Hayes and Hayes

No. 1023 October 21, 2026 113 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of the Marriage of Ly B. HAYES, Respondent-Appellant, and Stephen E. HAYES, Respondent-Respondent. Washington County Circuit Court 16DR17655; A184795 Eric Butterfield, Judge. Argued and submitted September 22, 2026. Kimberly A. Quach argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs was Quach Family Law, P. C. Mark T. McLeod and McLeod & McLeod Attorneys at Law filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. PAGÁN, J. Vacated and remanded. 114 Hayes and Hayes PAGÁN, J. Wife appeals from an order denying her motions to reopen and/or set aside the parties’ stipulated general judgment of dissolution, arguing that the trial court erred when it (1) denied wife’s ORCP 71 C motion to set aside the general dissolution judgment due to a breach of husband’s fiduciary duty to wife when he failed to disclose the extent of his retirement assets, and (2) denied wife’s motion to reopen the dissolution judgment pursuant to ORS 107.452 because husband failed to disclose retirement assets which were therefore omitted from the dissolution judgment. We conclude that, because the trial court failed to make an ade- quate record for appellate review, we cannot meaningfully review whether the court properly exercised its discretion in denying wife’s request under ORCP 71 C or whether it committed an error of law when it denied her request under ORS 107.452. Accordingly, we vacate and remand. “[W]e recount the facts ‘consistently with the trial court’s express and implied findings, supplemented with uncontroverted information from the record.’ ” Davis and Lallement, 287 Or App 323, 324, 401 P3d 1230 (2017) (quot- ing Tilson and Tilson, 260 Or App 427, 428, 317 P3d 391 (2013)). However, in this case, the trial court did not make express findings, and we thus recount the testimony from the trial transcript and the parties’ briefing. Wife and husband were married in 1997. After nineteen years of marriage, they divorced, at least in part so that wife could continue to work as a home care assistant for an individual who was uncomfortable with the fact that she was married while providing such services. The parties do not agree whether husband was or was not represented by legal counsel when preparing the dissolution documents, nor whether the divorce was intended to be a “sham” divorce, after which the parties would continue living together as a couple. Wife offered evidence of the sham to demonstrate her lack of understanding that she had, in fact, signed a divorce agreement that was binding on her. Wife claims that her limited facility with English and overall understanding of the divorce process inhibited Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 113 (2026) 115 her ability to fully advocate for herself during the proceed- ings. She claims that she never received documentation required by ORS 107.089, which would have included infor- mation about husband’s retirement accounts. The general judgment of dissolution did not include specific division of personal property, including retirement accounts, beyond the template language that the parties had “divided between them all personal property that they own separately or together, and each is awarded those items now in their pos- session * * *.” The extent to which the parties agreed to sep- arate division of personal property, either in their petitions for dissolution or otherwise, is contested. Wife brought the instant motions over six years after the parties divorced in 2016, in November of 2022. At a show cause hearing during which wife presented arguments relating both to set- ting aside the dissolution judgment under ORCP 71 C and reopening the judgment under ORS 107.452, the trial court summarily denied her motions without explanation, stating simply: “The petitioner’s motion to reopen case or set aside the general judgment of dissolution of marriage is denied.” “We review the trial court’s decision to grant relief under ORCP 71 C for an abuse of discretion.” Dunkin v. Dunkin, 162 Or App 500, 509, 986 P2d 706, rev den, 329 Or 553 (1999). Where a trial court denies a motion pursuant to ORS 107.452 due to its understanding of the law, we review the decision for errors of law. Kasner and Kasner, 296 Or App 54, 57, 437 P3d 1149 (2019). Because the trial court offered no rationale for its decision, it is unclear to us whether the court based its deci- sion on a legal conclusion, a factual finding, or both. In that circumstance, with competing standards of review and a developed factual record, the record is insufficient for our review, and we thus remand for the court to explain its rea- soning. See Olson and Olson, 218 Or App 1, 15, 178 P3d 272 (2008) (“When a trial court makes a discretionary decision, the record must reflect a proper exercise of that discretion.”); see also Jaimez v. Rosales, 323 Or App 741, 743, 525 P3d 92 (2023) (holding that, when a trial court’s reasoning is not sufficiently ascertainable for meaningful appellate review, “we typically remand for additional findings * * *”). We 116 Hayes and Hayes therefore vacate and remand. See Olson, 218 Or App at 15; see also Muthukan and Easterbrook, 306 Or App 579, 581, 475 P3d 459 (2020) (reversing and remanding a marital dis- solution judgment where it was “not possible to determine” the court’s reasoning for the challenged property division and therefore not possible to review whether the trial court’s decision was within its permissible range of discretion). Vacated and remanded.