Dept. of Human Services v. K. R. G.

No. 1048 October 28, 2026 291 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of C. K. J. R., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. K. R. G., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 24JU03765; A190088 (Control) In the Matter of R. R. H. R., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. K. R. G., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 24JU03766; A190089 Valeri L. Love, Judge. Submitted September 23, 2026. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Jose Garcia-Fuerte, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. JACQUOT, J. Affirmed. 292 Dept. of Human Services v. K. R. G. JACQUOT, J. In this consolidated juvenile dependency case, mother appeals judgments in which the juvenile court changed the permanency plans for her children, C and R, aged 9 and 11 respectively at the time of the permanency hearing, from reunification to adoption. In two assignments of error, mother challenges the court’s rulings that mother’s progress toward reunification was insufficient and changing the children’s plans from reunification to adoption. We affirm. Mother has not requested that we review de novo, and we do not exercise our discretion to engage in such review in this case.1 We are therefore bound by the juvenile court’s findings of historical fact—including what reunifi- cation efforts the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) made and what actions the parent took—if there is any evidence in the record to support them. Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B., 372 Or 133, 151, 546 P3d 255 (2024). We review the juvenile court’s determinations that ODHS’s efforts have been reasonable, that the parent’s progress is insufficient, and that there is no compelling reason to forgo a plan of adoption for errors of law. Dept. of Human Services v. S. J. M., 364 Or 37, 56-57, 430 P3d 1021 (2018) (compelling reasons determination); Dept. of Human Services v. T. R. P., 344 Or App 375, 377, 580 P3d 365 (2025) (reasonable efforts and insufficient progress determinations). Except in specific circumstances not applicable here,2 the juvenile court is authorized to change a child’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption if the pro- ponent of that plan change, typically and in this case ODHS, proves that ODHS’s efforts to reunify the parent and child have been reasonable and that, despite those reasonable 1 See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (“Upon an appeal in an equitable action or proceeding other than an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights, the Court of Appeals, acting in its sole discretion, may try the cause anew upon the record or make one or more factual findings anew upon the record.”); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (providing for the exercise of that discretion only in exceptional cases); ORAP 5.40(8)(d) (identifying nonexclusive considerations that may be relevant to our decision whether to exercise de novo review). 2 Under ORS 419B.340(5), the juvenile court may relieve ODHS of its obli- gation to make reunification efforts in cases in which there are “aggravated cir- cumstances,” the parent has committed certain crimes, or the parent’s rights to another child have been terminated. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 291 (2026) 293 efforts, the parent’s progress toward reunification has been insufficient. ORS 419B.476(2)(a); Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. K., 319 Or App 245, 252, 510 P3d 278 (2022). “[B]oth [ODHS’s] efforts and a parent’s progress are evaluated by reference to the facts that formed the bases for juvenile court jurisdiction.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. T., 247 Or App 706, 715, 271 P3d 143 (2012). That is, the court may only rely on facts that are “explicitly stated or fairly implied by the jurisdictional judgment” in making its determina- tions regarding ODHS’s reunification efforts and the par- ent’s progress. Id. at 715-16. ODHS’s reunification efforts are “reasonable” when they “focus on ameliorating the adjudicated bases for juris- diction” and “give parents a reasonable opportunity to demon- strate their ability to adjust their conduct and become mini- mally adequate parents.” Dept. of Human Services v. L. L. S., 290 Or App 132, 138, 413 P3d 1005 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). A parent need not completely ameliorate the bases for dependency jurisdiction for their progress to be “sufficient.” Y. B., 372 Or at 146. Instead, a parent’s prog- ress is “sufficient” if it would make the child’s safe return home possible, with or without continued services and sup- port. Id. at 154. Conversely, “[e]ven if a parent has completed all services that have been required, evidence that a parent continues to engage in behavior that is harmful to a child supports a determination that the parent has not made suf- ficient progress to make it possible for the child to return home.” Dept. of Human Services v. G. N., 263 Or App 287, 297, 328 P3d 728, rev den, 356 Or 638 (2014). When a juvenile court has determined to change a child’s permanency plan away from reunification, its goal then is to select a plan “that is most likely to lead to a positive outcome for the child.” State ex rel DHS v. M. A. (A139693), 227 Or App 172, 183, 205 P3d 36 (2009). To that end, ORS 419B.476(5) requires the court to address certain issues in the judgment changing a child’s permanency plan. As relevant here, when a child’s plan is being changed to adoption, ORS 419B.476(5)(d) requires the court to address whether any of the circumstances in ORS 419B.498(2) apply. 294 Dept. of Human Services v. K. R. G. ORS 419B.498(2) lists reasons the court may allow ODHS to forgo or delay filing a petition to terminate paren- tal rights in a dependency case, one of which is the existence of a “compelling reason, which is documented in the case plan, for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child or ward.” The statute provides some examples of compelling reasons, one of which is that “[a]nother permanency plan is better suited to meet the health and safety needs of the child or ward, including the need to preserve the child’s or ward’s sibling attach- ments and relationships.” ORS 419B.498(2)(b)(B). The party arguing that a compelling reason exists bears the burden to prove facts that would allow the court to make that determi- nation. S. J. M., 364 Or at 53-55. As noted, mother assigns error to the juvenile court’s ruling that her progress toward reunification was not sufficient and decision to change the children’s permanency plans from reunification to adoption. Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s determina- tions that ODHS made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children and that no compelling reason existed to deter- mine that adoption was not in either child’s best interests. See ORAP 5.45 (providing, in part, “[n]o matter claimed as error will be considered on appeal unless the claim of error was preserved in the lower court and is assigned as error in the opening brief * * *.”). We conclude that the juvenile court did not err in determining that mother’s progress toward reunification was insufficient. We recognize that mother’s providers testified that she is making steady progress toward sobriety and sta- bility and that they seemingly agree that mother’s relapses were isolated instances, rather than evidence of sustained, daily drug use. However, mother has struggled to maintain consistent sobriety throughout her life. Additionally, from October 2024, when the juvenile court took dependency jurisdiction over the children, to December 2025, when the permanency hearing began, mother tested positive for con- trolled substances at least eight times and did not appear for several other urinalyses. These instances of relapse show that mother’s ability to maintain sobriety to a point where she could safely parent her children was at least uncertain at the time of the permanency hearing. See Dept. of Human Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 291 (2026) 295 Services v. J. M., 275 Or App 429, 441, 364 P3d 705 (2015), rev den, 358 Or 833 (2016) (“When a parent has participated in some services, yet there is concern that the parent has not ‘internalized’ better parenting techniques, the ‘dispositive question * * * is not what [a parent] believes, but what [that parent] is likely to do.’ ” (Quoting Dept. of Human Services v. J. M., 260 Or App 261, 268, 317 P3d 402 (2013).)). The juvenile court determined, among other things, that the children felt safe with their relative resource par- ent—where they were currently placed—and were in need of stability and consistency. The children were not likely to be safely returned to mother within a period of time that was reasonable for the children, because mother had not main- tained sobriety for any significant length of time while they had been in care.3 Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in determining that mother’s progress toward reunification was insufficient or in changing the children’s permanency plans from reunification to adoption. Affirmed. 3 ODHS argues that we should reject as unpreserved mother’s argument that the evidence was legally insufficient for the juvenile court to change the per- manency plan away from reunification to adoption. ODHS argues that mother instead preserved a request for the court to continue the reunification plan under ORS 419B.476(4)(c). Having reviewed the record, we reject ODHS’s preservation argument. Citing Y. B., 372 Or at 146, mother argued that she need not have completely ameliorated the bases for jurisdiction for the court to determine that her progress was sufficient and that, given that standard, the evidence did not demonstrate that her progress toward reunification was insufficient. That is essentially the same argument that she advances on appeal.