Dept. of Human Services v. G. G.

142 October 28, 2026 No. 1029 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of E. G., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. G. G., Appellant. Union County Circuit Court 25JU03637; A189898 Thomas B. Powers, Judge. Submitted August 19, 2026. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and E. Nani Apo, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. ORTEGA, P. J. Affirmed. Cite as 354 Or App 142 (2026) 143 ORTEGA, P. J. Mother appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to her daughter, E, who was 3 years old at the time of the termination trial. On appeal, mother chal- lenges only the juvenile court’s determination that termi- nation of her parental rights was in E’s best interests. In support of her argument, mother asserts that evidence that it is in E’s best interests to remain in the current placement with resource parents is not sufficient by itself to support termination of mother’s parental rights. She also contends that a guardianship would fulfill E’s immediate need for permanency while also allowing mother the opportunity to work towards having a relationship with E. Although not all of the evidence offered by Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) is helpful to our analysis, we ultimately conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the best-interests determination in this case. Therefore, we affirm. We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo. ORS 19.415(3); ORS 419A.200(6). We give “consider- able weight” to demeanor-based credibility findings, because the juvenile court judge “had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor in evaluating the credibil- ity of their testimony.” Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. B., 294 Or App 514, 516, 432 P3d 343 (2018), rev den, 365 Or 556 (2019). We begin with the facts necessary to give context to our ruling. E was born in September 2022 and was removed from mother’s care at seven months old due to mother’s sub- stance abuse and mental health issues. E was placed with mother’s sister and brother-in-law and has remained there since then. In July 2025, ODHS filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to E. The petition alleged unfitness due to mother’s mental illness, substance abuse, criminal conduct, exposure of the child to domestic violence, lack of stable housing, physical/emotional neglect, failure to present a viable plan for the return of the child, failure to adjust her circumstances, and failure to acquire necessary parenting skills. The juvenile court held a termination trial in January 2026, and heard testimony from numerous witnesses, 144 Dept. of Human Services v. G. G. including mother, resource mother, ODHS caseworkers, and a psychologist who conducted evaluations and assessments of E and mother. The court also received documentary evidence, including psychological evaluations for mother and E and an observation assessing interactions between mother and E. At trial, mother testified that she had long-term substance abuse issues that impacted her ability to safely parent E. She also acknowledged that she did not engage in the services recommended by ODHS. Mother was arrested in December 2024 for robbery and felon in possession of a firearm. By the time of the termination trial, mother was in prison and had been sober for 13 months. She had been engaging in mental health treatment and planned to con- tinue engaging in programs as they became available to her. A psychologist, Dr. Clausel, conducted a psycholog- ical evaluation of mother. He diagnosed her with an atypi- cal cluster B personality disorder with histrionic, antisocial, and dependent features. At different points in his testimony, Clausel testified that mother’s personality disorder is char- acterized by a low tolerance for frustration, trouble with pro- viding stability and structure, and reduced insight. He also testified that atypical B personality disorders are negatively sensitive to a loss of control, and that when people with this disorder are not actively using substances and face a loss of control, they may experience “meltdowns” and depression and may become withdrawn. In addition, Clausel believed that mother was either actively using methamphetamine at the time of the eval- uation or had developed residual brain dysfunction due to long-term addiction. He opined that she was at significant risk for developing permanent, psychotic-level symptoms. His treatment recommendations were that mother address her substance abuse problems and engage in individual psy- chotherapy and parent skills training. Clausel also opined that mother would need to be reevaluated after two to four years of sobriety to see if there were permanent, irreversible cognitive impairments due to her long-term drug use. E had been doing well in her placement with resource parents—mother’s sister and brother-in-law—and Cite as 354 Or App 142 (2026) 145 was bonded to them. Resource mother testified that she wished to adopt E and would preserve her relationship with mother when safe and appropriate, but expressed concern about mother’s substance use and instability. Resource mother also testified that E requires very specific routines at home. Without them, E has severe meltdowns, which include “high-pitched screaming and just kind of not having control over herself in a physical and emotional way.” Additionally, resource mother testified that after visits with mother, E would sometimes act out, be harder to calm down, and would have night terrors, waking up in the night “covered in sweat and screaming.” Those behav- iors were more common when the visits were inconsistent, according to resource mother, who was called in to comfort E during visits about half the time. In evaluating the parent-child interaction, Clausel described the relationship between E and mother as tense or strained and noted that E became increasingly tense, frustrated, and aversive towards mother. During the inter- action, Clausel observed mother playing loud “house music” and not responding to E when she became upset by the music. Clausel also observed mother describing the weather as dangerous to E, and continued to repeat descriptions of the weather that seemed to upset E. Clausel also conducted a psychological evaluation of E, which revealed signs of developmental delays, including that she had significantly less control over her emotional reactions than an average two-year-old child. Clausel deter- mined that E had less tolerance for stimulation and high negative expressed emotion characterized by high conflict and high intensity, and that she had a higher than usual need for structure and consistency. Clausel testified that E needed a parental figure who was calmer than her and some- one who was able to show her how to cope with her emotions. Clausel also expressed that continued inconsistency from mother would negatively impact E’s ability to form healthy attachments and could lead to other psychological and social problems as she got older. In addition, without a predictable home environment, E was at risk of behavior problems, poor academic performance, depression, and anxiety. Clausel 146 Dept. of Human Services v. G. G. opined that mother’s personality disorder was concerning in relation to E, and he did not see a benefit to E continuing a relationship with mother. In Clausel’s opinion, E needed a stable, nurturing environment with low emotional intensity, and waiting to see improvement in mother could be harmful to her. At the end of trial, the juvenile court found that ODHS had demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that mother was unfit, that E’s integration into her home within a reasonable time was improbable, and that termi- nation of mother’s parental rights was in E’s best interests. On appeal, mother challenges only the determination that termination was in E’s best interests. ORS 419B.500 provides that “[t]he parental rights of the parents of a ward may be terminated * * * only * * * if the court finds it is in the best interests of the ward.” That determination is focused on the needs of the child. Dept. of Human Services v. J. S. E. S., 315 Or App 242, 244, 501 P3d 556 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 209 (2022). We will not assume that severing a child’s legal relationship with a parent deemed to be legally unfit is in a child’s best interests with- out evidence. Dept. of Human Services v. M. H., 306 Or App 150, 164, 473 P3d 1152 (2020). The “assessment of a child’s best interest must be child-centered,” taking into consider- ation the unique circumstances of each case. Dept. of Human Services v. T. M. D., 365 Or 143, 166, 442 P3d 1100 (2019); see also J. S. E. S., 315 Or App at 244 (the court’s best-interests determination is “focused on the needs of the child”). In assessing whether termination of the legal relationship is in the child’s best interests, we consider “(1) the strength of the bond between the parent and child; (2) whether severing that bond will help or harm the child; (3) the benefits to the child of terminating parental rights; and (4) the risk of harm to the child posed by termination.” Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. B., 321 Or App 50, 53, 515 P3d 927 (2022). “Ultimately, * * * we must be able to determine with confidence that the benefits to the child of ending the child’s legal relationship with a parent outweigh the risk of harm Cite as 354 Or App 142 (2026) 147 posed to the child by severing that legal relationship.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. H., 322 Or App 507, 520, 520 P3d 424 (2022) (citing L. M. B., 321 Or App at 53 (internal quota- tion marks omitted)). Mother argues that the record lacks child-specific evidence sufficient to support a determination that termina- tion is in E’s best interests. She asserts that evidence that it is in E’s best interests to remain in her current placement is not sufficient, and argues that a permanent guardian- ship would provide E with a permanent, stable home with resource parents, whom she identifies as her parents, and would allow mother the opportunity to continue contact and form a better bond with E. We are persuaded that the record is sufficient when viewed in its totality. At the outset, we note that some of Clausel’s testimony was not particularly helpful to our deter- mination, including some of his framing regarding mental disorders. For example, we are not persuaded by Clausel’s testimony generalizing that people with mother’s form of mental disorder are “infamously” prone to certain behaviors or can become “catastrophically depressed” or that “the best treatment recommendation for this individual is incarcera- tion because that’s where they just do great.” Nevertheless, we are persuaded that other aspects of Clausel’s testimony outlined above and the record as a whole are legally sufficient to support the best-interests determination, as described below, and including Clausel’s diagnosis of mother’s men- tal illness and history of substance abuse apart from those generalizations. The record supports that E and mother lack a strong bond or attachment that weighs in favor of termina- tion. Cf. Dept. of Human Services v. D. E. P., 315 Or App 566, 571, 502 P3d 764 (2021) (concluding that the record lacks clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests given that “B is attached to mother, and maintaining a relationship with mother is important to B’s well-being”). While we do not minimize the potential benefit to a child of a positive attachment to a birth par- ent, mother’s argument is based on speculation about a bond 148 Dept. of Human Services v. G. G. that she could potentially form with E in the future rather than child-specific evidence of E’s best interests. Additionally, the evidence shows that visits between mother and E cause emotional harm to E. See N. H., 322 Or App at 520-21 (concluding that a developmentally delayed child did not have an “interest in maintaining her legal rela- tionship with mother” where the child was not attached to the mother and the mother’s irregular visits were doing “a lot of damage” to the child). The record also supports that E has a higher than usual need for stability, structure, and consistency given her developmental delays and reduced emotional control and that she requires a caregiver who is emotionally regulated and consistent. E’s current caregivers (who are the potential adoptive parents) demonstrate a com- mitment to her and insight in taking care of her particular needs. Thus, E’s need for a higher level of stability and sup- port for emotional regulation weigh in favor of termination. The evidence further establishes that E is bonded and secure in a placement that is intended to be her adop- tive placement. See M. H., 306 Or App at 161 (a child’s “iden- tified adoptive placement is relevant to the best-interest inquiry in a termination proceeding”). Resource mother also demonstrated willingness to facilitate E’s relationships with other members of her family, including mother and an older brother. While resource mother expressed reserva- tions about continuing contact between E and mother post adoption, that position was reasonable given the relation- ship between mother and resource mother, mother’s behav- ior when she is not sober, and the fact that mother has yet to maintain stability outside the prison environment. The record here supports the view that resource mother under- stands the value of contact with mother if it can be man- aged safely and offers a basis for her concerns regarding the need to manage that contact. See State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. R. J. T., 229 Or App 619, 641-42, 214 P3d 1, rev den, 347 Or 43 (2009) (taking into consideration that foster parents, who had provided stability for the child and who the child viewed as her parents, wished to adopt the child, in determining that termination was in the child’s best interests, even though continuing contact with the mother may be beneficial). Cite as 354 Or App 142 (2026) 149 Finally, we often consider whether a parent would be likely to disrupt a guardianship in assessing whether termination is in a child’s best interests. See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. K. T., 334 Or App 55, 64-65, 554 P3d 832, rev den, 372 Or 787 (2024) (determining that termination served a child’s best interests where the mother’s volatile behavior would be “potentially disruptive” to a guardian- ship); Dept. of Human Services v. T. M. M., 327 Or App 631, 638, 535 P3d 800 (2023) (affirming that termination was in a child’s best interests where the mother’s history of insta- bility and extreme behavior raised concerns that she “would try to interfere” with a guardianship). Here, the record lacks sufficient evidence that mother would be disruptive, although there is some reason for concern that she could be. Nevertheless, given the other evidence in the record dis- cussed above, that concern is not significant to our determi- nation here. Having reviewed the record and made our own find- ings de novo, we conclude that the benefits to E outweigh the potential harm associated with terminating the legal rela- tionship with mother. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment terminating mother’s parental rights. Affirmed.