Todd v. PSRB

No. 1026 October 21, 2026 125 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON Matthew David TODD, Petitioner, v. PSYCHIATRIC SECURITY REVIEW BOARD, Respondent. Psychiatric Security Review Board CC240045; A185843 Submitted March 18, 2026. Harris S. Matarazzo filed the brief for petitioner Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman, Interim Deputy Attorney General, and Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and Kistler, Senior Judge. JACQUOT, J. Order denying conditional release reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed. 126 Todd v. PSRB JACQUOT, J. Petitioner seeks review of an order by the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB) that committed him to the continued jurisdiction of the PSRB, pursuant to ORS 426.701(6)(b) (2023),1 and denied his request for conditional release. Petitioner raises two assignments of error, argu- ing that the PSRB erred by (1) concluding that petitioner has a mental illness that is resistant to treatment, and (2) denying petitioner’s request for conditional release—both on the grounds that the PSRB lacked substantial evidence to support its decisions. We conclude that the PSRB did not err in finding that petitioner has a mental illness that is resistant to treatment, but we agree with petitioner that the PSRB erred in denying his conditional release. We vacate and remand the order denying conditional release as unsup- ported by substantial reason and otherwise affirm. Petitioner was arrested after allegedly following a woman to her church, while saying “inappropriate things,” and throwing chairs at two other members of the church. Petitioner was later admitted to the Oregon State Hospital for competency and restoration treatment, pursuant to ORS 161.370, where a clinical psychologist determined that peti- tioner was unable to aid and assist his attorney in pending criminal matters. The state then sought to civilly commit petitioner pursuant to ORS 426.701, which authorizes a court to com- mit an “extremely dangerous person” to the jurisdiction of the PSRB.2 The court determined petitioner was an “extremely dangerous person,” and petitioner was then placed under the jurisdiction of the PSRB for a maximum of 24 months. 1 The legislature recently made several non-substantive amendments to ORS 426.701, which became operative on January 1, 2026. Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 37; Or Laws 2025, ch 58, § 5; Or Laws 2025, ch 175, § 5. The PSRB continued petitioner’s commitment under the previous version of the statute; therefore, we refer to the previous version of ORS 426.701 in this opinion. 2 ORS 426.701(1)(a) provides that a person is “extremely dangerous” if an individual: “(A) Is at least 18 years of age; “(B) Is exhibiting symptoms or behaviors of a qualifying mental disorder substantially similar to those that preceded the act described in subsection (3)(a)(C) of this section; and “(C) Because of a qualifying mental disorder: Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 125 (2026) 127 An initial hearing was then held before the PSRB, pursuant to ORS 426.701(6)(a), to determine whether peti- tioner was properly under its jurisdiction and, if so, whether he should be conditionally released or continued in his com- mitment to the Oregon State Hospital. The PSRB found that petitioner “continue[d] to be an extremely dangerous person” and was “affected by a mental disorder that is resistant to treatment[.]” “When a person over whom the [PSRB] exercises jurisdiction * * * is adversely affected or aggrieved by a final order of the [PSRB], the person is entitled to judicial review of the final order.” ORS 161.348(1). “We review agency orders for errors of law, substantial evidence, and substan- tial reason.” Rinne v. PSRB, 326 Or App 777, 781, 533 P3d 802 (2023), rev den, 371 Or 825 (2024). “Substantial evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c). “Substantial reason exists where the agency has articulated a rational connection between the facts and the legal conclusion that the agency draws from them.” Rinne, 326 Or App at 781. A “qualifying mental disorder is ‘resistant to treat- ment’ if, after receiving care from a licensed psychiatrist and exhausting all reasonable psychiatric treatment, or after refusing psychiatric treatment, the person contin- ues to be significantly impaired in the person’s ability to make competent decisions and to be aware of and control extremely dangerous behavior.” ORS 426.701(1)(c). On appeal, petitioner argues that the PSRB’s “resistant to treatment” conclusion is unsupported by sub- stantial evidence because it contradicts several exhibits and testimony given by petitioner’s treating psychiatrist— Dr. Berry. We disagree. The record contains substantial evidence that petitioner’s mental illness is “resistant to treatment.” “(i) Presents a serious danger to the safety of other persons by reason of an extreme risk that the person will inflict grave or potentially lethal physi- cal injury on other persons; and “(ii) Unless committed, will continue to represent an extreme risk to the safety of other persons in the foreseeable future.” 128 Todd v. PSRB The record reflects that petitioner has improved sub- stantially since his commitment, and, with access to medi- cation and additional care, petitioner is able to “make basic decisions” and “care for himself.” But the record also shows that petitioner does not understand that his mental illness requires treatment. Berry noted that petitioner believes that he must take antipsychotic medication—not because of his condition—but because it is “expected of him” and “[required] to get out of the hospital.” Berry believes—and petitioner’s extensive history of prior civil commitments suggests as well—that petitioner would cease to take antipsychotic med- ication if released from a more structured setting. Because petitioner lacks “fundamental insight” into his condition, he is substantially impaired in his ability “to make competent decisions and to be aware of and control extremely dangerous behavior.” Accordingly, the PSRB did not err in finding that petitioner has a mental illness that is resistant to treatment. As to petitioner’s second assignment of error, we agree with petitioner that the PSRB’s denial of his request for conditional release was not supported by substantial rea- son. On appeal, the PSRB argues that petitioner “could not be adequately controlled and treated in the community if he were conditionally released at this time.” In support of its argument, the PSRB cited progress patient notes from Berry that note petitioner was “still quite limited” in his ability to discuss his history of “unsafe behavior related to his mental illness.” However, the PSRB does not adequately acknowl- edge that Berry, at the time of petitioner’s hearing, no lon- ger believed petitioner was limited in that capacity. Berry testified in support of petitioner’s conditional release, based on his experience as a psychiatrist both at Oregon State Hospital and in the community, observing that: “[Petitioner] understands that under certain conditions in certain settings when these expectations are there—for example, he is being held accountable to take his medica- tions and not use drugs and alcohol, he * * * has shown over and [over] again that he can successfully do that.” At the initial hearing, Berry repeatedly stated that petitioner could be controlled in the community with Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 125 (2026) 129 proper care, medication, supervision, and treatment—all of which would be available at a “secure residential treatment facility” in the community. Having reviewed the record, we agree that there is significant evidence petitioner could be conditionally released into one such facility. However, the PSRB’s order does not address Berry’s change of position or explain why, given that change, conditional release would not be appropriate or beneficial. The PSRB additionally argues that petitioner’s request for conditional release was denied, in part, because petitioner had not participated in the hospital’s risk review process. But ORS 426.701(6)(c) does not require one to undergo a hospital’s risk review process before conditional release, and neither does the statute allow the PSRB to deny release on the grounds that one has not undergone such a process. The PSRB does not articulate a reason why it needs the risk review process before petitioner can be condition- ally released. In considering the record, we conclude that substan- tial evidence supports the PSRB’s determination that peti- tioner has a mental illness that is resistant to treatment. However, the PSRB’s denial of petitioner’s request for condi- tional release lacked the substantial reasoning required to support such a decision. Order denying conditional release reversed and remanded; otherwise affirmed.