Dayton Bar Assn. v. Baker

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Baker, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2673.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-2673 DAYTON BAR ASSOCIATION v. BAKER. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as Dayton Bar Assn. v. Baker, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-2673.] Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including engaging in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and adversely reflects on practice of law—Two-year suspension with one year conditionally stayed. (No. 2025-0791—Submitted September 16, 2025—Decided July 15, 2026.) ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme Court, No. 2024-029. __________________ The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER, GALLAGHER, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. DEWINE, J., concurred, with an opinion. DETERS, J., concurred in part and dissented in part and would impose a  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO one-year suspension with six months conditionally stayed as recommended by the Board of Professional Conduct. EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J., of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sat for BRUNNER, J. Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent, Christine Marie Baker, of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0088634, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2012. On December 17, 2014, we suspended Baker from the practice of law based on her failure to complete the new-lawyers training required by former Gov.Bar R. X(3)(C)(2)(a), her failure to timely file the final reporting transcript as required by former Gov.Bar R. X(3)(C)(2)(b), and her failure to rectify her noncompliance in accordance with former Gov.Bar R. X(6)(B). See 2014-Ohio-5542. We reinstated her to the practice of law on March 18, 2015. See In re Continuing Legal Education Suspension of Baker, 2015-Ohio-990. {¶ 2} In a December 2024 amended complaint, relator, the Dayton Bar Association, alleged that Baker violated four professional-conduct rules arising from her efforts to recover two misdirected electronic-fund transfers and her subsequent commencement of civil litigation against the unintended recipient of the transfers in retaliation for his filing a disciplinary grievance against her. Specifically, relator charged Baker with twice filing frivolous lawsuits and engaging in conduct that (1) involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, (2) is prejudicial to the administration of justice, and (3) adversely reflects on her fitness to practice law. The parties entered into several stipulations of fact and submitted 23 stipulated exhibits. {¶ 3} Baker and the unintended recipient of the fund transfers testified at a hearing before a three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct. Following the hearing, the panel issued a report in which it found by clear and convincing evidence that Baker had committed each of the charged rule violations. 2  January Term, 2026 In the presence of numerous aggravating factors and just one mitigating factor, the panel recommended that Baker be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with six months conditionally stayed, and that certain conditions be placed on her reinstatement to the practice of law. The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. {¶ 4} Baker raises nine objections to the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, arguing, among other things, that relator’s complaint is the result of retaliation and institutional animus, that our regulation of the conduct at issue here violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that relator failed to prove its case by clear and convincing evidence. She urges that the complaint against her should be dismissed. Relator responded to Baker’s objections and raises a single objection to the board’s recommended sanction, arguing that an indefinite suspension is necessary to protect the public. {¶ 5} For the reasons that follow, we overrule each of Baker’s objections and adopt the board’s findings of misconduct. We sustain relator’s objection in part and suspend Baker from the practice of law for two years, with one year stayed on the conditions that she engage in no further misconduct and pay the costs of these proceedings. In addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(24), we condition Baker’s reinstatement to the practice of law on the submission of proof that she has (1) paid any monetary sanctions that may be ordered by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas in case No. 2024-CV-05626, (2) completed six hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) focused on legal ethics and professionalism, (3) submitted to a mental-health evaluation conducted by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) after the issuance of the suspension order in this case, and (4) complied with all of OLAP’s treatment recommendations. 3  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND MISCONDUCT A. The mistaken Zelle transfers {¶ 6} On September 19 and 20, 2023, Baker used Zelle, an electronic- payment service, with the intent to transfer $550 (in two separate payments of $250 and $300) from her law practice’s operating account to another bank account that she held jointly with her husband, Zachary Reynolds of Dayton, Ohio (“Ohio Zachary Reynolds”). She inadvertently transferred those funds to a Charles Schwab account belonging to a different Zachary Reynolds (“Reynolds”) who resides in Downers Grove, Illinois. {¶ 7} Upon noticing the unexpected deposits to his bank account, Reynolds immediately contacted his bank. During Baker’s disciplinary hearing, Reynolds testified that he did not file a formal fraud complaint with the bank at that time, because he wanted to make sure that his wife was not expecting the transfers. {¶ 8} Baker discovered her error around September 21, when the funds had not appeared in the intended receiving account. She testified that she spent approximately eight hours identifying Reynolds as the recipient of the transfers and locating his contact information. On September 22, Baker sent multiple communications to Reynolds by email, text message, and LinkedIn, a social-media platform. She also contacted Reynolds’s wife and several of his colleagues by various electronic means. B. Baker’s communications with Reynolds, his wife, and his colleagues {¶ 9} Baker’s earliest communication with Reynolds was an 8:04 a.m. email sent on September 22, 2023, which stated: On 19 Sep 2023 and 20 Sep 2023 you received $550 to your Zelle-linked Charles Schwab account. These payments were in error and your retention of this money is unlawful. 4  January Term, 2026 Efforts are being made to recover the funding from the financial institutions involved. If you do not return the ill gotten funds within 24 hours, collection, garnishment, and all available recovery methods will commence, including notifying your employer of your conduct. This communication is an attempt to collect a debt. {¶ 10} Baker closed the email with a signature block in which she identified herself as “Christine Baker, Esq.” above her Ohio attorney-registration number, business address, cellphone number, fax number, and professional email address. At 9:30 a.m., Baker sent Reynolds the same message by text but omitted the signature block and did not otherwise identify herself. She also left a voicemail message on Reynolds’s cellphone. {¶ 11} When Reynolds received Baker’s communications, he believed that he was the target of a scam, noting that Zelle cautions users to be wary of unknown people contacting them to request money, especially with urgent demands. Nevertheless, he responded to Baker’s first text message, stating, “Considering this is your error, I find your threats offensive and they are noted. You can follow the appropriate channels with Charles Schwab to recoup YOUR mistake.” (Capitalization in original.) {¶ 12} After receiving Reynolds’s text response, Baker replied, “Thank you for your reply. Thank you for confirming your receipt of funds. I am going to sue you in small claims court and broadcast the unassailable morality of corporate recruiter Z. Reynolds to the widest possible audience. You are an asset to the Reynolds surname.” She then sent a photo of a man pushing a dog in a stroller, followed by a text stating, “This is the brain injured man you stole from. Zach Reynolds (not the thief, that is you).” In another text, she stated, “Your theft will be shared with the Special Olympics of Illinois [an organization for which Reynolds 5  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO served as a board member] and, soon, anyone with a basic Internet connection.”1 Baker did not identify the man in the photograph as her husband, nor did she tell Reynolds the money errantly transferred was her money. Instead, she claimed that the money belonged to the man in the photograph. {¶ 13} Later that morning, Baker sent Reynolds a message through LinkedIn, using an account with the pseudonym “Callie Boom Boom,” whose “experience” was listed as “dog walker.” Although the board found that Baker used this pseudonym without clearly identifying herself, we note that she closed the message with her true name and cellphone number. In that message, Baker demanded return of the $550 and informed Reynolds that if the funds were not returned by 3:00 p.m. EST that day, she would initiate a civil action against him and his wife seeking damages for his “continued unlawful retention” of the funds. {¶ 14} At 11:01 a.m., Baker sent Reynolds’s wife, a schoolteacher, a message through Facebook Messenger using an account with the name Xi Yw. In that message, Baker informed Mrs. Reynolds that her husband had “wrongfully taken and retained $550” from Baker and threatened to sue both Reynolds and Mrs. Reynolds if the funds were not returned by 3:00 p.m. EST that day. Once again, she closed the message with her true name and phone number. Nine minutes later, Baker sent the same message to Mrs. Reynolds at her school email address. {¶ 15} Between 12:23 p.m. and 1:30 p.m., Baker also contacted four of Reynolds’s coworkers, including his immediate boss and the CEO of the company, and copied Reynolds on those messages. In her email to the CEO, Baker wrote, “Earlier today, your employee Zack Reynolds advised via text message that he is refusing to return $550 accidentally transmitted to his Charles Schwab account via Zelle. I am attaching his message. Is Mr. Reynolds’ conduct consistent with your firm’s values?” 1. The board found that Baker contacted the Special Olympics of Illinois, but we note that the record is unclear whether she actually followed through on her threat to do so. 6  January Term, 2026 {¶ 16} In her testimony before the disciplinary panel, Baker denied that she had contacted Reynolds’s colleagues to pressure him to return the money. Instead, she claimed that she had communicated with them only to “fairly describe his conduct.” Baker further indicated that her question about the firm’s values was intended to be rhetorical. The panel and board, however, found that Baker’s testimony on this issue was not credible, noting, “[T]here would be no reason for her to make the contact unless she expected consequences for Reynolds from his employer.” C. Reynolds’s efforts to return the errant funds and his attorney grievance {¶ 17} On September 22, 2023, the same day that he received Baker’s initial communications regarding the errant funds, Reynolds opened a formal dispute with Charles Schwab. According to Reynolds’s testimony before the disciplinary panel, the bank advised him to not touch the funds and to allow its fraud department to handle the investigation. He further testified that he was specifically instructed by his bank not to independently return the funds to the sender. {¶ 18} Reynolds testified that after receiving the barrage of communications from Baker, he phoned his bank again and was told that if he felt he was being harassed, he should go to his local police department. During his lunch break, he went to the Downers Grove Police Department. Reynolds stated that after reviewing the messages he had received from Baker, a police officer offered the opinion that the communications he was receiving were likely part of a scam because real attorneys would not risk their livelihood over “something like this.” According to Reynolds, the officer advised him to ignore the communications from Baker and follow his bank’s instructions. {¶ 19} Reynolds testified that he followed the bank’s advice and did not touch the erroneously deposited funds. On September 26, 2023, his bank informed him that the errantly transferred funds had been removed from his account. Baker 7  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO testified that the funds were back in her account by October 3—exactly two weeks after she initiated the first fund transfer to Reynolds. {¶ 20} On September 27, 2023, Reynolds filed a grievance with relator regarding Baker’s efforts to recover the erroneously transferred funds. D. Baker’s civil litigation against Reynolds 1. First civil action in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas {¶ 21} Baker testified at her disciplinary hearing that once the misdirected funds were returned to her bank account in early October 2023, she abandoned her efforts to sue Reynolds. But after learning of his grievance and meeting with relator’s investigator on November 16, she decided to proceed with the threatened litigation. On November 17, she filed a civil lawsuit against Reynolds. See Baker v. Reynolds, Montgomery C.P. No. 2023 CV 06192. The board found that Baker had filed the lawsuit in retaliation for the grievance Reynolds had filed against her. {¶ 22} In her initial complaint, Baker alleged three causes of action: conversion, defamation per se, and defamation per quod.2 Baker also falsely alleged that Reynolds “accepted each of the two payments via Zelle.” During Baker’s disciplinary hearing, Reynolds testified that no action is required for a Zelle recipient to “accept” a transfer of funds; the funds are automatically transferred to the recipient’s account. Baker admitted as much in a January 10, 2024 email to relator’s investigator—though when questioned on the topic during her disciplinary hearing she claimed that she did not know whether that was the case. 2. “Defamation is defined as a false publication which injures a person’s reputation.” Dale v. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn., 57 Ohio St.3d 112, 117 (1991), citing Cleveland Leader Printing Co. v. Nethersole, 84 Ohio St. 118 (1911). A statement that on its face reflects on the character of a person by bringing the person into ridicule, hatred, or contempt, or injures the person in the person’s trade or profession is defamatory per se, and damages are presumed. Becker v. Toulmin, 165 Ohio St. 549, 553 (1956). In contrast, when a statement is found to be defamatory through interpretation, innuendo, or the consideration of extrinsic evidence, it is defamatory per quod, and special damages must be pleaded and proved. Id. at 556. 8  January Term, 2026 {¶ 23} Baker also falsely alleged in her civil complaint that Reynolds had “advised in writing” that “he would take no steps to return the money,” and that “as he promised, Zack Reynolds took no steps to return [her] money.” Further, she claimed, “Mr. Reynolds advised me in writing that, to recover my money, I would have to ‘serve him with papers.’” She sought damages of $80,000 on her defamation claims and $2,500 on her conversion claim. {¶ 24} Contrary to Baker’s allegations, Reynolds had texted her on September 26, 2023, stating, “As I mentioned to you, as advised by my bank and attorney, Schwab’s fraud department is handling the dispute . . . based on your behavior all involved assume this is a scam. If it’s not a scam, you should be ashamed and embarrassed by your behavior.” (Ellipsis in original.) After receiving another text from Baker requesting that he refer her to his attorney, Reynolds wrote, “I suggest you call Charles Schwab or formally serve me papers. I will no longer respond to any attempts to contact me.” Nevertheless, Baker sent Reynolds another text expressing her belief that he did not have legal counsel and threatening to serve him with a legal complaint at his home, and if those attempts were not successful, his office. Reynolds replied, stating in part, “I do not have your money. I reported it to Charles Schwab as not being mine and they withdrew it from my account.” {¶ 25} Further demonstrating the falsity of Baker’s allegations against Reynolds, Baker conceded at her disciplinary hearing that it was reasonable for Reynolds to have been suspicious of the situation and to have followed his bank’s advice. In fact, she testified that “the only appropriate response [was] for Mr. Reynolds to . . . notify his banking institution and request reversal of the payments,”—though she maintained that that was not, in fact, his response. Baker further conceded that a week was a reasonable amount of time for the bank’s fraud department to investigate and reverse the charges. {¶ 26} After Baker filed her civil complaint, Reynolds hired Illinois attorney Eric Sparks to assist him. Sparks spoke to Baker by telephone on 9  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO November 27, 2023, and sent her an email requesting that she dismiss her complaint against Reynolds. Baker responded to the email, informing Sparks that she intended to amend her civil complaint and demanding $2,500 to settle the case. {¶ 27} On December 4, Baker filed a motion for injunctive relief in her civil action seeking to enjoin Sparks from practicing law in Ohio—despite the facts that Sparks was not a party to the action and had not attempted to file any pleading in an Ohio court. And on December 5, Baker amended her civil complaint to add claims for abuse of process and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 2. Removal to federal district court and voluntary dismissal {¶ 28} Reynolds hired the Dayton office of the law firm Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., to defend him in the civil action filed by Baker. With the firm’s assistance, the action was removed to federal court based on 28 U.S.C. 1332, diversity of citizenship, see Baker v. Reynolds, No. 3:23-cv-00380 (S.D.Ohio Dec. 18, 2023), and Sparks applied to be admitted to that court pro hac vice. Baker then sought and obtained leave to amend her complaint and added Dinsmore & Shohl, and Gould & Ratner, L.L.P., Sparks’s employer, as defendants. {¶ 29} On January 21, 2024, Baker sought leave to dismiss the federal case without prejudice. In her motion to dismiss, she attempted to justify her civil action by claiming, “Zachary Reynolds, of Downers Grove, Illinois, has weaponized the attorney grievance process.” She asserted in her motion to dismiss that Reynolds had made “contradictory claims,” engaged in “falsehoods,” submitted “an incomplete text message record,” and that he had “taunted [her], threatened [her] with criminal sanction, and told [her] to ‘get help.’” Baker concluded her motion by stating, “[W]ith the information at hand, the Defendants’ behavior—untruthful, probably unprincipled—is not bad enough to merit consuming significant judicial, organizational, and personal resources. At least not today.” {¶ 30} During her disciplinary hearing, Baker testified that she dismissed the federal case because the presiding magistrate was the immediate past president 10  January Term, 2026 of the Dayton Bar Association and the Dayton Bar Foundation, and a donor to the bar association. Baker contended that she “was getting some demeanor from the bench” that her case “was unwelcome to the federal court.” {¶ 31} As part of this disciplinary process, Reynolds submitted invoices demonstrating that he had incurred $21,665.80 in attorney fees defending against Baker’s initial lawsuit—$15,039.35 with Gould & Ratner and $6,616.45 with Dinsmore & Shohl. He also testified that he had paid those fees. 3. Baker refiles civil action in common pleas court after receiving notice of relator’s intent to file formal disciplinary complaint {¶ 32} On September 20, 2024, relator sent Baker notice of its intent to file a formal disciplinary complaint against her; she received the complaint shortly thereafter. Although nothing had transpired between Baker and Reynolds after Baker dismissed the federal action, Baker refiled her civil complaint in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court on October 30, 2024. See Baker v. Reynolds, Montgomery C.P. No. 2024-CV-05626. {¶ 33} In her refiled complaint, Baker limited her request for damages to $15,500—under the $75,000 threshold for diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. 1332—which prevented the case from being removed to federal court a second time. During her disciplinary hearing, Baker testified that her civil case “continues with the express written permission of two jurists.” However, no evidence supports this assertion, and during Baker’s disciplinary hearing, a motion to dismiss Baker’s refiled complaint was pending. {¶ 34} The board determined that Baker continued to pursue her complaint against Reynolds despite her acknowledgement that (1) her own error had caused $550 of her money to be transferred to Reynolds and (2) the funds were promptly returned to her solely as the result of Reynolds’s actions. {¶ 35} Furthermore, the board found that Baker refiled her complaint against Reynolds in retaliation for filing his grievance that initiated relator’s formal 11  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO disciplinary proceedings against her—even though she was aware of this court’s holding that “[a] statement made in the course of an attorney disciplinary proceeding enjoys an absolute privilege against a civil action based thereon as long as the statement bears some reasonable relation to the proceeding,” Hecht v. Levin, 1993-Ohio-110, paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 36} In addition to refiling her civil action against Reynolds, the board found that Baker has repeatedly disparaged Reynolds in the context of these disciplinary proceedings. For example, in her answer to relator’s October 31, 2024 certified disciplinary complaint, Baker stated, “I told Illinois Zachary Reynolds that he was stealing from a disabled Ohio man named Zachary Reynolds. I did call Mr. Reynolds a thief (he is), promised to assert that he is unsuitable for serving the disabled (he is), and threatened to broadcast Mr. Reynolds’ misdeeds.” Baker continued her attack in her answer to relator’s amended complaint, referring to Reynolds as “a liar and a thief.” In her answers to relator’s amended complaint, she claimed that in addition to lying to his wife, his colleagues, and his attorney, Reynolds lied to relator when he (1) reported that Ohio Zachary Reynolds was her client, (2) presented an incomplete record of their text messages, and (3) stated that he had alerted his bank of the errant Zelle payments on September 21, 2023. E. Rule violations found by the board {¶ 37} The board found that Baker’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.1 (prohibiting a lawyer from asserting an issue in a proceeding unless there is a nonfrivolous basis in law and fact for doing so), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). {¶ 38} With regard to the Prof.Cond.R. 3.1 violation, the board found that the totality of the evidence demonstrates that Baker did not pursue civil litigation 12  January Term, 2026 against Reynolds for legitimate legal objectives. Specifically, the board found that the timing of her initial filing—one day after meeting with relator’s investigator regarding Reynolds’s grievance—“is strongly indicative of an improper purpose.” The board also found that Baker’s claims for conversion, defamation, abuse of process, and negligent infliction of emotional distress lacked a proper factual and legal foundation and were not pursued for legitimate legal objectives. Instead, the board stated, “[Baker’s] actions were motivated by personal animosity and a desire to retaliate against Reynolds for filing a bar grievance” against her. The board additionally found that Baker’s allegations that Reynolds defamed her by making knowingly false statements in his grievance were unsupported by the record and that her defamation claims in her civil complaints are barred by Hecht, 1993-Ohio- 110. {¶ 39} With regard to the Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) violation, the board found that Baker repeatedly and falsely characterized Reynolds’s actions as “theft” or “stealing” in her publicly filed answers to relator’s disciplinary complaints, falsely alleged in her civil complaints that Reynolds had taken affirmative action to “accept[]” the two payments that she had erroneously directed to his bank account and that he had “advised in writing” that “he would take no steps to return the money.” In addition to finding that the evidence proved those allegations to be demonstrably false, the board noted that Baker took no action to correct the allegations in her complaint after learning of their falsity.3 The board further determined that the $80,000 in damages that Baker sought in her initial litigation was grossly disproportionate to the $550 that she had mistakenly transferred to Reynolds’s bank account. 3. Although not charged in relator’s amended complaint, we note that Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly failing to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer. 13  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 40} The board noted that Baker’s communications with Reynolds were not always consistent. She sometimes claimed that the errant funds were her own, and at other times claimed that the funds belonged to a “brain injured man”—and she did not initially disclose that that man was her husband, whose last name was different from her own. The board also found that Baker had engaged in deceptive conduct by using pseudonyms and aliases to communicate with Reynolds without clearly identifying herself—though we note that she did include her true name and phone number in the body of those messages. In addition, the board found that Baker continued to engage in dishonesty throughout the disciplinary proceedings by refusing to acknowledge the impropriety of her conduct and instead attempting to frame her actions as constitutionally protected speech and zealous advocacy. {¶ 41} With regard to the Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) violation, the board found that rather than use the legal system for legitimate dispute-resolution purposes, Baker abused it “as a tool for personal vendetta” and improperly burdened the courts with frivolous litigation. The board determined that the timing and content of Baker’s civil filings clearly demonstrated her retaliatory intent to punish Reynolds for exercising his right to file an ethics grievance against her and that the expansion of her litigation to name Reynolds’s attorneys as defendants served no legitimate purpose besides increasing litigation costs and pressuring Reynolds to withdraw his grievance. The board also found that Baker’s contacts with Reynolds’s employer and colleagues served no legitimate purpose in recovering her funds and were instead designed to harass and embarrass Reynolds. Moreover, her continued reference to Reynolds as a “thief” in publicly filed legal communications after her funds were returned improperly disparaged his character and reputation without factual basis. The board determined that those actions, individually and collectively, demonstrated that Baker had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, undermining public confidence in the legal profession and improperly burdening the courts with frivolous litigation. 14  January Term, 2026 {¶ 42} And finally, with regard to the Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) violation, the board found that the barrage of emotionally charged, threatening, and unprofessional communications Baker sent to Reynolds, his wife, and his employer, through email, text messages, and various social-media platforms went far beyond zealous advocacy. The board found that these communications were motivated by personal animosity and were intended to intimidate Reynolds and damage his professional reputation over a personal financial dispute that was settled in a matter of days. And not only was Baker’s civil litigation retaliatory, but the damages she sought were grossly disproportionate to the $550 that she had mistakenly transferred to Reynolds, and her expansion of the litigation to name Reynolds’s attorneys as defendants exhibited a fundamental misunderstanding of or disregard for the proper boundaries of legal advocacy. In addition, the board found that Baker’s refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of her conduct during her disciplinary-hearing testimony and pattern of behavior demonstrated “poor judgment, lack of emotional control, and an inability to maintain professional boundaries—all qualities that adversely reflect on [her] fitness to practice law.” {¶ 43} For violating Prof.Cond.R. 3.1, 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(h), the board recommended that Baker be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with six months conditionally stayed, and that certain conditions be placed on her reinstatement to the practice of law. That recommendation is more fully discussed in Parts III and IV below. II. BAKER’S OBJECTIONS TO THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS AND THE BOARD’S FINDINGS {¶ 44} Baker responds to the board’s report and recommendation by raising nine objections addressing all phases of the disciplinary process, beginning with relator’s investigation and ending with the board’s findings of misconduct, and urges us to dismiss this case. For ease of discussion, we will address Baker’s first objection and then address the remaining objections out of order and, in some 15  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO instances, grouped by related issues. And for the reasons that follow, we overrule each objection. A. Baker has not offered any evidence that the delay in relator’s investigation was unreasonable or that it violated her right to a fair hearing {¶ 45} In her first objection, Baker asserts for the first time that relator’s certified grievance committee unreasonably and intentionally delayed the investigation of this matter beyond the time permitted by our rules. Gov.Bar R. V(9)(D) provides that the investigation of grievances by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or a certified grievance committee “shall be concluded within two hundred seventy days from the date of the receipt of the grievance” and that a “decision as to the disposition of the grievance shall be made within thirty days after conclusion of the investigation.” {¶ 46} Gov.Bar R. V(9)(D)(1) permits the investigating entity to request from the director of the Board of Professional Conduct an extension of time to complete an investigation and specifies that “[n]o investigation shall be extended beyond one year from the date of receipt of the grievance.” However, the rule also provides that these time limits are not jurisdictional and that “[n]o investigation or complaint shall be dismissed unless it appears that there has been an unreasonable delay and that the rights of the respondent to have a fair hearing have been violated.” Gov.Bar R. V(9)(D)(2). {¶ 47} In this case, Baker asserts that Reynolds filed his grievance on September 27, 2023, and then “[n]othing happened for exactly 365 days” until relator issued a letter advising Baker of its forthcoming complaint. (Underlining in original.) The record shows that relator completed its investigation and sent Baker notice of its intent to file a formal disciplinary complaint on September 20, 2024— within one year of the date on which Reynolds filed the grievance. Because Baker has offered no evidence that the delay was unreasonable or that her rights to a fair hearing have been violated, we overrule her first objection. 16  January Term, 2026 B. Baker received all the process she is due {¶ 48} In her third, sixth, and eighth objections, Baker alleges that relator’s complaint was motivated by retaliation and institutional animus, that the board was biased against her, and that consequently, she has been deprived of due process of law. {¶ 49} With these objections, Baker attempts to convert this disciplinary proceeding into a referendum on what she perceives to be a host of bad acts committed by members of the Dayton Bar Association and the hearing panel rather than focus on the single subject of this proceeding—her own misconduct. Among other things, Baker alleges in her third and sixth objections that (1) two members of the bar association had previously “manufactured” disciplinary grievances against her, (2) members of the Dayton Bar Association engaged in inappropriate and degrading conduct during CLE presentations sponsored by relator and that relator refused to investigate, (3) a member of relator’s certified grievance committee suggested that she was drinking alcohol during an investigatory meeting conducted on Zoom, and (4) relator’s investigator was ill-prepared and “exploded in a rage” while meeting with her to discuss Reynolds’s grievance. Baker offers no citations to the record to substantiate her claims. {¶ 50} The disciplinary-hearing transcript shows that of those allegations, only the last two were mentioned during her disciplinary hearing. And the only evidence that Baker submitted regarding those incidents was her own affidavit memorializing her perception of her meeting with the investigator and her testimony, in which she ultimately concluded that it was “just a[n] odd meeting that . . . was uncomfortable for both” her and relator’s investigator. {¶ 51} The disciplinary-hearing transcript further belies Baker’s claim in her eighth objection that the board abandoned its neutrality and favored relator. Baker quotes a point during the disciplinary hearing in which relator’s counsel indicated that he did not have a document but that he could find it and to which, 17  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Baker contends, the panel chair “effectively t[ook] on the relator’s advocacy role” by responding, “‘I don’t think we need it.’” {¶ 52} A review of the transcript shows that relator’s counsel had questioned Baker regarding Exhibit 23, her motion to dismiss her complaint in the civil action that had been removed to federal court, when the panel chair asked how the law firms representing Reynolds came to be named as defendants in that case after noticing that they were listed in the motion’s caption. Baker admitted that she had added the two law firms as defendants but stated that she did not recall the specific circumstances in which she had added them. In response to the panel chair’s asking for the document in which Baker had named the law firms, relator’s counsel stated, “I don’t have that document. If I want to take a minute, I can find it, or we can go on. Whatever the panel wants me to do.” The panel chair replied, “I don’t think we need it.” {¶ 53} At that point, Baker had already admitted that she had added the law firms as defendants in her civil litigation, and relator had already offered another court filing that confirmed that fact. The document in which she named the law firms—Baker’s motion to amend the complaint—would have constituted cumulative evidence on that issue. Evid.R. 403(B), made applicable to attorney- discipline proceedings by Gov.Bar R. V(27)(A), permits a court—or in this case, the board—to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” The panel chair appropriately exercised that discretion in determining that spending additional time searching for cumulative evidence was unnecessary. {¶ 54} The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and the opportunity to be heard. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550 (1968), citing Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1911). In this case, Baker has not alleged that relator’s complaint failed to give her adequate notice of the charges against her. And we have recognized that the requirement of an opportunity to be heard has been 18  January Term, 2026 satisfied in attorney-discipline proceedings “when the respondent is afforded a hearing, the right to issue subpoenas and depose witnesses, and an opportunity for preparation to explain the circumstances surrounding his actions.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Character, 2011-Ohio-2902, ¶ 76, citing Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Acker, 29 Ohio St.2d 18, 20 (1972). {¶ 55} Baker has not shown that any of the allegations in her third, sixth, and eighth objections deprived her of the opportunity to be heard. On these facts, Baker has received all the proces