O'Leary v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals

[Cite as O'Leary v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2026-Ohio-2605.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA RONALD J.H. O’LEARY, ET AL., : v. : Nos. 114700, 114706, and 114709 CITY OF CLEVELAND BOARD : OF ZONING APPEALS, ET AL. : [APPEAL BY CITY OF CLEVELAND AND LUTHERAN METROPOLITAN : MINISTRY; CROSS-APPEAL BY BRIAN ROCKAS] : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 9, 2026 Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos. CV-23-976603 and CV-23-976612 Appearances: Ronald J.H. O’Leary, pro se. Mark D. Griffin, Cleveland Director of Law, and Carolyn M. Downey, Assistant Director of Law, for appellants. JONES DAY, Stephen G. Sozio, Adam J. Hollingsworth, and April M. Johnson; Berns, Ockner & Greenberger, LLC, Benjamin J. Ockner, and Majeed G. Makhlouf, for appellant/cross-appellee Lutheran Metropolitan Ministry.  Flowers & Grube and Paul W. Flowers, for cross- appellant Brian Rockas. ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.: In this split decision, these consolidated appeals concern Lutheran Metropolitan Ministry’s (“LMM”) continued use of property at 4100 Franklin Blvd. in Cleveland. The property is situated in a residentially zoned district and has long operated under a certificate of occupancy (“COO”) authorizing use as a “charitable institution.” The Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”) affirmed the notice of nonconformance (“NNC”) issued by the City of Cleveland Department of Building and Housing (“the City”) and granted area and use variances concerning the property. The trial court affirmed the BZA’s NNC but reversed the BZA’s grant of use and area variances. It also dismissed certain neighbors for failure to perfect their appeals. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the trial court’s judgment upholding the NNC and the dismissal of Brian Rockas (“Rockas”) for lack of jurisdiction. A majority of the panel agrees that the trial court erred in reversing the BZA’s area variance; that ruling is reversed and the area variance is remanded to the trial court for application of the correct legal standard. The trial court’s judgment reversing the use variance is affirmed. For the reasons that follow, Part I of this split decision is delivered by Judge Anita Laster Mays and addresses the City’s and the BZA’s contentions regarding the NNC, Rockas’s challenge to his dismissal for failure to perfect an administrative appeal and his allegation of a service defect, O’Leary’s assignment of error seeking reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of the neighbors for lack of perfection, and the sufficiency of the trial court’s journal entry. Part I also sets out the legal framework governing the variances. Judges Lisa B. Forbes and Sean C. Gallagher concur in judgment only as to Part I. Part II, delivered by Judge Lisa B. Forbes and joined by Judge Sean C. Gallagher, resolves the variances: it affirms the trial court’s reversal of the use variance, and it reverses the trial court’s reversal of the area variance and remands that matter for the trial court to apply the correct practical-difficulties standard. Judge Anita Laster Mays dissents in part, by separate opinion, from the majority’s disposition of the variances. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. PART I I. Factual Background LMM, a long-established Cleveland nonprofit, provides social services to vulnerable populations, including the formerly incarcerated, the homeless, and at-risk youth. The disputed property sits at 4100 Franklin Blvd. in Cleveland’s Ohio City neighborhood, an area historically characterized by mixed residential and institutional uses. The property, zoned as two-family residential (2F-A) under the Cleveland Codified Ordinances (“CCO”), formerly housed an LMM transitional residence and administrative offices. LMM conducted those operations under a legal nonconforming use, which preceded a 1985 rezoning ordinance that reclassified Franklin Blvd. and adjoining streets from multi-family and local retail to residential. The 1985 legislative change aimed to restrict further commercial and institutional encroachment into residential areas while preserving limited existing nonconforming uses. A. Prior Use of the Property In 2009, the City issued LMM a COO authorizing charitable use of the property. In 2017, LMM merged with Community Re-Entry, Inc., and Lutheran Family Services. In 2020, LMM subsequently merged with Lutheran Metro Properties, LLC, and LMM Leveraged Lender, LLC. In each case, LMM remained the sole surviving entity. LMM and its affiliates have continually operated the property as a lawful nonconforming charitable institution. LMM has at all times complied with the conditions set forth in the COO, providing an array of social and family services to its clients. LMM’s services include adoption assistance, counseling, behavioral-health support, and distributing essentials like food, clothing, hygiene supplies, and bus passes. Additional programs offered at the property include workforce education and training, benefits assistance, and case management. (CV-23-976612, BZA Record transmitted Apr. 27, 2023, at 72-73, 75.) The property is also equipped with kitchen, laundry, and shower facilities, which have historically been accessible to LMM’s clients on a limited basis. (Id. at 36, 45.) B. Proposed Use as a Youth Drop-In Center In 2022, LMM proposed to convert the Franklin Blvd. facility into a Youth Drop-In Center (“YDIC”) designed to serve homeless and at-risk youth aged 16 to 24. The proposed YDIC would provide daytime shelter and essential services such as shower and laundry facilities, food distribution, clothing, internet access, and life-skills programming. LMM emphasized that the YDIC would operate only during the day. II. Procedural Background A. Application for Review LMM submitted plans that included upgrades to the kitchen, bathroom, and laundry areas, along with requests to repave the parking lot and add features including an outdoor patio, privacy fencing, a library, and a computer lab. LMM argued that the YDIC was consistent with its existing COO and fell within the definition of a “charitable institution” under CCO 337.03(b) and 337.02(g)(3). B. Notice of Nonconformance After reviewing LMM’s submission, the City issued an NNC regarding LMM’s application. The City concluded that LMM’s proposed use constituted an impermissible change of use under the zoning code because the YDIC introduced new activities, specifically, food service, laundry, and shower operations that were not previously approved and were more intensive than prior office or residential transitional uses. The notice required LMM either to (a) discontinue the proposed change or (b) apply to the BZA for the necessary use and area variances under CCO. C. LMM’s Appeal to the BZA and Request for Variance LMM appealed to the BZA challenging the NNC. In the alternative, LMM requested variances authorizing the proposed use under CCO 329.03.  1. Testimony and Evidence at the BZA Hearings At the BZA hearings, LMM presented testimony from its executive leadership and community partners describing the purpose and need for the YDIC. Witnesses testified that the center would serve approximately 20 to 30 clients per day, that hours of operation would be limited to daytime hours, and that security and sanitation measures would be in place. The BZA approved the variances, subject to operational conditions. Several neighboring residents, including Ronald J.H. O’Leary (“O’Leary”) and Rockas opposed the project. They testified that the YDIC would contribute to increased foot traffic, noise, loitering, and general disruption in the area. They also expressed concern that the proposed use was inconsistent with the residential zoning and would further institutionalize the Franklin Blvd. corridor, contrary to the purpose of the 1985 rezoning ordinance. 2. The BZA’s Decision and Findings Following a hearing, the BZA upheld the NNC as it relates to dimensional nonconformity and granted a minor area variance for setback under CCO 329.03(b). The BZA found that the variance preserved the neighborhood’s character. In its March 13, 2023 written decision, the board concluded that (a) LMM’s proposed use fits within the existing permitted nonconforming charitable-institution use, but the proposed changes are an expansion of that nonconforming use and, therefore, a variance is required; (b) the property’s prior institutional use and layout created a hardship unique to LMM that justified the variance; and (c) the variance would not substantially alter the character of the neighborhood. D. Administrative Appeals to the Trial Court LMM appealed the BZA’s decision to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-23-976603, challenging the NNC. On March 16, 2023, O’Leary filed both a motion to intervene in that case and a separate administrative appeal in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-23-976612. The new appeal contested the BZA’s grant of use and area variances in LMM’s favor. The notice of appeal in Case No. CV-23-976612 identified multiple individuals as appellants, including Rockas and ten other neighbors, all appearing pro se. Rockas did not personally sign the notice. Instead, his name appeared with the notation “/s/Brian Rockas (RJHO by consent).” The filing did not indicate that O’Leary had entered an appearance as counsel for the group. In the trial court, the neighbors argued that the BZA’s decision was unsupported by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. The neighbors alleged that the BZA failed to make the explicit findings required by CCO 329.03(b), which states in part: (1) The practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship is peculiar to the premises sought to be built upon or used because of physical size, shape, or other characteristics of the premises . . . which differentiate it from other premises in the same district and create a difficulty or hardship caused by a strict application of the provisions of this Zoning Code not generally shared by other land or buildings in the same district; (2) Refusal of the variance appealed for will deprive the owner of substantial property rights; and (3) Granting of the variance appealed for will not be contrary to the purpose and intent of this Zoning Code.  Finally, the neighbors alleged that the 1985 rezoning demonstrated legislative intent to prohibit further nonresidential expansion along Franklin Blvd. LMM and the City defended the BZA’s decision, arguing that the board had discretion to weigh the evidence and that the trial court was not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body. E. The Trial Court’s Partial Reversal and Jurisdictional Ruling On April 20, 2023, LMM moved to dismiss all appellants except O’Leary, arguing that the joint notice of appeal filed by O’Leary, Rockas, and the other neighbors did not comply with R.C. 2505.04 and App.R. 3. LMM claimed that each appellant was required to individually invoke the jurisdiction of the court by filing an independent notice of appeal. On May 24, 2023, the trial court granted LMM’s motion and dismissed all appellants except O’Leary. The court found that in administrative appeals, a joint notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction upon parties who have not individually filed notices. The trial court determined that only O’Leary had properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction under R.C. 2505.04. The trial court affirmed the BZA’s decision upholding the City’s NNC and reversed the BZA’s decision granting the variances. Three related appeals follow and have been consolidated for our review, raising the following assignments of error. III. Assignments of Error A. LMM’s Assignments of Error (No. 114706) 1. The trial court erred in affirming the BZA’s decision to uphold a notice of nonconformance as to LMM’s use of its property because the use is not a nonconforming use and its proposed use is a continuation,  not an expansion, enlargement, substitution, or other change of the property’s longstanding use as a charitable institution. 2. The trial court erred in reversing the BZA’s grant of variances to LMM permitting it to improve the property as part of its continued use as a charitable institution because the BZA’s decision was not unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence in the record, and because the trial court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the BZA.1 B. The BZA’s Assignments of Error (No. 114700) 1. The common pleas court abused its discretion by substituting its judgment for that of the administrative agency, the Board of Zoning Appeals. 2. The common pleas court abused its discretion when the court exceeded its review authority by finding that a youth drop-in center should be placed in an area specifically zoned for such activity. 3. The common pleas court erred as a matter of law by failing to provide a journal entry with sufficient detail and analysis to permit appellate review of its decision. 4. The common pleas court abused its discretion where it usurped the authority of the City of Cleveland’s legislature to determine and balance the zoning needs of its community in relation to public health, morals, welfare, or public safety. C. Rockas’s Assignments of Error (No. 114709) 1. The trial court erred in dismissing the appeal of Brian Rockas and other individuals who jointly appealed the determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals. 1 In 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 114706, O’Leary filed a brief in his capacity as a cross- appellee. While O’Leary identified several issues, he did not assert any independent assignments of error related to the trial court’s rulings on the merits. Instead, he requested that the trial court’s dismissal of the neighbors’ administrative appeal be reversed. For purposes of appellate review, we construe this request as O’Leary’s sole assignment of error. Although O’Leary presented arguments in support of the trial court’s decisions upholding the NNC and reversing the BZA’s grant of variances, he did so in defense of the judgment below, not in pursuit of affirmative relief.  2. The trial court failed in dismissing the appeal of Brian Rockas and other individuals who jointly appealed the determination of the Board of Zoning Appeals. The parties present multiple assignments and cross-assignments of error. LMM and the BZA each assert assignments addressing the NNC and the variances. Rockas raises two assignments challenging his dismissal for failure to perfect an administrative appeal and alleging a service defect. O’Leary, as an appellee on the merits, advances several arguments supporting the trial court’s rulings on the NNC and the variances but tenders only a single assignment of error seeking reversal of the trial court’s dismissal of the neighbors for lack of perfection. Similarly, the City supports the BZA’s decisions concerning the NNC. For ease of analysis, we address the assignments out of order and group overlapping issues. IV. Standards of Review A. Jurisdiction and Perfection of Appeal — R.C. 2505.04 A dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction presents a question of law that this court reviews independently under a de novo standard. Mitchell v. Dir., Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2024-Ohio-2073, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.). Subject-matter jurisdiction derives from statute and cannot be conferred by agreement, waiver, or consent. Holt v. Cuyahoga Cty., 2017-Ohio-748, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). When jurisdiction depends on compliance with a statute governing the initiation of an appeal, such as the timely filing of a notice of appeal under R.C. 2505.04, the reviewing court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the procedural requirements were met. Crosby-Edwards v. Ohio Bd. of Embalmers & Funeral Dirs., 2008-Ohio-762, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). B. Sufficiency of the Journal Entry for Appellate Review Whether a judgment entry contains enough reasoning to permit review presents a question of law we consider de novo. See MSRK, L.L.C. v. Twinsburg, 2012-Ohio-2609, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). Although detailed explanation is preferred, the determining factor is whether the entry and the certified record together permit meaningful review. See Vang v. Cleveland, 2017-Ohio-4187, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). C. Trial Court Review Under R.C. 2506.04 When reviewing whether the trial court properly applied the standard set forth in R.C. 2506.04, the standard of review depends upon whether the reviewing body is the trial court or the appellate court. Under R.C. 2506.04, the court of common pleas serves as the initial reviewing court in administrative appeals. It must examine the entire record, including any new or additional evidence admitted under R.C. 2506.03. “If a preponderance of reliable, probative and substantial evidence exists, the Court of Common Pleas must affirm the agency decision; if it does not exist, the court may reverse, vacate, modify or remand.” Dudukovich v. Lorain Metro. Hous. Auth., 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 207 (1979); see also Aseff v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 142 Ohio App.3d 624 (8th Dist. 2001). Although the trial court weighs the evidence and examines the entire record, it does not conduct a de novo proceeding. Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34 (1984). The trial court must accord due deference to the administrative agency’s resolution of evidentiary conflicts and may not, particularly in matters within the agency’s specialized expertise, substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Children’s Laboratory School v. Huber Hts., 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3841, *5 (2d Dist. Sept. 6, 1995); R.C. 2506.04. D. Appellate Review Under R.C. 2506.04 On further appeal, the judgment of the court of common pleas may be reviewed in this court only on questions of law, without reweighing the evidence. Id. at *6; Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147 (2000). Therefore, as to evidentiary challenges, we ask only whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining whether the administrative order is supported by a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Appellate courts may not substitute their judgment for that of an administrative agency or a trial court, absent the approved criteria for doing so. Kisil at 34. A reversal is warranted only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment, the record fails to demonstrate a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s decision. McDermott v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2024-Ohio-1780, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). E. Scope of De Novo Review Here, the parties raise the following purely legal questions that we review de novo: (1) whether Rockas invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court by perfecting his appeal, entitling him to service, as raised in his first and second assignments of error and in O’Leary’s sole assignment of error; and (2) the sufficiency of the journal entry to permit meaningful appellate review, as raised in the BZA’s third assignment of error. V. Analysis A. Perfection of Administrative Appeals (No. 114709) In Rockas’s first assignment of error and O’Leary’s sole assignment of error, the parties contend the trial court erred by dismissing all appellants except O’Leary. O’Leary and Rockas argue that the joint notice of appeal filed in the trial court substantially complied with App.R. 3(B), that the appellants (including Rockas) were identified in the caption, and that filing one notice for all neighbors did not deprive the court of jurisdiction. They maintain the dismissal elevated form over substance and frustrated App.R. 3(B)’s purpose of allowing joint appeals by parties with identical interests. R.C. 2505.04 governs perfection of appeals and provides that an appeal is perfected upon the filing of a written notice of appeal “in accordance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure.” It further specifies that, in an administrative- related appeal, the notice is filed “with the administrative officer, agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality involved.” R.C. 2505.04. App.R. 3(A) similarly provides that an appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court and that the timely filing of the notice is the only jurisdictional step in perfecting an appeal. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Nolan, 72 Ohio St.3d 320, 322-323 (1995). In support of his argument, Rockas relies on App.R. 3(B), captioned “Joint or Consolidated Appeals,” which states: If two or more persons are entitled to appeal from a judgment or order of a trial court and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal, or may join in appeal after filing separate timely notices of appeal, and they may thereafter proceed on appeal as a single appellant. Appeals may be consolidated by order of the court of appeals upon its own motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the several appeals. Under App.R. 3(A), jurisdiction is conferred when a timely notice is filed with the clerk, and App.R. 3(B) authorizes multiple appellants to file a joint notice when their interests are aligned. But App.R. 3(B)’s joint-notice language governs appeals from trial court judgments and does not displace R.C. 2505.04 and 2505.05 in administrative appeals under R.C. Ch. 2506. In an R.C. Ch. 2506.01 appeal, each party seeking to reverse or modify the agency decision must independently file and perfect a notice of appeal; absent a separately perfected appeal, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to consider that party’s assignments of error. AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. v. Lynch, 2012-Ohio-1975, ¶ 22. Alternatively, the absence of a signature by the party or by counsel of record on the notice of appeal violates Civ.R. 11. A litigant may appear pro se on his own behalf, but a party may not sign or prosecute on behalf of another absent appearance as counsel of record. On this independent basis as well, dismissal was proper. The plain language of R.C. 2505.04 requires that a notice of appeal be filed “in accordance with” the applicable procedural rules; in other words, the notice must be valid. The notice as to Rockas was invalid because it did not comply with Civ.R. 11. Civ.R. 11 requires that every pleading or paper be signed by at least one attorney of record or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, be signed by the party. Even in appeals from trial-court judgments, a joint notice of appeal must expressly name each appellant and be personally signed, either by each pro se litigant or by counsel of record on behalf of each represented party. Hineman v. Brown, 2003-Ohio-926, ¶ 2 (11th Dist.) (requiring each pro se appellant to be named and to personally sign to invoke jurisdiction). Here, the record shows that all appellants appeared pro se in the administrative proceedings below. The notice of appeal filed in the trial court was prepared and signed by O’Leary, who listed himself and the remaining appellants, including Rockas, in the caption. Several individuals signed the notice in their own names; others, including Rockas, were named but did not personally sign. O’Leary, though a licensed attorney, appeared pro se and did not enter an appearance as counsel of record for the group. Because O’Leary signed only in his personal capacity, his signature perfected the appeal solely for himself. His professional license did not authorize him to act as counsel for others without entering an appearance. See Civ.R. 11; Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a) (scope of representation). Consequently, the joint filing was jurisdictionally effective as to O’Leary, but not as to Rockas.  A pro se litigant, even one who is an attorney, cannot act as counsel for co-appellants absent proper authorization and appearance. See State ex rel. Hadley v. Pike, 2014-Ohio-3310, ¶ 10 (7th Dist.). While App.R. 3(B) facilitates joint appeals in some circumstances, it does not abrogate the requirement that each pro se appellant personally execute the notice or authorize an attorney of record to do so. Because Rockas neither signed nor retained O’Leary as counsel of record, his appeal was not perfected under R.C. 2505.04 and App.R. 3(A). The trial court correctly determined that jurisdiction vested only in those appellants who executed the filing. Rockas’s first assignment of error and O’Leary’s sole assignment of error are overruled. B. Service Upon Pro Se Appellants In his second assignment of error, Rockas contends the trial court failed to ensure that all pro se litigants, including Rockas, were properly served with all filings. Under App.R. 13(B), service of all papers “required or permitted to be served shall be made upon each of the parties.” Service on a party represented by counsel must be made upon that attorney, while service on a self-represented party must be made directly upon the party. Civ.R. 5(A) mirrors this requirement of service on every party. Ohio courts strictly construe these provisions to protect due-process rights. Service upon an attorney is valid only if that attorney has entered an appearance as counsel of record for the party served. Civ.R. 5(B); Ervin v. Patrons Mut. Ins. Co., 20 Ohio St.3d 8 (1985). Failure of service that deprives a party of actual notice may render a judgment voidable. Miller v. Lint, 62 Ohio St.2d 209, 214 (1980). Rockas argues that LMM’s motion to dismiss was served electronically only on O’Leary and not upon the remaining pro se appellants. He asserts that because several appellants, including himself, were unrepresented, LMM was required under Civ.R. 5 to serve each individually. Rockas contends that the failure to do so deprived the trial court of authority to dismiss the appeal. See Citibank v. Wood, 2006-Ohio-5755, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.) (failure to mail motion to pro se party reversible). However, a party’s entitlement to service under the Civil Rules presumes that the party has first properly perfected an appeal and become a party of record. Apostolic Faith Assembly, Inc. v. Coventry Twp., 2008-Ohio-2820, ¶ 6 (9th Dist.). Here, the notice of appeal was filed and signed by one neighbor who is a licensed attorney but appeared pro se and who signed on behalf of other pro se neighbors. Because each appellant must independently file and perfect an administrative appeal under R.C. 2505.04, a pro se filer may not sign a notice of appeal for other pro se filers. The trial court enforced the individual-filing requirement recognized in AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc., 2012-Ohio-1975, and dismissed Rockas as a party. The arguments Rockas raises in his second assignment of error relating to service underscore the rationale for the jurisdictional rule requiring appellants to file individual notices of appeal pursuant to AT&T Communications of Ohio, Inc. The invalid notice of appeal created ambiguity as to who had properly invoked the court’s jurisdiction and who was entitled to service. Once the trial court determined that Rockas had not perfected his appeal, it lacked authority to consider further procedural objections. This jurisdictional defect is dispositive and forecloses review of all issues, including claims of deficient service. See Cyr v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2022-Ohio-25, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). Because Rockas did not perfect an administrative appeal, his service- related assignment, which presupposes party status, is moot and is overruled on that basis. C. Sufficiency of the Journal Entry In its third assignment of error, the BZA argues the trial court erred by issuing a journal entry insufficient for appellate review. A judgment entry is sufficient if, together with the certified record, it permits meaningful appellate review. Whether the entry so permits is a question of law we review de novo. We agree that the trial court’s two-page entry is sparse. It cites the applicable zoning provisions and states that the BZA’s variance decision is unsupported by law, but it offers no analysis or findings of fact. The BZA contends this lack of detail precludes review. Unlike cases in which conclusory entries prevent appellate review, the certified record here, consisting of the BZA transcript, exhibits, and filings, provides a sufficient basis to evaluate the issues under R.C. 2506.04. Because we can ascertain whether the trial court applied the correct legal standards and whether its judgment finds support in the record, a remand for a more detailed entry is unnecessary. The BZA’s third assignment of error is overruled. We now turn to the trial court’s application of R.C. 2506.04. D. Notice of Nonconformance In its first assignment of error, LMM challenges the trial court’s order affirming the BZA’s NNC. LMM argues that the trial court misinterpreted the ordinance governing “charitable institutions” and erred when it determined that the proposed use of the property was a continuation, enlargement, or change of nonconforming uses under CCO 359.01. The City and the BZA contend the trial court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the BZA’s decision that LMM’s proposed YDIC was not a continuation of any prior lawful nonconforming “charitable institution” use at 4100 Franklin Blvd. and that the trial court properly affirmed the BZA’s affirmance of the NNC. The trial court found that the operations at the site had expanded materially beyond the prior charitable use, citing the addition of showers, laundry facilities, and a commercial kitchen/food service; extended operating hours; and increased foot traffic and security needs. On that basis, the court affirmed the NNC. The BZA attests that its decision was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. In contrast, LMM contends the trial court misapplied R.C. 2506.04 and failed to accord proper weight to the certified record when it affirmed the issuance of the NNC. Under R.C. 2506.04, the trial court must determine whether the administrative order is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. Henley, 90 Ohio St.3d at 147; Kisil, 12 Ohio St.3d at 34. If a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supports the administrative order, the trial court must affirm; if it does not, the court may reverse, vacate, modify, or remand. Dudukovich, 58 Ohio St.2d at 207. The trial court’s journal entry affirming the NNC stated in part: [a]fter review of the complete record, the Court finds that significant changes to the building and operations at the property were being requested. The Court finds that the proposed Youth Drop-In Center would expand and enlarge the use of the property, including the hours of operation of the facility and the amount of activity at the facility. The Court finds that the City Zoning Administrator’s decision to issue the Notice of Non-Conformance was not arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, illegal, or unconstitutional and was supported by a preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence. The decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals upholding the May 13, 2022 Notice of Non-Conformance issued by the City Zoning Administrator in connection with LMM’s Youth Drop-In Center for homeless and housing-insecure youths and young adults is affirmed. (Journal Entry, Sept. 12, 2023.) After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court’s decision, we will reverse only as a matter of law, in the absence of a “preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence” to support the trial court’s decision. McDermott, 2024-Ohio-1780, at ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Kisil at 34; Gregory v. Cuyahoga Cty., 2020-Ohio-2714, ¶ 24, (8th Dist.), quoting Kurutz v. Cleveland, 2018-Ohio-2398, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).  On this record, the trial court could reasonably conclude, based on a preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence, that the BZA’s decision to sustain the NNC was supported by the evidence. Initially, we note that CCO 359.01(a) permits the continuation of a lawful nonconforming use but, absent a variance, prohibits its enlargement and, absent a special permit, prohibits any substitution or change in use unless the new use is found to be no more harmful or objectionable than the prior use. The certified record reflects (1) a material change in on-site functions at 4100 Franklin Blvd.: adding showers, laundry, and a kitchen for food service, and distribution of clothing, personal-hygiene items, and transit passes; (2) a shift in clientele to youth ages 16-24 experiencing homelessness or housing instability; (3) expanded operational requirements (hours, staffing, traffic, supervision, and security protocols); (4) planned interior renovations to accommodate the new and expanded functions, including dedicated shower areas, a kitchen, a library, and a computer lab; and (5) outdoor improvements and related parking changes. CCO 337.02(g), 337.03(b), and 359.01(a) permit these charitable functions provided the use is located at least 30 feet from adjoining premises and the expanded use and hours receive appropriate variances from the BZA. We rely on the ordinance text contained in the certified record. To the extent an ordinance provision is not included in the record, we describe it only to the degree necessary to resolve the legal issue presented. The record and the trial court’s journal entry reflect a preponderance of evidence supporting the conclusion that LMM’s proposal constitutes a change or enlargement in use rather than mere continuation. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the nonconformance determination is supported by a preponderance of reliable and probative evidence. LMM’s first assignment of error is overruled. E. Variances Under CCO 359.01(a) CCO 359.01(a) governs changes to lawful nonconforming uses and creates two distinct avenues for BZA action. It permits continuation of a lawful nonconforming use, but “no enlargement or expansion shall be permitted except as a variance under the terms of Chapter 329,” and “no substitution or other change in such nonconforming use to other than a conforming use shall be permitted except by special permit from the Board of Zoning Appeals.” The ordinance further provides that a special permit may issue only if, after public hearing, the board finds that the new nonconforming use is “no more harmful or objectionable than the previous nonconforming use” in floor or space occupied, volume of trade or production, daily hours or other period of use, the type or number of persons attracted to the premises, and “any other characteristic of the new use as compared with the previous use.” The standards embedded in these two mechanisms are materially different. A use variance under CCO 329.03(b) requires a showing of “unnecessary hardship” peculiar to the premises, not self-created, such that refusal of the variance will deprive the owner of substantial property rights and the relief will not be contrary to the purpose and intent of the zoning code. By contrast, a special permit under CCO 359.01(a) does not turn on hardship at all; it turns on a comparative- impact finding that the proposed nonconforming use will be no more harmful or objectionable than the existing nonconforming use across the ordinance’s specified operational dimensions. LMM’s filings to the BZA expressly invoked both routes. The NNC advised that, because the property was an existing nonconforming charitable institution, LMM’s proposed expansion would require “a variance or special permit” under CCO 359.01. In response, LMM appealed the NNC and, in the alternative, requested “a use variance and an area variance,” while also asking the board to authorize the proposed YDIC if it deemed the use a substitution or change. Notwithstanding this dual framing, the BZA’s written March 13, 2023 resolution characterizes its action solely as granting a “variance,” recites the CCO 329.03(b) hardship and substantial-rights language, and nowhere states that it is issuing a special permit or that the new use is “no more harmful or objectionable” than the prior use in the respects listed in CCO 359.01(a). We confine our analysis to the BZA’s grant of a use variance and an area variance under CCO 329.03(b), and we express no view on whether LMM may qualify for, or whether the BZA should grant, any special permit under CCO 359.01(a). F. The Use and Area Variances The remaining assignments of error, LMM’s assignment of error No. 2 and the BZA’s assignments of error Nos. 1, 2, and 4, challenge the trial court’s reversal of the BZA’s grant of the use and area variances and contend that the trial court exceeded its limited authority under R.C. 2506.04. Those assignments are resolved by the majority in Part II. As explained there, the majority affirms the trial court’s reversal of the use variance and reverses the trial court’s reversal of the area variance and remands that matter to the trial court to appl