State v. Bradley

[Cite as State v. Bradley, 2026-Ohio-3786.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF WAYNE ) STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 25AP0025 Appellee v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE PAUL BRADLEY WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO Appellant CASE No. 2024 CR-B 000415 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: September 28, 2026 FLAGG LANZINGER, Judge. {¶1} Appellant Paul Bradley appeals his convictions for obstructing official business and resisting arrest in the Wayne County Municipal Court. This Court affirms. I. {¶2} The State filed a complaint against Bradley charging him with one count of obstructing official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31(A), a misdemeanor of the second degree and one count of resisting arrest in violation of R.C. 2921.33(A), a misdemeanor of the second degree. The complaint stemmed from an incident that occurred when officers from the Rittman Police Department executed a warrant for Bradley’s arrest. {¶3} The matter proceeded to a jury trial. The State presented testimony from Officer Hunter and Officer Colter of the Rittman Police Department. The State also presented footage from Officer Hunter’s body camera, which was later admitted as evidence. Bradley testified on his own behalf.  2 {¶4} The Wayne County Municipal Court had issued a warrant for Bradley’s arrest for failure to appear for court. Officer Hunter testified that he and Officer Colter executed the warrant for Bradley’s arrest at Bradley’s known address. Officer Hunter testified he confirmed the warrant prior to arrival at Bradley’s address. Officer Hunter verified Bradley’s physical description and viewed a photograph of him. Upon arrival at Bradley’s address, Officer Colter knocked on the front door of the house and Officer Hunter proceeded to the back of the house. Officer Hunter testified he could hear a radio on in the garage and could smell an odor of burnt marijuana. Upon approaching the open garage door, Officer Hunter observed Bradley inside and asked him to step out. Officer Hunter explained to Bradley that there was a warrant for his arrest. {¶5} The State played Officer Hunter’s body-camera footage for the jury. The video shows that Officer Hunter informed Bradley of the warrant and he asked Bradley to step out of the garage. Bradley moved to the entrance of the garage and told Officer Hunter he needed to use the restroom. He instructed Officer Hunter to leave his card, and that “a representative would get back to [him].” Bradley then questioned whether the warrant was “for the dog ticket?” Officer Hunter asked Bradley to walk to his cruiser while he verified the warrant. Bradley responded by stating, “The thing is, it’s for a dog ticket.” {¶6} Bradley then told Officer Hunter, “You guys can’t just walk up here on an open door like that.” Officer Hunter again explained that Bradley had a warrant. Bradley replied that he did not care and stated he did not have to engage with the officers. Bradley told Officer Hunter, “Dude, you make me want to shut this door on your face and . . . put you on the evening news or something.” Bradley attempted to close the garage door, but the door did not move far. Officer Hunter testified that Officer Colter prevented Bradley from closing the garage door and continued to hold the door open.  3 {¶7} Officer Hunter again explained to Bradley that he had a warrant, to which Bradley replied, “I’m not going anywhere.” Officer Hunter advised Bradley that if he refused to comply, he would charge Bradley with obstructing. Officer Hunter told Bradley several times thereafter that he was under arrest. Bradley responded by saying he would “go in on [his] own time.” At that point, Officer Hunter again told Bradley he was under arrest and attempted to grab Bradley’s arm. Bradley pulled away. Bradley exited the garage and moved to a side yard. As Bradley moved to the yard, Officer Hunter told Bradley to put his hands behind his back several times. Bradley responded by saying, “Don’t . . . touch me.” Officer Hunter again told Bradley to put his hands behind his back and Bradley replied, “no.” Officer Hunter then grabbed Bradley’s arm. Bradley pulled free and continued to walk away. Officer Hunter advised Bradley that he would charge him with resisting arrest if he continued to resist. Both officers then attempted to place Bradley under arrest, but he again pulled away. Officer Hunter then tried to stun Bradley with his taser. Bradley then ran toward the street. {¶8} Upon reaching the edge of the yard, Bradley stopped and placed his hands behind his back. Officer Hunter told Bradley to get on the ground several times. Bradley did not comply. Bradley continued to walk away from the officers with his hands behind his back. The officers again attempted to place Bradley in handcuffs and were successful. Officer Hunter testified that based on his experience, he believed Bradley’s actions delayed him in performing his duties. {¶9} Officer Colter’s testimony largely corroborated Officer Hunter’s testimony. Officer Colter testified that at the time of the incident, he and Officer Hunter were executing a warrant for Bradley’s arrest. He stated that Officer Hunter advised Bradley they were there to execute a warrant for Bradley’s arrest. Officer Colter testified Bradley attempted to close the garage door on the officers, but that he held the door open. Officer Colter stated that Bradley was  4 “combative,” and that he “attempted to grab [Bradley’s] right arm as [officers] were trying to put him in cuffs. He resisted, he out powered both of us. We gave him several commands to stop and get on the ground, which he proceeded not to, towards the sidewalk of the residence.” {¶10} Bradley testified on his own behalf. Relevant to this appeal, Bradley testified that he had no reason to believe there was a warrant for his arrest. He stated that he was never served with the underlying complaint and/or given notice of a pending court date. Bradley stated he believed the incident was part of a conspiracy against him. The trial court admitted the complaint as evidence. {¶11} Following the trial, the jury found Bradley guilty of both counts. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a fine of $100.00 plus court costs on the charge of obstructing official business and a fine of $150.00 plus court costs on the charge of resisting arrest. The trial court also sentenced Bradley to 30 days in jail on the charge of resisting arrest. The trial court stayed Bradley’s sentence pending appeal. {¶12} Bradley appeals, raising three assignments of error. For ease of analysis, we combine Bradley’s first and second assignments of error. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I MR. BRADLEY’S CONVICTIONS FOR OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS AND RESISTING ARREST ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGALLY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND MUST BE VACATED. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE JURY’S VERDICT FINDING MR. BRADLEY GUILTY OF RESISTING ARREST WAS BASED ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND [WAS] AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.  5 {¶13} In his first assignment of error, Bradley states his convictions for obstructing official business and resisting arrest were based on insufficient evidence. However, the argument within the body of his first assignment of error focuses entirely on his conviction for obstructing official business. In his second assignment of error, Bradley again contends his conviction for resisting arrest was based on insufficient evidence and raises the additional argument that his conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We overrule both assignments of error. {¶14} Concerning Bradley’s second assignment of error, we recognize that “a review of the sufficiency of the evidence and a review of the manifest weight of the evidence are separate and legally distinct determinations.” State v. Seibert, 2021-Ohio-3069, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Vicente-Colon, 2010-Ohio-6242, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.). “[I]t is not appropriate to combine a sufficiency argument and a manifest weight argument within a single assignment of error.” State v. Mukha, 2018-Ohio-4918, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.); see Loc.R. 16(B)(7) (“Each assignment of error shall be separately discussed . . . .”); App.R. 12(A)(2) (“The court may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the party raising it fails to . . . argue the assignment separately in the brief[.]”). Nonetheless, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of Bradley’s combined assignment of error. A. Bradley’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. {¶15} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the prosecution has met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Thompkins at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this Court must view the  6 evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to reasonably conclude that the State proved the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The trier of fact is entitled to rely on direct, as well as circumstantial evidence. See id. Obstructing Official Business {¶16} R.C. 2921.31(A) governs obstructing official business and provides, No person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public official’s capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in the performance of the public official’s lawful duties. “A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” R.C. 2901.22(A). “Purpose can be established by circumstantial evidence and may be ascertained from the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.” State v. Moss, 2018-Ohio-4747, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting North Ridgeville v. Reichbaum, 112 Ohio App.3d 79, 85 (9th Dist. 1996). “Law enforcement officers are considered public officials.” State v. Zupancic, 2021-Ohio-1448, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), citing R.C. 2921.01(A). {¶17} Concerning his conviction for obstructing official business, Bradley argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish an affirmative act that hampered or impeded the officers. This Court has held that “[a]n affirmative act is required in order to support a finding that an individual was guilty of obstructing official business.” State v. Harris, 2015-Ohio-5378, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting Reichbaum at 84. Although the mere failure to obey a law enforcement officer’s request may not amount to obstruction, “failing to comply with an officer’s order may  7 constitute obstruction under some circumstances.” State v. Mauricio, 2025-Ohio-5088, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Keagle, 2019-Ohio-3975, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.). “[A] suspect may indeed obstruct official business when he creates a significant delay by ignoring an officer’s repeated orders, thereby impeding the officer’s ability to perform his lawful duties.” Mauricio at ¶ 7, quoting Seibert, 2021-Ohio-3069, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.). {¶18} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of obstructing official business proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, both officers testified they were executing a warrant for Bradley’s arrest at the time of the incident. Both officers testified they informed Bradley he had a warrant for his arrest, asked him to step out of the garage, and that Bradley refused to do so. Both officers testified Bradley attempted to close the garage door after he was informed about the warrant and that Bradley pulled away from them after they informed him he was being placed under arrest. Both officers also testified that Bradley continued to walk away from officers despite repeated commands to stop. A rational trier of fact could have reasonably concluded that Bradley’s actions in attempting to close the garage door on the officers, pulling away from the officers, and subsequently walking away from the officers constituted an affirmative act with the purpose to impede the officers in their duty to execute the arrest warrant. See R.C. 2921.31(A); see also State v. Mattle, 2023-Ohio-1352, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.) citing State v. Johnson, 2014-Ohio-2856, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.) (“This Court has noted that attempting to flee can amount to obstructing official business.”); Seibert at ¶ 36 (holding that sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction for obstructing official business where officers told the defendant he was under arrest, but he refused to comply); Mauricio at ¶ 11 (holding that sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction for obstructing official business where the defendant refused to give his identification  8 and walked away from a police officer on multiple occasions, thereby impeding the officer’s investigation). Resisting Arrest {¶19} R.C. 2921.33(A) governs resisting arrest and provides, “[n]o person, recklessly or by force, shall resist or interfere with a lawful arrest of the person or another.” “‘Force’ means any violence, compulsion, or constraint physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” R.C. 2901.01(A)(1). A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist. R.C. 2901.22(C). {¶20} Bradley contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he used force or acted recklessly against the officers because “pulling away instinctively when grabbed, followed by voluntary movement toward the police vehicle, does not rise to the level of ‘force’ or ‘recklessness’ required for a criminal conviction. However, “the act of pulling away from an officer during the process of an arrest satisfies the force element of resisting arrest.” State v. Jester, 2026-Ohio-1542, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.), citing State v. Kornilov, 2012-Ohio-6218, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.). “[D]elaying an arrest by preventing the seizure or detention of a person may constitute resisting arrest because it constitutes reckless resistance. By committing an act giving rise to the delay, a person may be proceeding with heedless indifference to the consequences and disregarding a known risk that his conduct will prevent arrest.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Hicks, 2011- Ohio-2769, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.).  9 {¶21} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of resisting arrest proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Both officers testified that they attempted to place Bradley under arrest twice, but that Bradley over- powered them and pulled away. See Jester at ¶ 29, citing Kornilov at ¶ 31 (“[T]he act of pulling away from an officer during the process of an arrest satisfies the force element of resisting arrest.”). Additionally, Bradley continued to move away from the officers after officers told him several times he was under arrest. See Hicks at ¶ 19 (“[D]elaying an arrest by preventing the seizure or detention of a person may constitute resisting arrest because it constitutes reckless resistance.”). B. Bradley’s conviction for resisting arrest was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶22} “[W]hen considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is required to consider the entire record, ‘weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Seibert, 2021-Ohio-3069, at ¶ 15 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). “A reversal on this basis is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” State v. Croghan, 2019-Ohio-3970, ¶ 26 (9th Dist.). {¶23} On appeal, Bradley asserts his conviction for resisting arrest is against the manifest weight of the evidence because he contested the validity and service of the complaint underlying the warrant. Bradley appears to assert his arrest was not lawful. {¶24} “A lawful arrest is an essential element of the crime of resisting arrest.” State v. Vactor, 2003-Ohio-7195, ¶ 34 (9th Dist.). “‘An arrest is ‘lawful’ if the surrounding circumstances would give a reasonable police officer cause to believe that an offense has been or is being  10 committed.’” State v. Wigle, 2011-Ohio-6239, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Sansalone, 71 Ohio App.3d 284, 285-286 (1st Dist. 1991). “The state need not prove that the defendant was in fact guilty of the offense for which the arrest was based when proving the element of lawful arrest.” Vactor at ¶ 34. {¶25} Upon review, we conclude Bradley has not shown that the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding him guilty of resisting arrest. Contrary to Bradley’s assertion on appeal, Bradley did not contest the existence or the validity of the warrant during trial. Rather, Bradley testified that he was never served with the underlying complaint and/or given notice of pending court date. However, a review of the complaint shows the issuing officer indicated Bradley “Refused” to acknowledge receipt of the citation. In resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Bradley refused to acknowledge receipt of the citation. The jury was able to observe Bradley’s testimony and was in the best position to evaluate his credibility. The jury was free to believe, all, none, or part of Bradley’s testimony. State v. Yost, 2024-Ohio-545, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). Bradley has not shown this is the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against his conviction for resisting arrest. Croghan, 2019-Ohio-3970, at ¶ 26. {¶26} Bradley’s first and second assignments of error are overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MERGE [BRADLEY]’S CONVICTIONS FOR OBSTRUCTING OFFICIAL BUSINESS AND RESISTING ARREST AS THEY ARE ALLIED OFFENSES OF SIMILAR IMPORT UNDER R.C. 2941.25. {¶27} In his third assignment of error, Bradley contends the trial court erred when it failed to merge his convictions for obstructing official business and resisting arrest. We reject his argument.  11 {¶28} “An accused’s failure to raise the issue of allied offenses of similar import in the trial court forfeits all but plain error . . . .” State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 3. A forfeited error will result in a reversal only if it “affected the outcome of the proceeding and reversal is necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. A defendant who forfeits an allied offense argument “has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions are for allied offenses of similar import committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus . . . .” Id. This Court will not develop a plain error argument on an appellant’s behalf. State v. Clark, 2021-Ohio-3397, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.). {¶29} The record reflects that Bradley did not raise an allied offense argument at sentencing. Nor has Bradley argued plain error on appeal. “This Court will not develop [a plain error argument] for him as it is his burden on appeal to demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability’ that his convictions are in fact for allied offenses.” Id. at ¶ 20, quoting Rogers at ¶ 3. {¶30} Bradley’s third assignment of error is overruled. III. {¶31} Bradley’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Wayne County Municipal Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.  12 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT HENSAL, P. J. STEVENSON, J. CONCUR. APPEARANCES: YU KIM-REYNOLDS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. ANGELA WYPASEK, Prosecuting Attorney, and MICHAEL J. DEFIBAUGH, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.