State v. M. M. M.

98 September 23, 2026 No. 877 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of M. M. M., a Youth. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. M. M. M., Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 23JU00342, 23JU00347, 24JU01588, 24JU02087; A187585 (Control), A187586, A187587, A187588 Thomas A. Goldman, Judge pro tempore. Argued and submitted August 19, 2026. Christa Obold Eshleman argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Youth, Rights & Justice. Patricia G. Rincon, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. LAGESEN, C. J. Reversed and remanded. Cite as 353 Or App 98 (2026) 99 LAGESEN, C. J. Youth appeals a dispositional order revoking her probation in all cases and committing her to the custody of Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) for placement in a youth cor- rectional facility for a total period not to exceed four years, less four days. See ORS 419C.478(1); ORS 419C.495. We reverse and remand. We review for abuse of discretion the juvenile court’s determination that commitment to OYA for placement in a youth correctional facility is in a youth’s best interests. State v. T. J. L., 335 Or App 477, 483, 558 P3d 855 (2024), adh’d to as modified on recons, 337 Or App 600, 564 P3d 503 (2025); see also State v. C. J. W., 345 Or App 531, 535, 583 P3d 1074 (2025), rev den, 375 Or 109 (2026). Pertinent to this appeal, where a juvenile court grounds a discretionary decision on a factual determination that is not supported by legally suf- ficient evidence, the court acts outside its permissible range of discretion. State v. N. K. H., 341 Or App 78, 80, 572 P3d 349, rev den, 374 Or 437 (2025). The juvenile court’s determination that commit- ment of youth to OYA custody for placement in a youth correctional facility was in youth’s best interest rested expressly on its determination that the placement would pro- vide youth with needed mental health and substance abuse treatment, and also that it would “create an opportunity for long term treatment completion, where the youth has histor- ically struggled.” Certainly, where, as here, repeated efforts to provide treatment in less restrictive settings have failed, such a determination could be within the juvenile court’s discretion if the evidence showed that the commitment to OYA for placement in a youth correctional facility would result in youth receiving needed treatment. See Restatement of Children and the Law § 12.01 comment g (2026) (“A more restrictive environment may also be justified if it provides close supervision and structure that cannot be provided effectively in the community and if the program provides the services needed.” (Emphasis added.)). The problem here, as youth points out, is that there is no evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s 100 State v. M. M. M. determination that the treatment services youth needs are ones that OYA provides in its facilities. The state does not dispute the point. Instead, it directs our attention to OYA’s statutory obligation to conduct intake assessments to argue that it was permissible for the court to infer from that stat- utory obligation that youth would receive any needed treat- ment; the state also notes that the record indicates that the parties had discussed placing youth in a facility that would permit access to whatever treatment was available at that particular facility. But general statutory obligations and off-the-record discussions are not evidence that allow for a factual finding that, if committed to OYA for placement in a youth correctional facility, youth will receive the services that she needs. Therefore, because the juvenile court’s best- interests determination rests on a factual finding without evidentiary support, the determination is outside the court’s range of permissible discretion and must be reversed. Our conclusion that the juvenile court’s best- interests determination rests on an unsupported factual finding obviates the need to address youth’s second assign- ment of error, which challenges the duration of her commit- ment to OYA custody. Below and on appeal, youth challenges the duration of that commitment on constitutional grounds. We remind the parties that it is well-established that an Oregon court will not resolve constitutional issues when there is a subconstitutional ground for a decision. See, e.g., Leo v. Keisling, 327 Or 556, 562, 964 P2d 1023 (1998). Thus, if the same issue arises on remand, the juvenile court and parties should first address any statutory constraints on the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion to impose consecutive terms of commitment, including whether the juvenile court must exercise its discretion in a manner that reflects that its decision regarding the duration of the commitment to OYA is “based on the specific circumstances and rehabili- tative needs of the youth in each case.” State v. B. Y., 371 Or 364, 383, 537 P3d 517 (2023). Reversed and remanded.