Full Opinion

[Cite as Rezaei v. Rezaei, 2026-Ohio-3715.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) SANDRA REZAEI C.A. No. 31710 Appellee v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE AMIN REZAEI COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO Appellant CASE No. DR-2020-04-0986 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: September 23, 2026 FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Amin Rezaei, appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division. We affirm. I. {¶2} Amin and Plaintiff-Appellee, Sandra Rezaei, were divorced on December 1, 2020. The trial court’s decree of divorce incorporated the parties’ separation agreement. Relevant to this appeal, the decree included the following provision regarding spousal support: A. Spousal Support (1) After considering all factors set forth in [R.C.] 3105.18 the parties hereinafter acknowledge that [Amin] has an obligation of support to [Sandra]. However, the Parties agree that [Amin]’s spousal support obligation shall be set at $0 per month at this time. This agreement is made because it is contemplated that [Amin] is relocating to his home country of Iran effective immediately. The parties agree that the Court shall retain jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support in the event that [Amin] returns to the United States or does not relocate as planned. . . . If or when the court issues a spousal support order, the term of that order shall be no longer than a two year (24 month) period of time. 2 ... (3) The issue of spousal support shall be subject to the Court’s continuing jurisdiction as set for above and therefore, is modifiable or reviewable by the Court consistent with the terms of this Agreement. (Emphasis in original.) {¶3} Sandra filed a motion to modify the spousal support award in July 2022, asserting Amin had returned to the United States and that there had been a substantial change in his income. After a period of discovery, the matter came before a magistrate for hearing. Following the hearing, the magistrate granted Sandra’s motion and ordered Amin to pay Sandra spousal support in the amount of $3,337.00 per month for a period of 24 months. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision the same day the magistrate filed it. Amin filed timely objections and supplemented his objections after the court reporter filed the transcript of the hearing. Sandra filed a response, and the trial court overruled the objections. {¶4} Amin appeals, raising three assignments of error. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPUTING AN INCOME OF $204,000 TO APPELLANT AND FAILING TO CONSIDER ALL REQUIRED FACTORS OF [R.C.] 3105.18. {¶5} In his first assignment of error, Amin contends the trial court abused its discretion when it modified his spousal support obligation to Sandra because the trial court (1) failed to consider the health of the parties, (2) failed to consider the parties’ liabilities, and (3) improperly determined he was underemployed. We overrule the assignment of error. {¶6} “This Court reviews a trial court’s action with respect to a magistrate’s decision for an abuse of discretion.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.). “In so doing, 3 we consider the trial court’s action with reference to the nature of the underlying matter.” Id. at ¶ 18. This Court also “reviews the domestic relations court’s decision regarding the modification of spousal support for an abuse of discretion.” Kelly v. Kelly, 2019-Ohio-4723, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.), quoting Wuscher v. Wuscher, 2014-Ohio-377, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). Under an abuse of discretion standard, we must determine whether the trial court’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable rather than merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶7} Here, the separation agreement provided the trial court “shall retain jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support in the event that [Amin] returns to the United States or does not relocate as planned.” Amin does not assert in this assignment of error that trial court did not have jurisdiction to modify the existing spousal support award. After a trial court has determined it has authority to do so, it must “determine whether the existing support order should be modified in light of the change in circumstances that has occurred.” Alkire v. Alkire, 2021-Ohio-186, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.), quoting Tufts v. Tufts, 2010-Ohio-641, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.); R.C. 3105.18. “Such a determination is conducted in consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C).” Alkire at ¶ 20, quoting Tufts at ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to modify a spousal support order, the trial court need not [examine] all factors listed in R.C. 3105.15(C)(1). The court need only consider the factors which have actually changed since the last order.” Alkire at ¶ 20, quoting Lumpkin v. Lumpkin, 2003-Ohio-2841, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). {¶8} On appeal, Amin first contends the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider Amin’s health issues and the parties’ liabilities when it modified the amount and duration of the spousal support award. However, Amin did not object to the magistrate’s decision on either basis. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) objections “shall be specific and state with particularity 4 all grounds for objection.” “Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion . . . unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). “Where a party fails to raise an issue in its objections to a magistrate’s decision, that issue is forfeited on appeal.” Niederst v. Niederst, 2018-Ohio-5320, ¶ 34 (9th Dist.), quoting Bass- Fineberg Leasing, Inc. v. Modern Auto Sales, Inc., 2015-Ohio-46, ¶ 24 (9th Dist.); see also Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). Amin has not raised a plain error argument on appeal, and we will not do so for him. Herron v. Herron, 2019-Ohio-5095, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). {¶9} Amin next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) finding he was voluntarily underemployed, and (2) imputing an income to him in the amount of $204,000. However, “when appealing from a trial court’s order adopting a magistrate’s decision, ‘[a]ny claim of trial court error must be based upon the actions of the trial court,’ not the magistrate.” (Alterations in original.) J.P. v. T.H., 2016-Ohio-243, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.), quoting Citibank v. Masters, 2008-Ohio-1323, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.). In this case, the magistrate imputed an income of $204,000 to Amin “[b]ased upon the evidence presented to the court . . . .” Amin objected, asserting the magistrate abused her discretion by finding he was voluntarily underemployed and imputing an income in an amount he had never earned. In overruling Amin’s objections, the trial court did not find Amin was voluntarily underemployed nor did the trial court impute an income to him. Rather, the trial court found the evidence showed Amin had left secure and lucrative employment—where he was capable of earning $204,000—shortly after he was served with Sandra’s motion to modify. {¶10} As this Court has previously noted “[u]nlike the child support statute, there is no language in R.C. 3105.18 that directs a trial court to ‘impute’ income.” Collins v. Collins, 2011- Ohio-2087, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). Rather, a trial court is directed to consider “[t]he income of the parties, 5 from all sources” and “[t]he relative earning abilities of the parties[.]” R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a) and (b). With respect to the relative earning abilities of the parties, “[t]he end result is not to arrive at a specific figure so as to ‘impute’ income; rather, the end result is to consider and weigh the spouses’ relative earning abilities along with the other factors in arriving at reasonable spousal support both as to amount and term.” Collins at ¶ 19. {¶11} Here, the trial court noted the evidence showed Amin had been in the car sales industry for several years before moving to Iran and that he had obtained secure and lucrative employment in the industry upon his return to the United States. The evidence showed Amin left that employment shortly after Sandra served him with the motion to modify the spousal support award. If Amin had continued in that employment, the evidence showed he was “on track to making” $204,000 that year. The trial court found this evidence to be relevant and equitable to the determination of spousal support in this case. See id. at ¶ 21 (“Even absent an improper motive, one spouse’s decision to leave secure and lucrative employment can be highly relevant and raise equitable considerations given the circumstances of the parties.”). Consequently, the trial court concluded the magistrate did not err by considering the amount Amin was capable of earning. The trial court then found the spousal support award was reasonable under the circumstances. {¶12} Based on the above, we conclude that Amin has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the spousal support award. Amin’s first assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT LANGUAGE IN THE DIVORCE DECREE WAS INHERENTLY UNENFORCEABLE AS IT ALLOWED APPELLEE AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME TO REQUEST SPOUSAL SUPPORT[.] 6 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT APPELLEE’S MOTION WAS BARRED BY LACHES[.] {¶13} In his second assignment of error, Amin contends the decree’s spousal support provision is unenforceable because it allowed Sandra an indefinite period of time to request spousal support. In his third assignment of error, Amin asserts the trial court erred by not concluding Sandra’s motion was barred by the doctrine of laches. Upon review, we conclude Amin forfeited these issues for review. {¶14} Amin did not object to the magistrate’s decision on either basis. See Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(ii) (noting that objections “shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection”). “Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion . . . unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).” Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv). “Where a party fails to raise an issue in its objections to a magistrate’s decision, that issue is forfeited on appeal.” Niederst, 2018-Ohio-5320, at ¶ 34 (9th Dist.), quoting Bass-Fineberg Leasing, Inc., 2015-Ohio- 46, at ¶ 24 (9th Dist.); see also Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). Amin has not raised a plain error argument on appeal, and we will not do so for him. Herron, 2019-Ohio-5095, at ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). {¶15} Amin’s second and third assignments of error are overruled. III. {¶16} Amin’s first, second, and third assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. 7 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT HENSAL, P. J. STEVENSON, J. CONCUR. APPEARANCES: GARY M. ROSEN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. CORINNE HOOVER and JOSEPH A. BRUCE, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.