Dept. of Human Services v. J. O. S.

318 October 28, 2026 No. 1055 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the Matter of O. S. S., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. O. S., Appellant. Lake County Circuit Court 23JU00944; A190499 (Control) In the Matter of M. L. S., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. O. S., Appellant. Lake County Circuit Court 23JU00946; A190500 In the Matter of S. R. S., a Child. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. O. S., Appellant. Lake County Circuit Court 23JU00950; A190501 In the Matter of N. F. S., a Child. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 318 (2026) 319 DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Petitioner-Respondent, v. J. O. S., Appellant. Lake County Circuit Court 23JU00952; A190502 David M. Vandenberg, Judge. Argued and submitted September 23, 2026. Holly Telerant, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate Section, Oregon Public Defense, Commission. Philip Thoennes, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Solicitor General. Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Egan, Judge, and Jacquot, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. 320 Dept. of Human Services v. J. O. S. PER CURIAM In this consolidated juvenile dependency case, father appeals judgments in which the juvenile court changed the permanency plans for his children, N, M, S, and O, who were 8, 7, 4, and 3 years old respectively at the time of the per- manency hearing, from reunification to guardianship. In 12 assignments of error, father argues that the juvenile court erred in ruling that the efforts of the Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) were reasonable and that the court, therefore, “erred in reaching the question of father’s progress and in ruling to change the plans away from reuni- fication.” We affirm. Father has not requested that we review de novo, and we do not exercise our discretion to engage in such review in this case.1 We are therefore bound by the juvenile court’s findings of historical fact—including what reunifica- tion efforts ODHS made and what actions the parent took— if there is any evidence in the record to support them. Dept. of Human Services v. Y. B., 372 Or 133, 151, 546 P3d 255 (2024). We review the juvenile court’s determinations that ODHS’s efforts have been reasonable and that the parent’s progress is insufficient for errors of law. Dept. of Human Services v. T. R. P., 344 Or App 375, 377, 580 P3d 365 (2025). Except in specific circumstances not applicable here,2 the juvenile court is authorized to change a child’s perma- nency plan away from reunification if the proponent of the plan change, typically and in this case ODHS, proves that ODHS’s efforts to reunify the parent and child have been reasonable and that, despite those reasonable efforts, the parent’s progress toward reunification has been insufficient. ORS 419B.476(2)(a); Dept. of Human Services v. L. M. K., 1 See ORS 19.415(3)(b) (“Upon an appeal in an equitable action or proceeding other than an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights, the Court of Appeals, acting in its sole discretion, may try the cause anew upon the record or make one or more factual findings anew upon the record.”); ORAP 5.40(8)(c) (providing for the exercise of that discretion only in “exceptional cases”); ORAP 5.40(8)(d) (identifying nonexclusive considerations that may be relevant to our decision whether to exercise de novo review). 2 Under ORS 419B.340(5), the juvenile court may relieve ODHS of its obli- gation to make reunification efforts in cases in which there are “aggravated cir- cumstances,” the parent has committed certain crimes, or the parent’s rights to another child have been terminated. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 318 (2026) 321 319 Or App 245, 252, 510 P3d 278 (2022). “[B]oth [ODHS’s] efforts and a parent’s progress are evaluated by reference to the facts that formed the bases for juvenile court jurisdiction.” Dept. of Human Services v. N. T., 247 Or App 706, 715, 271 P3d 143 (2012). That is, the court may only rely on facts that are “explicitly stated or fairly implied by the jurisdictional judgment” in making its determinations regarding ODHS’s reunification efforts and the parent’s progress. Id. at 715-16. ODHS’s reunification efforts are “reasonable” when they “focus on ameliorating the adjudicated bases for juris- diction” and “give parents a reasonable opportunity to demon- strate their ability to adjust their conduct and become mini- mally adequate parents.” Dept. of Human Services v. L. L. S., 290 Or App 132, 138, 413 P3d 1005 (2018) (internal quota- tion marks omitted). A parent need not completely amelio- rate the bases for dependency jurisdiction for their progress to be “sufficient.” Y. B., 372 Or at 146. Instead, a parent’s progress is “sufficient” if it would make the child’s safe return home possible, with or without continued services and support. Id. at 154. As noted, father challenges only the juvenile court’s determination that ODHS’s efforts to reunify father and his children were reasonable and asserts that, because those determinations were erroneous, the court further erred in reaching the question of whether his progress was sufficient and ultimately determining that it was not and changing the children’s permanency plans. Father does not advance any argument that the evidentiary record did not support the juvenile court’s determination that his progress toward reunification was not sufficient. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in determining that ODHS made reasonable efforts to reunify father with his children. With respect to father, the juvenile court asserted jurisdiction over the children because father “failed to maintain a safe envi- ronment for the child[ren] because the father has allowed the child[ren] to live in a home that is unsafe and unsan- itary”; father “does not understand the needs of the child and lacks the parenting skills necessary to adequately and appropriately parent and protect the child”; and “[d]espite 322 Dept. of Human Services v. J. O. S. being offered services designed to improve the father’s par- enting skills, he has never made himself available for such.” To address those conditions and circumstances, ODHS pro- vided father with a mental health assessment, psychologi- cal evaluation, hands-on parenting training, and visitation with the children through ODHS’s supervised visitation pro- gram and through the Oregon Tech Relationship Building Program (“OIT”), a visitation service facilitated by psychol- ogy or sociology students to “encourage increased attach- ment * * * between the parents and children.” ODHS also provided father with gas vouchers and lodging assistance so that he could visit the children, as well as assisting him with car repairs throughout the case. Father asserts that those reunification efforts were not reasonable because ODHS “did not provide father with [the OIT] service, or apparently any other parenting-skills services to bridge the gap, until December 2025” and that ODHS’s efforts therefore did not give father a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate his ability to adjust his conduct and become a minimally adequate parent. We disagree. The record reflects that ODHS referred father to the OIT program in “late summer” 2025; that the OIT program did not have capacity to serve father and the children until an opening in the program became available in November 2025; that ODHS consulted with father and the OIT pro- gram to develop a schedule and plan for the visits between father and the children, including providing the OIT pro- gram with ODHS’s goals and expectations for father; that ODHS received weekly updates from the OIT program and responded to questions; and that the OIT service was scheduled to continue through February 2026, shortly after the permanency hearing that is the subject of this appeal, although it was possible that it might be extended. In determining whether ODHS has made reason- able efforts to reunify a parent and child, the court’s inquiry is focused on “all of [ODHS’s] efforts during the life of the case,” not only those made in the period immediately preced- ing the permanency hearing. Dept. of Human Services v. T. S., 267 Or App 301, 309 n 5, 340 P3d 142 (2014). Considering all of the efforts ODHS made to reunify father and his children Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 318 (2026) 323 over the life of the case, including services provided to father as well as those provided to the children to manage their significant emotional and behavioral needs and bring them to a more manageable level, we conclude that ODHS’s reuni- fication efforts were reasonable. Dept. of Human Services v. C. S. C., 303 Or App 399, 405, 463 P3d 582 (2020) (“When assessing whether [ODHS’s] reunification efforts have been reasonable, the juvenile court must consider those efforts over the life of the dependency case and in light of a parent’s and child’s specific circumstances, with the child’s health and safety being the court’s paramount concerns.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). Moreover, given the profound needs that at least N, M, and S continued to demonstrate at the time of the permanency hearing and all of the services provided, we are not persuaded by father’s argument that he did not have a “reasonable opportunity” to demonstrate his ability to adjust his conduct and become a minimally ade- quate parent for the children because the OIT service had only been provided for a period of two to three months. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not err in determining that ODHS’s efforts to reunify father and his children were reasonable. As noted, father has not advanced any arguments that the evidence failed to demon- strate that his progress toward reunification was not suf- ficient. Accordingly, we further conclude that the juvenile court did not err in reaching the question of the sufficiency of father’s progress, in determining that his progress was not sufficient, and ultimately changing the children’s per- manency plans away from reunification. Affirmed.