State v. Gomez
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA182244
JudgePowers
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1124 November 18, 2026 97
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZ GOMEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Yamhill County Circuit Court
22CR43949; A182244
Ladd J. Wiles, Judge.
Submitted April 8, 2026.
Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate
Section, and Nora Coon, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon
Public Defense Commission, filed the briefs for appellant.
Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Leigh A. Salmon,
Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and
O’Connor, Judge.
POWERS, J.
Reversed and remanded.
98 State v. Gomez
POWERS, J.
Defendant appeals from the trial court’s order deny-
ing his motion for return of property under ORS 133.633 as
moot. Law enforcement seized cash from defendant after he
was arrested. The state later dismissed the charges, and
defendant sought the return of his seized property. Although
the trial court found that the sheriff’s office no longer had the
money it seized from defendant, we conclude that the trial
court erred in dismissing defendant’s motion as moot, as a
decision on the merits of the motion would have a practical
effect on the rights of the parties. Accordingly, we reverse
and remand.
The pertinent facts are relatively few and undis-
puted. Defendant and 11 codefendants were arrested in
Yamhill County and charged with drug-related offenses.
Law enforcement seized either $954.31 or $1,280.00 in
cash from defendant during his arrest, and an evidence
technician from the Yamhill County Sheriff’s Office logged
the cash as evidence.1 At the request of someone from the
United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), a Yamhill
County detective gave a bag of undifferentiated cash seized
from defendant and his eleven codefendants to a DEA agent.
Defendant did not receive any notice of the transfer, and the
sheriff’s office did not initiate a forfeiture action related to
the cash that it had seized from defendant.
The state later dismissed the charges against
defendant, and he subsequently filed the underlying motion
for return of the property seized because his criminal case
had been dismissed and the money was no longer needed for
evidentiary purposes. See ORS 133.643(4) (providing that a
motion for the return or restoration of things seized “shall
be based on the ground that the movant has a valid claim
to rightful possession” because “they are no longer needed
for evidentiary purposes”). At the hearing on the motion,
there was no dispute that defendant was entitled to the
1
The parties disagree about the amount seized, with the state offering evi-
dence that it was $953.31 and defendant testifying that it was $1,280.00. The
trial court did not make a factual finding on the dispute, and we need not resolve
that dispute on appeal. On remand, the trial court will have an opportunity to
address that unresolved issue.
Cite as 355 Or App 97 (2026) 99
seized cash, that the state never provided defendant with
any notice of the transfer of money, and that the state never
initiated forfeiture proceedings. Defendant argued that
the Yamhill County Sheriff’s Office lacked the authority to
transfer his seized money to the DEA and asked the court
to order that the sheriff’s office return his money. The trial
court determined that the Yamhill County Sheriff’s Office
no longer possessed defendant’s cash and denied defendant’s
motion as moot. Defendant timely appeals.
On appeal, appointed counsel filed an opening brief
in accordance with State v. Balfour, 311 Or 434, 814 P2d 1069
(1991), that did not contain a Section B. See ORAP 5.90(1)(b)(i)
(explaining that Section B “is the client’s product and may
contain any claim of error that the client wishes to assert”).
After reviewing that brief and the record, we asked for sup-
plemental briefing on whether the trial court erred in con-
cluding that defendant’s motion under ORS 133.633 for
return of money seized was moot based on the fact that the
Yamhill County Sheriff’s Office had transferred the money
to the DEA. The supplemental opening brief raises a single
assignment of error that challenges the trial court’s mootness
determination and further contends that, even if the chal-
lenge were moot, we should decide the case under ORS 14.175.
Defendant argues that his motion was not rendered moot by
the transfer of his money to the DEA, as the Yamhill County
Sheriff’s Office could have complied with an order from the
trial court to pay defendant the amount of money seized.
For its part, the state remonstrates that the denial
of the motion is reviewable by us only upon certification that
the items are no longer needed for evidentiary purposes,
that defendant’s arguments are unpreserved and he did not
ask for plain-error review, that the trial court correctly con-
cluded that defendant’s motion was moot because ordering
the return of his money was impossible, that his fungibil-
ity argument is insufficiently developed, and that defen-
dant failed to establish the required elements for review of
a moot challenge under ORS 14.175. In an amended reply
brief, defendant notes that shortly after the state filed its
answering brief, the trial court issued an order granting
certification that the money that was subject to the motion
100 State v. Gomez
for return of things seized was no longer needed for eviden-
tiary purposes.
We review a trial court’s mootness determination
for legal error. Garges v. Premo, 362 Or 797, 801, 421 P3d
345 (2018). As explained below, because a ruling on the mer-
its of defendant’s motion will have some practical effect on
the rights of the parties, we conclude that the trial court
erred in deciding that the motion was moot. Accordingly, we
reverse and remand.
It is axiomatic that a claim is moot when “a court’s
decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning
the rights of the parties.” Eastern Oregon Mining Association
v. DEQ, 360 Or 10, 15, 376 P3d 288 (2016). Whether a claim
is moot “will depend on a factual determination regarding
the potential impact of the court’s decision on the parties.”
Garges, 362 Or at 802. Here, given that there is no factual
dispute that defendant was entitled to the seized money, a
ruling on the legal entitlement to a return of the property
seized would have a practical effect on defendant’s rights.
That is, if the trial court granted the motion, defendant
would have an order demonstrating his legal right to the
property. Assuming that the order was presented to the
Yamhill County Sheriff’s Office, the county could provide its
response on how it would comply with the order.
To the extent that the state contends that the trial
court did not err because it was “impossible” to return the
seized money, we reject the underlying premise of that argu-
ment. In our view, that argument appears to misapprehend
the role of impossibility in the mootness analysis. In the
context of the mootness analysis, impossibility refers to a
court’s inability to grant effectual relief, not to a party’s
potential inability to comply with the relief granted. See,
e.g., Hamel v. Johnson, 330 Or 180, 184, 998 P2d 661 (2000)
(observing that a case becomes moot “when an event occurs
that renders it impossible for the court to grant effectual
relief” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).
As illustrated by the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Hamel and Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 848 P2d 1194
(1993), the mootness analysis turns on whether a court’s
Cite as 355 Or App 97 (2026) 101
decision on the merits has some practical effect on the rights
of the parties to the controversy. See Brumnett, 315 Or at
406 (noting that even if a case is otherwise justiciable, a
case will be dismissed as moot if the court’s decision “no lon-
ger will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of
the parties”). The potential impossibility of a party’s ability
to comply with a court’s order does not transform a court’s
decision into an abstract, hypothetical, or contingent ques-
tion. Here, the abstract question of whether the sheriff’s
office could comply with a court order granting defendant’s
motion is separate and distinct from the actual question of
whether the court’s decision would have a practical effect on
the rights of the parties. That is, if defendant were to pre-
vail on the merits of his motion, he would be entitled to an
order demonstrating his legal right to the money seized by
law enforcement. Thus, the court’s decision would still have
some practical effect on the rights of the parties.
Moreover, we reject the state’s argument that it is
“impossible” to return the money because that argument is
both premature and goes beyond the narrow issue in this
appeal. First, it is premature to predicate an order for the
return of seized items upon the parties’ hypothetical abil-
ity to comply with that order. That is, if he were success-
ful, defendant would be entitled to his money. The court’s
order on his motion to return money seized would have a
practical effect on his rights. Thus, defendant’s motion was
not moot, regardless of the court’s conclusions regarding the
hypothetical ability of the sheriff’s office to comply. Second,
because the narrow issue in this appeal is whether defen-
dant’s motion was moot, we do not reach the merits of the
state’s impossibility argument or address the impact, if
any, of the transfer of defendant’s cash from the sheriff’s
office to the DEA. As a result, we do not opine on what rem-
edies, if any, defendant or the county may have to enforce
or resist the order. Although it may be true, as the state’s
brief suggests, that defendant could have received the seized
money through a federal government process, that possibil-
ity does not necessarily render the trial court’s decision on
the motion moot. There may be further litigation to enforce
the order that the parties will engage in, but in all events a
ruling on the merits of defendant’s motion was not moot.
102 State v. Gomez
In short, our decision focuses on the trial court’s
dismissal of the motion as moot, which we conclude was
erroneous because a ruling will have a practical effect on
the rights of the parties. Because we resolve this matter by
concluding that defendant’s motion was not moot, we do not
address the parties’ other arguments.
Reversed and remanded.