Meyer v. Morrow
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA186774
JudgeShorr
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1138 November 18, 2026 211
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
In the Matter of the Henry A. Meyer Revocable Living Trust.
John MEYER,
Appellant,
v.
Michelle MORROW;
Molly Meyer; James L. Meyer; Mary Ann Meyer Santana;
Jane Meyer; Quinn Meyer; Annabelle Ahouiyek;
Miranda Spackman; John P. Santana; J. Kevin Shuba,
Garrett Hemann Robertson, P.C.; Heather O. Gilmore, P.C.;
Jan Kitchel; and Kehoe Properties Northwest LLC,
Respondents.
Marion County Circuit Court
19PB06270; A186774
Thomas M. Hart, Judge.
Argued and submitted August 27, 2026.
Thomas M. Christ argued the cause for appellant. Also
on the briefs was Sussman Shank LLP.
Gina Anne Johnnie argued the cause for respondent Jane
Meyer. Also on the brief was Sherman Sherman Johnnie &
Hoyt, LLP.
Bryce M. Brown argued the cause for respondent Mary
Ann Meyer Santana. Also on the brief was Janet Larsen.
J. Kevin Shuba argued the cause for respondents J. Kevin
Shuba and Garrett Hemann Robertson, P. C.
Bradley T. Crittenden, Joseph M. Winsby and Chenoweth
Law Group, PC filed the brief for respondent Kehoe
Properties Northwest, LLC.
Jan K. Kitchel waived appearance.
212 Meyer v. Morrow
No appearance for respondents Peter B. Meyer, Michelle
Morrow, Molly Meyer, James L. Meyer, Quinn Meyer,
Annabelle Ahouiyek, Miranda Spackman, John P. Santana,
and Heather O. Gilmore PC.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
SHORR, P. J.
Reversed and remanded.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 211 (2026) 213
SHORR, P. J.
This appeal concerns a limited judgment entered
on January 15, 2025, in this trust administration case.
Appellant John Meyer argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the limited judgment because it
addresses the same “cause” that was addressed in a 2024
limited judgment that was on appeal before us at the time.
We conclude that the court did not lack jurisdiction to issue
the limited judgment as to some parts of that judgment, but
that some of the language of the limited judgment does not
align with the matters that the court intended to cover and
therefore veered into the cause that was pending in this
court, over which the trial court did not have jurisdiction.
We therefore reverse and remand.
In a separate opinion issued today, Santana/Meyer
v. Morrow, 355 Or App 36, ___ P3d ___ (2026), we discuss
the history of this family dispute, and we only briefly dis-
cuss that matter here to give context to our decision. The
primary dispute was over the powers of the trustee of a fam-
ily trust, and the surviving beneficiaries’ disagreement over
whether the trustee was empowered to sell the family farm,
the last remaining asset of the trust, to a developer, Kehoe
Northwest Properties, LLC (Kehoe). In February 2024, the
trial court issued a limited judgment that included a num-
ber of declarations regarding the authority of the trustee to
sell the property and the validity of the purchase agreement
between the trust and Kehoe. The limited judgment also
made a number of prior orders of the court appealable. Two
beneficiaries, Mary Ann and John,1 filed separate appeals
challenging various aspects of the limited judgment and
prior orders.
While those appeals were pending, administration
of the trust and maintenance of the property continued to
be an issue. In April 2024, the independent trustee filed a
final report and submitted her resignation as trustee, and
requested a general judgment of distribution and an award
of attorney fees. In her filing, the trustee noted that the
1
As in the other case, we refer to the family member parties by their first
names due to most of them sharing a common surname.
214 Meyer v. Morrow
trust was not ready for distribution in the traditional sense
because of outstanding legal issues related to the disposi-
tion of the trust’s only asset, but noted that there were no
liquid funds available to continue to pay the trustee and
counsel for the trustee for their continued services. The fil-
ing set forth a number of possible routes that the court could
take in response to the current state of the trust. Various
family members filed objections, and a hearing was held on
September 27, 2024. At the hearing, the court stated that it
was allowing the trustee’s resignation, and concluded that
the proper course of action with respect to the property was
for the trustee to execute a deed transferring the property
to Kehoe, but that the deed be held in escrow until the legal
challenges were complete.
Months passed as the parties debated the appropri-
ate text of the proposed judgment to submit to the court.
Another hearing was held on January 15, 2025, during
which the court heard further argument regarding the
wording of the judgment and made redline changes to the
text. During that hearing, the court affirmed that it only
had jurisdiction over issues that were not being addressed
at the Court of Appeals, and indicated that future orders
would be made once there was an answer from the Court
of Appeals as to how it could proceed. The court ultimately
issued a limited judgment that stated:
“1. Pursuant to ORS 130.620, 130.630(2), ORS 130.720,
ORS 130.725, and ORS 130.730, the Trustee is instructed to
execute a deed in the form attached hereto as Exhibit A as
necessary to transfer title of the real property held by the
Trustee that is subject to the purchase and sale agreement
with Kehoe Northwest Properties, LLC (‘Kehoe’). Said deed
shall be to Kehoe, shall be held in escrow, and shall not
effectuate a transfer of ownership to Kehoe until such time
as it is recorded or delivered to Kehoe. The deed shall be
recorded or delivered to Kehoe when: (a) in the judgment of
the court or a successor trustee, the appeals are resolved,
the obligations of the parties and the conditions set forth
in the purchase and sale agreement have been performed,
satisfied, waived, excused, or otherwise discharged, and
Kehoe authorizes and is willing to accept such recording or
delivery; or (b) the court or a successor trustee has further
ordered or authorized such recording or delivery to Kehoe.
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 211 (2026) 215
This limited judgment does not prejudice any of Kehoe’s
rights or claims related to the purchase and sale agree-
ment, which Kehoe reserves.”2
John filed this appeal.
The issue before us is whether the trial court had
jurisdiction to enter the 2025 limited judgment while the
2024 limited judgment was pending on appeal. The issue
of jurisdiction is a legal question, and we review the trial
court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction for legal error.
Stachlowski v. 1000 Broadway Building LP, 305 Or App 174,
185, 470 P3d 376 (2020).
Under ORS 19.270(1), “[t]he Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the cause when the
notice of appeal has been served and filed[.]” However, under
ORS 19.270(7), “[i]f a limited or supplemental judgment is
appealed, the jurisdiction of the appellate court is limited
to the matters decided by the limited or supplemental judg-
ment, and the trial court retains jurisdiction over all other
matters in the proceeding.” The 2024 judgment was a lim-
ited judgment; therefore we had jurisdiction over the mat-
ters decided therein, and the trial court retained jurisdic-
tion over all other matters related to the administration of
the trust.
John, joined by Mary Ann, argues that the validity
of the 2025 limited judgment depends on the outcome of the
other appeals, namely the trustee’s authority to complete
the sale of the property to Kehoe. John maintains that that
demonstrates that the 2025 limited judgment encroached
on the matters for which we had jurisdiction, and thus the
trial court did not have jurisdiction and the limited judg-
ment is void. Specifically, John points to the conditions for
recording or delivery of the deed to Kehoe, in that although
part (a) states that release is contingent upon resolution of
the appeals, it does not set forth that those appeals must be
resolved in any particular way. He further argues that part
(b) on its face authorizes the court or a successor trustee to
2
The judgment also contained items approving the trustee’s resignation,
instructing the trustee to provide final bank statements to the beneficiaries, and
deferring ruling on other pending matters until entry of a general judgment. The
parties do not challenge those items in this appeal.
216 Meyer v. Morrow
authorize delivery or recording of the deed, regardless of any
outcome of the appeals. Effectively, John asserts that the
trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it issued a judg-
ment that would allow for the property to be sold to Kehoe
while the propriety of the sale to Kehoe was still pending on
appeal.
The opposing parties respond that John misrep-
resents the nature of the limited judgment, and that any
further action to complete the sale by delivering the deed to
Kehoe is clearly contingent upon resolution of the appeals,
and did nothing more than provide instructions for an
administrative path forward once the appeals were resolved.
At oral argument before us, counsel admitted that the judg-
ment was “not artfully written,” but maintained that the
intent was that no finalization of the transfer of the deed
would occur without an order from the court and without the
appeals being resolved in a manner allowing for the trans-
fer. Kehoe maintains that if the other appeals are resolved
in John and Mary Ann’s favor, the deed would be void and
returned to a newly-appointed trustee; but if the appeals are
affirmed, then the deed could be recorded and delivered to
Kehoe in accordance with the 2025 limited judgment.
The trial court did not lack jurisdiction to allow
the trustee to resign and to order a deed placed in escrow.
Those were new issues of trust administration that were
not addressed in the 2024 limited judgment and were not
pending on appeal before us. It is abundantly clear from
the statements made by the court at the September 2024
and January 2025 hearings that the court’s intent was to
fashion a solution for the new problem of the resignation of
the trustee, and to wait for full resolution of all appeals of
the prior limited judgment and abide by all directives of the
appellate courts, and not to encroach on the jurisdiction of
our court.
However, on its face, the language of the judgment
does not state what was the clear intent of the court. The
judgment allows for the transfer of the deed without the
final resolution of the appeals in a manner allowing for
such transfer. Particularly clause (b), stating that the deed
shall be recorded or delivered to Kehoe when the court or a
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 355 Or App 211 (2026) 217
successor trustee has ordered or authorized such recording
or delivery, fails to condition such a transfer on the comple-
tion of the appeals at all.
In an opinion issued today, we have decided the
other consolidated appeals and have affirmed the 2024 lim-
ited judgment on all bases. Although we do not doubt from
its past oversight of this trust that the trial court will await
a final appellate judgment in the other matter before allow-
ing the transfer of the deed out of escrow, John is correct
that any judgment from the trial court is binding and must
accurately reflect the then-existing rights and obligations of
the parties. Because the language of the 2025 limited judg-
ment strayed into matters that were the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of our court, and because the litigation is not yet com-
plete, we reverse and remand the 2025 limited judgment.
Reversed and remanded.