Dept. of Human Services v. R. W. C.

No. 1061 November 4, 2026 339 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of R. C., Jr., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, and R. C., JR., Respondent, v. R. W. C., Appellant. Jackson County Circuit Court 24JU04301; A189944 Timothy Barnack, Judge. Submitted June 12, 2026. Aron Perez-Selsky filed the brief for appellant. Stacy M. Chaffin, Assistant Attorney General, waived appearance for respondent DHS. Erica Hayne Friedman waived appearance for respon- dent child. Before Lagesen, Chief Judge, and Egan, Judge.* LAGESEN, C. J. Affirmed. ______________ * Determined by a two-judge department as authorized by ORS 2.570(2)(b). 340 Dept. of Human Services v. R. W. C. LAGESEN, C. J. Father appeals a judgment terminating his paren- tal rights to his child, R. Appointed counsel filed a brief pur- suant to ORAP 5.90 and State v. Balfour, 311 Or 434, 814 P2d 1069 (1991). The brief did not contain a Section B. See ORAP 5.90(1)(b). We affirm. On August 28, 2024, the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) filed a petition to terminate father’s parental rights to R. In the juvenile court, on December 13, 2024, father appeared and he denied the allegations in the petition. On December 16, 2025, after father failed to appear at a pre-trial conference, the court issued an order requiring father to appear for a trial set for January 7, 8, and 9, 2026. In compliance with the requirements of ORS 419B.820, the order directing father to appear informed father that (1) he must “appear personally in the courtroom”; (2) his counsel may not attend in his place; and (3) if he “fails to appear personally as ordered * * *, the court, without further notice and in the parent’s absence, may terminate the [his] paren- tal rights.” A termination trial was held on January 7, 2026, at which, according to the termination judgment on appeal, father “did not appear as ordered, although he was served as required by law.” At that trial, the state presented its prima facie case, including through the testimony of an ODHS caseworker whom the trial court expressly found to be cred- ible. The trial court granted the relief sought in ODHS’s petition and terminated father’s parental rights to R. On appeal, appointed counsel for father initially filed a brief pursuant to ORAP 5.90 and Balfour, in which the counsel took the position that “the termination judgment was given for want of an answer and is not appealable.” See ORS 19.245(2) (providing that, except in certain circumstances, “[a] party to a judgment given by confession or for want of an answer may not appeal from the judgment”). We struck that brief and ordered father to file an amended opening brief. We explained that because, in the juvenile court, on December 13, 2024, father appeared in response to a summons, and father Cite as 354 Or App 339 (2026) 341 denied the allegations in the petition to terminate his paren- tal rights, the judgment was not given for want of an answer within the meaning of ORS 19.245(2). See Dept. of Human Services v. B. P., 281 Or App 218, 233-35, 381 P3d 1073 (2016), rev den, 361 Or 100 (2017) (the parent did not “waive” right to appeal termination judgment where he responded to sum- mons but failed to appear at call, because termination judg- ment was not entered for “want of an answer”); see also Dept. of Human Services v. S. C. T., 281 Or App 246, 253-54, 380 P3d 1211 (2016), rev den, 360 Or 752 (2017) (“ORS 19.245(2) does not apply, because parents responded to their summons in the particular manner that it directed”).1 After this court’s order striking father’s brief, appointed counsel filed an amended opening brief pursuant to ORAP 5.90 and Balfour. Now, having reviewed the record, including the trial court file, the transcript of the hearings, and the Balfour brief, we have identified no arguably meritorious issues. In reaching that conclusion, we note both that the juvenile court expressly found the ODHS caseworker to be credible, and we generally defer to a juvenile court’s demeanor-based credibility findings even where, as here, our standard of review is de novo. Dept. of Human Services v. T. L. M. H., 294 Or App 749, 750 n 1, 432 P3d 1186 (2018), rev den, 365 Or 556 (2019) (“We ordinarily defer to the juvenile court’s credibility findings when those findings are based on the court’s direct observation of the witnesses * * * because we, as an appellate court, do not have the same opportunity to observe witnesses firsthand and, for that reason, [we] do not have the same institutional capacity to make demean- or-based judgments.”). Moreover, even on de novo review, 1 We also observe that, where counsel believes this court should dismiss for want of jurisdiction, it is not apparent that filing a Balfour brief pursuant to ORAP 5.90 is the appropriate procedure. See ORAP 5.90 (rule applicable where counsel “appointed by the court to represent an indigent defendant in a criminal case on direct appeal has thoroughly reviewed the record, has discussed the case with trial counsel and the client, and has determined that the case does not raise any arguably meritorious issues”); Lutcavich v. Pedro, 346 Or App 1, 3, 583 P3d 1084 (2025) (“The applicable standard of review for Balfour submissions * * * is whether the record * * * discloses any arguably meritorious issues for the court’s review, such that the court must order supplemental briefing to address the argu- ably meritorious issue.” (Emphasis omitted.)). 342 Dept. of Human Services v. R. W. C. we generally do not consider issues that were not pre- served in the juvenile court, and father preserved no issues in the juvenile court. See, e.g., Dept. of Human Services v. D. B. S. W., 318 Or App 423, 425, 506 P3d 1195, rev den, 369 Or 733 (2022) (declining to consider unpreserved challenge to juvenile court’s best interest determination). Given those constraints, we see no arguable procedural or substantive basis for displacing the judgment on appeal. Consequently, we affirm. Affirmed.