State v. J. H. W.

No. 1059 October 28, 2026 331 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of J. H. W., a Youth. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. J. H. W., Appellant. Linn County Circuit Court 24JU04143; A187179 Brendan J. Kane, Judge. Argued and submitted October 7, 2026. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, and Stacy Marie Du Clos, Deputy Public Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Greg Rios, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Kamins, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Pagán, Judge. PER CURIAM Reversed. 332 State v. J. H. W. PER CURIAM In this juvenile delinquency proceeding, youth chal- lenges his adjudication for conduct that, if committed by an adult, would constitute harassment, ORS 166.065, and second-degree disorderly conduct, ORS 166.025. On appeal, youth argues that the evidence was insufficient to support that adjudication. We agree and reverse. The facts are not materially disputed. Youth was driving a pickup truck, and his passenger fired a gel-blast- er—a toy gun that fires gelatinous balls—at a bystander and hit her in the face and neck. Youth made eye contact with the bystander. Although youth initially told police that he did not have a gel-blaster, he admitted to possessing one when the officer asked if he could look inside youth’s truck. He then said that he bought it two days after the incident but then admitted he bought it two or three weeks prior. He also initially denied having a passenger in his truck when the shots were fired, but eventually admitted to the pres- ence of a passenger. On appeal, youth argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish accomplice liability for either harassment or second-degree disorderly conduct. To estab- lish accomplice liability, the evidence required a showing that youth possessed specific intent “to promote or facilitate the commission” of either of those crimes. ORS 161.155(2). Youth acknowledges that he drove the truck from which the gel-blaster was fired and further acknowledges that the gel- blaster was his, but he argues that the record lacks any evi- dence from which a factfinder could infer that he knew that his passenger would fire the gel-blaster and, therefore, the record lacks sufficient evidence for a factfinder to find that he had the specific intent to ‘promote or facilitate’ either crime. The state responds that the fact that youth owned the gel-blaster supports the inference that youth “furnished” the gel-blaster for the passenger’s use and that the fact that youth lied about owning the gel-blaster at the time of the incident supports an inference that he was trying to conceal his involvement in the passenger’s activity. We agree with youth. That youth’s gel-blaster was located in youth’s car when a passenger used it, without Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 331 (2026) 333 more, does not support an inference that youth intended to promote or facilitate the passenger firing the gel-blaster out the window. And the fact that youth was not forthcoming with police about owning the blaster—after he was aware that someone used it to hit a bystander—does not speak to whether youth promoted or facilitated its use against that bystander. Reversed.