Rossi v. Rossi
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 6, 2026
Docket26 MA 0022
JudgeRobb
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Rossi v. Rossi, 2026-Ohio-4416.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MAHONING COUNTY
LAURA K. ROSSI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL T. ROSSI et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 26 MA 0022
Civil Appeal from the
Common Pleas Court of Mahoning County, Ohio
Case No. 2023 CV 00116
BEFORE:
Carol Ann Robb, Mark A. Hanni, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.
Atty. Bruce M. Broyles, for Plaintiff-Appellant and
Atty. Scott C. Essad, for Appellees Meena Rossi and Hiro Onodo, LLC and Atty. Douglas
W. Ross, Daniel Daniluk, LLC, for Appellee Michael Rossi.
Dated: November 6, 2026
–2–
Robb, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Laura K. Rossi, appeals the February 12, 2026 judgment
overruling her objections to the magistrate’s decision and enforcing the parties’ settlement
agreement. Laura argues the parties’ settlement agreement did not encompass her ex-
husband’s fraudulent transfers that occurred after her January 2023 complaint in this case
was filed. We affirm.
Statement of the Case
{¶2} In January of 2023, Laura filed a complaint for fraudulent transfer against
Appellees, her ex-husband Michael T. Rossi; his company Hiro Onodo, LLC; and Meena
Rossi, his new wife. Laura claimed to have a judgment against Michael in excess of one
million dollars flowing from their divorce proceedings. (January 18, 2023 Complaint.)
{¶3} Laura alleged Michael’s former 1099 non-employee compensation was
transferred to his company to prevent Laura from collecting her judgment. Laura also
alleged the company paid Meena some of that money as a “management fee” paid to her
in the form of 1099 non-employee compensation. Laura alleged the foregoing conduct
was designed to avoid paying her and is a violation of Ohio’s Uniform Transfer Act. Laura
sought an order of attachment of funds and a punitive damage award, plus attorney’s
fees, interest, and costs. (January 18, 2023 Complaint.)
{¶4} The parties consented to a trial before the magistrate per Civ.R. 53(C).
After several pretrials were held and pretrial motions were filed, the trial court issued a
judgment in October of 2024 indicating that counsel advised the court that the case had
settled. This judgment also states plaintiff would submit a final judgment entry of
dismissal within 30 days. (October 16, 2024 Judgment.)
{¶5} In January of 2025, the court issued a stipulated dismissal entry. It states
Laura’s claims were dismissed with prejudice and the court would retain continuing
jurisdiction to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement. This judgment is signed by the
trial court judge and counsel for each of the parties. (January 22, 2025 Stipulated
Dismissal Entry.)
Case No. 26 MA 0022
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{¶6} In November of 2025, Appellees filed a motion to enforce the settlement
agreement. Their motion alleges in part that Laura violated the terms of the parties’
settlement agreement by filing a new lawsuit against them. A copy of the parties’
settlement agreement is attached to the motion as exhibit A. A copy of Laura’s complaint
filed in August of 2025 in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas against Appellees
alleging Michael fraudulently transferred 1099 compensation to the company and Meena
in violation of Ohio’s fraudulent transfer is attached as exhibit C. (November 5, 2025
Motion to Enforce.)
{¶7} Laura opposed their motion to enforce. She alleged that her prior lawsuit,
settlement, and release only encompassed and governed Michael’s fraudulent
conveyances occurring in the years 2020, 2021, and 2022. She asserted the 2023
complaint and January 2025 settlement agreement did not include the Appellees’ 2024
and 2025 fraudulent conveyances. Laura claimed their 2024 and 2025 conduct was not
encompassed by the allegations in her 2023 complaint. Laura urged the court to find the
Appellees’ subsequent improper conduct was not encompassed by the plain language of
the settlement agreement. (December 2, 2025 Memo in Opposition.)
{¶8} Appellees filed a reply in support. They asserted the terms of the parties’
settlement agreement clearly encompassed alleged future claims as well as those
detailed in the complaint. They asked the court to order Laura to dismiss her 2025
complaint with prejudice. (December 9, 2025 Reply.)
{¶9} The magistrate conducted an oral hearing on the motion and granted the
motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Laura was ordered to dismiss her 2025
complaint with prejudice within 14 days. (January 22, 2026 Magistrate’s Decision.) The
magistrate also issued an amended magistrate’s decision. (January 23, 2026
Magistrate’s Decision.)
{¶10} Laura filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. She argued the
magistrate erred by focusing on the similar nature or basis of the claims instead of
addressing whether her 2025 allegations were actually released by the parties’ January
2025 settlement agreement. Upon focusing on the release language, Laura asserts the
claims in her 2025 complaint (arising from the fraudulent transfers in the year 2024 and
Case No. 26 MA 0022
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2025) were not released or covered by the settlement agreement. (January 26, 2026
Objections.) Appellees filed a joint response in opposition.
{¶11} The trial court adopted and affirmed the magistrate’s decision. It found
Laura violated the parties’ settlement agreement when she filed the second complaint in
Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 2025 CV 02144. It ordered her to
dismiss the same within 14 days. (February 12, 2026 Judgment.) She raises one
assignment of error on appeal.
Assignment of Error
{¶12} Laura’s sole assigned error asserts:
“The trial court erred in finding that Appellant violated the terms of the settlement
agreement by filing the second complaint as Appellant only released and discharged
Appellees from any and all past, present, and future claims, which the Plaintiff had, has,
or may have arising out of the claims of fraudulent conveyance, fraudulent transfer, or
other claims arising out of Michael Rossi transferring payments from Advisor's Equity
Group, LLC to Hiro Onodo, LLC.”
{¶13} A settlement agreement is a contract. Rulli v. Fan Co., 79 Ohio St.3d 374,
376 (1997), citing Noroski v. Fallet, 2 Ohio St.3d 77, 79 (1982). When a motion to enforce
a settlement agreement presents a question of contract law, we review the matter de
novo. Stalder v. Gatchell, 2022-Ohio-1325, ¶ 73 (7th Dist.), citing Continental W.
Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson Inc., 74 Ohio St.3d 501, 502
(1996).
{¶14} When construing an agreement, a court's principle objective is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the parties. Hamilton Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Nationwide Ins.
Cos., 86 Ohio St.3d 270, 273 (1999). “The intent of the parties to a contract is presumed
to reside entirely in the specific language they chose to employ in the agreement.” Kelly
v. Med. Life Ins. Co., 31 Ohio St.3d 130 (1987), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶15} We must read the applicable contract in its entirety, give effect to each
provision, and ascertain the intent of the parties from considering it as a whole. Saunders
v. Mortensen, 2004-Ohio-24, ¶ 16. “Courts should attempt to harmonize provisions and
words so that every word is given effect.” Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co., 124 Ohio App.3d 84,
88 (9th Dist.1997).
Case No. 26 MA 0022
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{¶16} Thus, where the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, a court
cannot look beyond the plain language of the agreement to determine the rights and
obligations of the parties. Aultman Hospital Ass'n v. Community Mut. Ins. Co., 46 Ohio
St.3d 51 (1989). However, if a contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one
meaning, then it is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence of reasonableness or intent can be
employed. City of Steubenville v. Jefferson Cty., 2008-Ohio-5053, ¶ 22 (7th Dist.).
{¶17} “To construe or interpret what is already plain is not interpretation” and is
not our function when a writing is unambiguous. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc. v. Ohio Ins. Guar.
Assn., 69 Ohio St.3d 521, 524 (1994), quoting Iddings v. Bd. of Edn. of Jefferson Cty.
School Dist., 155 Ohio St. 287, 290 (1951) (addressing statutory construction). Absent
an ambiguity, courts must apply an agreement “as written and conduct no further
investigation.” State v. Hurd, 89 Ohio St.3d 616, citing State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch,
72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584 (1995) (addressing statutory language).
{¶18} Here, the parties argue the settlement agreement is clear and
unambiguous. Yet, both assert it sets forth different things.
{¶19} Laura claims the settlement agreement covers only the allegations in the
complaint due to the use of the words “the claims” in the agreement. She alleges the
parties’ use of the definite article “the” limits the coverage of the agreement to only those
outlined in the complaint.
{¶20} Appellees disagree and direct this court to the broad scope of the language
contained in Section 5. They allege a plain reading of the contract as a whole shows they
agreed to settle and preclude all claims alleging Michael made fraudulent conveyances
to avoid his obligations to Laura. Appellees contend Laura’s act of filing her new lawsuit,
which alleges fraudulent transfers by Michael in the same fashion or scheme as the one
alleged in her 2023 complaint, violates the terms of their settlement. For the following
reasons, we agree.
{¶21} The parties entered a settlement agreement in January of 2025. The
agreement states it is an agreement between Laura, Michael, Meena, and Hiro Onodo,
LLC. The agreement includes several paragraphs outlining the parties’ history under the
heading “WHEREAS.” This section states in part that Laura and Michael were married
and Michael owes Laura money pursuant to their divorce decree. It also states the
Case No. 26 MA 0022
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domestic relations court found Michael in contempt and determined he owed Laura $1.2
million. The domestic relations court ordered him to make monthly payments to satisfy
the same in 2020. (Settlement Agreement.)
{¶22} The background section also states that Laura filed a 2018 lawsuit against
Michael for breach of certain agreements in violation of their 2014 property division. She
was awarded $1.2 million plus interest. (Settlement Agreement.)
{¶23} This section also provides that in January of 2023, Laura filed her 2023
lawsuit in this case, alleging fraudulent transfer claims against Appellees. It states the
parties entered the agreement to “settle the claims of fraudulent conveyance arising out
of Michael Rossi transferring his guaranteed payments for personal services in the form
of 1099 non-employee compensation from Advisor’s Equity Group, LLC to Hiro Onodo,
LLC and Meena Rossi.” (Settlement Agreement.)
{¶24} The next section of the settlement agreement is titled “AGREEMENT.” It
states in part under the subheading “1. Payment to Plaintiff” that Michael will pay Laura a
lump sum, which will be credited toward both the property division payment required per
the domestic relations case, as well as toward the judgment in the 2018 case. (Settlement
Agreement.)
{¶25} Under “2. Future Collection Actions” the agreement states in part, “Laura
Rossi will not be prohibited from future collection actions against Michael” in the 2018
case or the parties’ domestic relations case. However, it states: “Plaintiff covenants not
to file any collection actions or lawsuit against Defendants asserting any claims related to
the clams in the Lawsuit, which claims are released as set forth in ¶ 5.” (Emphasis
added.) (Settlement Agreement.)
{¶26} Thereafter, and also under the “AGREEMENT” heading, the settlement
includes a section titled “5. Release and Discharge.” This section states:
Plaintiff hereby satisfies, releases, and forever discharges, jointly
and severally, individually and collectively Defendants . . . each of the
foregoing from any and all past, present, and future claims, actions, causes
of action, . . . whether known or unknown, which the Plaintiff had, has, or
may have arising out of the claims of fraudulent conveyance, fraudulent
transfer, or other claims arising out of Michael Rossi transferring payments
Case No. 26 MA 0022
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from Advisor’s Equity Group, LLC to Hiro Onodo, LLC, payments made by
Advisor’s Equity Group, LLC to Hiro Onodo, LLC, Michael Rossi’s or Meena
Rossi’s ownership of Hiro Onodo, LLC, any income or payments received
by Michael Rossi or Meena Rossi from Hiro Onodo, LLC . . . (collectively
the “Claims”).
{¶27} Further, under the heading “7. Covenant not to Sue,” the agreement states:
Plaintiff covenants and agrees not to file any lawsuit or legal action
regarding the Claims released herein. The foregoing covenant and
agreement shall be a complete defense to any such lawsuit or legal action.
This Agreement can be raised as a complete defense to and will preclude
any lawsuit, legal action or proceeding to bring any released or assert any
released Claims.
{¶28} Under the heading “11. Entire Settlement Agreement and Future
Amendment,” the settlement agreement states:
This Agreement contains the entire Agreement between the Parties
with respect to the transaction contemplated herein, supersedes all prior
agreements and understandings whatsoever between the Parties and
cannot be changed or amended, except by written agreement signed by all
of the Parties.
{¶29} Upon reading the agreement as a whole, and giving all terms therein
meaning as required, the agreement unambiguously encompasses the future claims of
fraudulent transfer by Michael, including those occurring after Laura’s 2023 complaint
was filed, made in the same manner.
{¶30} Contrary to Laura’s arguments, the parties’ settlement agreement does not
limit its application to the allegations in her 2023 complaint. The settlement does not state
it only applies to Appellees’ conduct detailed in the 2023 complaint. The agreement does
not restrict or limit its parameters to certain years or dates.
{¶31} Instead, the agreement broadly defines “the Claims” which are being settled
as encompassing Appellees’ conduct “known and unknown.” It further provides it applies
to “any and all past, present, and future claims, actions, causes of action, . . . whether
known or unknown, which the Plaintiff had, has, or may have arising out of the claims of
Case No. 26 MA 0022
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fraudulent conveyance, fraudulent transfer, or other claims arising out of Michael Rossi
transferring payments.”
{¶32} In light of this language, we agree with Appellees. Common, undefined
words in a written instrument “will be given their ordinary meaning unless manifest
absurdity results, or some other meaning is clearly evidenced from the face or overall
contents of the instrument.” Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 53 Ohio St.2d 241,
(1978), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶33} Because the agreement is broadly written and unambiguous, it covers his
subsequent fraudulent conveyances allegedly conducted in the same manner as the
allegations in Laura’s 2023 complaint. It is not our function to rewrite the agreement to
provide an equitable result. Accordingly, Laura’s sole assigned error lacks merit.
Conclusion
{¶34} Based on the foregoing, Laura’s sole assignment of error lacks merit. The
trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Hanni, J., concurs.
Dickey, J. concurs.
Case No. 26 MA 0022
[Cite as Rossi v. Rossi, 2026-Ohio-4416.]
For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the
Appellant.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
This document constitutes a final judgment entry.