State v. J. S.

No. 985 October 14, 2026 733 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of J. S., fka J. W., a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. J. S., fka J. W., Appellant. Lane County Circuit Court 25CC03366; A187863 Debra E. Velure, Judge. Argued September 23, 2026. Liza Langford argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant. Brianne Bartschi, Certified Law Student, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney General. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and O’Connor, Judge. O’CONNOR, J. Reversed. 734 State v. J. S. O’CONNOR, J. Appellant appeals from a judgment of civil commit- ment. The trial court ordered that appellant be committed to the custody of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not to exceed 180 days, based on appellant being a “person with mental illness.” ORS 426.130(1)(a)(C) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 5.1 Specifically, appellant was committed on the basis that he is “[u]nable to provide for basic personal needs that are necessary to avoid serious physical harm in the near future,” as the result of a mental disorder, and “is not receiving such care as is necessary to avoid such harm.” ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 4. Appellant contends that the evi- dence was legally insufficient to commit him on that basis. As explained below, we reverse. STATEMENT OF FACTS Appellant is diagnosed with schizophrenia, fetal alcohol syndrome, and type 2 diabetes. He voluntarily lived in an adult foster home where he received support with med- ication administration, meals, and managing errands in the community. Appellant left the adult foster home shortly after he stopped taking the medication prescribed to man- age his schizophrenia. When appellant was found about one week later, he spoke with both the manager of the adult fos- ter home—although appellant appeared to not recognize the manager—and a police officer at a church where appellant was provided food. The police officer remarked that appellant appeared to be having delusions and hallucinations as well as concern- ing hygiene practices. The officer noticed stains on appel- lant’s pants, and appellant stated that he “wasn’t allowed to urinate in public or outside, so he went in his pants instead.” Appellant explained to the officer that his last meal had been potato chips that he found. He could not remember the other meals he had eaten since he left the adult foster home. 1 The legislature recently made significant amendments to the civil com- mitment statutes, which became operative on January 1, 2026. Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 66. Appellant was committed under the previous version of the statutes, so our analysis is based on the previous version of the statutes. We express no opinion on whether the evidence would be sufficient under the revised statutes. Cite as 353 Or App 733 (2026) 735 In addition, appellant reported to the officer that “his feet hurt really bad,” and the officer noticed appellant was wear- ing shoes without socks. The officer decided to place appel- lant on a police officer hold based on “concerns for [appel- lant’s] ability to take care of his basic needs,” and appellant agreed to be transported to the hospital—although appel- lant believed he was going to the hospital only to have his feet evaluated. At the hospital, appellant’s lab results showed “ele- vated blood sugar, but not dangerously elevated blood sugar,” meaning there was no imminent risk of diabetic crisis. Appellant’s lab results did not show “significant dehydra- tion or significant malnourishment.” Appellant had wounds on his feet. Appellant’s treating psychiatric mental health nurse practitioner (PMHNP) testified at the commitment hearing that appellant had “mostly been declining wound care” for his feet, but had accepted antibiotics to prevent infection, allowed a foot soaking and redressing, and agreed “not to pick at the scabs.” The PMHNP testified that appel- lant displayed symptoms of schizophrenia, consistent with his prior diagnosis, primarily due to his delusions and hal- lucinations. The PMHNP expressed concern that appellant’s delusions—along with his refusal to take anti-psychotics— rendered appellant unable to care for himself. When asked about his plans were he to be released from the hospital, appellant told the PMHNP that God would provide food to him and that he would live in Los Angeles with actress Kaley Cuoco, who he believed he was in a relationship with. Additionally, the PMHNP testified that if appellant were released from the hospital, he would likely “continue to walk as his only means to get around,” which could further dam- age his feet. A mental health examiner appointed by the court provided a report based on his own examination of appel- lant at the hospital and the testimony provided at the hear- ing. In his report, the examiner observed that, during the week appellant was houseless, he had obtained food and found places to sleep. The examiner also pointed out that appellant had “good insight about his diabetes, and his judgment about it seem[ed] fair,” although appellant could 736 State v. J. S. not articulate a plan for housing or for obtaining food. The examiner ultimately determined that although appellant may not be able to provide for his basic needs, appellant’s mental health did not appear to pose an “imminent threat to his health and safety.” During closing arguments at the commitment hear- ing, the state argued that appellant demonstrated an inabil- ity to provide for his basic needs during the week he was in the community, and absent a plan to provide for these basic needs, appellant’s commitment was necessary to avoid seri- ous physical harm in the near future. Appellant argued that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he faced a nonspeculative threat to his safe survival because the evidence showed that appellant engaged with commu- nity services available to him and did not have acute medi- cal concerns related to an inability to meet his basic needs. The trial court agreed with the state and found by clear and convincing evidence that due to appellant’s mental disor- der, he was unable to provide for his basic needs—primarily because appellant had “no plan in place for [his] survival.” ANALYSIS To meet the legal standard for a civil commitment under ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) (2023), the state must prove that due to a mental disorder, a person is “unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs in a way that leaves the per- son at nonspeculative risk of serious physical harm—mean- ing that the person’s safe survival will be compromised—in the near future, even though that risk is not imminent.” State v. M. A. E., 299 Or App 231, 240, 448 P3d 656 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Food, water, and medi- cal care are examples of basic personal needs. State v. M. A., 276 Or App 624, 631, 371 P3d 495 (2016). It is not enough to show that a person’s ability to provide for basic personal needs is compromised—the man- ner and degree of compromise is critical. Accordingly, the state must prove “(1) that the individual’s inability to pro- vide for their basic personal needs puts them at a nonspecu- lative risk of serious physical harm and (2) that the serious physical harm is likely to occur in the near future.” State Cite as 353 Or App 733 (2026) 737 v. P. D., 333 Or App 738, 742, 553 P3d 1063 (2024) (inter- nal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. R. L. M., 309 Or App 545, 550, 482 P3d 201 (2021) (noting that likeliness of serious physical harm in the near future requires some evidence of “how soon [an] adverse consequence is likely to occur” (emphasis in original)). The state also must prove a causal connection between the person’s mental disorder and the inability to provide for basic personal needs, State v. C. H., 306 Or App 63, 67, 473 P3d 60 (2020), and that the person is not already “receiving such care as is necessary to avoid such harm,” ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) (2023). The trial court found the legal standard to be met here. On appeal, in a preserved claim of error, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for that determi- nation. Legal sufficiency is a question of law. State v. A. D. S., 258 Or App 44, 45, 308 P3d 365 (2013). Our task, there- fore, is to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the trial court’s dis- position and determine whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support civil commitment. State v. L. R., 283 Or App 618, 619, 391 P3d 880 (2017). Given the clear-and- convincing-evidence standard of proof that applies in civil commitment proceedings, the ultimate question for us as the reviewing court is whether a rational factfinder could find on this record that, at the time of the commitment hear- ing, it was “ ‘highly probable’ ” that, due to a mental disorder, appellant was unable to provide for his basic personal needs in a manner and to a degree that creates a nonspeculative risk of serious physical harm. State v. S. A. R., 308 Or App 365, 366, 479 P3d 618 (2021) (quoting State v. M. J. F., 306 Or App 544, 549, 473 P3d 1141 (2020)). Having reviewed the record and considered the par- ties’ arguments, we agree with appellant that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish inability to meet basic personal needs within the meaning of ORS 426.005(1)(f)(B) (2023). First, absent evidence of malnourishment or dehy- dration, the inability to communicate a plan as to where a person will obtain food or water does not necessarily establish a risk of serious physical harm in the near future. 738 State v. J. S. State v. A. M. W., 340 Or App 473, 476, 572 P3d 343 (2025). Here, just as in A. M. W., appellant was not malnourished or dehydrated when he arrived at the hospital despite being away from the adult foster home for a week, and there is no evidence that appellant would refuse food or water. See id. (finding insufficient evidence to support civil commitment based on the appellant’s eating and drinking habits where the record showed that the appellant was not malnour- ished, but rather ate “whenever food [was] available,” and where there was no evidence of “water avoidance or a his- tory of dangerous dehydration”). As the state points out, the absence of a plan for obtaining food and water may demon- strate a risk of serious harm if, for example, a person’s men- tal disorder makes it likely that they will not consume food or water. See State v. V. L., 341 Or App 774, 780, 575 P3d 215 (2025) (upholding a civil commitment where the appellant had no plan for how to obtain food and water in sealed con- tainers when the appellant’s schizophrenia “prevented her from * * * consuming any food or drink that was not sealed”). The record in this case does not contain evidence that appel- lant’s mental disorder prevents him from consuming food or water. The record instead reflects that he does consume food and water, but is unable or unwilling to explain how he obtains the food or water. Further, as the state recognizes on appeal, evidence related to appellant’s type 2 diabetes did not demonstrate a risk of serious physical harm in the near future by itself. The state instead argues that it is further evidence of the risk to defendant from his disorganized thinking. But the record establishes that defendant was managing his diabe- tes, even though defendant could not, or would not, articu- late how he was managing it. When appellant first arrived at the hospital, he was not in diabetic crisis and did not have “dangerously elevated blood sugar.” The PMHNP testified that appellant’s diabetes did not present an imminent risk and failure to properly treat diabetes presented long-term, not near-future, risk. Cf. State v. C. K., 300 Or App 313, 318, 451 P3d 243 (2019) (finding a “nonspeculative risk of a seri- ous life-threatening infection—one that could lead to organ failure—in the near future” where the evidence showed that Cite as 353 Or App 733 (2026) 739 the appellant lacked “capacity to care for her ostomy site due to her mental disorder and memory lapses”). The state cites V. L., 341 Or App 774, and State v. J. B., 337 Or App 34, 562 P3d 326 (2024), to support its argument that appellant’s thinking is so disorganized due to his schizophrenia that he lacks the ability to provide for his basic needs to the extent that appellant is at risk of seri- ous physical harm in the near future. However, appellant’s circumstances are distinguishable from the circumstances of the appellants in those cases. In V. L., the appellant’s schizophrenia kept her from “engaging in any personal hygiene or consuming any food or drink that was not sealed,” and her treating physician testi- fied that because the appellant had no plan to obtain sealed food or water, “she would be at risk of dehydration and malnutrition in the near future.” 341 Or App at 780. Here, appellant’s mental disorder did not keep him from engaging in personal hygiene or, as explained above, from consuming available food or water. Although appellant told the officer he had urinated in his pants, appellant also explained this was because he “wasn’t allowed to urinate in public or out- side.” As the mental health examiner put it, “This demon- strates an interesting issue: peeing in one’s pants is clearly poor judgment, probably not healthy in the long term, but it is not imminently dangerous as long as the temperatures are not cold. Trying to not break the law seems to demon- strate some appropriate judgment.” In J. B., the record showed that even while in treat- ment, the appellant “could not prepare her own food or remember whether she had eaten,” and she “had difficulty with speech and making herself understood.” 337 Or App at 36. Here, by contrast, the record shows that appellant was aware of his basic needs and was willing and able to seek community support. While appellant could not explain where he obtained his last meal, he remembered that his last meal was potato chips and the adult foster home man- ager testified that appellant was found at a church that pro- vided him with food. In addition, before appellant was taken to the hospital, he communicated to the officer that his feet hurt and agreed to be transported to the hospital to seek 740 State v. J. S. treatment for the wounds on his feet. Thus, unlike J. B., appellant was able to recall his last meal, seek out addi- tional food, and effectively communicate a need to someone in the community who could assist him. Taken together, the record shows that despite his delusions, appellant was capable of obtaining food, under- stood when and how to seek help, and was willing to accept community support. Thus, the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that appellant faced a nonspeculative risk of serious physical harm in the near future as a result of a mental disorder, and the trial court erred in finding otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of civil commitment. Reversed.