Dept. of Human Services v. A. E.

130 October 21, 2026 No. 1027 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of C. E., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. A. E., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 24JU04736; A190345 (Control) In the Matter of P. E., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. A. E., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 24JU04737; A190346 In the Matter of K. E., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. A. E., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 24JU04738; A190347 Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 130 (2026) 131 In the Matter of C. E., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. A. E., Appellant. Douglas County Circuit Court 24JU04739; A190348 Ann Marie Simmons, Judge. Submitted September 23, 2026. Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, and Holly Telerant, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon Public Defense Commission, filed the brief for appellant. Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General, and Derek Olson, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. JACQUOT, J. Affirmed. 132 Dept. of Human Services v. A. E. JACQUOT, J. In this consolidated juvenile dependency case, mother appeals judgments in which the juvenile court changed the permanency plans for her children away from reunification. The juvenile court changed the permanency plans for A and K, aged 14 and 11, from reunification to guardianship. For P and R, aged 5 and 4, the juvenile court changed the permanency plans from reunification to adop- tion. Mother alleges in twelve assignments of error that the juvenile court erred by: (1) ruling that mother’s progress was insufficient for all four children to safely return home; (2) ruling that further efforts would not make it possible for all four children to safely return home within a reason- able time; (3) changing A’s and K’s permanency plans from reunification to guardianship; and (4) changing P’s and R’s permanency plans from reunification to adoption. We affirm. Mother has not requested that we review de novo, and we do not exercise our discretion to engage in such review in this case.1 We are therefore bound by the juvenile court’s findings of historical fact—including what reuni- fication efforts Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) made and what actions the parent took—if there is any evidence in the record to support them. Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B., 372 Or 133, 151, 546 P3d 255 (2024). We review the juvenile court’s determinations that ODHS’s efforts have been reasonable, that the parent’s progress is insufficient, and that there is no compelling reason to forgo a plan of adoption for errors of law. Dept. of Human Services v. S. J. M., 364 Or 37, 56-57, 430 P3d 1021 (2018) (compelling reasons determination); Dept. of Human Services v. T. R. P., 344 Or App 375, 377, 580 P3d 365 (2025) (reasonable efforts and insufficient progress determinations). 1 See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (“Upon an appeal in an equitable action or proceeding other than an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights, the Court of Appeals, acting in its sole discretion, may try the cause anew upon the record or make one or more factual findings anew upon the record.”); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (providing for the exercise of that discretion only in exceptional cases); ORAP 5.40(8)(d) (identifying nonexclusive considerations that may be relevant to our decision whether to exercise de novo review). Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 130 (2026) 133 Except in specific circumstances not applicable here,2 the juvenile court is authorized to change a child’s permanency plan from reunification to adoption if the pro- ponent of that plan change, typically and in this case ODHS, proves that ODHS’s efforts to reunify the parent and child have been reasonable and that, despite those reasonable efforts, the parent’s progress toward reunification has been insufficient. ORS 419B.476(2)(a); Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. K., 319 Or App 245, 252, 510 P3d 278 (2022). “[B] oth [ODHS’s] efforts and a parent’s progress are evaluated by reference to the facts that formed the bases for juvenile court jurisdiction.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. T., 247 Or App 706, 715, 271 P3d 143 (2012). That is, the court may only rely on facts that are “explicitly stated or fairly implied by the jurisdictional judgment” in making its determina- tions regarding ODHS’s reunification efforts and the par- ent’s progress. Id. at 715-16. ODHS’s reunification efforts are “reasonable” when they “focus on ameliorating the adjudicated bases for jurisdiction” and “give parents a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate their ability to adjust their conduct and become minimally adequate parents.” Dept. of Human Services v. L. L. S., 290 Or App 132, 138, 413 P3d 1005 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). A parent need not completely ameliorate the bases for dependency jurisdiction for their progress to be “sufficient.” Y. B., 372 Or at 146. Instead, a parent’s progress is “sufficient” if it will make the child’s safe return home possible, with or without continued ser- vices and support. Id. at 154. Conversely, “[e]ven if a par- ent has completed all services that have been required, evi- dence that a parent continues to engage in behavior that is harmful to a child supports a determination that the parent has not made sufficient progress to make it possible for the child to return home.” Dept. of Human Services v. G. N., 263 Or App 287, 297, 328 P3d 728, rev den, 356 Or 638 (2014). When a juvenile court has decided to change a child’s permanency plan away from reunification, its goal 2 Under ORS 419B.340(5), the juvenile court may relieve ODHS of its obli- gation to make reunification efforts in cases in which there are “aggravated cir- cumstances,” the parent has committed certain crimes, or the parent’s rights to another child have been terminated. 134 Dept. of Human Services v. A. E. then is to select a plan “that is most likely to lead to a positive outcome for the child.” State ex rel DHS v. M. A. (A139693), 227 Or App 172, 183, 205 P3d 36 (2009). To that end, ORS 419B.476(5) requires the court to address certain issues in the judgment changing a child’s permanency plan. As relevant here, when a child’s plan is being changed to adoption, ORS 419B.476(5)(d) requires the court to address whether any of the circumstances in ORS 419B.498(2) apply. ORS 419B.498(2) lists reasons the court may allow ODHS to forgo or delay filing a petition to terminate paren- tal rights in a dependency case, one of which is the existence of a “compelling reason, which is documented in the case plan, for determining that filing such a petition would not be in the best interests of the child or ward.” The statute pro- vides some examples of compelling reasons, one of which is that “[a]nother permanent plan is better suited to meet the health and safety needs of the child or ward, including the need to preserve the child’s or ward’s sibling attachments and relationships[.]” ORS 419B.498(2)(b)(B). The party arguing that a compelling reason exists bears the burden to prove facts that would allow the court to make that determi- nation. S. J. M., 364 Or at 53-55. We further conclude that the juvenile court did not err in determining that mother’s progress toward reunifi- cation was insufficient. Mother’s active participation in ser- vices at the time of this hearing was admirable, but it mir- rors her previous pattern of attempting to get sober and, subsequently, relapsing. The children had been significantly impacted by the repeated chaos caused by mother’s drug use and relapses and their removals and returns home. The children each have psychological conditions of their own including attachment problems. Mother was compliant with treatment at the time of the hearing, but at this point, the record supports a determination that mother’s progress toward reunification was not sufficient to allow the children to safely return home within a reasonable time. We further affirm the juvenile court’s determina- tion that further efforts will not make it possible for the children to be returned home within a reasonable time, given mother’s long-term struggle to maintain her sobriety Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 130 (2026) 135 without relapsing. ORS 419B.476(4)(c) allows a court to con- tinue the reunification plan “[i]f the court determines that further efforts will make it possible for the ward to safely return home within a reasonable time[.]” The court here did not make that finding. “[W]hen a juvenile court has made a determination that further efforts will not make it pos- sible for a ward to safely return home within a reasonable time, we review that determination for legal error.” Dept. of Human Services v. C. K., 351 Or App 13, 18, ___ P3d ___ (2026). We examine whether the facts explicitly found by the juvenile court, together with all inferences reasonably drawn from those facts, were legally sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination. Id. at 21. Mother asks us to assign the burden to prove that additional efforts will allow the child to return home safely. Like in C. K., it is not necessary for us to do so to decide this case. Id. The record amply supports the juvenile court’s determination that mother’s ability to maintain long-term sobriety was at least uncertain, given her history of cycles of relapse and her relatively brief period of success. If the juvenile court determines, as it did here for A and K, “that the permanency plan for the ward should be establishment of a legal guardianship,” then it must engage in a legal analysis and include in its permanency judgment “the court’s determination of why neither placement with parents nor adoption is appropriate.” ORS 419B.476(5)(e). Both A and K expressed their desires to stay in their respec- tive current placements—with resource parents and with a cousin, respectively. Each requested that they not be placed together and that they not be returned to their parents. Additionally, the juvenile court determined that adoption was inappropriate for A and K because “another placement plan [was] better suited” to meet their needs and adoption was “unlikely, or otherwise inappropriate,” due to A and K’s “unwillingness to consent” and their “attachment to a par- ent.” See ORS 109.328 (“If the child is 14 years of age or older, the adoption shall not be made without the consent of the child.”). In her last assignment of error, mother argues that we should reverse the change of P and R’s permanency plans 136 Dept. of Human Services v. A. E. to adoption because the “compelling reason” that existed was P and R’s attachment to their siblings and parents. Mother did not preserve those arguments, nor does she request plain error review. For those reasons, we will not address those arguments. See State v. Ardizzone, 270 Or App 666, 673, 349 P3d 597, rev den, 358 Or 145 (2015) (“Defendant does not request plain error review in this case, and we therefore do not undertake that analysis.”). Mother did preserve her argument that she was participating in services that would allow the children to return home safely and that that was a compelling reason not to change the plan to adoption, but that argument meets the same fate as mother’s argument that she had made sufficient progress and that additional efforts would allow the children to safely return home. She did not carry her burden. Although she may ultimately be successful in sufficiently addressing her substance abuse, given her history, the record demonstrates that waiting the amount of time it would take to ensure the children could be safely returned was outweighed by the children’s needs for stability and consistency. Accordingly, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in deciding on this record that there was no compelling reason to forgo changing P and R’s plans to adoption. Affirmed.