State ex rel. Ames v. W. Geauga Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Ames v. W. Geauga Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4076.] NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published. SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-4076 THE STATE EX REL . AMES, APPELLANT, v. WEST GEAUGA LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, APPELLEE. [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Ames v. W. Geauga Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-4076.] Mandamus—Public-records requests—R.C. 149.43—Appellant failed to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1) because he impermissibly commenced his mandamus action within statutory three- business-day cure period—Court of appeals’ judgment dismissing petition affirmed. (No. 2025-1511—Submitted June 30, 2026—Decided October 20, 2026.) APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Geauga County, No. 2025-G-0016, 2025-Ohio-5179. __________________ The per curiam opinion below was joined by FISCHER, DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. KENNEDY, C.J., concurred except as to Parts II(B) and (C)(14), dissented in part, and would reach the merits of the petition  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO for the reasons set forth in her dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Jordan v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-3051. Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Appellant, Brian M. Ames, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eleventh District Court of Appeals against appellee, the West Geauga Local School District Board of Education, seeking the production of public records under R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act. The Eleventh District dismissed the petition, concluding that Ames had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1) because he impermissibly commenced his mandamus action within the three-business-day cure period mandated by the statute. See 2025-Ohio-5179, ¶ 6 (11th Dist.). {¶ 2} Ames has appealed. Because the Eleventh District correctly concluded that Ames had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1), we affirm. {¶ 3} The parties have also filed numerous motions peripheral to the merits of the appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we deny one of these motions as moot and deny the other pending motions. I. BACKGROUND A. Public-Records Request and Response {¶ 4} On March 24, 2025, Ames emailed a public-records request to Karen Pavlat, the treasurer of the school district, asking for “the check register for February 2025.” Pavlat responded the same day, acknowledging receipt of the request and advising that it would be processed “as soon as reasonably possible.” On April 3, the board’s counsel, Sara Ravas Cooper, emailed Ames a copy of the February 2025 check register. The register included descriptions of services purchased for certain students, and it identified those students by student numbers and initials; the copy produced to Ames had the student initials redacted. In her 2  January Term, 2026 email, Cooper stated that both 20 U.S.C. 1232g, the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), and R.C. 3319.321, the Ohio Student Privacy Act (“OSPA”), prohibited the board from disclosing student initials in response to a public-records request because student initials are “personally identifiable information” for those students. As a further explanation for the redactions, Cooper stated that the February 2025 check register connected purchased services with particular students, thus requiring the redactions to avoid disclosing information in those students’ education records. {¶ 5} Ames responded to Cooper by email on April 15, asserting that “directory information” such as a student’s name is excluded from the definition of “personally identifiable information” under both FERPA and OSPA. He stated he intended to “proceed in mandamus” and would “be sending the newly required notice shortly.” B. The Pre-Suit Complaint {¶ 6} Last year’s amendments to the Public Records Act, effective April 9, 2025, require a public-records requester, before commencing a mandamus action, to provide the public office at issue with service of a complaint and an opportunity to cure an alleged failure to comply with a public-records request. See R.C. 149.43(C)(1), 2024 Sub.H.B. No. 265. On April 21, 2025, Ames sent to the board by certified mail the “Court of Claims Public Records Access Formal Complaint” (“the pre-suit complaint”) required by R.C. 149.43(C)(1), stating that he submitted a public-records request on March 24, that a response was made on April 3, and that the records produced contained improper redactions. As shown by the certified-mail receipt, service of the pre-suit complaint was addressed to “West Geauga Local School District Attn: Treasurer.” The certified-mail receipt was signed by “Diane Martin” and indicated the date of delivery as April 28. 3  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 7} On April 29, Pavlat informed Ames by email that the school district had received the pre-suit complaint and that it was standing by its original objections and response as conveyed on April 3. C. Mandamus Action in the Eleventh District {¶ 8} On April 30, 2025, Ames filed in the Eleventh District a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the board to provide an unredacted copy of the February 2025 check register. He requested awards of statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs. The petition included a separate “affidavit of verity” in which Ames attested that he had properly transmitted a complaint to the public office or person responsible for public records, that the complaint was transmitted to the board at least three business days before Ames filed the suit, and that the failure alleged in the complaint was not cured or otherwise resolved to his satisfaction. Attached to the mandamus petition as an exhibit was the certified-mail receipt showing that the pre-suit complaint was delivered to the school district on April 28, 2025. {¶ 9} The board filed an answer, stating as one of its defenses that Ames’s mandamus petition was filed before the expiration of the three-business-day cure period in violation of R.C. 149.43(C)(1). The board also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal of the petition for the same reason, among others. {¶ 10} On November 17, 2025, the Eleventh District dismissed Ames’s mandamus petition. The court determined that the “[e]xhibits attached to [Ames’s] petition indicate that [the board] was served by certified mail on April 28, 2025, with [Ames’s] [pre-suit] complaint.” 2025-Ohio-5179 at ¶ 6 (11th Dist.). The court concluded that Ames had failed to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1) because, after he transmitted the pre-suit complaint to the board, he impermissibly filed his mandamus petition within the three-business-day period granted to the board under the statute to cure the failure alleged in the pre-suit 4  January Term, 2026 complaint. Id. For this reason, the Eleventh District concluded that the mandamus action “must be dismissed.” Id. The court overruled all pending motions as moot, including the board’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. See id. at ¶ 7. D. The Present Appeal {¶ 11} Ames appealed the dismissal of his mandamus petition to this court. The parties have filed briefs, and the case is ripe for our decision. While the appeal was pending, the board filed a motion to refer the case to mediation, which we denied. 2025-Ohio-5200. The parties have filed a number of other motions, which we address below. II. ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review {¶ 12} We have not specifically addressed the standard of review for dismissal of a mandamus petition for failure to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1). This court applies a de novo standard when reviewing a lower court’s dismissal of a mandamus action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), State ex rel. Woods v. Heekin, 2024-Ohio-1719, ¶ 8, and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), State ex rel. Duncan v. Mentor, 2023-Ohio-3115, ¶ 6. We review de novo a lower court’s dismissal of an extraordinary-writ action for failure to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A). McIntyre v. May, 2026-Ohio-1231, ¶ 5. Here, the Eleventh District determined that Ames did not comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1), because he impermissibly commenced his mandamus action within the three-business-day cure period. Because the determination of compliance with R.C. 149.43(C)(1) is analogous to the determination of compliance with R.C. 2969.25(A), we apply a de novo standard of review in this situation. 5  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO B. Ames Failed to Comply with the Procedural Requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1) {¶ 13} The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether Ames complied with the procedural requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1), which provides: If a person allegedly is aggrieved by the failure of a public office or the person responsible for public records to promptly prepare a public record and to make it available to the person for inspection in accordance with division (B) of this section or by any other failure of a public office or the person responsible for public records to comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this section, the person allegedly aggrieved may serve pursuant to Rule 4 of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure a complaint, on a form prescribed by the clerk of the court of claims, to the public office or person responsible for public records allegedly responsible for the alleged failure. Upon receipt of the complaint of the person allegedly aggrieved, the public office or person responsible for public records has three business days to cure or otherwise address the failure alleged in the complaint. The person allegedly aggrieved shall not file a complaint with a court or commence a mandamus action under this section within the three-day period. . . . The requester may commence a public-records mandamus action only “[u]pon the expiration of the three-day period.” Id. “Compliance with this requirement is a prerequisite to the commencement of a lawsuit” under R.C. 149.43(C)(1). State ex rel. Jordan v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2025-Ohio-3051, ¶ 4 (DeWine, J., concurring). R.C. 149.43(C)(2) provides that upon filing a mandamus complaint 6  January Term, 2026 with a court, the requester must file in conjunction with the complaint a “written affirmation” stating that the [requester] properly transmitted a complaint to the public office or person responsible for public records, [that] the failure alleged in the complaint has not been cured or otherwise resolved to the [requester’s] satisfaction, and that the complaint was transmitted to the public office or person responsible for public records at least three business days before the filing of the suit. Finally, R.C. 149.43(C)(2) mandates that if the requester fails to file the written affirmation, “the suit shall be dismissed.” {¶ 14} The statute thus imposes multiple mandatory prerequisites that must be satisfied before a public-records mandamus action may proceed. First, the requester must serve a pre-suit complaint—on a form prescribed by the clerk of the Court of Claims—on the public office in accordance with Civ.R. 4. R.C. 149.43(C)(1). Second, after proper service of the pre-suit complaint, the public office has three business days from its receipt of the complaint to address the failure alleged in the complaint, and the requester “shall not” file a complaint with a court or commence a mandamus action “within the three-day period.” Id. If the public office does not resolve the issue within three business days, the requester may file a complaint in the Court of Claims or commence a mandamus action. R.C. 149.43(C)(1)(a) and (b). Third, upon filing a complaint or commencing a mandamus action, the requester must file with the court, in conjunction with the complaint or petition, a “written affirmation” stating that he or she followed the pre-suit procedures. R.C. 149.43(C)(2). {¶ 15} As his first proposition of law, Ames asserts that the Eleventh District erred in determining that the date of service of the pre-suit complaint was 7  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO April 28, 2025. He contends that the delivery date was not Monday, April 28, but rather Friday, April 25, as purportedly indicated by the tracking number associated with his certified-mail receipt. The tracking and delivery information is not part of the record on appeal, but Ames asks us to take judicial notice of the time and place of delivery of the certified-mail package containing the pre-suit complaint by visiting the website for the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), navigating to the “USPS Tracking” page, and entering the tracking number shown on the certified-mail receipt attached as an exhibit to his mandamus petition. {¶ 16} Because this is a direct appeal, we are limited to the record that was before the Eleventh District. See Morgan v. Eads, 2004-Ohio-6110, ¶ 13 (“a bedrock principle of appellate practice in Ohio is that an appeals court is limited to the record of the proceedings at trial”). “A reviewing court cannot add matter to the record before it, which was not a part of the trial court’s proceedings, and then decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.” State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d 402 (1978), paragraph one of the syllabus. The tracking and delivery information that Ames contends is located on the USPS website was not presented to the Eleventh District. Because we confine our review to the record on appeal, we do not consider the additional evidence proposed by Ames. {¶ 17} Based on the evidence in the record on appeal, Ames’s argument that the Eleventh District erred in its determination of the date of service of the pre-suit complaint lacks merit. The certified-mail receipt attached as an exhibit to Ames’s mandamus petition shows that the pre-suit complaint was delivered to the school district on Monday, April 28, 2025. Although Ames’s petition alleged that “[s]ervice of said complaint was perfected on April 25, 2025,” this allegation is contradicted by the certified-mail receipt. {¶ 18} R.C. 149.43(C)(1) provides that upon receipt of the pre-suit complaint, the public office “has three business days to cure or otherwise address the failure alleged in the complaint. The [public-records requester] shall not . . . 8  January Term, 2026 commence a mandamus action under this section within the three-day period.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the board had three business days from April 28, 2025, to cure or otherwise address the failure alleged in Ames’s pre-suit complaint, and Ames was prohibited from commencing his mandamus action within that three-day period. The date of receipt is not included in the calculation of that period. See Civ.R. 6(A) (“In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included.”). Accordingly, because the pre- suit complaint was delivered to the school district on April 28, the first business day of the cure period was Tuesday, April 29, the second was Wednesday, April 30, and the third was Thursday, May 1. To comply with the statute, Ames needed to wait until after the three-business-day cure period expired—Friday, May 2 at the earliest—to commence his mandamus action. By filing his petition before that time—on Wednesday, April 30—he failed to comply with the procedural requirements of R.C. 149.43(C)(1).1 Therefore, the Eleventh District did not err in determining that Ames commenced his mandamus action within the three-business- day cure period in violation of R.C. 149.43(C)(1). See 2025-Ohio-5179 at ¶ 6 (11th Dist.). {¶ 19} Because resolution of Ames’s first proposition of law is dispositive of this appeal, we need not reach his remaining propositions of law. C. Motions {¶ 20} The following section addresses the 27 motions currently pending and considers them in order of filing. 1. Even if the pre-suit complaint was delivered on April 25, 2025, as Ames urges, he still would have failed to comply with R.C. 149.43(C)(1). The first business day after April 25 was Monday, April 28, the second was Tuesday, April 29, and the third was Wednesday, April 30. Ames commenced his action on April 30, within the three-business-day cure period under his premise. 9  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 1. The board’s motion for an award of sanctions (Nov. 17, 2025) {¶ 21} The board filed a motion for an award of sanctions against Ames on November 17, 2025—the same day Ames filed his notice of appeal in this case— asserting that he had engaged in frivolous conduct in this case as well as other “related cases” filed in the Eleventh District and in the Geauga County Court of Common Pleas. The board asserts that Ames should be sanctioned under R.C. 149.43(C)(6), S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A), and Civ.R. 11. {¶ 22} The board has not established that Ames should be sanctioned under R.C. 149.43(C)(6), which provides that “[i]f the court does not issue a writ of mandamus under [R.C. 149.43(C)] and the court determines at that time that the bringing of the mandamus action was frivolous conduct as defined in [R.C. 2323.51(A)],[2] the court may award to the public office all court costs, expenses, and reasonable attorney’s fees, as determined by the court.” R.C. 149.43(C)(6) thus authorizes the court where the action was filed to sanction a public-records requester for bringing a frivolous mandamus action. Here, because Ames’s mandamus action was brought in the Eleventh District, the Eleventh District was 2. R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a) defines “frivolous conduct” as conduct of a party to a civil action that satisfies any of the following conditions: (i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another improper purpose, including, but not limited to, causing unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost of litigation. (ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law. (iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery. (iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief. Accord State ex rel. Striker v. Cline, 2011-Ohio-5350, ¶ 12-15. 10  January Term, 2026 the proper court to determine whether Ames should be sanctioned under R.C. 149.43(C)(6). {¶ 23} The board also has not shown that sanctions are warranted under either S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A) or Civ.R. 11. We may sanction a party who submits a filing or the person who signed or submitted a filing when we determine that the filing “is frivolous or is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose.” S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A). “A filing is frivolous if it is not reasonably grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Id. Civ.R. 11 requires that every pleading, motion, or other document filed with a court be supported by good grounds and not be interposed for delay and authorizes sanctions for a willful violation of the rule. Even assuming that Civ.R. 11 applies in an appeal to this court, the board has not established that Ames’s notice of appeal—the only document he had filed in this court as of November 17, 2025—violated the rule. Moreover, other than referring to the judgment against Ames in the court below— that is, the judgment on appeal before us—the board presents in its motion no evidence or authority demonstrating that Ames had engaged in frivolous or other improper conduct warranting sanctions. {¶ 24} We deny the board’s November 17, 2025 motion for an award of sanctions. 2. The board’s motion for a vexatious-litigator declaration (Nov. 17, 2025) {¶ 25} Also on November 17, 2025, the board filed a motion for an order declaring Ames to be a vexatious litigator under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B). This court may declare a party or person a vexatious litigator if the party or person “habitually or persistently engaged in conduct warranting sanctions under [S.Ct.Prac.R.] 4.03(A) whether or not [we] exercised [our] discretion to impose such sanctions.” S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B). As explained above, a party or person engages in conduct warranting sanctions when the party submits a filing or the person signs or submits 11  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO a filing that “is frivolous or is prosecuted for delay, harassment, or any other improper purpose,” S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A). {¶ 26} In its motion, the board argues that Ames should be declared to be a vexatious litigator because “there is no good ground to support Ames’[s] past, current, and threatened conduct in the instant case, as well as other cases and actions involving the Board and different parties.” The board also claims that Ames’s conduct is “interposed for delay,” serves “merely to harass and maliciously injure the Board,” is “not warranted under existing law,” “cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,” and consists of “allegations and other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support.” On these grounds, the board asserts that Ames’s “past, current, and threatened conduct” amounts to frivolous conduct under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A) and vexatious conduct under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B). {¶ 27} We have declared a person to be a vexatious litigator for repeatedly filing frivolous cases in this court. See, e.g., State ex rel. Johnson v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, 2020-Ohio-999, ¶ 21-23 (declaring the relator to be a vexatious litigator when he had filed 22 original actions in approximately seven years, all of which were dismissed, and when his arguments were repetitive). We have also declared a person to be a vexatious litigator based on conduct in a single case when we found that the person had “engaged in habitual and persistent frivolous conduct” in that case. State ex rel. Ware v. Vigluicci, 2024-Ohio-5492, ¶ 11; id. at ¶ 10-12 (declaring the relator to be a vexatious litigator when he had fabricated evidence that he had attached to his complaint, submitted the same fraudulent documents as evidence in the original action, submitted an affidavit containing a false statement, and filed a merit brief in which he continued to assert a false claim and attached the same fabricated evidence). {¶ 28} Like the board’s motion for an award of sanctions filed the same day, its vexatious-litigator motion consists mostly of boilerplate allegations that are 12  January Term, 2026 unsupported by evidence or authority. The only example the board provides in support of its allegation that Ames has “habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds instituted and maintained R.C. 2731.04 mandamus claims” is an Eleventh District decision, State ex rel. Ames v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Dev. Disabilities, 2024-Ohio-5441 (11th Dist.), in which the court affirmed a trial court’s judgment dismissing a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The board does not refer to any other cases in which Ames instituted allegedly frivolous actions. {¶ 29} Accordingly, the board has not shown that Ames has repeatedly filed frivolous cases in this court. Nor has the board shown that as of November 17, 2025—the day Ames filed his notice of appeal—he had engaged in habitual and persistent frivolous conduct in the present appeal. For these reasons, we deny the board’s November 17, 2025 motion for a vexatious-litigator declaration. 3. Ames’s motion for sanctions (Dec. 11, 2025) {¶ 30} Ames filed his own motion for sanctions on December 11, 2025, arguing that counsel for the board, Matthew John Markling, should be sanctioned under Civ.R. 11 because Markling had failed to verify the facts in several documents he signed before filing them. According to Ames, Markling failed to look up the tracking information for the pre-suit complaint that Ames sent to the board by USPS certified mail and filed in the Eleventh District a motion for judgment on the pleadings and two other documents falsely stating that the pre-suit complaint was served on April 28, 2025. Ames argues that because Markling signed these filings on behalf of the board stating that the pre-suit complaint was served on a different date than the one allegedly shown on the USPS website reached by entering the certified-mail tracking number, Markling is liable for sanctions under Civ.R. 11 and should be referred to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel for violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), (d), and (h). 13  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 31} Even assuming that Civ.R. 11 applies in an appeal to this court, Ames’s argument lacks merit. First, Ames does not contend that Markling falsely stated the date of service of the pre-suit complaint in any pleading, motion, or other document filed in this court. Second, the board’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and the two other documents it filed in the court below did not falsely state the date of service of Ames’s pre-suit complaint. As explained above, the certified-mail receipt attached as an exhibit to Ames’s mandamus petition shows that the pre-suit complaint was delivered to the school district on April 28, 2025, as stated in the board’s filings. Regardless, the Eleventh District did not rely on this statement in the board’s filings in dismissing Ames’s petition; rather, the court relied on the exhibits attached to Ames’s petition, 2025-Ohio-5179 at ¶ 6-7 (11th Dist.), and it then overruled as moot all pending motions, including the board’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, see id. at ¶ 7. Third, Civ.R. 11 specifies that sanctions may be imposed only for willful violations. State ex rel. Haley v. Davis, 2016-Ohio-534, ¶ 16. Even if Markling was mistaken about the date of service in the filings, Ames has provided no evidence indicating that any alleged misstatement was intentional or that the filings were presented for the purpose of harassment or malicious injury, see id. Accordingly, Ames has not shown that Markling willfully violated Civ.R. 11 in the present appeal by signing filings containing an allegedly false statement in the lower-court proceedings. {¶ 32} We deny Ames’s December 11, 2025 motion for sanctions. 4. The board’s motion for sanctions (Dec. 22, 2025) {¶ 33} In responding to Ames’s motion for sanctions filed on December 11, 2025, the board requests that this court sanction him under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A) and Civ.R. 11 for filing that motion. The board argues that because Ames’s motion did not show that any alleged misstatement of the date of service in the filings in the lower-court proceedings was willful rather than mistaken or inadvertent, as would have been required to impose Civ.R. 11 sanctions, it “obviously serves 14  January Term, 2026 merely to harass and maliciously injure the Board and the undersigned,” was filed for improper purposes including causing unnecessary delay and increasing the cost of litigation, is unwarranted under existing law, and is unsupported by evidence. The board concludes that this court must sanction Ames for his meritless request for sanctions as well as for his other frivolous conduct, stating: “Enough is enough. If not now, then when?” {¶ 34} Even assuming that Civ.R. 11 applies and that Ames’s December 11, 2025 motion for sanctions lacks merit (it does, as do the numerous motions filed by the board), the board has not shown that any particular meritless filing warrants sanctions under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(A) or Civ.R. 11. We deny its December 22, 2025 motion for sanctions. 5. The board’s motion to dismiss the appeal (Jan. 21, 2026) {¶ 35} On January 21, 2026, the board moved to dismiss Ames’s appeal “for want of a final appealable order.” The board claims that when the Eleventh District dismissed the underlying mandamus action, the court did not rule on the board’s pending “demand for sanctions” (asserted as “additional defenses” in its answer to Ames’s mandamus petition) and did not expressly state in its judgment that there is no just reason for delay as mandated by Civ.R. 54(B). The board also claims that its various motions for sanctions against Ames, filed after the Eleventh District entered judgment, remain pending. The board thus argues that the Eleventh District’s judgment was not a final, appealable order and that Ames’s appeal must be dismissed. {¶ 36} The board’s motion to dismiss lacks merit. First, the board’s “demand for sanctions” in its answer was not a motion for sanctions on which the Eleventh District was required to rule. A motion for sanctions may not be included in an answer, because it is not a pleading—it is a motion governed by separate procedural rules and must be submitted in compliance with Civ.R. 7(B). See S & S Computer Sys., Inc. v. Peng, 2002-Ohio-2905, ¶ 10, fn. 1 (9th Dist.) (motion for 15  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO sanctions was not a “claim for relief in [a] pleading” that was subject to a defense presented by a Civ.R. 12 motion but, rather, a motion that was subject to the requirements of Civ.R. 7(B)); Haney v. Trout, 2002-Ohio-564, 2002 WL 205997, *6 (10th Dist. Feb. 12, 2002) (rejecting argument that a motion for sanctions is a pleading), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Riston v. Butler, 2002-Ohio-2308, ¶ 24 & fn. 20 (1st Dist.). Pleadings and motions are distinct filings under the Rules of Civil Procedure. Civ.R. 7(A) defines pleadings as a complaint, an answer, a reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, a third- party complaint, and a third-party answer; a motion for sanctions does not fall within any of these categories. Civ.R. 7(B) separately governs motions, and Civ.R. 7(B)(1) provides that “[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion.” Both Civ.R. 11 and R.C. 2323.51 specifically identify requests for relief for a violation of those authorities as motions. See Civ.R. 11 (“For a willful violation of this rule, an attorney or pro se party, upon motion of a party . . . may be subjected to appropriate action . . . .” [Emphasis added.]); R.C. 2323.51(B)(1) (“any party adversely affected by frivolous conduct may file a motion for an award of court costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, and other reasonable expenses” [emphasis added]). Because a motion for sanctions is procedurally a motion and not a pleading, embedding a request for sanctions within an answer does not satisfy the requirements for bringing such a motion. {¶ 37} Second, the board cites no authority supporting its contention that its postjudgment motions for sanctions—which, according to the board, were filed in the Eleventh District after that court dismissed the mandamus action—render the Eleventh District’s November 2025 judgment of dismissal not a final, appealable order. Although the board’s motion refers to a Fourth District Court of Appeals decision—State ex rel. Verhovec v. Marietta, 2013-Ohio-5414, ¶ 84 (4th Dist.), in which the Fourth District held that an entry of dismissal entered after a motion for statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees had been filed was not a final, 16  January Term, 2026 appealable order, because the entry had not disposed of that motion—that decision is inapposite because it did not involve a postjudgment motion for sanctions like what is at issue here. {¶ 38} Because the board has not shown that the underlying November 2025 judgment was not a final, appealable order, we deny its January 21, 2026 motion to dismiss the appeal. 6. The board’s motion to remand the appeal to the Eleventh District to resolve postjudgment filings (Jan. 21, 2026) {¶ 39} In conjunction with its January 21, 2026 motion to dismiss the appeal, the board asks this court to remand the appeal to the Eleventh District to resolve various motions that the board filed after the dismissal of Ames’s mandamus action. The board refers to two postjudgment motions that it filed in the Eleventh District after the entry of judgment and that are purportedly still pending, and it relies on App.R. 4(B)(2)(e) to support a remand. However, because the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply to appeals to this court, App.R. 4 does not require this court to remand the appeal. See R.C. 2505.03(C) (“An appeal of a final order, judgment, or decree of a court shall be governed by the Rules of Appellate Procedure or by the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court, whichever are applicable . . . .”); App.R. 1(A) (“These rules govern procedure in appeals to courts of appeals from the trial courts of record in Ohio.”); S.Ct.Prac.R. 1.04 (“The Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio shall apply to all documents filed with the Supreme Court.”). For this reason, we deny the board’s January 21, 2026 motion to remand the appeal. 7. The board’s revised motion to stay the briefing schedule (Jan. 27, 2026) {¶ 40} On January 27, 2026, the board filed a revised motion to stay the briefing schedule until we rule on the board’s pending January 21, 2026 motions to dismiss the appeal and to remand the appeal. The board also asserts that a stay is required because of a purportedly pending motion to dismiss the appeal based on 17  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the Eleventh District’s supposed lack of jurisdiction over the underlying mandamus action. That motion, filed January 27, 2026, was explicitly superseded by the board’s revised motion to dismiss the appeal, filed February 9, 2026, and is a nullity. See S.Ct.Prac.R. 3.13(C) (“A revised document that is properly filed under this rule will supersede the original document, and the Supreme Court will not consider the original document that was filed.”). {¶ 41} Because we deny the pending motions that purport to require a stay of the briefing schedule in this appeal (as explained above), we also deny the board’s January 27, 2026 revised motion to stay the briefing schedule. 8. The board’s motion to strike Ames’s merit brief (Jan. 27, 2026) {¶ 42} On January 27, 2026, the board moved to strike Ames’s merit brief because he purportedly failed to include in the appendix of the brief the statutes on which he relies, in violation of S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.02(B)(5)(e). Ames did not respond to the motion. {¶ 43} S.Ct.Prac.R. 16.02(B)(5)(e) requires that an appellant’s merit brief contain an appendix that includes copies of “[a]ny constitutional provision, statute, or ordinance upon which the appellant relies, to be construed, or otherwise involved in the case.” Although this court has recognized that “a substantial disregard of the whole body of the [Rules of Practice] cannot be tolerated,” Drake v. Bucher, 5 Ohio St.2d 37, 40 (1966), we have declined to strike a brief when its technical shortcomings had not prejudiced the opposing party’s ability to file a responsive brief or hindered our ability to decide the case, see State ex rel. Sultaana v. Mansfield Corr. Inst., 2023-Ohio-1177, ¶ 13; State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 2006-Ohio-903, ¶ 14. {¶ 44} Here, the board does not suggest that Ames’s failure to include in his merit brief’s appendix the statutes on which he relies has prejudiced its ability to respond to his merit brief. Nor would such an argument be persuasive. Although Ames does rely on various provisions of the Revised Code, he provides citations to 18  January Term, 2026 those provisions, official versions of which are easily found on an official website maintained by the State’s Legislative Service Commission. Moreover, the board was able to file a merit brief despite the lack of a complete appendix in Ames’s merit brief. {¶ 45} Because the technical shortcomings of Ames’s merit brief have not hindered the board’s ability to file its own merit brief or our ability to decide the case, we deny the board’s January 27, 2026 motion to strike Ames’s merit brief. 9. The board’s motion for oral argument (Jan. 27, 2026) {¶ 46} On January 27, 2026, the board requested oral argument under S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(B). “In direct appeals, we generally grant oral argument only when a case deals with matters of great public importance, co