Carlton v. Palmer
CourtOhio Supreme Court
Date FiledSeptember 10, 2026
Docket2025-1638
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Carlton v. Palmer, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3486.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-3486
CARLTON, APPELLANT, v. PALMER, WARDEN, APPELLEE.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Carlton v. Palmer, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-3486.]
Habeas corpus—Inmate’s counsel’s signature on petition and on certificate of
service did not satisfy verification requirement of R.C. 2725.04—Court of
appeals’ judgment granting warden’s motion to dismiss affirmed.
(No. 2025-1638—Submitted June 30, 2026—Decided September 10, 2026.)
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County,
No. 25 MA 0069, 2025-Ohio-5216.
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The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Dejuan Carlton, appeals the judgment of the Seventh
District Court of Appeals dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
appellee, Bryant Palmer Jr., the warden of the institution in which Carlton is
confined. The Seventh District dismissed Carlton’s petition because it was not
verified, in violation of R.C. 2725.04. We affirm the court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
{¶ 2} In 2011, the Stark County Court of Common Pleas accepted Carlton’s
pleas of guilty to one count of aggravated murder and one count of aggravated
robbery, both with attached firearm specifications. The court sentenced Carlton to
an aggregate term of 23 years to life in prison. In 2016, Carlton filed a motion for
leave to file a delayed appeal. The Seventh District denied the motion, and this
court declined to accept Carlton’s discretionary appeal from that denial, State v.
Carlton, 2016-Ohio-5585.
{¶ 3} In July 2025, Carlton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
Seventh District, arguing that “[t]here is no legal authority for [his] imprisonment
as it is the result of the trial court’s actions taken and sentence imposed absent a
properly signed journal entry.” Palmer moved to dismiss Carlton’s petition,
arguing that it was procedurally defective and that Carlton had not yet served his
maximum prison sentence.
{¶ 4} The Seventh District granted Palmer’s motion, holding that Carlton
had failed to comply with R.C. 2725.04’s verification requirement. 2025-Ohio-
5216, ¶ 26, 35 (7th Dist.). The court further concluded that Carlton had adequate
remedies in the ordinary course of the law through which he could challenge the
trial court’s judgment entry and that his habeas claims did not implicate the subject-
matter jurisdiction of the trial court. Id. at ¶ 27.
{¶ 5} Carlton has appealed to this court as of right.
II. ANALYSIS
{¶ 6} We review de novo a decision of the court of appeals dismissing a
habeas corpus petition. State ex rel. Parker v. Black, 2022-Ohio-1730, ¶ 6.
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{¶ 7} “To be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, a party must show that he
is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty, R.C. 2725.01, and that he is entitled to
immediate release from prison or confinement.” State ex rel. Cannon v. Mohr,
2018-Ohio-4184, ¶ 10. Further, a petitioner is not entitled to a writ ordering his
immediate release if he has or had “an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, unless a trial court’s judgment is void for lack of jurisdiction.” State ex rel.
Davis v. Turner, 2021-Ohio-1771, ¶ 8.
{¶ 8} Carlton raises two propositions of law challenging the Seventh
District’s dismissal of his habeas action. In particular, Carlton argues that his
attorney’s signature on “a filed document” sufficiently complies with the
verification requirement of R.C. 2725.04. Carlton also contends that the Seventh
District erred in holding that procedural deficiencies aside, he was not entitled to
habeas relief for the reason that he was not attacking the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the sentencing court. We reject Carlton’s first proposition of law, and we need
not reach the second.
A. Carlton’s petition is procedurally defective
{¶ 9} R.C. 2725.04 requires that a habeas petition be “signed and verified
either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some person for him.” As
his first proposition of law, Carlton argues that his attorney’s signature on his
petition, and on the attached certificate of service, satisfies R.C. 2725.04’s
verification requirement. Carlton contends that the Seventh District erred in relying
on Davis v. Sheldon, 2020-Ohio-436, to hold that Carlton’s petition lacked
verification and was subject to summary dismissal.
{¶ 10} But it is Carlton who errs in arguing that our holding in Davis v.
Sheldon does not apply to the facts of this case. Although he notes that Davis does
not address whether an attorney’s signature satisfies the verification requirement of
R.C. 2725.04, the pertinent analysis is straightforward. A verification is a “‘formal
declaration made in the presence of an authorized officer, such as a notary public,
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by which one swears to the truth of the statements in the document.’ ” (Emphasis
added.) Chari v. Vore, 2001-Ohio-49, ¶ 21, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (7th
Ed.1999). Thus, in Davis, we noted that a habeas petitioner failed to comply with
the verification requirement because “neither [he] nor his attorney swore to the truth
of the facts contained” in the petition. Davis at ¶ 8.
{¶ 11} An attorney’s signature on a pleading merely verifies that “the
attorney . . . has read the document” and “that to the best of the attorney’s . . .
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it.” Civ.R. 11.
Carlton’s counsel’s signature on the habeas petition and on the certificate of service
does not satisfy the basic verification requirement of R.C. 2725.04. Neither Carlton
nor his attorney swore to the truth of the facts alleged in the petition. And though
the petition contains counsel’s signature, it does not contain either Carlton’s
verification of the truth of the allegations or a sworn statement from counsel. We
reject Carlton’s argument to the contrary.
B. We need not determine whether Carlton raises only nonjurisdictional
claims
{¶ 12} Carlton’s second proposition of law challenges the Seventh
District’s statement, in dicta, that the allegations in his petition do not attack the
jurisdiction of the court that imposed his sentence. See 2025-Ohio-5216 at ¶ 27
(“Even assuming [Carlton]’s petition was procedurally proper, . . . he challenges an
alleged defect in the judgment entry rather than the trial court’s jurisdiction.”).
Because Carlton’s petition was fatally defective for failing to satisfy the verification
requirement of R.C. 2725.04, dismissal was required. See Chari at ¶ 22.
Accordingly, we need not reach the arguments Carlton has asserted in support of
his second proposition of law, which go to the merits of his habeas claims.
C. Request for oral argument
{¶ 13} The cover page of Carlton’s merit brief states: “Oral Argument
Requested.” Carlton’s cover-page request does not comply with this court’s rule
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January Term, 2026
governing requests for oral argument. See S.Ct.Prac.R. 17.02(B) (“A request for
oral argument on the merits shall be by motion and filed no later than twenty days
after the filing of the appellee’s . . . brief.”). We therefore deny Carlton’s request
for oral argument.
III. CONCLUSION
{¶ 14} For the foregoing reasons, we deny Carlton’s request for oral
argument and affirm the judgment of the Seventh District Court of Appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
__________________
Mary Catherine Corrigan, for appellant.
D. Andrew Wilson, Attorney General, and Lisa K. Browning, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
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