Dept. of Human Services v. S. C. / E. M. A.

No. 1033 October 28, 2026 193 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of O. C., aka O. A., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. S. C. and E. M. A., aka E. A., Appellants. Umatilla County Circuit Court 24JU01554; A189501 (Control), A190068 In the Matter of E. R. R. A., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. E. M. A., aka E. A. Appellant. Umatilla County Circuit Court 24JU01555; A190071 Eva J. Temple, Judge. Submitted August 19, 2026. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Sean Connor, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant S. C. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant E. M. A. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General, filed the briefs for respondent. 194 Dept. of Human Services v. S. C. / E. M. A. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. JOYCE, J. Reversed. Cite as 354 Or App 193 (2026) 195 JOYCE, J. This juvenile dependency case involves plans for reunifying father with one child, O, and reunifying mother with O and a second child, E. Both parents appeal from per- manency judgments in which the juvenile court changed the permanency plans for both children from reunification to adoption. On appeal, both parents challenge the juvenile court’s determinations that ODHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify father with O and mother with O and E. We conclude that the juvenile court correctly determined that ODHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify father with O, but that it erred in determining that ODHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with O and E. Accordingly, we reverse. Because neither parent has requested de novo review, we “are bound by [the juvenile court’s] findings of historical fact if there is any evidence in the record to sup- port them.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. S., 246 Or App 341, 344, 265 P3d 792 (2011), rev den, 351 Or 586 (2012). “Where findings on disputed issues of fact are not made but there is evidence supporting more than one possible factual conclu- sion, we presume that the juvenile court decided the facts consistently with its ultimate legal conclusion.” Id. at 345. However, “[t]he juvenile court’s determinations [of] whether ODHS’s efforts were reasonable and the parent’s progress was sufficient are legal conclusions that we review for errors of law.” Dept. of Human Services v. G. N., 263 Or App 287, 294, 328 P3d 728, rev den, 356 Or 638 (2014). In light of that standard, we state the facts relevant to mother and father consistently with the juvenile court’s written findings. I. BACKGROUND A. Jurisdiction over O and E Father and mother are the parents of O, who was five years old at the time of the permanency hearing held in September and October 2025. Mother is also the parent of E, who was eight years old at the time of the hearing. Both O and E were brought into ODHS custody in March 2024 because E was found wandering outside unsupervised after many hours. ODHS filed a dependency petition as to 196 Dept. of Human Services v. S. C. / E. M. A. both O and E, and in July 2024, the juvenile court entered a jurisdictional judgment asserting dependency jurisdiction over both children. The court asserted jurisdiction over O, as to father, because father “does not understand the basic needs of his child and lacks parenting skills necessary to safely parent the child, placing the child at risk of harm,” and “has parole restrictions on contact with minors which prevent him from being a custodial resource for the child, placing the child at risk of harm.” In its disposition, the court ordered father to engage in sex offender treatment, a psychosexual evaluation, or sexual risk assessment, and to comply with the conditions of his probation. It also ordered father to engage in various family support services and edu- cation classes and to maintain contact with his ODHS case- worker and attorney. The court asserted jurisdiction over both O and E as to mother, because “mother does not under- stand the basic needs of her child[ren] and lacks parenting skills necessary to safely parent the child[ren], placing the child[ren] at risk of harm.” B. Father’s Participation in Services Father was released from prison in 2018 after serv- ing time for sex offense convictions and was required to reg- ister as a sex offender following his release and to complete three years of post-prison supervision (PPS). However, due to father frequently being on “abscond” status, his PPS was extended to May 2026. Following a 2022 conviction for fail- ure to report as a sex offender, father had a special condition of parole that prohibited him from contacting a person under 18 years of age, which included his daughter, O. Father’s parole officer, Dennis, testified that father had not been in compliance with PPS or in contact with Dennis for most of the three years prior to the permanency hearing. Father was in jail for a “60-day structured sanction” and released on May 30, 2025. Following his release he “has been report- ing to his supervising officer weekly.” At the time of the hearing, father had not engaged in any form of sex offender treatment and had not completed a psychosexual evaluation or sexual risk assessment as ordered by the court. Father’s ODHS caseworker, Patterson, testified that “previously, when I’d spoken with [father], he Cite as 354 Or App 193 (2026) 197 had made it clear that he didn’t want to do the [sex offender] treatment.” Patterson further testified that to alleviate the parole restriction on father’s contact with minors, father would have to “[b]e[ ] in compliance with his parole and hav[e] the parole officer approve that contact.” Patterson went on to say that father “could have done all of the ser- vices. But without sex offender treatment, he would not have been able to reunify [with O].” Dennis testified that he had not required father to attend sex offender treatment because father never obtained employment and thus could not pay for the treatment. Dennis testified that other sex offenders assigned to him have obtained employment and completed treatment. ODHS first learned that father could not pay for sex offender treatment at the permanency hearing. Upon learning of that barrier, ODHS offered to pay for father’s treatment. ODHS referred father to parenting coaching, mental health counseling, and resources to obtain housing, but father did not engage with those services. The juvenile court determined that ODHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify father and O but that father’s progress toward reunification with O was not suffi- cient. It found that “[father] and his attorney argued this offer [to pay for sex offender treatment] should have been made earlier, but [father] has been on abscond for most of the time his child has been in ODHS care, and he has consistently refused all services. [Father] has not completed any court ordered ser- vices. He will be released from his post-prison supervision in approximately seven months, but he has done nothing to alleviate the risk he poses to all children. There is no rea- son to believe he will change his behavior or circumstances within a reasonable time.” C. Mother’s Participation in Services As a result of the incident where E was found wan- dering outside unsupervised, mother was charged with and pleaded guilty to second-degree child neglect and recklessly endangering another person and was placed on three years of bench probation with orders to have a mental health eval- uation and complete any recommended treatment, complete 198 Dept. of Human Services v. S. C. / E. M. A. a parenting course, and comply with all ODHS directives and conditions. At the time of the incident with E, mother and the children had been living in a trailer in a backyard where father’s mother lived as well. Mother testified that father had lived with her and the children and that she did not believe he was dangerous despite knowing of his parole condition restricting his contact with people under 18 years old. At the time of the hearing, mother testified that she was currently in a romantic relationship with father and that she was cur- rently living in a trailer at a national forest in Ukiah. Mother’s primary ODHS caseworker, Patterson, began working on her case in March 2024. Patterson tes- tified that mother was referred to housing services, men- tal health services, and parenting coaching. Mother applied for an apartment through a housing service but “gave up” when her application was denied due to her criminal convic- tion. Patterson offered to help mother apply to other apart- ments, but mother declined because she was at “the point of just giving up.” Mother’s referral to parenting coaching ended in October 2024 due to “lack of engagement,” but Patterson renewed mother’s referral and “that started again in December—maybe the beginning of January of 2025.” Mother did not engage in mental health services until December 2024. Because of Patterson’s increasing concerns regard- ing mother’s ability to understand and retain information, ODHS referred mother for a neuropsychological evaluation with Dr. Miller that occurred in March 2025. Miller diag- nosed mother with a moderate intellectual disability that would require a “significant level of care” to manage. Miller believed that mother living in an adult foster home could benefit mother until “her life situation was stabilized and she had enough support,” at which time “her functioning should be reevaluated about whether she could benefit from counseling, parent training, and other services.” Regarding mother’s ability to parent, Miller testified that he did not believe mother had the ability to “provide a high level of supervision or care for her children” because mother “has difficulty caring for herself in a safe and competent way.” Cite as 354 Or App 193 (2026) 199 In light of Miller’s evaluation, Patterson believed that mother could qualify for developmental disability (DD) services. Patterson then contacted other counties to see what programs were available for a parent with develop- mental disabilities to “come in, receive services, and still actively parent and engage with their child while address- ing those safety concerns.” Although Patterson was unable to “find a program for that,” she successfully contacted the Community Development Disability Program (CDDP), a community resource for parents with intellectual disabili- ties, and was told that mother would need to initiate con- tact with the organization to determine her eligibility for services. In July 2025, ODHS confirmed in a meeting with mother that she was engaged with CDDP’s intake process to determine her eligibility for DD services, which involved a neuropsychological evaluation by Dr. Condon. Condon conducted the evaluation on August 7 and 12 of 2025, diagnosed mother with a mild intellectual dis- ability, and recommended that she receive DD services, believing that her functioning could improve with correct support and training. However, Condon also opined that “it is likely that her deficits are chronic and are expected at least in part to last indefinitely.” Mother’s application for DD services was accepted during the week prior to the October 1, 2025, permanency hearing date. The juvenile court determined that ODHS made reasonable efforts to reunify mother with O and E, but that mother’s progress toward reunification was not sufficient. The court concluded that “All witness testimony, including mother’s testimony, supported the conclusions of Dr. Miller and Dr. Condon that mother has a developmental disability, and she needs the assistance of others to manage care for herself. She has not demonstrated an ability to care for any children, but her children are particularly in need of a high level of supervision and skill due to their behaviors and disabil- ities. Mother is unlikely to ever be able to independently provide for her own basic needs and is very unlikely to be able to parent her children due to her impaired ability to learn and to adapt to their needs.” 200 Dept. of Human Services v. S. C. / E. M. A. Related to O and E’s need for a “high level of super- vision,” the court found that both children have “acted out in sexually inappropriate manners” and O had “exhibited violent outbursts and dysregulation.” Neither child was enrolled in school prior to coming into care, and O was “severely delayed in her speech and communication.” The court further found that both children had significant dis- abilities and trauma histories that require a high level of care. The court ultimately found that “[t]he kind of parent- ing needed [for O and E] is far beyond the abilities of mother or either of the children’s fathers.” Both parents appeal the judgment, challenging the juvenile court’s determination that ODHS had made reason- able efforts to reunify father with O and mother with both O and E. Neither parent challenges the court’s determination on the sufficiency of their progress in ameliorating the bases for jurisdiction. II. ANALYSIS Before a juvenile court may change a child’s perma- nency plan away from reunification, it must determine both that ODHS made “reasonable efforts * * * to make it possi- ble for the ward to safely return home” and that the par- ent’s progress by the time of the permanency hearing was insufficient “to make it possible for the ward to safely return home.” ORS 419B.476(2)(a). “The particular issues of paren- tal unfitness established in the jurisdictional judgment provide the framework for the court’s analysis of each ques- tion—that is, both ODHS’s efforts and a parent’s progress are evaluated by reference to the facts that formed the bases for juvenile court jurisdiction.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. T., 247 Or App 706, 715, 271 P3d 143 (2012). “Reasonable efforts” are “efforts that focus on ame- liorating the adjudicated bases for jurisdiction, and that give parents a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate their abil- ity to adjust their conduct and become minimally adequate parents.” Dept. of Human Services v. L. L. S., 290 Or App 132, 138, 413 P3d 1005 (2018) (internal quotation marks omit- ted). For ODHS’s efforts to be reasonable, “the efforts must go on long enough to allow for a meaningful assessment of Cite as 354 Or App 193 (2026) 201 whether parents are making sufficient progress to permit reunification.” Dept. of Human Services v. W. M., 310 Or App 594, 598-99, 485 P3d 316 (2021). The reasonable efforts standard requires the court to look at the totality of the cir- cumstances, including consideration of the “burdens that the state would shoulder in providing [adequate] services” and any “benefit[s] [that] might reasonably be expected to flow from them.” Dept. of Human Services v. M. K., 257 Or App 409, 416, 306 P3d 763 (2013). The court shall also con- sider the children’s “health and safety [as] paramount con- cerns.” ORS 419B.476(2)(a). Finally, the court considers “a parent’s lack of cooperation [in determining whether ODHS made reasonable efforts], but * * * evaluate[s] such lack of cooperation within the context of ODHS’s conduct and the case circumstances.” Dept. of Human Services v. R. W., 277 Or App 37, 44, 370 P3d 543 (2016). ODHS must prove facts supporting a change in plan away from reunification by a preponderance of the evidence. Dept. of Human Services v. C. H., 373 Or 26, 46, 559 P3d 395 (2024). As to father, there was sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to conclude that ODHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify father with O. ODHS referred father to services that were designed to ameliorate the jurisdictional basis but, as the juvenile court found, father “consistently refused all services.” Father did not complete a psychosexual evaluation or sexual risk assessment and did not believe that he needed sex offender treatment. Father argues that the juvenile court erred in determining that ODHS made reasonable efforts because it failed to offer to help father pay for the sex offender treatment, yet father did not communicate his inability to afford treatment as a rea- son for his refusal to participate in that treatment. Rather, he maintained that he did not need sex offender treatment. When ODHS learned that father needed assistance paying for the treatment, it offered to pay for the service. In the totality of the circumstances, the juvenile court did not err in concluding that ODHS had made reasonable efforts to reunify father with O. As to ODHS’s efforts to reunify mother with O and E, we reach a different conclusion. We acknowledge that 202 Dept. of Human Services v. S. C. / E. M. A. ODHS made efforts to get mother the services that she needed. However, those efforts were nevertheless not rea- sonable because the time that it took to get mother properly diagnosed with her intellectual disability and referred to the necessary services to treat that disability did not pro- vide her with a reasonable, if any, opportunity to ameliorate the adjudicated bases of jurisdiction. As noted above, the juvenile court’s basis for dependency jurisdiction over E and O with respect to mother was that “mother does not under- stand the basic needs of her child[ren] and lacks parenting skills necessary to safely parent the child[ren], placing the child[ren] at risk of harm.” Consequently, the court ordered mother to participate in a mental health evaluation and any recommended treatment resulting from that evaluation for her to be able to gain those skills. Those were the services that ODHS was thus obligated to, and which it endeavored to, provide to mother. Although ODHS referred mother for mental health services in June or July 2024, and mother did not engage with those services until December 2024, mother’s first neu- ropsychological evaluation for potential developmental dis- abilities occurred in March 2025, approximately 10 months after the court took jurisdiction. Following that evaluation, Miller diagnosed her with a moderate intellectual disabil- ity. Mother’s caseworker then began the process of referring her for DD services, which in turn involved an evaluation to determine mother’s eligibility for those services. Mother did not receive that evaluation and resulting referral for DD services until August 2025, just a few weeks prior to the beginning of the permanency hearing in September 2025. Because of this, mother had not begun receiving the ser- vices necessary for managing her developmental disabili- ty—a significant barrier to mother being able to ameliorate the conditions that brought the children into care—by the time of the permanency hearing. That timing makes any assessment of mother’s progress at the permanency hear- ing premature, specifically as to her ability to understand her children’s basic needs, which, as the court found, are significant. The fact that the children’s needs are signifi- cant makes mother’s access to and use of DD services even more critical in determining whether her children can be Cite as 354 Or App 193 (2026) 203 returned to her care. L. L. S., 290 Or App at 138 (reason- able efforts must “give parents a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate their ability to adjust their conduct and become minimally adequate parents” (internal quotation marks omitted)); W. M., 310 Or App at 598-99 (reasonable efforts “must go on long enough to allow for a meaningful assess- ment of whether parents are making sufficient progress to permit reunification”). We appreciate that some of the delay in obtaining the evaluation for mother and the accompanying services were apparently the result of limited resources in a small county, but it is nevertheless incumbent upon ODHS to pro- vide the services that a parent needs to be able to demon- strate that they are (or are not) capable of being minimally adequate parents. Mother did not yet have that opportunity at the time of the permanency hearing. Thus, the juvenile court erred in determining that ODHS made reasonable efforts to reunify O and E with mother and in changing O and E’s permanency plans as to mother away from reunification. Reversed.