Full Opinion

No. 1138 November 18, 2026 211 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of the Henry A. Meyer Revocable Living Trust. John MEYER, Appellant, v. Michelle MORROW; Molly Meyer; James L. Meyer; Mary Ann Meyer Santana; Jane Meyer; Quinn Meyer; Annabelle Ahouiyek; Miranda Spackman; John P. Santana; J. Kevin Shuba, Garrett Hemann Robertson, P.C.; Heather O. Gilmore, P.C.; Jan Kitchel; and Kehoe Properties Northwest LLC, Respondents. Marion County Circuit Court 19PB06270; A186774 Thomas M. Hart, Judge. Argued and submitted August 27, 2026. Thomas M. Christ argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Sussman Shank LLP. Gina Anne Johnnie argued the cause for respondent Jane Meyer. Also on the brief was Sherman Sherman Johnnie & Hoyt, LLP. Bryce M. Brown argued the cause for respondent Mary Ann Meyer Santana. Also on the brief was Janet Larsen. J. Kevin Shuba argued the cause for respondents J. Kevin Shuba and Garrett Hemann Robertson, P. C. Bradley T. Crittenden, Joseph M. Winsby and Chenoweth Law Group, PC filed the brief for respondent Kehoe Properties Northwest, LLC. Jan K. Kitchel waived appearance. 212 Meyer v. Morrow No appearance for respondents Peter B. Meyer, Michelle Morrow, Molly Meyer, James L. Meyer, Quinn Meyer, Annabelle Ahouiyek, Miranda Spackman, John P. Santana, and Heather O. Gilmore PC. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. SHORR, P. J. Reversed and remanded. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 211 (2026) 213 SHORR, P. J. This appeal concerns a limited judgment entered on January 15, 2025, in this trust administration case. Appellant John Meyer argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the limited judgment because it addresses the same “cause” that was addressed in a 2024 limited judgment that was on appeal before us at the time. We conclude that the court did not lack jurisdiction to issue the limited judgment as to some parts of that judgment, but that some of the language of the limited judgment does not align with the matters that the court intended to cover and therefore veered into the cause that was pending in this court, over which the trial court did not have jurisdiction. We therefore reverse and remand. In a separate opinion issued today, Santana/Meyer v. Morrow, 355 Or App 36, ___ P3d ___ (2026), we discuss the history of this family dispute, and we only briefly dis- cuss that matter here to give context to our decision. The primary dispute was over the powers of the trustee of a fam- ily trust, and the surviving beneficiaries’ disagreement over whether the trustee was empowered to sell the family farm, the last remaining asset of the trust, to a developer, Kehoe Northwest Properties, LLC (Kehoe). In February 2024, the trial court issued a limited judgment that included a num- ber of declarations regarding the authority of the trustee to sell the property and the validity of the purchase agreement between the trust and Kehoe. The limited judgment also made a number of prior orders of the court appealable. Two beneficiaries, Mary Ann and John,1 filed separate appeals challenging various aspects of the limited judgment and prior orders. While those appeals were pending, administration of the trust and maintenance of the property continued to be an issue. In April 2024, the independent trustee filed a final report and submitted her resignation as trustee, and requested a general judgment of distribution and an award of attorney fees. In her filing, the trustee noted that the 1 As in the other case, we refer to the family member parties by their first names due to most of them sharing a common surname. 214 Meyer v. Morrow trust was not ready for distribution in the traditional sense because of outstanding legal issues related to the disposi- tion of the trust’s only asset, but noted that there were no liquid funds available to continue to pay the trustee and counsel for the trustee for their continued services. The fil- ing set forth a number of possible routes that the court could take in response to the current state of the trust. Various family members filed objections, and a hearing was held on September 27, 2024. At the hearing, the court stated that it was allowing the trustee’s resignation, and concluded that the proper course of action with respect to the property was for the trustee to execute a deed transferring the property to Kehoe, but that the deed be held in escrow until the legal challenges were complete. Months passed as the parties debated the appropri- ate text of the proposed judgment to submit to the court. Another hearing was held on January 15, 2025, during which the court heard further argument regarding the wording of the judgment and made redline changes to the text. During that hearing, the court affirmed that it only had jurisdiction over issues that were not being addressed at the Court of Appeals, and indicated that future orders would be made once there was an answer from the Court of Appeals as to how it could proceed. The court ultimately issued a limited judgment that stated: “1. Pursuant to ORS 130.620, 130.630(2), ORS 130.720, ORS 130.725, and ORS 130.730, the Trustee is instructed to execute a deed in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A as necessary to transfer title of the real property held by the Trustee that is subject to the purchase and sale agreement with Kehoe Northwest Properties, LLC (‘Kehoe’). Said deed shall be to Kehoe, shall be held in escrow, and shall not effectuate a transfer of ownership to Kehoe until such time as it is recorded or delivered to Kehoe. The deed shall be recorded or delivered to Kehoe when: (a) in the judgment of the court or a successor trustee, the appeals are resolved, the obligations of the parties and the conditions set forth in the purchase and sale agreement have been performed, satisfied, waived, excused, or otherwise discharged, and Kehoe authorizes and is willing to accept such recording or delivery; or (b) the court or a successor trustee has further ordered or authorized such recording or delivery to Kehoe. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 211 (2026) 215 This limited judgment does not prejudice any of Kehoe’s rights or claims related to the purchase and sale agree- ment, which Kehoe reserves.”2 John filed this appeal. The issue before us is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the 2025 limited judgment while the 2024 limited judgment was pending on appeal. The issue of jurisdiction is a legal question, and we review the trial court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction for legal error. Stachlowski v. 1000 Broadway Building LP, 305 Or App 174, 185, 470 P3d 376 (2020). Under ORS 19.270(1), “[t]he Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the cause when the notice of appeal has been served and filed[.]” However, under ORS 19.270(7), “[i]f a limited or supplemental judgment is appealed, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited to the matters decided by the limited or supplemental judg- ment, and the trial court retains jurisdiction over all other matters in the proceeding.” The 2024 judgment was a lim- ited judgment; therefore we had jurisdiction over the mat- ters decided therein, and the trial court retained jurisdic- tion over all other matters related to the administration of the trust. John, joined by Mary Ann, argues that the validity of the 2025 limited judgment depends on the outcome of the other appeals, namely the trustee’s authority to complete the sale of the property to Kehoe. John maintains that that demonstrates that the 2025 limited judgment encroached on the matters for which we had jurisdiction, and thus the trial court did not have jurisdiction and the limited judg- ment is void. Specifically, John points to the conditions for recording or delivery of the deed to Kehoe, in that although part (a) states that release is contingent upon resolution of the appeals, it does not set forth that those appeals must be resolved in any particular way. He further argues that part (b) on its face authorizes the court or a successor trustee to 2 The judgment also contained items approving the trustee’s resignation, instructing the trustee to provide final bank statements to the beneficiaries, and deferring ruling on other pending matters until entry of a general judgment. The parties do not challenge those items in this appeal. 216 Meyer v. Morrow authorize delivery or recording of the deed, regardless of any outcome of the appeals. Effectively, John asserts that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a judg- ment that would allow for the property to be sold to Kehoe while the propriety of the sale to Kehoe was still pending on appeal. The opposing parties respond that John misrep- resents the nature of the limited judgment, and that any further action to complete the sale by delivering the deed to Kehoe is clearly contingent upon resolution of the appeals, and did nothing more than provide instructions for an administrative path forward once the appeals were resolved. At oral argument before us, counsel admitted that the judg- ment was “not artfully written,” but maintained that the intent was that no finalization of the transfer of the deed would occur without an order from the court and without the appeals being resolved in a manner allowing for the trans- fer. Kehoe maintains that if the other appeals are resolved in John and Mary Ann’s favor, the deed would be void and returned to a newly-appointed trustee; but if the appeals are affirmed, then the deed could be recorded and delivered to Kehoe in accordance with the 2025 limited judgment. The trial court did not lack jurisdiction to allow the trustee to resign and to order a deed placed in escrow. Those were new issues of trust administration that were not addressed in the 2024 limited judgment and were not pending on appeal before us. It is abundantly clear from the statements made by the court at the September 2024 and January 2025 hearings that the court’s intent was to fashion a solution for the new problem of the resignation of the trustee, and to wait for full resolution of all appeals of the prior limited judgment and abide by all directives of the appellate courts, and not to encroach on the jurisdiction of our court. However, on its face, the language of the judgment does not state what was the clear intent of the court. The judgment allows for the transfer of the deed without the final resolution of the appeals in a manner allowing for such transfer. Particularly clause (b), stating that the deed shall be recorded or delivered to Kehoe when the court or a Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 211 (2026) 217 successor trustee has ordered or authorized such recording or delivery, fails to condition such a transfer on the comple- tion of the appeals at all. In an opinion issued today, we have decided the other consolidated appeals and have affirmed the 2024 lim- ited judgment on all bases. Although we do not doubt from its past oversight of this trust that the trial court will await a final appellate judgment in the other matter before allow- ing the transfer of the deed out of escrow, John is correct that any judgment from the trial court is binding and must accurately reflect the then-existing rights and obligations of the parties. Because the language of the 2025 limited judg- ment strayed into matters that were the exclusive jurisdic- tion of our court, and because the litigation is not yet com- plete, we reverse and remand the 2025 limited judgment. Reversed and remanded.