Kheloui v. Moon

[Cite as Kheloui v. Moon, 2026-Ohio-3923.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT UNION COUNTY ZACK KHELOUI, CASE NO. 14-26-04 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. KENNETH MOON, OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 24 DR 0030 Judgment Affirmed Date of Decision: October 5, 2026 APPEARANCES: Zach Kheloui Appellant Kristin L. Arnold for Appellee Case No. 14-26-04 WALDICK, J. {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Zack Kheloui (“Kheloui”), appeals from the judgment entered against him in the Union County Court of Common Pleas, in which the trial court overruled Kheloui’s motion for relief from an agreed judgment of divorce. On appeal, Kheloui argues that the agreed judgment of divorce dissolving his marriage to defendant-appellee, Kenneth Moon (“Moon”), should have been vacated pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) and, further, that the trial court erred in denying Kheloui’s motion to disqualify Moon’s counsel in the post-divorce proceedings. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. Procedural History and Factual Background {¶2} Kheloui and Moon were married in 2015. On February 13, 2024, Kheloui filed a complaint for divorce against Moon in the trial court. On June 18, 2024, following several months of pretrial proceedings, the trial court filed an assignment notice scheduling a “pretrial/uncontested divorce” for June 27, 2024. (Notice of Hearing, Docket No. 23). {¶3} On September 4, 2024, an agreed judgment entry decree of divorce was filed in the trial court. That judgment entry reflected that on June 27, 2024, the case came before the trial court and the parties then reached a full agreement on all matters relating to the pending divorce action. Upon the terms and conditions set -2- Case No. 14-26-04 forth therein, the September 4, 2024 agreed judgment entry ordered that the parties’ marriage be terminated as of the filing date of that agreed divorce decree. {¶4} The record reflects that no appeal was taken following the agreed decree of divorce having been granted to the parties on September 4, 2024. {¶5} On August 5, 2025, eleven months after the divorce was final, Kheloui filed a pro se motion to vacate the divorce decree, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). On that same date, Kheloui filed a motion requesting a hearing on his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. On August 11, 2025, Kheloui filed a supplement to his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and, under separate cover, a notice of filing supplemental documents in support of the motion to vacate the judgment of divorce. {¶6} On September 17, 2025, Moon filed – through his attorney, Kristin Arnold – a motion to dismiss Kheloui’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion and a memorandum in opposition thereto. {¶7} On October 8, 2025, Kheloui filed a motion seeking to disqualify Kristin Arnold from acting as Moon’s attorney. {¶8} On November 17, 2025, an evidentiary hearing was held before the trial court’s magistrate on Kheloui’s motion to disqualify Moon’s counsel. {¶9} On November 21, 2025, the magistrate filed an order finding that no evidence was adduced during the hearing that supported Kheloui’s motion to disqualify Attorney Arnold and, further, that the magistrate could determine no other basis to disqualify Attorney Arnold under the Rules of Professional -3- Case No. 14-26-04 Conduct. The magistrate therefore ordered that the motion to disqualify Arnold be overruled. On November 24, 2025, Kheloui filed an objection to the November 21, 2025 magistrate’s order. {¶10} On November 26, 2025, the trial court judge filed a judgment entry overruling Kheloui’s objections to the November 21, 2025 magistrate’s order and affirming the orders made therein. {¶11} On February 10, 2026, the trial court’s magistrate filed a decision and recommendations with regard to the pending Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. In that decision, after making findings of fact, the magistrate concluded that there was no basis upon which to grant the relief sought by Kheloui pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). The magistrate therefore recommended that Kheloui’s motion be overruled and that Moon’s motion to dismiss the 60(B) motion be granted. {¶12} On that same date, the trial court filed a judgment entry adopting the decision and recommendations of the magistrate and, in particular, overruling Kheloui’s motion for relief from judgment. {¶13} On February 23, 2026, Kheloui filed an objection to the February 10, 2026 magistrate’s report. {¶14} On March 23, 2026, the trial court filed a judgment entry reviewing Kheloui’s objections to the magistrate’s report and finding those objections to lack merit. Following that review, the trial court ordered that the February 10, 2026 -4- Case No. 14-26-04 magistrate’s report and recommendations be adopted as the final order of the trial court, and the trial court overruled Kheloui’s motion for relief from judgment. {¶15} On April 8, 2026, Kheloui filed this appeal, in which he has raised four assignments of error. First Assignment of Error The Trial Court denied Appellant a meaningful opportunity to present evidence, refused or failed to consider evidence contained in the record, and then relied upon the alleged absence of evidence to deny relief. Second Assignment of Error The Trial Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing despite the presentation of operative facts, documentary evidence, and identified witness testimony. Third Assignment of Error The Trial Court committed reversible error by applying the wrong legal standard to Appellant’s fraud-upon-the-court claim, thereby failing to address documented evidence that the June 27, 2024 uncontested divorce proceeding was procured through representations contradicted by the contemporaneous record. Fourth Assignment of Error The Trial Court erred by making multiple findings of fact directly contradicted by the record, mischaracterizing Appellant’s filings and objections, and preventing meaningful review of his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. -5- Case No. 14-26-04 Analysis of Assignments of Error {¶16} As a preliminary matter, relative to this Court’s review of all four assignments of error raised on appeal, we are mindful that Kheloui is a pro se litigant who has been representing himself in this case since the time of filing his motion, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), seeking to vacate the divorce decree, on August 5, 2025. Nevertheless, we note that a party proceeding pro se is held to the same standards as other litigants who have retained counsel. Henry v. Henry, 2012-Ohio-655, ¶ 29 (3d Dist.). “For this reason, pro se litigants ‘must comply with the rules of procedure and must accept the consequences of their own mistakes.’” Freytag v. Freytag, 2024-Ohio-2403, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.), citing Baker v. Mosler, 2013-Ohio-4976, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.), quoting Thrower v. Bolden, 2012-Ohio-3956, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). First Assignment of Error {¶17} In the first assignment of error, Kheloui argues that the trial court prejudicially erred in its handling of the evidentiary hearing on Kheloui’s motion to disqualify opposing counsel, attorney Kristin Arnold, from representing Moon in the case, and further that the trial court erred in overruling that motion. {¶18} With regard to that claim, the record reflects that on October 8, 2025, Kheloui filed a motion seeking to disqualify Arnold from acting as Moon’s attorney under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7, which provides – subject to enumerated exceptions – that “a lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a -6- Case No. 14-26-04 necessary witness[.]”. Kheloui’s motion to disqualify Arnold asserted that her law partner had previously represented Moon in the creation of a trust, which Kheloui alleged resulted in the concealment of funds inherited by Moon and the perpetration of fraud upon the court. {¶19} An evidentiary hearing was held on that motion on November 17, 2025, at which Kheloui represented himself and called Arnold to the stand as a witness. No other testimony was presented, and Kheloui offered no exhibits in evidence. As detailed above, that motion was subsequently overruled by the trial court. {¶20} On appeal, Kheloui asserts that the trial court, through its magistrate, denied him a meaningful opportunity to present evidence at the November 17, 2025 hearing, and further refused or failed to consider evidence contained in the record and then erroneously relied upon the alleged absence of evidence to deny the relief sought. {¶21} “It is well-established that ‘[a] trial court has the duty and responsibility to supervise the conduct of attorneys who appear before it.” Karaman v. Pickrel, 2008-Ohio-4139, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting 155 N. High, Ltd. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 423, 426 (1995). A trial court therefore possesses the “inherent authority” to dismiss or disqualify an attorney from representation in a case if the attorney “cannot, or will not, comply with the Code of Professional Responsibility when representing a client.” Mentor Lagoons, Inc. v. Rubin, 31 Ohio -7- Case No. 14-26-04 St.3d 256, 259 (1987). “However, because of the potential use of the advocate- witness rule for abuse, disqualification ‘is a drastic measure which should not be imposed unless absolutely necessary.’” Fordeley v. Fordeley, 2015-Ohio-2610, ¶ 25 (11th Dist.), quoting Waliszewski v. Caravona Builders, Inc., 127 Ohio App.3d 429, 433 (9th Dist. 1998). {¶22} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to disqualify counsel for an abuse of discretion. Lake Royale Landowners Ass’n v. Dengler, 2022-Ohio-2929, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.); Gisslen v. Gisslen, 2011-Ohio-3105, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), citing Carr v. Acacia Country Club, 2009-Ohio-628 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶23} In the instant case, contrary to Kheloui’s claims on appeal, the record – and, in particular, the transcript of the November 17, 2025 evidentiary hearing on the motion to disqualify Arnold – establishes that the trial court’s magistrate in no way deprived Kheloui of the opportunity to be fully heard on that motion. {¶24} Specifically, the transcript of the November 17, 2025 hearing reflects that the magistrate began that hearing by reviewing the procedural history of the case on the record and then noting that the matter before the court at that time was Kheloui’s motion to disqualify attorney Kristin Arnold from acting as Moon’s counsel. The magistrate also inquired of Kheloui about his decision to represent himself. The magistrate explained to Kheloui that a pro se litigant is held to the -8- Case No. 14-26-04 same standards as a licensed attorney when it comes to following the governing rules of procedure and evidence. The magistrate explained that it is rarely in a person’s best interest to represent themselves, but confirmed that Kheloui had the right to do so. In response, Kheloui stated that he had been unable to find a lawyer to take on the case and acknowledged that he wished to proceed pro se at the hearing. {¶25} The magistrate then indicated that Kheloui could call his first witness, and Kheloui called Arnold to the stand. After Arnold was sworn and seated as a witness, the magistrate instructed Kheloui that he could ask his questions of the witness. Kheloui then stated that he had “copies of evidence”. (Tr., 12). In response, the magistrate noted that he did not know what evidence Kheloui may have, and explained that the court had limited time for the hearing that day, due to getting a late start, for which the magistrate apologized. The magistrate told Kheloui that they would see how far they could get with the hearing, and the magistrate indicated a willingness to continue the matter if Kheloui needed more time to present his evidence. {¶26} Kheloui then began questioning Arnold on the witness stand, and Arnold answered all the initial questions asked of her. However, as the direct examination of Arnold continued, it became apparent that Kheloui’s questions related to the claims raised in his pending Civ.R. 60(B) motion to set aside the judgment of divorce, and not to the claims raised in the motion to disqualify Arnold. The magistrate explained to Kheloui that the court was willing to be more patient -9- Case No. 14-26-04 with pro se parties, but asked Kheloui to focus his questions on the issue of whether Arnold should be removed from the case. Kheloui however indicated that he wished to question Arnold about whether he had willingly agreed to the divorce, in response to which the magistrate again instructed Kheloui to focus his questions on the issues involved in the motion to disqualify Arnold. {¶27} Notwithstanding that instruction from the trial court, Kheloui proceeded to continue questioning Arnold about the divorce negotiations and the scheduling of the June 27, 2024 pretrial conference at which the divorce was ultimately resolved by agreement of the parties. After Kheloui asked Arnold numerous questions on those topics, all of which she answered without objection, an objection was finally lodged by Arnold’s counsel as to the relevance of Kheloui’s line of questioning. Counsel noted that Kheloui had alleged in his motion for disqualification that there was a conflict of interest of some type between Arnold’s law office and Kheloui, and that the motion alleged that Arnold was a potential witness. Counsel further noted that Kheloui had been asking questions at the hearing for 20 to 25 minutes, but had not asked any questions relating to the issues raised in the motion to disqualify Arnold. {¶28} In response to that objection, the magistrate again instructed Kheloui to ask questions focusing on the issues raised in the motion to disqualify Arnold. Kheloui resumed his direct examination of Arnold but continued to focus his -10- Case No. 14-26-04 questions entirely on the negotiations involved in the divorce settlement, and not on the issues relating to the motion seeking Arnold’s disqualification. {¶29} After Kheloui asked a number of additional questions based solely on that same line of questioning, all of which Arnold answered, the magistrate yet again told Kheloui to ask questions relating to the motion for disqualification, explaining that the hearing was his opportunity to present evidence on that motion. Kheloui again disregarded the magistrate’s instruction and continued to question Arnold about the divorce settlement negotiations. {¶30} After a number of additional questions about the divorce settlement negotiations were answered by Arnold, Kheloui finally shifted the focus of his questions to the issues raised in his motion to disqualify Arnold. At that time, after Arnold confirmed that her law firm is named Arnold & Arnold, Kheloui asked, “So does your firm maintain a Trust Division?”, in response to which Arnold answered, “Yes, we have an attorney in the practice that does estate planning.” (Tr., 35). Kheloui asked if Moon had hired Arnold’s firm “for his Trust”, and Arnold answered, “Yes, he did.” (Tr., 35-36). Kheloui then asked if the agreement between the trust division of Arnold’s firm and Moon was to create and provide legal services to the Moon Trust, and Arnold answered, “That is attorney/client privileged information.” (Tr., 36). {¶31} At that point, the magistrate asked Kheloui to explain the relevance of his question, and Kheloui stated that the relevance was that, while Arnold had been -11- Case No. 14-26-04 advocating for Moon in the divorce proceeding to get him a fair division of assets, her firm had created a trust for Moon involving the same assets at issue in the divorce. The magistrate explained to Kheloui that Arnold’s role in the divorce case was to advocate for Moon and that she did not have any obligation toward Kheloui in those circumstances. At that point, Kheloui suggested that Arnold had colluded with his own prior counsel in the case, in response to which the magistrate told Kheloui to go ahead with his questioning, stating, “We want you to present your evidence.” (Tr., 38). {¶32} Kheloui then stated, “Every time I go ahead to ask questions, I get stopped”, to which the magistrate replied: No, that is not true, Mr. Kheloui. If we listen to it, there are long periods of silence where we just sit and wait for you to ask the next question. I’m trying to be very patient about that. I want you to feel you’re being heard. So I’ll have to ask you to ask your next question. If you were an attorney, about two minutes ago, I would have said, please ask your next question or we’ll assume you are done. But I’m giving you that opportunity, sir. (Tr., 38-39). {¶33} Following that, Kheloui did not ask any additional questions of the witness, although the magistrate again invited Kheloui to resume his questioning, stating, “So do you have any other questions bearing on the legal basis for involuntarily removing an attorney from a case? Any other thing you want to ask Attorney Arnold?” (Tr., 40). In response to that, the transcript specifically reflects -12- Case No. 14-26-04 that there was another period of silence on the record. When Kheloui failed to respond, the magistrate said: And if you don’t ask a question, we are going to assume that you are done and I’ll ask you to be seated. We have got to move on, sir, please. I’m being very patient. (Tr., 40). {¶34} In response to that, Kheloui stated, “I am done.” (Tr., 40). The magistrate then asked Kheloui if he had any other witnesses on the issue before the court, and Kheloui said he did not. The presentation of evidence at the hearing was concluded after Arnold’s counsel waived cross-examination of Arnold and called no witnesses. The record reflects that at no time during the hearing did Kheloui attempt to have any exhibits identified, nor did he offer any exhibits for admission into evidence. {¶35} Upon that record, this Court finds no support for Kheloui’s argument on appeal that he was denied the opportunity to be heard on his motion to disqualify Arnold. {¶36} Similarly, we also find no merit with regard to Kheloui’s appellate claim that the trial court failed to consider evidence contained in the record and erroneously relied upon the alleged absence of evidence in denying the motion seeking Arnold’s removal from the case. -13- Case No. 14-26-04 {¶37} As noted above, Kheloui’s motion to disqualify Arnold from further representation of Moon was based on the allegation that Arnold should be disqualified under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7, which provides in relevant part: (a) A lawyer shall not act as an advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness unless one or more of the following applies: (1) the testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; (3) the disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client. (b) A lawyer may act as an advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness unless precluded from doing so by Rule 1.7 or 1.9. (Emphasis sic.) {¶38} As our judicial colleagues on the Fifth District Court of Appeals aptly explained in King v. Pattison, 2013-Ohio-4665 (5th Dist.): Under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7, a lawyer may be disqualified from representing his or her client only when it is likely the lawyer will be a “necessary” witness. A necessary witness under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 is one whose testimony must be admissible and unobtainable through other trial witnesses. Popa Land Co., Ltd v. Fragnoli, 9th Dist. Medina No. 08CA0062-M, 2009-Ohio-1299, ¶ 15. “Testimony may be relevant and even highly useful but still not strictly necessary. A finding of necessity takes into account such factors as the significance of the matters, weight of the testimony and availability of other evidence. * * * A party’s mere declaration of an intention to call opposing counsel as a witness is an insufficient basis for disqualification even if that counsel could give relevant testimony.” Akron v. Carter, 190 Ohio App.3d 420, 2010-Ohio-5462, -14- Case No. 14-26-04 942 N.E.2d 409, ¶19 (9th Dist.) quoting Puritas Metal Prods. Inc. v. Cole, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 07CA009255, 07CA009257, and 07CA009259, 2008-Ohio-4653, at ¶ 34 quoting Mettler v. Mettler (2007), 50 Conn.Supp. 357, 928 A.2d 631, 633. Id., at ¶ 17. {¶39} In the instant case, Khleoui’s motion to disqualify Moon’s attorney was overruled after the magistrate found that no evidence was adduced during the hearing that supported the motion to disqualify Attorney Arnold and, further, that the magistrate could find no other basis under the Rules of Professional Conduct upon which to disqualify Arnold. Upon review, we determine that those findings are fully supported by the record. {¶40} As detailed extensively, supra, Khleoui was given every opportunity to present evidence in support of his motion to remove Arnold from the case. At the November 17, 2025 hearing on that matter, the only evidence Kheloui actually put forth relative to the allegations in his motion was that contained in Arnold’s answers to two or three questions about her law firm and whether the firm had done some estate planning work for Moon. That evidence established only that Arnold’s firm includes an attorney who handles estate planning and that Moon had previously hired Arnold’s firm to do some work relating to a trust. Kheloui presented no evidence tending to establish under Prof.Cond.R. 3.7 that Arnold was a necessary witness in the instant case as a result of the prior legal work done by her firm for Moon nor, as the magistrate found, was there any evidence presented tending to -15- Case No. 14-26-04 establish that Arnold should be disqualified under any other of the Professional Rules of Conduct governing attorneys in Ohio. {¶41} Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Kheloui’s motion to disqualify Arnold. {¶42} The first assignment of error is overruled. Second, Third, and Fourth Assignments of Error {¶43} In the remaining three assignments of error, which this Court shall collectively address, Kheloui asserts that the trial court erred for various reasons in denying his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and in failing to hold a hearing on that motion prior to overruling it. {¶44} With regard to those claims, the trial court record reflects that Kheloui filed a complaint for divorce from Moon on February 13, 2024. Following several months of pretrial proceedings, an agreed judgment entry decree of divorce was then filed in the trial court on September 4, 2024. Specifically, that judgment entry reflects that on June 27, 2024, the case came before the trial court and the parties then reached a full agreement on all matters relating to the pending divorce action. The September 4, 2024 divorce decree further reflects that, at the June 27, 2024 hearing, the parties – who were both represented by counsel – acknowledged under oath to the trial court that the terms and conditions of the agreed decree of divorce were fair and equitable, and also that the parties subsequently signed the agreed judgment entry knowingly and voluntarily. The agreed judgment entry then -16- Case No. 14-26-04 goes on to recite the financial settlement reached by the parties, and further reflects the division of personal property to which the parties had agreed. Upon the terms and conditions set forth therein, the September 4, 2024 agreed judgment entry then orders that the parties’ marriage be terminated as of the filing date of that agreed divorce decree. {¶45} No appeal was taken following the agreed decree of divorce having been granted to the parties on September 4, 2024. {¶46} On August 5, 2025, eleven months after the divorce was final, Kheloui filed a pro se motion to vacate the divorce decree, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). On that same date, Kheloui filed a motion requesting a hearing on his Civ.R. 60(B) motion. On August 11, 2025, Kheloui filed a supplement to his Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and, under separate cover, a notice of filing supplemental documents in support of the motion to vacate the judgment of divorce. {¶47} On February 10, 2026, the trial court’s magistrate filed a decision and recommendations with regard to the Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment. In that decision, after making findings of fact, the magistrate concluded that there was no basis upon which to grant the relief sought by Kheloui pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). The magistrate therefore recommended that Kheloui’s motion be overruled and that Moon’s motion to dismiss the 60(B) motion be granted. -17- Case No. 14-26-04 {¶48} On that same date, the trial court filed a judgment entry adopting the decision and recommendations of the magistrate and, in particular, overruling Kheloui’s motion for relief from judgment. {¶49} On February 23, 2026, Kheloui filed an objection to the February 10, 2026 magistrate’s report. {¶50} On March 23, 2026, the trial court filed a judgment entry reviewing Kheloui’s objections to the magistrate’s report and finding those objections to lack merit. Following that review, the trial court ordered that the February 10, 2026 magistrate’s report and recommendations be adopted as the final order of the trial court, and the trial court overruled Kheloui’s motion for relief from judgment. {¶51} On appeal, as previously noted, Kheloui argues that the trial court erred in overruling the Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment and in doing so without holding a hearing thereon. {¶52} “Civ.R. 60(B) provides litigants with a vehicle to seek relief from a judgment.” Feasby v. Garza, 2025-Ohio-5786, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), citing Wank v. Wank, 2015-Ohio-3094, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.). Specifically, Civ.R. 60(B) states: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; -18- Case No. 14-26-04 (2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) The judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (5) Any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (B) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules. {¶53} Thus, “[t]he rule provides five potential grounds for relief which may be paraphrased as follows: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) that the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; or (5) any other reason justifying relief. Feasby, supra, at ¶ 10, citing American Business Mortg. Servs. v. Barclay, 2006-Ohio-2532, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.). “The fifth ground listed is a ‘catchall’ provision that is applicable in extraordinary or unusual circumstances in which the movant establishes that substantial grounds warrant relief from the judgment.” Feasby, ¶ 10, citing Souders v. United States Bank N.A., 2023-Ohio-4709, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.). -19- Case No. 14-26-04 {¶54} To prevail on a motion for relief from judgment, the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2) or (3), not more than one year after the judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, paragraph two of the syllabus (1976). The failure to establish any one of those three prongs means that the movant cannot prevail on the Civ.R. 60(B) motion. United Bank v. Lemon, 2018-Ohio-634, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). {¶55} “‘If the movant files a motion for relief from judgment and it contains allegations of operative facts which would warrant relief under Civil Rule 60(B), the trial court should grant a hearing to take evidence and verify these facts before it rules on the motion.’” Kay v. Glassman, 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 19 (1996), quoting Coulson v. Coulson (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 12, 16 (1983). {¶56} A Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that court’s ruling on the motion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Echemann v. Echemann, 2018-Ohio-1441, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.). An abuse of discretion is more than an error in law or judgment and implies that the court’s attitude was unreasonable, -20- Case No. 14-26-04 arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). {¶57} Finally, we note that “Civ.R. 60(B) exists to resolve injustices that are so great that they demand a departure from the strict constraints of res judicata.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 15. “However, ‘public policy favors the finality of judgments * * * .’” Feasby, supra, at ¶ 11, quoting Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Collins, 2021-Ohio-508, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). There is a “firm and long-standing principle that final judgments are meant to be just that – final.” Ohio Pyro, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 2007-Ohio-5024, ¶ 22. Therefore, challenges to final judgments, other than through the appeal process, are disfavored and will succeed only in very limited situations. Id. {¶58} In the instant case, the Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment filed by Kheloui on August 5, 2025 was 134 pages in length and contained an extensive argument, at times rambling and repetitive, as to why Kheloui believed the September 4, 2024 agreed judgment of divorce should be vacated. {¶59} While Kheloui’s motion asserted that it was being filed pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), (3), (4), and (5), a review of the motion reflects – with one exception – that the motion was actually based entirely on various allegations of neglect, incompetence, or misconduct on the part of Kheloui’s own attorney during the divorce proceedings. More specifically, the motion was based on claims that -21- Case No. 14-26-04 Kheloui’s counsel rendered bad legal advice and caused Kheloui to believe that he had no choice but to settle the case on the terms proposed. {¶60} We note that many of the claims asserted by Kheloui relating to the performance of his counsel in the divorce settlement proceedings are directly refuted by the representations and findings set forth in the September 4, 2024 agreed judgment entry of divorce itself, which Kehloui does not dispute having signed. More importantly, it has long been held that the remedy for alleged attorney incompetence or misconduct is an action for malpractice, and Civil Rule 60(B) is not to be used as a substitute for a malpractice action. See, e.g., GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, paragraph four of the syllabus (1976); Cornett v. Cornett, 2016-Ohio-7902 (2d Dist.); Keen v. Keen, 2025-Ohio- 5810 (5th Dist.). {¶61} In the Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, Kheloui did raise an additional claim of fraud, characterized as being based on “newly discovered evidence”, in which it was asserted that financial records discovered by Kheloui after the divorce was final tended to reflect that Moon had misrepresented his financial assets in the divorce proceedings. However, the representations made by Kheloui in his motion seeking relief from judgment also clearly reflected that Kheloui himself had possession of, and access to, the financial records at issue at or near the time the divorce complaint was filed, well before the case was settled by -22- Case No. 14-26-04 agreement. For that reason, Kheloui’s claim of fraud on the part of the adverse party, based on newly discovered evidence, lacked merit. {¶62} On appeal, Kheloui also asserts that his motion for relief from judgment should have been granted pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5) on the basis of fraud having been perpetrated upon the trial court. While not clearly delineated as such in his Civ.R. 60(B) motion, Kheloui’s appellate argument in that regard is based on the fact that, on June 18, 2024, following several months of pretrial proceedings in the pending divorce case, the trial court filed an assignment notice reflecting that, upon the agreement of counsel, the court was scheduling a “pretrial/uncontested divorce” for June 27, 2024. (Notice of Hearing, Docket No. 23). As previously noted, the record reflects that it was at the June 27, 2024 pretrial that the parties then reached a full agreement on all matters relating to the pending divorce action, an agreement that was subsequently memorialized in the agreed judgment entry decree of divorce filed by the trial court on September 4, 2024. However, because the June 18, 2024 assignment notice termed the matter set for June 27, 2024 as a “pretrial/uncontested divorce”, and because an agreement settling the divorce was not reached prior to the June 27, 2024 pretrial, but rather at the time of the June 27th pretrial, Kheloui has seized upon the term “uncontested divorce” used by the trial court in the assignment notice as proof that the attorneys for both parties perpetrated a fraud on the trial court by representing to the court that the divorce was no longer contested as of June 18, 2024. -23- Case No. 14-26-04 {¶63} Upon review, we find that this particular argument raised by Kheloui in support of his Civ.R. 60(B)(5) claim lacks merit. On the record of this case, it is clear to this Court that the June 18, 2024 assignment notice filed by the trial court served, at the request of counsel, to set a pretrial in the case at which it was possible that the divorce action might be settled, but did not – as Kheloui interprets it – reflect that the attorneys had firmly, or fraudulently, represented to the trial court that the divorce had already been settled. {¶64} As the trial court’s magistrate attempted to explain to Kheloui at the November 17, 2025 hearing on the motion to disqualify Moon’s counsel, when Kheloui’s direct examination of Attorney Arnold focused on questions about the scheduling of that June 27, 2024 pretrial: There was on June 18 an assignment was put on, upon agreement of the Counsel, it is hereby ordered that a further pretrial/uncontested divorce is scheduled for June 27, 2024 at 11:30 a.m. And that pretrial/uncontested means that the Court thought there was – it was moving toward a resolution. We wanted to be prepared if there was a resolution to finalize it. And that is what happened. So there is nothing unusual about that. That happens very often, Mr. Kheloui, that we do that kind of thing. *** [I]f I had been assured it was settled, we would have simply set it for an uncontested hearing. Because the assignment says pretrial/uncontested hearing * * * [t]hat leads me to believe I was not positive it was going to settle. And if it didn’t, we’d just go to a pretrial. (Tr., 23-24). -24- Case No. 14-26-04 {¶65} In sum, as to the claims raised on appeal in the second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Kheloui failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief from judgment for any of the reasons set forth in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5). The August 5, 2025 motion filed by Kheloui seeking to vacate the divorce decree, as well as the August 11, 2025 supplemental filings to that Civ.R. 60(B) motion, did not set forth sufficient operative facts entitling Kheloui to a hearing on his motion, much less entitling him to relief from the final judgment of divorce previously entered in this case. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kheloui’s motion for relief from judgment, nor in doing so without holding a hearing thereon. {¶66} The second, third, and fourth assignments of error are overruled. Conclusion {¶67} Having found no error in the particulars assigned and argued by the plaintiff-