is
unenforceable, Mary Ann argues in her fourth assignment
of error that the court erred when it declared that neither
party was in default under the purchase agreement. She
asserts that Kehoe was in fact in default, based on its fail-
ure to meet key milestones and obtain the necessary docu-
ments to close. Kehoe asserts that it is not in default in any
of the ways identified by Mary Ann and also maintains that
it is up to the parties to a contract to assert their rights and
hold the other party accountable for breaches of contract.
Kehoe argues that because the trust—the only other party
to the contract—has not taken any steps to hold Kehoe in
default, there was no basis for the court to be required to
declare Kehoe in default.
We conclude that the trial court did not err by
declaring that neither party was in default. The contract
contains terms relating to the breach of provisions, the
waiver of or failure to enforce rights, and procedures for
holding a party accountable for breach, including notice of
default and opportunity for the offending party to cure. All
such provisions are worded in permissive language, in that
a party may take steps to cancel the sale in the event of
a qualifying breach by the other party, but in no way is a
party required to cancel based on a breach by the other side.
It is undisputed that neither of the parties to the purchase
agreement had taken steps at that point in time to hold the
other party in default. Therefore, there is no mechanism for
the court to declare either party in default absent a request
by the other party to enforce the terms of the contract. We
therefore reject Mary Ann’s fourth assignment of error.
Cite as 355 Or App 36 (2026) 53
C. No Violation of Trustee Duty Regarding the Sale
In his seventh assignment of error, John takes issue
with the following declaration by the court:
“5. The current trustee and former co-trustees did
not, and will not by completing the sale, breach any of their
fiduciary duties to the Trust or the beneficiaries thereof
in connection with the sale of the real property, to Kehoe
Northwest Properties LLC, including without limitation,
when determining the amount of property to be sold, the
sales price for such property; and entering into, modifying,
and administering the purchase agreement[.]”
John argues that the court erred in issuing that declaration
because it improperly commented on hypothetical future
actions that are nonjusticiable in a declaratory action and
because it deprived the beneficiaries of their right to a jury
determination on the fact question of whether any trustee
had breached their duties to the beneficiaries in connection
with the sale. We affirm on both arguments.
1. Justiciability
The issue of justiciability is a question of law that
we review for legal error. Board of Cty. Comm. of Columbia
Cty. v. Rosenblum, 324 Or App 221, 231, 526 P3d 798 (2023).
The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act confers on Oregon
courts of record the power to “declare rights, status, and
other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could
be claimed.” ORS 28.010. In order for a court to entertain a
declaratory action, “the complaint must present