Ross v. Ross

[Cite as Ross v. Ross, 2026-Ohio-3482.] IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LICKING COUNTY, OHIO JUSTIN R. ROSS Case No. 2026 CA 00005 Petitioner - Appellee Opinion And Judgment Entry Appeal from the Licking County Court of -vs- Common Pleas, Case No. 25 CV 00615 VANESSA L. ROSS Judgment: Affirmed Date of Judgment Entry: September 3, 2026 Respondent - Appellant BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Robert G. Montgomery, and Kevin W. Popham, Judges APPEARANCES: No appearance for Petitioner-Appellee; Vanessa L. Ross, Pro Se, for Respondent-Appellant OPINION Popham, J., {¶1} Respondent-appellant Vanessa Ross (“Appellant”) appeals the December 24, 2025, judgment entry of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, overruling her objections to the magistrate’s decision. Petitioner-appellee is Justin Ross (“Appellee”). For the reasons below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. Facts & Procedural History {¶2} Appellant is Appellee’s former sister-in-law. Appellant and Appellee’s brother have three children together and are now divorced. Appellee is a pastor. During her 2001 divorce from her husband, Appellant sought financial assistance from Appellee, who declined the financial request. Appellee then asked Appellant to refrain from contacting him and his family. Appellant complied with that request until 2024. {¶3} On October 30, 2024, Appellant began posting on social media videos concerning Appellee and his family. Initially, Appellee filed a report with the Licking County Sheriff’s Office, asking that law enforcement inform Appellant that she was not permitted to trespass at Appellee’s church. However, Appellant continued posting videos to social media sites. On Apil 21, 2025, Appellee filed a petition for a civil stalking protection order (“CSPO”) against Appellant. The trial court granted an ex parte CSPO that same day. {¶4} On April 30, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the petition. Appellee testified that the incidents occurred between October 30, 2024, and December 9, 2024, and involved numerous Appellant-posted videos that Appellee perceived as threatening to himself and his family. Appellee identified Appellant as the person appearing in the videos and testified that they were publicly posted on TikTok and/or Facebook. Appellee introduced the videos into evidence, played them at the hearing, and identified the statements that caused him to believe that Appellant would cause him physical harm or mental distress. Those statements included: “Justin, honey, apparently you didn’t know that I do too (go for the throat). You should have thought twice about that before you turned your back on me and my children, because, once I re-emerged, WHEW, talk about a volcano explosion! Bet you didn’t see this coming, did you?” “I am so pissed off at the two of you, it makes me want to come in there and flip the tables in your church and go to jail just for the fuck of it because it would be worth it.”  “You just never know what you’re going to get with me – I hope you two know that.” “You can trespass me from your church, but you don’t have any clue how many other cards I have up my sleeve – I might know some people who can hack into your livestream.” After stating she thinks she is going to be “showing up at church,” states, “the clock is ticking.” “If you come at me with some smirky ass shit like you did in 2021, I just might come through that computer screen and knock that joker smile off your face. I think you, Mr. Justin Ross, met your match when you met me.” {¶5} In another video, Appellant explained that, in addition to fighting her ex- husband, “I am fighting you two too. In case you haven’t noticed, it pushes me to a mental breaking point.” When discussing Appellee’s church, Appellant stated, “I ain’t got nothing to lose, take me to court, dare you, let’s go.” Speaking to Appellee and his wife, Appellant stated, “Do you want to play games here? I don’t know how much more off the deep end I need to go to get your attention, but I am not beyond being parked outside of your church on a Sunday.” {¶6} Appellant also explained in a video that she created brochures about Appellee and his family and intended to distribute them to Appellee’s church members and the community unless Appellee gave her money. Appellant was shown sitting at a desk with a stack of brochures. She also stated, “I actually have considered paying someone to come to your church and pass out brochures to everyone in your congregation – you just never know.”  {¶7} Appellee testified that he is in imminent fear for himself and his family. He is particularly concerned about Appellant’s obsessive behavior because he had no contact with her for approximately four years, and she then suddenly began repeatedly posting online about him and his family. Appellee believes Appellant is mentally unstable and unpredictable. {¶8} Appellee testified that Appellant’s threats to show up at his neighborhood, church, and community caused him significant anxiety. He was afraid to go to the grocery store, hired additional special-duty officers for security at his church, and sought counseling with his wife because of Appellant’s conduct. Appellee participated in twelve hours of counseling to address the stress caused by Appellant’s harassment. Appellee testified that Appellant’s conduct affected his marriage, family, and ministry. {¶9} On cross-examination, Appellee acknowledged that Appellant had not actually gone to his home or church. He maintained, however, that he believed her threats to do so were serious. {¶10} Appellant testified that she never threatened Appellee with physical harm. She admitted making the videos and acknowledged that they were “made to the family, as a whole, including Petitioner.” Appellant explained that she was grieving her grandmother’s death when she made the videos. She stated that, while “going through her grief,” she was “lashing out at [Appellee’s] family” because she believes the family had not done enough to help her. {¶11} Appellant testified that if Appellee was upset by the videos, he simply should not watch them. She characterized the videos as “expressions of feelings” that she would never actually act upon.  {¶12} Appellant also stated that Appellee’s brother was not paying child support and that she believed Appellee refused to acknowledge that his brother was an alcoholic. When asked whether her ex-husband was afraid of her, Appellant stated, “[n]o, my ex-husband and I have been involved for the last year after our divorce up until I started going after the family on social media for their covering up, condoning, and enabling the disease of alcoholism and lack of support by my ex-husband to my children.” {¶13} On May 12, 2025, the magistrate issued a CSPO effective until April 21, 2030. The magistrate found that Appellant began posting on social media in November of 2024, renewing her previous request for financial support and threatening to shame and harass Appellee and his family if her demands were not met. Further, between November and December of 2024, Appellant published dozens of videos expressing her anger and rage toward Appellee and his family for failing to provide her financial support. The magistrate found that Appellant specifically referenced Appellee, his wife, and his church by name in the videos. {¶14} The magistrate further found that Appellant referred to Appellee as “Pastor Justin” and made statements such as, “I am not beyond being parked outside your church on a Sunday” and “the more pissed off I find myself with the two of you, it makes me want to come in there and flip the tables in your church and go to jail for the fuck of it because it would be worth it.” The magistrate described Appellant’s tone as aggressive and erratic and noted that Appellant had been trespassed from Appellee’s church in December of 2024. The magistrate also found that Appellant created brochures about Appellee and his family with the intention of distributing them unless Appellee gave her money and that she stated, “the clock is ticking” and “time is running out” to meet her demands.  {¶15} The magistrate found that Appellee hired additional security to protect himself and his family and sought mental-health counseling. The magistrate also found that Appellant admitted making the statements in the videos and publishing them with the intent of getting the attention of Appellee and his wife. Appellant explained that Appellee’s refusal to provide her with financial support caused her to feel slighted and angry and acknowledged that she had ongoing mental health issues. {¶16} The magistrate concluded that Appellant’s continued and escalating conduct, coupled with her mental instability, caused Appellee to believe that Appellant would act on her threats. The magistrate further concluded that Appellee presented competent and credible evidence establishing that Appellant knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused Appellee and his wife to suffer mental distress and fear of future mental distress. The magistrate determined, however, that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Appellant engaged in menacing by stalking of Appellee’s children. {¶17} On May 16, 2025, Appellant filed initial objections to the magistrate’s decision, and on September 26, 2025, she filed supplemental objections. {¶18} On December 24, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry overruling Appellant’s objections and adopting the magistrate’s decision granting the CSPO. The trial court found sufficient credible evidence supported the issuance of the CSPO and that Appellee’s testimony established that Appellant engaged in a pattern of conduct causing him to believe she would cause him mental distress, pursuant to R.C. 2903.211(A). Specifically, the court found that Appellant posted numerous videos to TikTok and/or Facebook over a two-to-three-month period in which she threatened to expose Appellee. The court found that this conduct caused Appellee mental distress, as demonstrated by his testimony that he contacted law enforcement and sought counseling. {¶19} The trial court also addressed Appellant’s objections to the video evidence. Appellant argued that the videos were irrelevant, unauthenticated, and lacked a proper foundation. The trial court concluded that Appellee’s testimony properly authenticated the videos and established the necessary foundation for their admission. The court further found the videos relevant because they demonstrated Appellant’s statements and actions and supported the finding that she engaged in a pattern of conduct. {¶20} Appellant appeals the December 24, 2025, judgment entry of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas and assigns the following as error: “I. The trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence to support the issuance of a civil protection order.” “II. The trial court improperly admitted unauthenticated video evidence.” “III. The trial court misapplied the statutory ‘pattern of conduct’ requirement.” “IV. The trial court failed to independently analyze appellant’s objections as required by Civil Rule 53.” Standard of Review & CSPO {¶21} The decision whether to grant a civil protection order lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Singhaus v. Zumbar, 2015-Ohio-4755, ¶ 12 (5th Dist.). In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must find the trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).  {¶22} A reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court where there exists some competent and credible evidence supporting the judgment rendered by the trial court. Swartz v. Van Deest, 2023-Ohio-1882, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.), citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179. The weight to be given to the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are issues for the trier of fact. State v. Jamison, 49 Ohio St. 3d 182 (1990). The trier of fact “has the best opportunity to view the demeanor, attitude, and credibility of each witness, something that does not translate well on the written page.” Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 418 (1997). {¶23} R.C. 2903.214 governs the issuance of a protection order and provides, in pertinent part: (C) A person may seek relief under this section for the person, or any parent or adult household member may seek relief under this section on behalf of any other family or household member, by filing a petition with the court. The petition shall contain or state all of the following: (1) An allegation that the respondent is eighteen years of age or older and engaged in a violation of section 2903.211 of the Revised Code against the person to be protected by the protection order … including a description of the nature and extent of the violation. R.C. 2903.214(C)(1). {¶24} “To be entitled to a civil stalking protection order, the petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent engaged in menacing by stalking, a violation of R.C. 2903.211, against the person seeking the order.” Tumblin v. Jackson, 2006- Ohio-3270, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.). A preponderance of the evidence “means the greater weight of evidence … or evidence that leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” State v. Stumpf, 32 Ohio St.3d 95, 102 (1987). Therefore, “[w]hen assessing whether a civil stalking protection order should have been issued, the reviewing court must determine whether there was sufficient credible evidence to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner was entitled to relief.” Fouch v. Pennington, 2012-Ohio-3536, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.). {¶25} R.C. 2903.211(A) proscribes “menacing by stalking” and provides: (A)(1) No person by engaging in a pattern of conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or a family or household member of the other person or cause mental distress to the other person or a family or household member of the other person. In addition to any other basis for the other person’s belief that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or the other person’s family or household member or mental distress to the other person or the other person’s family or household member, the other person’s belief or mental distress may be based on words or conduct of the offender that are directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other organization that employs the other person or to which the other person belongs. (A)(2) No person , through the use of any form of written communication or any electronic method of remotely transferring information, including, but not limited to, any computer, computer network, computer program, computer system, or telecommunication device shall post a message or use any intentionally written or verbal device shall post a message or use any  intentionally written or verbal graphic gesture with purpose to do either of the following: (a) Violate division (A)(1) of this section; (b) Urge or incite another to commit a violation of division (A)(1) of this section. I. {¶26} In her first assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence to support the issuance of the CSPO. Specifically, Appellant argues there was no direct threat of physical harm and no testimony that she was an imminent threat, engaged in physical surveillance, or attempted in-person contact. {¶27} However, the plain language of the statute does not require direct or attempted physical contact. The statute permits a court to grant a CSPO if a person knowingly causes another person to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person or cause mental distress to the other person. {¶28} We find competent and credible evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Appellant knowingly caused Appellee to believe she would cause him physical harm. Appellee testified that Appellant’s statements that she was going to “go for the throat,” “flip tables,” “show up at their church … the clock is ticking,” and “knock that joker smile off your face,” caused him to believe Appellant intended to cause him physical harm. We find that interpretation reasonable, particularly because Appellant specifically referenced Appellee’s name or occupation in conjunction with these statements. {¶29} Further, we find competent and credible evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Appellant knowingly caused Appellee to believe that she would cause mental distress to him or his family. As defined by R.C. 2903.211(D)(2), “Mental distress” is “any mental illness or condition that involves some temporary substantial incapacity,” and “any mental illness or condition that would normally require psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services, whether or not any person requested or received psychiatric treatment, psychological treatment, or other mental health services.” {¶30} It is the duty of the trier of fact to determine whether a victim suffered mental distress as a result of the offender’s actions. Fouch v. Pennington, 2012-Ohio-3536, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.). The statute, however, “does not require that the victim actually experience mental distress, but only that the victim believes the stalker would cause mental distress or physical harm.” Wade v. Wade, 2024-Ohio-3136, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.), quoting Bloom v. Macbeth, 2008-Ohio- 4564, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.). Moreover, a victim’s testimony regarding his or her fear is sufficient to establish mental distress. Id., citing State v. Horsley, 2006-Ohio-1208, ¶ 48 (10th Dist.). An “[i]ncapacity [from a mental illness] is substantial if it has a significant impact upon the victim’s daily life, such as causing a change in one’s routine.” Id., quoting A.V. v. McNichols, 2019-Ohio-2180, ¶ 22 (4th Dist.). {¶31} Here, Appellee testified about his fear. He also testified that the videos significantly impacted his daily life. Specifically, Appellee hired additional security for himself and his family at the church where he works and filed a police report - in an attempt to prevent Appellant from coming to the church. Appellee further testified that he sought counseling for the distress caused by Appellant. {¶32} Accordingly, we find the trial court did not commit error in determining that sufficient evidence supported the issuance of the CSPO. Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.  II. {¶33} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court improperly admitted unauthenticated video evidence, i.e., the videos of Appellant making the statements. We disagree. {¶34} Evidence Rule 901 governs authentication of evidence and provides that “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Evid.R. 901(A). {¶35} Evidence Rule 901(B)(1) provides that the authentication requirement may be satisfied through the “[t]estimony of [a] witness with knowledge that “a matter if what it is claimed to be.” {¶36} Authentication is satisfied when a proponent presents foundational evidence or testimony from which a rational trier of fact may determine that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. State v. Morgan, 2021-Ohio-4443, ¶ 50 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Callender, 2015-Ohio-4255, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.). “The proponent need not offer conclusive evidence as a foundation but must merely offer sufficient evidence to allow the question as to authenticity or genuineness to reach the jury.” State v. Caldwell, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 5879, *18 (9th Dist. 1991). {¶37} Ohio courts addressing the admissibility of social-media content have concluded that “the determination of admissibility and authentication of social media evidence is ‘based on whether there was sufficient evidence of authenticity for a reasonable [factfinder] to conclude that the evidence was authentic.’” State v. Padgette, 2020-Ohio-672, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Gibson, 2015-Ohio-1679, ¶ 41 (6th Dist.).  {¶38} Appellant contends Appellee’s assertions that the videos originated from Appellant were insufficient to authenticate them because there was no metadata verification, platform certification, account-ownership documentation, or independent corroboration of the files’ origin or upload timestamps. However, Appellant cites no authority supporting her contention that a witness’s testimony is insufficient to authenticate videos or that some other form of verification or certification of an account is required. {¶39} Additionally, Appellant authenticated the TikTok and/or Facebook evidence through her own testimonial admission that she recorded and posted the videos and made the videos “about the family, including [Appellee].” Appellant specifically testified that she was “going after the family on social media” based on their alleged cover-up of her ex-husband’s alleged alcoholism. Although Appellant explained that the videos were an “expression of grief,” she did not deny that she appeared in the videos or claim that the videos had been altered in any way. Appellant not only failed to present evidence disputing or rebutting Appellee’s testimony that the videos depicted Appellant, but she also corroborated Appellee’s testimony that she was the person depicted in the videos. {¶40} We find Appellee’s testimony was sufficient to authenticate the videos. In addition, Appellant’s own testimony served to authenticate the videos. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the videos into evidence. Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. III. {¶41} In her third assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court “misapplied” the pattern-of-conduct requirement by equating speech alone with statutory stalking conduct. We disagree.  {¶42} Appellant argues that speech alone is insufficient to constitute “conduct” under R.C. 2903.211 because the statements or comments she made online were not threats and she never made physical contact with Appellee or his family. {¶43} As used in R.C. 2903.211(D)(1), “pattern of conduct” means “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those actions or incidents.” The statute further provides: “[t]he posting of messages, use of intentionally written or verbal graphic gestures, or receipt of information or data through the use of any form of written communication or an electronic method of remotely transferring information, including, but not limited to, a computer, computer network, computer program, computer system, or telecommunications device, may constitute a pattern of conduct.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1). Further, “post a message” means “transferring, sending, posting, publishing, disseminating, or otherwise communicating, or attempting to transfer, send, post, publish, disseminate, or otherwise communication, any message or information, whether truthful or untruthful, about an individual, and whether done under one’s own name, under the name of another, or while impersonating another.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(7). {¶44} Appellant’s argument that her online speech cannot qualify as “conduct” is contradicted by the plain language of R.C. 2903.211(D), which expressly provides that posting messages about another person may constitute a pattern of conduct. Further, the statute does not require that acts occur in person or involve physical contact between the parties to qualify as “conduct.” {¶45} Appellant’s argument that she never actually threatened Appellee likewise fails. The trier of fact must take into consideration every action, even if an individual action, viewed in isolation, does not appear particularly threatening. City of Middletown v. Jones, 2006-Ohio- 3465, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). Here, the statements Appellant made in the videos, considered as a whole, demonstrate that Appellee could reasonably have perceived Appellant’s words and demeanor as threatening. {¶46} The determination of whether two actions or incidents were “closely related in time” is a matter for the trier of fact based upon consideration of the evidence in the context of all the circumstances of the case. Id. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that the incidents were “closely related in time,” given Appellee’s testimony that the posts and videos occurred over a two-to-three-month period. {¶47} We find competent and credible evidence supporting the magistrate’s and trial court’s “pattern of conduct” findings. Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled. IV. {¶48} In her fourth assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court failed to independently analyze her objections as required by Civil Rule 53. She argues the trial court summarily adopted the magistrate’s decision without conducting a meaningful review. We disagree. {¶49} A trial court is required to independently review the issues raised in objections to a magistrate’s decision. Civil Rule 53(D)(4)(d) provides that, “[i]n ruling on objections, the court shall undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual issues and appropriately applied the law.” {¶50} An appellate court presumes that a trial court performed an independent analysis of a magistrate’s decision. In re C.W., 2025-Ohio-2857, ¶ 24 (5th Dist.). Therefore, the party asserting error must affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court failed to conduct the required independent analysis. Arnold v. Arnold, 2005-Ohio-5272, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.). This burden requires more than a mere inference, and the mere fact that a trial court adopted a magistrate’s decision does not establish that the court failed to exercise its independent judgment. In re C.W. at ¶ 24. {¶51} The trial court specifically stated in its December 24, 2025, judgment entry that “the Court has independently reviewed the Magistrate’s Decision and the record. Finding the Decision is supported by the record, and there are no errors of law, the Court approves the Magistrate’s granting of a Civil Protection Order.” The trial court also identified the arguments Appellant raised in her objections and explained why it found those arguments not well-taken. {¶52} Appellant argues that the trial court did not address all of her objections in sufficient detail. However, the trial court’s failure to agree with Appellant or to “specifically discuss every factor weighing into the decision does not rebut the presumption that the trial court conducted an independent analysis in accordance with Civ. R. 53(D)(4)(d).” Williams v. Tumblin, 2014-Ohio-4365, ¶ 37 (5th Dist.). {¶53} Upon review, we find Appellant failed to meet her burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court failed to conduct an independent analysis. Rather, the record demonstrates that the trial court independently reviewed the magistrate’s decision and the objections thereto. Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.  {¶54} Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. {¶55} For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. {¶56} Costs to Appellant Vanessa L. Ross. By: Popham, J. Hoffman, P.J. and Montgomery, J., concur