Dept. of Human Services v. M. C. L.

256 October 28, 2026 No. 1041 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of A. J. L., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. M. C. L., Appellant. Washington County Circuit Court 24JU02901; A190170 Michele C. Rini, Judge. Submitted August 19, 2026. Tiffany Keast, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense Commission. Jeff J. Payne, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General. Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Joyce, Judge, and Hellman, Judge. ORTEGA, P. J. Affirmed. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 256 (2026) 257 ORTEGA, P. J. In this juvenile dependency case, mother appeals a judgment establishing a permanent guardianship over her son, A, asserting two assignments of error on appeal. First, mother contends that the juvenile court erred in sustain- ing an objection to her proffered testimony concerning the suitability of the proposed guardian. Second, mother argues that the juvenile court erred in establishing a permanent guardianship for A, based on that omission of her testimony. We conclude that mother did not make an offer of proof sufficient to permit us to determine whether any error in excluding the testimony was prejudicial. Given that con- clusion, we need not reach the merits of mother’s assign- ments of error. Accordingly, we affirm. Mother has a lengthy history of involvement with the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS), includ- ing an extended period of wardship for A from July 2019 to February 2021. A was 13 years old at the time of the perma- nent guardianship trial and had been a ward of the juvenile court since September of 2024. In May 2025, the ODHS filed a petition to establish a permanent guardianship for A with his current resource parent. During mother’s testimony at the guardianship hearing, her counsel asked mother if she had concerns about the proposed guardian. The juvenile court sustained an objection asserted by A’s counsel to testi- mony from mother about the suitability of the guardian. On appeal, mother argues that the juvenile court erred by excluding her testimony, asserting three arguments. First, she argues that she was entitled to present evidence regarding the suitability of the proposed guardian under ORS 419B.875(2), which provides the right for a parent to “participate in hearings.” Second, mother contends that her proposed testimony about the guardian related to the best interest requirement for establishing a guardianship under ORS 419B.365(4). Third, mother contends that under ORS 419B.369(1), the court was required to determine whether the proposed guardian was suitable to serve that role for A. We first address preservation. The state argues that mother failed to preserve her arguments regarding 258 Dept. of Human Services v. M. C. L. ORS 419B.875(2) and ORS 419B.369(1). Generally, appellate courts will not consider claims of error that were not raised below. State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341, 15 P3d 22 (2000). Mother’s sole argument in the juvenile court was that her testimony was related to the best interest requirement; she did not mention, as she does on appeal, a right to participate in hearings under ORS 419B.875(2), nor did she connect her proposed testimony to required determinations under ORS 419B.369(1). We have held that an objection on one ground is not sufficient to preserve some other objection. State v. Isom, 313 Or 391, 406, 837 P2d 491 (1992); see State v. Rumler, 199 Or App 32, 41, 110 P3d 115 (2005) (a matter is unpreserved if the trial judge would be “surprised” by an argument on appeal and would feel “blindsided” if this court were to reverse based on defendant’s argument). Therefore, moth- er’s proposed testimony related to the best interest require- ment was insufficient to preserve her arguments related to a right to participate under ORS 419B.875(2) and whether the guardian was suitable under ORS 419B.369(1). We next turn to mother’s contention that her pro- posed testimony about the guardian related to the best inter- est requirement for establishing a guardianship under ORS 419B.365(4). The state responds that any error regarding the exclusion of the testimony is harmless because mother did not make a sufficient offer of proof to demonstrate preju- dice by the exclusion. We agree with the state. “Ordinarily, we will not reverse a trial court’s judg- ment based on the possibility that excluded evidence might have affected the outcome of the proceeding unless the appellant made an offer of proof showing that the exclusion of the evidence was prejudicial.” Dept. of Human Services v. D. J., 259 Or App 638, 646, 314 P3d 998 (2013). The offer of proof is necessary for us to determine “if there is little like- lihood that the particular error affected the verdict.” Dept. of Human Services v. J. L. S., 321 Or App 158, 163, 515 P3d 932 (2022) (quoting Dept of Human Services v. G. D. W., 353 Or 25, 39, 292 P3d 548 (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 256 (2026) 259 In this case, although mother argued that she sought to address A’s best interest, she did not offer any- thing further as to the content of her proposed testimony. Therefore, mother failed to provide an offer of proof suffi- cient to enable us to determine whether any error was prej- udicial. D. J., 259 Or App at 646. Thus, because mother did not provide us with a sufficient record to support a basis for reversal of the judgment, we do not further consider the merits of her arguments. Affirmed.