Dept. of Human Services v. L. C. B.

No. 1019 October 21, 2026 95 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of L. C., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. L. C. B., Appellant. Multnomah County Circuit Court 25JU01654; A190721 Susan M. Svetkey, Senior Judge. Submitted September 23, 2026. Sarah Laidlaw and Laidlaw Appellate Law LLC filed the briefs for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Shannon T. Reel, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. EGAN, J. Affirmed. 96 Dept. of Human Services v. L. C. B. EGAN, J. Father appeals a judgment terminating his paren- tal rights to his five-year-old son, L. In 12 assignments of error, father challenges the juvenile court’s rulings that he was unfit under ORS 419B.504 and that terminating his parental rights was in L’s best interests. We affirm. “We review the record in proceedings for termina- tion of parental rights de novo, ORS 19.415(3)(a), and deter- mine anew whether to terminate parental rights.” Dept. of Human Services v. J. M.-A., 333 Or App 334, 336, 554 P3d 263 (2024). A juvenile court may terminate a parent’s parental rights based on unfitness, ORS 419B.504, if it determines “by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit by reason of conduct or condition seriously detrimental to the child or ward and integration of the child or ward into the home of the parent or parents is improbable within a reason- able time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.” Dept. of Human Services v. C. M. K., 270 Or App 1, 16, 346 P3d 1254, cert den, 357 Or 324 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); ORS 419B.521(1) (“The facts on the basis of which the rights of the parents are terminated, unless admitted, must be established by clear and convincing evi- dence * * *.”). Courts engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether a parent is unfit. First, the court must determine whether “the parent has engaged in some conduct or is char- acterized by some condition” and whether that “conduct or condition is ‘seriously detrimental’ to the child.” State ex rel SOSCF v. Stillman, 333 Or 135, 145, 36 P3d 490 (2001). At the second step, the court must determine whether “inte- gration of the child into the home of the parent or parents is improbable within a reasonable time due to conduct or conditions not likely to change.” Id. Both the “serious detri- ment” and “reasonable time” inquiries are child-specific. Id. at 146. If the court concludes that a parent is unfit under ORS 419B.504, it may terminate the parent’s parental rights only if clear and convincing evidence also establishes that Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 95 (2026) 97 termination is in the particular child’s best interests. ORS 419B.500; Dept. of Human Services v. D. E. P., 315 Or App 566, 570, 502 P3d 764 (2021). Considerations that inform the best-interest inquiry include “(1) the strength of the bond between the parent and child; (2) whether severing that bond will help or harm the child; (3) the benefits to the child of terminating parental rights; and (4) the risk of harm to the child posed by termination.” Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. B., 321 Or App 50, 53, 515 P3d 927 (2022). Having reviewed the record and made our own find- ings de novo, we conclude that father was unfit under ORS 419B.504 at the time of the termination trial. Father had longstanding substance-abuse and criminal-conduct issues, remained incarcerated, and had not made a lasting adjust- ment sufficient to permit L’s safe return. Although father had participated in services, the evidence showed that he continued to have significant substance-abuse issues, lacked a meaningful treatment plan, and would need a substantial period of stability before his ability to safely parent could even be evaluated. L had never been in father’s care and, by the time of trial, had spent five years in substitute care. Given L’s developmental and other special needs, his estab- lished attachments to his resource family and siblings, and the evidence concerning father’s continuing circumstances, the record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that integration of L into father’s home was improbable within a reasonable time. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that termination was in L’s best interests. L’s primary attachments were to his resource parents, whom he called “mom” and “daddy,” and to his older siblings, who were also members of that family. Dr. Bennett testified that L had a “visiting relationship” rather than a parental bond with father, that L did not exhibit a significant response when visits did not occur, and that severing the relationship would not be harmful because there was no parental bond to sever. She further testified that termination would ben- efit L by providing permanency, a sense of belonging and family, and a reliable plan for his future, particularly given L’s needs and the length of time he had spent in substitute 98 Dept. of Human Services v. L. C. B. care. Those child-specific circumstances establish by clear and convincing evidence that the benefits of termination outweighed the risk of harm from severing the legal rela- tionship with father. We do not consider father’s tenth and eleventh assignments of error, in which he asserts that the juvenile court misinstructed itself with respect to the best interest analysis because father did not preserve those claims in the juvenile court. Westendorf and Westendorf, 165 Or App 175, 178, 996 P2d 523 (2000) (concluding that the fact that a case is “subject to de novo review does not mean that the rule [requiring preservation of claims of error] applies with any less force than it does in other cases.”). Affirmed.