Disciplinary Counsel v. Ickes

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Ickes, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3173.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-3173 DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ICKES. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Ickes, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3173.] Judges—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct—Jud.Cond.R. 1.2, 2.8(B), 2.11(A), and 2.12(A)—Two-year suspension and immediate suspension from judicial office without pay for duration of disciplinary suspension. (No. 2025-1323—Submitted December 10, 2025—Decided August 19, 2026.) ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2024-032. __________________ KENNEDY, C.J., authored the opinion of the court, which FISCHER, HESS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. DEWINE, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and would impose a one-year suspension with six months stayed on that condition that respondent commit no further misconduct. DETERS, J., concurred in  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO part and dissented in part and would impose a two-year suspension, fully stayed on the conditions that respondent engage in no further misconduct and that respondent complete a course approved by relator on antiharassment training. MICHAEL D. HESS, J., of the Fourth District Court of Appeals, sat for BRUNNER, J. KENNEDY, C.J. {¶ 1} Respondent, Jon Marshal Ickes, of Fremont, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0059071, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1992. He was appointed to fill an unexpired term on the Sandusky County Court of Common Pleas, General and Domestic Relations Division, in July 2020. Ickes was later elected to a full term that commenced on January 1, 2021. He is one of two judges who serve on that court. {¶ 2} In a January 2025 amended complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged that Ickes committed 17 ethical violations by harassing a pregnant employee, fostering an inappropriate and unprofessional workplace environment, using a racial slur within the earshot of a criminal defendant, using a lewd and vulgar nickname for a child-rape case, and failing to disqualify himself from two criminal cases in which his stepson testified as a law-enforcement witness for the State. The parties entered into stipulations of fact and some misconduct. They also stipulated to aggravating and mitigating factors and submitted as evidence more than 65 exhibits. {¶ 3} In May 2025, a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct conducted a four-day hearing and heard the testimony of 19 witnesses, including Ickes. After the hearing, the panel issued an order unanimously dismissing four of the alleged rule violations. The panel later issued a report finding that Ickes committed ten of the alleged rule violations and unanimously dismissing three others as not proved by clear and convincing evidence. After considering the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors and our applicable precedent, the panel 2  January Term, 2026 recommended that Ickes be suspended from the practice of law for one year fully stayed on the condition that he commit no further misconduct. The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. No objections have been filed. {¶ 4} After independently reviewing the board’s report and recommendation, the record, and our applicable precedent, we adopt the board’s findings of misconduct. However, judges are held “to a higher standard than attorneys who are not holding a judicial office.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Celebrezze, 2026-Ohio-45, ¶ 35. And cases from this court involving attorneys committing only some of the same violations as Ickes have resulted in actual suspensions. Since Ickes is a judge with multiple violations, his sanction should be more, not less, severe. Therefore, for the reasons that follow, we find that a harsher sanction than that recommended by the board is warranted, and we suspend Ickes from the practice of law for two years. I. MISCONDUCT A. Count One: Conduct Toward J.D. {¶ 5} In July 2022, Ickes hired J.D. as his assignment commissioner. In early 2024, J.D. learned that she was pregnant and shared that news with Ickes and Ickes’s bailiff, Candice Talbot, because J.D. was experiencing morning sickness. On April 2, 2024, while Talbot and J.D. discussed the pregnancy, Ickes joined the conversation and told J.D. to “wait until the titty fairy comes.” J.D. told Ickes that she did not “want to hear [that statement] again.” Ickes then asked whether they could “talk about the butt fairy,” to which J.D. said that she did not “want to talk about anything with body parts at all.” J.D. further told Ickes and Talbot that talking and joking about sexual cases made her uncomfortable. Afterward, J.D. was upset and went to the court administrator to recount what had occurred. When she returned to the office, Ickes told her that he had a conference the next day and knew 3  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO that J.D. was “going to miss [him] at around 8:30, so [she should] just text [him] an emoji and [not] say any of the words that [they] can’t say.” {¶ 6} Ickes informed his wife, Cynthia Ickes, of the conversation with J.D., and Mrs. Ickes called J.D. on April 3. J.D. recorded the conversation, worried that Ickes would not “let things go.” Mrs. Ickes mentioned Ickes’s concern that he would never be able to joke with J.D. again. J.D. told her that she did not feel comfortable with him joking about her body or making sexual comments. In response, Mrs. Ickes told J.D. that Ickes had said J.D. would be sensitive because of the “hormone fairy.” At the call’s end, J.D. felt afraid “[b]ecause [she] knew that the situation was progressing” since her boundary “was being pushed and belittled.” {¶ 7} When Ickes returned to the office from his conference, he called out J.D. for not talking to him much and told her he could “come back th[at] afternoon and [the two of them could] not talk some more.” The next day, Ickes summoned J.D. into his chambers, asking what was wrong and stating that his comment about the “titty fairy” was not a sexual joke. He then “shooed” J.D. away, mumbling curses under his breath, before later asking her whether she wanted to be there, which J.D. interpreted as asking whether she wanted to continue working in his chambers or quit. He also insinuated that he would fire her. {¶ 8} Once again, J.D. felt that the situation was escalating because Ickes was still discussing the incident and he stated that she was not going back to “normal,” leaving her in fear of losing her job and benefits. She testified at the hearing: I know when Judge Ickes starts to not like somebody, how quick that can turn. And I was pregnant. I had a maternity leave saved up. I was at this point actively looking for another job, but I wasn’t seeing one that—I mean, even close to what I was making. And I know that pregnant women have a harder time finding employment. My 4  January Term, 2026 husband’s factory was shutting down. The writing was on the wall. And I was very scared. {¶ 9} Eventually, while Ickes was on vacation, J.D. left her position to work for the court’s other general-division judge, Judge Jeremiah S. Ray, to whom she disclosed the situation with Ickes. Judge Ray had J.D. write a summary of Ickes’s and Talbot’s conduct and reported it. Talbot was placed on administrative leave, but Ickes instructed county administrators to halt their investigation and hired human-resources consulting firm Clemans-Nelson & Associates to conduct an independent investigation into J.D.’s allegations. {¶ 10} Attorney Brian D. Butcher, President and CEO of Clemans-Nelson, conducted the investigation and prepared two reports—one relating specifically to Talbot’s conduct and the other relating specifically to Ickes’s conduct. With regard to Ickes, Butcher noted that text messages provided by witnesses he spoke with during his investigation clearly showed that J.D. had participated in pranks, used vulgar language, and exchanged inappropriate comments and photos by text message with Ickes, Talbot, and others—some of which are discussed below. Although Butcher recognized that J.D.’s own conduct could cast doubt on her credibility, he found that J.D. was “well within her right to feel offended” by Ickes’s unwelcome comment regarding her breasts, his continued harassment (including through the telephone call from his wife), his efforts to minimize his misconduct, and his subsequent efforts to ascertain why J.D. was so uncomfortable with his comment. With the benefit of hindsight, Ickes admitted to the panel that he had failed to handle the situation with J.D. appropriately. {¶ 11} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing evidence that Ickes’s misconduct as alleged in Count One violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.8(B) (requiring a judge to be patient, dignified, and courteous with litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others with whom the 5  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO judge deals in an official capacity and to require similar conduct of lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control). The board also found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that Ickes’s conduct violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.12(A) (providing that a judge shall require court staff, court officials, and others subject to the judge’s direction and control to act in a manner consistent with the judge’s obligations under the Code of Judicial Conduct). We adopt these findings of misconduct. B. Count Two: Unprofessional Workplace Environment {¶ 12} The independent investigator’s report not only addressed the incident involving J.D. but also detailed the unprofessional culture that Ickes had fostered among his staff. 1. Guns, Pranks, Name-Calling, and Vulgar Language {¶ 13} Ickes kept a Nerf gun with him at work and used it to shoot people in his chambers and courtroom. This occurred even when defendants who were charged with serious crimes were present. In addition to the Nerf gun, Ickes had a firearm in his chambers and once told staff, “If you repeat this, I’ll call you a liar. If you repeat this, I will shoot you in the pinky toe.” In another incident, Ickes intended to “shoot” a staff member with his Nerf gun but mistakenly opened the drawer containing his firearm. He then joked about the incident, saying how “that would not have been good.” {¶ 14} Additionally, Ickes routinely played pranks on his staff and encouraged them to do the same. Once, he put a device making cricket sounds in J.D.’s office. Another time he had police officers confront J.D. about a possible traffic violation, greatly upsetting her. {¶ 15} There were also instances of name-calling, including his referring to a county human-resources employee as “pimple dick” and using fictitious titles with inappropriate acronyms to refer to probation staff—namely, Adult Supervision Specialist (A.S.S.), Pretrial Intensive Supervision Specialist (P.I.S.S.), and 6  January Term, 2026 Presentence Investigation Supervision Specialist (P.I.S.S.). Ickes also called probation staff various nicknames on the record, including “Number Two,” “Number Three,” “Number 39,” and “New Guy.” In addition, the record shows that in the workplace, Ickes • called the probation secretary “Boris,” from the cartoon Natasha and Boris, because she was black, • called a probation officer the “Angel of Death” for reporting another probation department employee’s illegal conduct, • called a probationer “Dimebag Darrell,” which appeared to be referring to drug- related offenses even though the probationer had not been convicted of any such offenses, • commonly called J.D. a “libtard,” meaning a stupid liberal, for disagreeing with his political views, • regularly called people “dipshits” and “dumbasses,” and • referred to a person who was breastfeeding as a “bosom buddy.” {¶ 16} Other vulgar comments Ickes made at work, sometimes on the record in court, contributed to the inappropriate workplace environment. When instructing juries not to look at or post on social media, he would say “snatch chat” instead of Snapchat, referring to a woman’s genitals. In addition, the record shows that • after once hearing a witness use the word “throuple” to describe her relationship, Ickes later asked a prosecutor and a staff member of the court whether they were interested in becoming a throuple with his wife and himself, • Ickes said that the value of a crime victim’s breasts had determined the amount of a settlement in a federal court case, 7  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO • a woman who had been granted protection orders against her neighbors once came into court with a black eye, and Ickes commented that it “look[ed] like she need[ed] to be evened out,” • after hearing someone describe a person who dates law-enforcement officers as a “badge bunny,” Ickes asked about “bench bunnies” and called a female prosecutor a “badge bunny,” • after once giving a female probation officer a Bang Energy drink, Ickes said that she could then say that she had “been banged by a judge,” • Ickes “continuously commented about [the court administrator’s] sultry face and [her] sultry makeup and how sultry [she] looked on [a] day” that she was wearing makeup, and after she wore a dress to work, Ickes lamented that he “only got to see [her] walk around in [her] dress once,” • Ickes once commented about how a female attorney “sat sexy” in a chair, • After a victim advocate wore lollipop earrings one day in court, Ickes said that “they look[ed] real enough to lick,” • Ickes showed court staff pictures of a woman dressed in a short skirt and crop top and, separately, pictures of women in bikinis that he covertly took while on vacation, • when J.D. got a haircut, Ickes told her she looked like actress Winona Ryder and that he thought Ryder was hot, • Ickes once asked the chief probation officer, “If a picture of a penis is called a ‘dick pic,’ then what is the female version?”, • Ickes would apply lotion to his legs in front of J.D., and he asked others who came into his chambers whether they or their partners moisturized, • when the judges went to conferences, Ickes would say that “they were going drinking and chasing whores,” and 8  January Term, 2026 • at one conference, Ickes held out a stress ball to a female staff member, asking whether she wanted to hold his ball. {¶ 17} In his independent report regarding Ickes’s conduct, Butcher stated that the witnesses he interviewed had recalled specific instances of Ickes’s inappropriate and unprofessional conduct consistent with the statements provided by J.D. and two other complainants. Butcher noted that some witnesses who had not observed any of the alleged misconduct described Ickes’s office as “inappropriate,” “unique,” “relaxed,” and the “polar opposite” of Judge Ray’s office. {¶ 18} Butcher reported that one witness had described Ickes as having a “playfulness about him that some people don’t like” and that another witness had told him that “this is the type of workplace that [Ickes] has cultured.” Butcher also stated that other witnesses, including those from the prosecutor’s office, told him that they “really enjoy[ed] being in [Ickes’s] courtroom” and that there was no question regarding his ability as a judge when he was on the bench. Butcher concluded that Ickes had fostered a culture of unprofessionalism and an inappropriate workplace environment. He determined, however, that Ickes had not targeted any race, gender, or other protected class with his inappropriate behavior. {¶ 19} In an email sent to Judge Ray and all courthouse staff, Ickes acknowledged that he had made “mistakes” in the way he managed his courtroom and chambers and that he was taking corrective action to make sure those mistakes did not recur. He also informed staffers that the court was in the process of reviewing an employee handbook that would establish clear processes for handling work-related issues going forward. 2. Inappropriate Comments to a Victim in the Strub Matter {¶ 20} One particular instance of Ickes’s unprofessionalism that received attention during the board’s proceedings was his treatment of probation officer Logan Risch. After criminal defendant Krista Strub was brought to Sandusky 9  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO County Jail for booking, Risch conducted a routine pat-down on her, going beyond protocol by wearing not only the required gloves but also a mask. When Risch moved Strub’s hair, fentanyl became airborne, resulting in Risch overdosing, blacking out, and hitting her head on a counter. Her partner performed CPR on her, and Risch was rushed to the hospital. She required physical therapy for a neck injury as well as therapy for a panic attack and anxiety she experienced after returning to work. {¶ 21} Strub pled guilty to illegal conveyance of drugs of abuse onto grounds of a specified governmental facility, with Ickes presiding over the case. Risch attended Strub’s sentencing hearing, although she did not testify as a victim because she was not asked to. Ickes sentenced Strub to 120 days in jail and four years of community control. {¶ 22} A couple of days later, Ickes came to the probation department’s offices and asked Risch why she had not testified, calling her a “dumbass” in front of her colleague. Later, Risch was in Ickes’s chambers with others for another case when the Strub matter came up; Ickes commented that “some dumbass [correction officer] at the jail didn’t have their gloves on and touched fentanyl.” That comment made Risch feel dismissed, “like what [she] had [gone] through wasn’t really a big deal.” {¶ 23} Later, Strub filed a motion for credit for time served, and Risch gave victim-impact testimony. Ickes denied the motion but days later called Risch into his chambers to discuss the hearing. Specifically, Ickes told Risch that she had acted unprofessionally by shaking her head while Strub spoke and that she needed to act more professionally as a probation officer. This confused Risch since she had been acting in the capacity of a victim, not a probation officer, at the hearing. She did not believe Ickes had treated her as a victim at all. 10  January Term, 2026 3. Findings of Misconduct {¶ 24} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing evidence that the misconduct alleged in Count Two violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.8(B), in that Ickes failed to conduct himself in a patient, dignified, and courteous manner with lawyers, court staff, court officials, and others while acting in his official capacity. The board also found by clear and convincing evidence that Ickes failed to promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and failed to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, in violation of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2. We adopt these findings of misconduct. C. Count Three: Inappropriate Racial Comments in the Simmons Matter {¶ 25} On November 17, 2023, Nathaniel Simmons, a black man, was indicted on single felony counts of possessing and trafficking marijuana and his case was assigned to Ickes’s docket. A pretrial hearing was scheduled for January 10, 2024—while J.D. still was serving as Ickes’s assignment commissioner. Simmons and his counsel checked in with J.D. on the morning of the hearing. While his counsel waited in J.D.’s office, Simmons exited and sat on a bench in the hallway. {¶ 26} Ickes passed Simmons on his way to his chambers, making eye contact, and Simmons believed that Ickes recognized him from previous court appearances. From where he was seated, Simmons could hear conversations that were taking place in J.D.’s office. {¶ 27} At some point, someone in J.D.’s office mentioned the 1974 movie Blazing Saddles, an “American satirical Western comedy film,” Wikipedia, Blazing Saddles, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blazing_Saddles (accessed Mar. 13, 2026) [https://perma.cc/R4WK-5U4Q]. Ickes explained the movie’s premise and sang the African American spiritual featured in the movie, Swing Low, Sweet Chariot. He then proceeded to quote the movie, specifically a scene when a sheriff says, 11  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO “Morning, ma’am” to an elderly woman, who replies, “Up yours, n* * * *r.” Simmons heard the entire conversation. {¶ 28} Thereafter, Simmons’s attorney requested a different judge, and Ickes continued the case. Ickes later recused himself with no explanation. He then self-reported his misconduct to relator, and a visiting judge was assigned to preside over the case. Simmons pled guilty to one count of possession of marijuana and was sentenced to 90 days’ incarceration. {¶ 29} While in jail, Simmons’s cellmate, Timothy Norris—a black defendant with a pending case before Ickes—learned of the incident. Norris requested a different judge because of Ickes’s “prejudice and lack of respect [for Norris’s] culture.” At the hearing on the request, Norris contended that Ickes had used a “racial slur.” Ickes responded that he did not use the word as a slur or direct it toward any inmate and that the incident was inapplicable to Norris. Norris replied that “it applie[d] to all colored people,” but Ickes maintained that he was simply quoting a movie. Ickes verbally denied Norris’s motion, but he never issued an entry to document the ruling. {¶ 30} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing evidence that Ickes’s misconduct alleged in Count Three resulted in additional violations of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.8(B). We find that Ickes’s use of an offensive racial slur in his chambers and within earshot of the public was undignified, discourteous, and profoundly disrespectful to court staffers, the African American litigant present for a hearing that day, and to all who seek justice in his courtroom. Moreover, his use of the divisive slur as a judge and in the confines of the courthouse—even in the context of quoting a movie—diminished public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. We therefore adopt these findings of misconduct. 12  January Term, 2026 D. Count Four: Inappropriate Case Nickname and Text Messaging from the Bench in the Stratton Matter {¶ 31} In July 2023, Leroy A. Stratton was indicted on one count of rape for live-streaming himself performing oral sex on an 18-month-old victim. See State v. Stratton, Sandusky C.P. No. 23 CR 594. During the eight months the case was on his docket, Ickes regularly referred to the case as the “baby cocksucker case.” Ickes testified that he had used the vulgar phrase as a way to psychologically process a very serious and troubling case. However, one member of his staff testified that the nickname was “disgusting,” and another said that it made her feel “[e]xtremely uncomfortable and disturbed.” {¶ 32} During the trial in February 2024, Ickes participated in a text conversation that included J.D., Talbot, and the court administrator, Megan Miller. Concerning a potential juror who was simply sitting in the gallery during voir dire, the four had the following exchange: Ickes: I think we have a potential defendant in the array. Miller: Who? Talbot: Who? Ickes: Tan button shirt with the porn stash. Miller: You’re being silly? Ickes: Next Christian creeper. Talbot: Gross. Miller: Rushed down here for nothing. J.D.: He looks like a [G]uess [W]ho character. “Christian creeper” referred to the type of child predator that Ickes’s stepson, Christian Ortolani, would investigate in his capacity as a detective at the Fremont Police Department. 13  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 33} A video of the crime was shown during Stratton’s trial. During trial testimony, Ickes sent videos of a woman eating a banana and a dancing banana in the following text exchanges:1 Miller: [D]oes he say he did it more than once? Talbot: Don’t think he’s been asked that yet. Ickes: ... Talbot: Pleasuring himself with a dildo…. Miller: WHAT! Ickes: 1. The corresponding photos below are screenshots of the two videos Ickes sent. 14  January Term, 2026 Talbot: Talbot: Look at the mom. Miller: What’s she doing? Talbot: She looks like she’s about to kill him. He just admitted to [the detective] in the video that he kissed his penis. {¶ 34} The board found by clear and convincing evidence that Ickes’s misconduct in the Stratton case violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2 and 2.12(A). We find that Ickes engaged in impropriety by using a vulgar nickname for the case and by engaging in social texting with court staff from the bench during Stratton’s trial. The conduct of Ickes and his staff demeaned the seriousness of the charged offense and failed to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. We therefore adopt the board’s findings of misconduct with respect to Count Four of relator’s complaint. E. Count Five: Failure to Recuse {¶ 35} Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A) provides: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to the following circumstances . . . .” The rule then provides a nonexhaustive list of circumstances that require a judge’s recusal. One of the enumerated circumstances is that “[t]he judge knows that the judge, the judge’s spouse or domestic partner, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse or domestic partner of such a person is . . . [l]ikely to be a material witness in the proceeding.” Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A)(2)(d). {¶ 36} At all times relevant to this disciplinary proceeding, Ickes’s stepson, Christian Ortolani, was employed as a patrol officer or detective for the Fremont 15  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Police Department. In the course of that employment, Ortolani was involved in the underlying investigation of two cases brought against Curtis L. Elkins and in the investigation of the Stratton case, discussed above. All three cases were assigned to Ickes. 1. The Elkins Matters {¶ 37} On December 28, 2022, Curtis L. Elkins was charged with five felonies for allegedly firing a semi-automatic handgun several times from his vehicle into other vehicles (“the drive-by case”). Ortolani arrested Elkins and signed the criminal complaints against him. Elkins had also been indicted in an unrelated assault case in September 2022 (“the assault case”). Both cases were originally assigned to Judge Ray, but he had them transferred to Ickes because Judge Ray had previously represented Elkins. {¶ 38} Ickes presided over pretrial hearings in both cases and over voir dire in the assault case, but he never disclosed his relationship and potential conflict of interest on the record or secured a waiver of disqualification from the parties even though potential jurors were asked whether they were related to any of the State’s witnesses, including Ortolani. {¶ 39} During trial in the assault case, Ortolani testified about investigating crimes in the Fremont area and interviewing Elkins. He also authenticated the videotaped interview that was played for the jury, admitted into evidence, discussed in closing argument, and available to the jury during deliberations. {¶ 40} The jury found Elkins guilty of felonious assault, and Ickes revoked his bond and scheduled the case for sentencing. At sentencing, the State referred to the videotaped interview with Ortolani. Ickes sentenced Elkins to a six-to-nine- year term of incarceration. Throughout, Ickes neither disclosed his relationship to Ortolani on the record nor secured a waiver of the conflict from the parties. See Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(C) (providing that a judge who is subject to disqualification for reasons other than personal bias or prejudice may disclose on the record the basis 16  January Term, 2026 of the judge’s disqualification and ask the parties and their lawyers to consider whether to waive disqualification and requiring any agreed waiver to be incorporated into the record of the proceeding); see also Official Comment 5 to Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 (“A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.”). Elkins filed a notice of appeal in the Sixth District Court of Appeals. {¶ 41} Separately, in the drive-by case, Elkins filed a motion for recusal given Ickes’s “familial relationship” with Ortolani, whom Elkins identified as the “lead detective” in the investigation. Elkins noted that the State had identified Ortolani as a witness in its discovery responses and disclosed that Ortolani had authored one of the investigative reports in the case. During the hearing on Elkins’s motion for recusal, Ickes claimed that Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 required disqualification only if Ortolani was a material witness in the case—even though the plain language of the rule requires disqualification in any proceeding in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Because the parties agreed that Ortolani would be a material witness at trial, Ickes recused himself and the drive- by case was reassigned to another judge. The drive-by case was subsequently dismissed after the eyewitness left Ohio. {¶ 42} In the June 2023 appeal of his convictions in the assault case, Elkins argued, among other things, that Ickes erred by failing to disqualify himself from that case when Ortolani testified on behalf of the State and by failing to secure a waiver of the conflict from Elkins. He also requested and obtained leave of court to supplement the record with his motion for recusal and Ickes’s entry of recusal in the drive-by case. {¶ 43} The Sixth District reversed Elkins’s assault conviction, finding no evidence indicating that Elkins or his attorney knew about Ickes’s relationship with 17  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Ortolani until after sentencing. It found an “unconstitutional potential for bias, where, as here, the judge’s family member is a testifying officer and the judge does not inform the parties of the relationship during the pendency of the trial court case so that the issue of bias can be addressed.” State v. Elkins, 2024-Ohio-5351, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.). The court found noteworthy that Ickes had granted Elkins’s motion for recusal in the drive-by case on the basis of Ickes’s relationship with Ortolani. Therefore, the court remanded the assault case for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 17. 2. The Stratton Matter {¶ 44} In the Stratton case mentioned above, Ortolani arrested Stratton, read him his rights, executed a search warrant, and was involved in the investigation. At a February 2024 hearing, Stratton made a verbal motion for Ickes to recuse himself due to Ickes’s familial relationship with Ortolani, noting that Ickes had failed to disclose that relationship. The State argued that Ortolani was not a material witness and that he would not testify “to any fact or piece of evidence that other witnesses [were] not able to testify to.” Ickes later denied Stratton’s motion for recusal, finding that the Code of Judicial Conduct “requires disqualification where impartiality might reasonably be questioned” and determining that “the assertion in [the Stratton] matter [did] not arise to that standard.” {¶ 45} During the trial, Ortolani testified, authenticated a video of the crime, and sat at the State’s counsel table. Stratton was convicted of rape and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He appealed his conviction based on, among other things, Ickes’s failure to recuse himself. While Stratton’s appeal was pending, the court of appeals issued its decision in Elkins, 2024-Ohio-5351 (6th Dist.). In February 2025, the court of appeals ordered the parties in Stratton to brief the issue whether Ickes’s refusal to recuse himself based on Ortolani’s involvement in the case was reversable error under Elkins. And on May 6, 2025, the court found that Ickes’s participation in Stratton’s trial presented the probability of bias and therefore violated Stratton’s 18  January Term, 2026 due-process rights. State v. Stratton, 2025-Ohio-1621, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.). This, the court said, constituted reversible error in light of its decision in Elkins. Id. at ¶ 29. The court therefore reversed Stratton’s conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at ¶ 32. 3. Findings of Misconduct {¶ 46} The board acknowledged that we have ““long held that “a mere mistake in the exercise of judicial discretion by a judge is not and should never be the cause or subject of a disciplinary proceeding under” the judicial-conduct rules.”” Board report at ¶ 50, fn. 5, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Gaul, 2023- Ohio-4751, ¶ 44, quoting Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 30 (1958). Relying on that precedent, the board apparently determined that Ickes’s erroneous denial of Stratton’s motion for recusal should not result in a finding of judicial misconduct. {¶ 47} In contrast, the board determined that Elkins was not informed of Ickes’s relationship with Ortolani before the trial of his felonious-assault case and that Ortolani’s involvement in Elkins’s cases was not merely ministerial. The board acknowledged that Ickes had credibly testified that he was often unaware at the commencement of cases of Ortolani’s participation. But it found that even as Ortolani’s role became apparent as Elkins’s cases progressed, Ickes never disclosed their relationship on the record to give the parties the opportunity to make informed legal decisions. {¶ 48} The parties stipulated that Ickes’s misconduct alleged in Count Five violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A), but Ickes disputed relator’s assertion that his conduct also violated Jud.Cond.R. 1.2. However, based on the parties’ stipulations and the evidence presented at the hearing, the board found by clear and convincing evidence that Ickes’s conduct alleged in Count Five violated both Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A) and 1.2. 19  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 49} We agree that Ickes’s failure to recuse himself from Elkins’s felonious-assault case—in which his stepson actually testified as a material witness for the prosecution—violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.11(A). We also find that Ickes’s failure to disclose his relationship with Ortolani to the parties in that matter created an appearance of impropriety and called into question the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, in violation of Jud.Cond.R. 1.2. We therefore adopt the board’s findings of misconduct. II. THE BOARD’S RECOMMENDATION {¶ 50} In its posthearing brief, relator recommended that Ickes be suspended from the practice of law for two years with one year conditionally stayed, while Ickes argued in his brief that a fully stayed one-year suspension is the appropriate sanction for his misconduct. The board recommends that we suspend Ickes from the practice of law for one year with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he commit no further misconduct. III. SANCTION {¶ 51} “The primary purposes of judicial discipline are to protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and maintain and enhance public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Bachman, 2020-Ohio-6732, ¶ 22, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 2004- Ohio-4704, ¶ 33. “‘When imposing sanctions for judicial misconduct, we consider all relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the judge violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.’” Celebrezze, 2026-Ohio-45, at ¶ 31, quoting Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Winkler, 2024-Ohio-3141, ¶ 21. Aggravating factors weigh in favor of “recommending a more severe sanction.” Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B). Mitigating factors weigh in favor of “recommending a less severe sanction.” Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C). 20  January Term, 2026 A. Ickes’s Aggravating and Mitigating Factors {¶ 52} The parties stipulated and the board found that two aggravating factors are present in this case: Ickes engaged in a pattern of misconduct and committed multiple offenses. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(3) and (4). The board rejected relator’s