Full Opinion

122 November 18, 2026 No. 1127 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of the Compensation of Rosie Torrez, Claimant. Rosie TORREZ, Petitioner, v. TRAVEL CENTERS OF AMERICA, Respondent. Workers’ Compensation Board 2300005BF; A186871 Argued and submitted October 7, 2026. Julene M. Quinn argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner. Alexander F. Sargent argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief was MacColl Busch Sato, PC. Before Kamins, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Pagán, Judge. KAMINS, P. J. Reversed and remanded. Cite as 355 Or App 122 (2026) 123 KAMINS, P. J. Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Board awarding $9,500 in attorney fees. Claimant had requested $13,050 in fees and now challenges part of the reduction in fees in a single assignment of error. Claimant contends that the board applied an incorrect legal standard when it refused to award fees for hearing-level counsel’s time spent assisting review-level counsel with cer- tain tasks on review.1 For the reasons discussed below, we reverse and remand. We review the board’s legal conclusions for legal error, its factual findings for substantial evidence, and its exercise of discretion for abuse of discretion. ORS 183.482(8). The board must award “a reasonable attorney fee” where, as here, a request for review before the board is initiated by an employer or insurer and the claimant prevails. ORS 656.382(2) (emphasis added). In determining a reasonable fee, the board must consider the 12 factors given in OAR 438-015-0010(4). To facilitate our review, the board’s order must identify the factors that are applicable and explain how the board weighed them in its decision-making pro- cess. See Acuna v. SAIF, 346 Or App 29, 584 P3d 322 (2025) (reversing and remanding in part because the board’s order did not articulate the connection between the factors consid- ered and the conclusions drawn); Taylor v. SAIF, 295 Or App 199, 433 P3d 419 (2018), rev den, 365 Or 194 (2019) (same). In this case, claimant sought attorney fees for her hearing-level counsel’s time spent assisting her review-level counsel. The board determined that “in the absence of an explanation regarding its necessity,” hearing-level counsel’s time spent reading and editing review-level counsel’s brief and responding to emails from defense counsel regarding briefing did not provide “a reasonable basis for an attorney fee award in this case.” The board’s order also mentioned that it was making its determination in relation to two of the OAR 438-015-0010(4) reasonableness factors: time devoted and complexity of the issues. However, the board did not 1 Claimant also argues that the board violated her due process rights by awarding fees based on a rationale that her opponent did not raise. Because we reverse for other reasons, we do not address claimant’s due process argument. 124 Torrez v. Travel Centers of America explain how or why the complexity of the issues in this case rendered hearing-level counsel’s involvement unreasonable. To the extent that the board concluded that hear- ing-level counsel’s involvement was unreasonable because claimant had not shown that it was necessary, the board applied an incorrect legal standard. See Bowman v. SAIF Corp., 278 Or App 417, 374 P3d 1008 (2016) (holding that the board committed legal error when it considered attor- ney time spent at a particular stage of the review process categorically unreasonable). Necessity is not one of the OAR 438-015-0010(4) reasonableness factors, and something does not necessarily have to be “necessary” to be “reason- able.” We therefore reverse and remand to the board to reconsider whether claimant’s fee is reasonable. See ORS 656.382(2) (“[T]he employer or insurer shall be required to pay the attorney of the claimant a reasonable attorney fee in an amount set by the * * * board.”). Reversed and remanded.