Full Opinion

No. 1028 October 21, 2026 137 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of J. C. aka V. C., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. I. L. C., Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 25JU04021; A189980 (Control) In the Matter of Y. C. W., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. I. L. C., Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 25JU04022; A189983 In the Matter of K. C. W., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. I. L. C., Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 25JU04023; A189984 Xiomara Y. Torres, Judge. 138 Dept. of Human Services v. I. L. C. Argued and submitted September 23, 2026. Sean Connor, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. PER CURIAM Reversed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 137 (2026) 139 PER CURIAM In this consolidated juvenile dependency case, mother appeals judgments asserting dependency jurisdic- tion over her children, K, M, and J, who were 14, 10, and 4 years old, respectively, at the time of the jurisdiction trial. In a combined argument supporting nine assignments of error, mother challenges the individual bases on which the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over each child, as well as the ultimate ruling to assert dependency jurisdiction over each child. As explained below, we agree with mother and reverse the judgments. In reviewing a juvenile court’s assertion of depen- dency jurisdiction, we “view the evidence, as supplemented and buttressed by permissible derivative inferences, in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition and assess whether, when so viewed, the record was legally suf- ficient to permit the outcome.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. H. S., 292 Or App 708, 709, 425 P3d 775 (2018). The juvenile court is authorized to assert depen- dency jurisdiction over a child when the child’s condition and circumstances expose the child to a current threat of serious loss or injury that will likely be realized. ORS 419B.100(1) (c); Dept. of Human Services v. A. L., 268 Or App 391, 397- 98, 342 P3d 174 (2015). The petitioner, usually and in this case the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS), bears the burden of proof. Id. That burden includes demon- strating a nexus between the child’s allegedly risk-causing conditions and circumstances, and a threat of harm to the child of the type, degree, and duration as to justify juvenile court intervention into the constitutionally protected family sphere. Dept. of Human Services v. S. D. I., 259 Or App 116, 121, 312 P3d 608 (2013). Proof of harm or risk at some point in the past is insufficient; the threat must be current at the time of trial. State v. S. T. S., 236 Or App 646, 654, 238 P3d 53 (2010). Nor can the risk be speculative; there must be a reasonable probability that the risk will be realized. Dept. of Human Services v. J. H., 292 Or App 733, 738, 425 P3d 791 (2018). In this case, the juvenile court asserted dependency jurisdiction over K, M, and J based on “mother’s failure to 140 Dept. of Human Services v. I. L. C. provide adequate education and medical care” and because K and M’s father was deceased and J did not have a legal father.1 Mother argues that the court erred in doing so because the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that those con- ditions and circumstances existed and that they exposed the children to a current and nonspeculative threat of serious loss or injury at the time of the jurisdiction trial. Having reviewed the evidentiary record, we agree with mother that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the assertion of dependency jurisdiction over K, M, and J. The record contains evidence that, once K and M were enrolled in school following ODHS’s intervention, they were significantly behind their grade-level peers in most areas, likely as a result of their lack of formal education or structured homeschooling. There is also evidence in the record that mother did not have medical or dental insurance for any of the children and did not provide them with rou- tine medical or dental care, preferring instead to treat any ailments with “natural remedies.” However, the record also shows that mother had taken K to a doctor on at least one occasion for treatment of a “busted” chin, that M had a den- tal appointment scheduled at the time ODHS intervened, and that, aside from some significant dental decay that K and M experienced that had been addressed by the time of the jurisdiction trial, none of the children had any seri- ous physical, medical, behavioral, or emotional problems. Indeed, teachers who worked with both K and M testified positively about their presence at and participation in school and the progress they had made since their enrollment. The most significant evidence of risk in the record is that dental decay like that that M experienced “places children at risk for adverse health sequelae such as infection.” To the extent that that evidence demonstrates that the children were exposed to some risks as a result of 1 On ODHS’s motion, the juvenile court dismissed allegations that “mother failed to maintain a safe environment for the child[ren] because the mother has allowed the child[ren] to live in a home that is unsafe, unsanitary, and in which children are accessing and using intoxicants” and that “mother’s substance abuse impairs her ability to safely parent the child[ren].” The juvenile court also concluded that ODHS failed to prove its allegation that “mother’s mental health problems interfere with her ability to safely parent the child[ren]” and dismissed that allegation. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 137 (2026) 141 mother’s “failure to provide adequate education and medical care,” it fails to demonstrate that any of the children were exposed to any threats of the type, degree, and duration as to authorize state intervention into the constitutionally-pro- tected family sphere, S. D. I., 259 Or App at 121, that is, any threat of serious loss or injury that was likely to be realized without juvenile court dependency jurisdiction. A. L., 268 Or App at 397-98. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court erred in asserting jurisdiction over K, M, and J and reverse.2 Reversed. 2 Our disposition obviates the need to address mother’s argument that the allegation that mother failed to provide adequate medical care did not encompass any failure to provide adequate dental care, an argument mother did not raise before the juvenile court.