Garcia v. Garcia
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 12, 2026
DocketA189333
JudgeKamins
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1107 November 12, 2026 713
This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion
pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited
except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1).
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
Linnea M. GARCIA,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
Torivio M. GARCIA,
Respondent-Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
17DR19746; A189333
Sean E. Armstrong, Judge.
Submitted October 22, 2026.
Torivio M. Garcia filed the briefs pro se.
Linnea M. Garcia filed the brief pro se.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
KAMINS, J.
Affirmed.
714 Garcia v. Garcia
KAMINS, J.
This appeal arises from a supplemental judgment
denying an award of attorney fees following a judgment
modifying custody, parenting time, and child support in a
marital dissolution proceeding. Father challenges the trial
court’s denial of his request for fees, arguing that the trial
court erred by declining to award fees on procedural grounds
and by failing to apply the “mandatory” factors governing
attorney fee awards in ORS 20.075. For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying
father fees altogether on procedural grounds and therefore
was not required to apply the statutory factors applicable to
determining the amount of any fee award.
Father sought a modification of custody, parent-
ing time, and support by filing a pro se motion for order of
immediate danger and temporary custody on December 11,
2024. In February, father filed a notice of representation
alerting the court that he was now represented by counsel.
The matter proceeded through discovery and hearing and
ultimately, through an agreement of the parties, resulted in
a modification order. Father subsequently filed a “Statement
of Attorney Fees,” in which his attorney sought fees pursu-
ant to ORS 20.075 and ORS 107.105 and argued that moth-
er’s litigation tactics reflected a refusal to act reasonably
and justified a fee award. The trial court denied the request
for fees:
“Respondent sought attorney’s fees per ORCP 68.
Respondent, who was self-represented at the time, filed a
motion seeking modification of custody, parenting time,
and child support on December 11, 2024. Respondent failed
to plead the issue of attorney’s fees in that motion.”
On appeal, father argues that the trial court erred as a mat-
ter of law by denying the request for fees on the ground that
father failed to file a motion under ORCP 68 rather than a
“Statement of Attorney Fees.”
Father’s argument reflects a misunderstanding as
to the basis of the trial court’s denial of a fee award. The trial
court did not deny fees because the “Statement of Attorney
Fees” was not captioned as an ORCP 68 motion. Rather, the
Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 713 (2026) 715
trial court denied fees because father did not plead an enti-
tlement to fees as required in ORCP 68 C(2)(a):
“A party seeking attorney fees shall allege the facts, stat-
ute, or rule that provides a basis for the award of fees in a
pleading filed by that party. Attorney fees may be sought
before the substantive right to recover fees accrues. No
attorney fees shall be awarded unless a right to recover
fees is alleged as provided in this paragraph or in para-
graph C(2)(b)[1] of this rule.”
ORCP 68C(2)(a).
The motion giving rise to the judgment under
review was the emergency motion father filed on December
11, 2024. As the trial court observed, that motion did not
assert a right to attorney fees or otherwise put the opposing
party on notice that fees would be sought in the proceeding.
Nor was that notice provided in any other pleading in the
case. Because father did not put mother on notice that he
would seek fees, the trial court did not err in denying father
fees. See Ornelas and Ornelas, 217 Or App 124, 131, 174 P3d
1077 (2007) (recognizing that “the pleading requirements
set forth in ORCP 68 C(2) apply to dissolution cases” and the
“provision that the party seeking fees must allege as much
explicitly is a mandatory requirement that, if not followed,
causes prejudice to the party deprived of the appropriate
process”).
Affirmed.
1
That provision provides:
“If a party does not file a pleading but instead files a motion or a response
to a motion, a right to attorney fees shall be alleged in the party’s motion or
response, in similar form to the allegations required in a pleading.” ORCP
68 C(2)(b).