Full Opinion

[Cite as Lucas v. Brindle, 2026-Ohio-4592.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT BELMONT COUNTY DIANA L. LUCAS, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ETHEL MAE MCFARLAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL R. BRINDLE, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 Civil Appeals from the Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio Case No. 21 CV 44 BEFORE: Scott Lynch, John J. Eklund, Eugene A. Lucci, Eleventh District Judges, sitting by assignment. JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. –2– Atty. Richard O. Hamilton, Jr. and Atty. Adam J. Turer, Robbins, Kelly, Patterson & Tucker, L.P.A., 312 Elm Street, Suite 2200, Cincinnati, OH 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland. Atty. Joshua E. O’Farrell and Atty. J. Alex Quay, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.C., 4277 Munson Street, N.W., Canton, OH 44718, for Defendants-Appellants, Gateway Royalty V, LLC and Molly K. Johnson. Dated: November 17, 2026 SCOTT LYNCH, J. {¶1} Defendants-appellants, Gateway Royalty V, LLC, and Attorney Molly K. Johnson, appeal the judgment of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Diana L. Lucas, Executrix for the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland, and sanctioning Gateway and Johnson for frivolous conduct. {¶2} We affirm the grant of summary judgment with respect to Lucas’s claims for Quiet Title and Conversion on the grounds that a forged instrument cannot pass title or a colorable claim of title. We reverse the grant of summary judgment with respect to her claims for Tortious Interference, Slander of Title, and Civil Conspiracy finding that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Gateway’s complicity in the underlying forgery. For similar reasons we reverse the award of punitive damages and attorney fees. The malice necessary to sustain a punitive award cannot be established as a matter of law for summary judgment purposes in the present case. We find the economic loss rule inapplicable in the present case and affirm the award of compensatory damages. Finally, we reverse the sanctions awarded for frivolous conduct as there were legitimate grounds for moving for reconsideration. Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 –3– {¶3} Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Substantive and Procedural Background {¶4} On March 19, 2021, Ethel Mae McFarland filed a Complaint against Michael R. Brindle; Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC; American Mineral Solutions, LLC (“AMS”); Daniel F. Spitznagel; Gateway Royalty V, LLC; Ascent Resources – Utica, LLC; Timothy Paul Miller; Paloma Partners III, LLC; Gulfport Energy Corporation (as successor in interest to Paloma Partners); and XTO Energy Inc. {¶5} According to the Complaint, McFarland owned real estate and the associated oil and gas rights in Belmont County. The oil and gas rights (hereafter mineral rights) are subject to lease agreements with defendants, Ascent, Paloma, Gulfport, and XTO. The Complaint alleged that Brindle, Terra Firma, AMS, Sptiznagel, Gateway, and Miller had fraudulently conspired to deprive McFarland of her mineral rights by forging deeds transferring the rights to Terra Firma. Thereafter, the mineral rights were transferred to AMS and then to Gateway. {¶6} With respect to Gateway, the Complaint raised claims of Quiet Title; Fraud; Tortious Interference; Conversion; Equitable Disgorgement; Slander of Title; Breach of Accounting / Specific Performance; Civil Conspiracy; and Punitive Damages. {¶7} On April 20, 2021, Gateway filed an Answer and counterclaimed against McFarland raising claims of Quiet Title, Declaratory Judgment, Breach of Contract, and Unjust Enrichment. Gateway asserted its ownership of the mineral rights as a bona fide Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 –4– purchaser in good faith and alleged that McFarland had breached an agreement to execute a deed transferring the mineral rights to Terra Firma. {¶8} On July 25, 2022, the trial court entered default judgment in favor of McFarland against Brindle and Terra Firma. {¶9} On October 18, 2022, a Suggestion of Death was filed on behalf of McFarland. Thereafter, Lucas, as executrix of McFarland’s estate, was substituted as the new party plaintiff. {¶10} On December 13, 2022, Lucas filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Gateway’s Counterclaim. {¶11} On January 27, 2023, the trial court dismissed Gateway’s counterclaims against substitute plaintiff Lucas. {¶12} On February 14, 2023, Lucas filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway. {¶13} On March 14, 2023, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Ascent. {¶14} On March 15, 2023, Gateway filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Complaint. {¶15} On April 6, 2023, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Miller. {¶16} On April 19, 2023, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against XTO. {¶17} On May 16, 2024, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lucas and overruled Gateway’s competing Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel for Lucas was granted until June 10, 2024, “within which to submit a proposed Judgment Journal Entry containing Plaintiff’s recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 –5– damage, and/or a hearing, if requested, for punitive damages as to Plaintiff’s ownership of the subject mineral rights.” {¶18} On July 2, 2024, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Spitznagel and AMS. {¶19} On July 15, 2024, Gateway filed a Motion for Status Conference and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Unresolved Claims, asserting that Lucas’s claims for Fraud, Equitable Disgorgement, Breach of Accounting / Specific Performance, and Punitive Damages remained unresolved by the grant of summary judgment in Lucas’s favor. {¶20} On July 17, 2024, the trial court “direct[ed] all counsel to sign an Agreed Entry listing all pending claims and suggesting a briefing schedule.” {¶21} On September 5, 2024, an Agreed Entry was issued which provided, in relevant part: By agreement and stipulation, Plaintiff’s claim for fraud as against Defendant Gateway is hereby dismissed. Plaintiff’s claims for equitable disgorgement, accounting/specific performance, and punitive damages are hereby mooted to the extent that these are remedies sought by Plaintiff, not additional claims against Defendants. Accordingly, Defendant Gateway’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Unresolved Claims filed herein on July 15, 2024 is moot and is hereby withdrawn. {¶22} On February 11, 2025, Gateway filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking the trial court to reconsider, inter alia, the dismissal of its counterclaims against Lucas and the grant of summary judgment in her favor. {¶23} On February 20, 2025, Lucas filed her opposition to reconsideration as well as a Motion for Sanctions against Gateway, and its Counsel, Johnson, pursuant to R.C. 2323.51, Civil Rule 11, and Civil Rule 56(G). Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 –6– {¶24} On March 5, 2025, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supplementing the earlier grant of summary judgment in Lucas’s favor. The court expressly determined that Lucas was entitled to judgment against Gateway, Brindle, and Terra Firma on her claims for Quiet Title, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Slander of Title, and Civil Conspiracy. The court awarded against these defendants, “jointly and severally, compensatory damages in the amount of $658,860.30, plus punitive damages in the amount of $1,976,580.90, plus her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred in this action.” {¶25} On March 6, 2025, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and granted the Motion for Sanctions. The court noted that “the Grace Affidavit is self-serving, untimely, and ill-suited as the summary judgment deadline passed previously,” while “[t]he supposed new, direct, and binding authority cited by Gateway fails to meet those descriptions.” {¶26} On March 24, 2025, a sanctions hearing was held. {¶27} On April 22, 2025, Lucas filed a Motion to Determine Attorneys’ Fees and Costs pursuant to the trial court’s finding that Gateway acted in bad faith and award of punitive damages and attorney fees. {¶28} On May 21, 2025, the trial court issued a “proposed” Judgment and Journal Entry, reaffirming its finding that Gateway’s Motion for Reconsideration was groundless and granting Lucas’s Motion for Sanctions against both Gateway and Johnson. {¶29} On June 3, 2025, Lucas filed, pursuant to court order, an Affidavit of Adam J. Turer for Plaintiff’s Fees and Costs limited to the Opposition of Gateway’s Motion for Reconsideration. Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 –7– {¶30} On October 20, 2025, a hearing was held to determine Lucas’s attorney fees and costs. {¶31} On February 12, 2026, the trial court issued a Final Appealable Judgment and Journal Entry. The court found, in relevant part, as follows: 3. Plaintiff’s family has owned the subject property known as 50050 Methodist Ridge Road, St. Clairsville, OH 43950 (“Property”) for over 100 years. Ethel Mae McFarland was the sole owner of the Property from her husband’s death on August 6, 2006, until Ethel’s death on October 5, 2022. Ethel was also the owner of the mineral rights and oil and gas rights on the Property (collectively, “Mineral Rights”). 4. On or about August 26, 2013, Ethel Mae McFarland granted an Oil and Gas Lease to Paloma Partners III, LLC (“Paloma”). 5. On or about July 10, 2015, Paloma subsequently assigned the Lease to XTO Energy Inc. (“XTO”). 6. On or about November 21, 2017, XTO assigned 95% of the working interest in the Lease to Ascent Resources – Utica, LLC (“Ascent”), and retained a 5% non-operating working interest via a Stipulation and Cross Conveyance effective November 21, 2017. 7. XTO subsequently assigned its 5% non-operating working interest in the Paloma Lease to Ascent via Assignment and Bill of Sale effective July 1, 2022. 8. Upon learning of the [present] dispute, Ascent and XTO each suspended all royalty payments under the Lease. 9. In November 2018, June 2019, and August 2020, Ascent made three payments to McFarland in the amount of $83,996.22 each as consideration for an Amendment and Ratification of Oil and Gas Lease executed by McFarland. 10. In November 2019, Gateway Royalty V, LLC (“Gateway”) made an offer to McFarland to purchase her Mineral Rights for up to $763,560; the offer was good through December 15, 2019. McFarland did not accept this or any other offer to sell her Mineral Rights. Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 –8– 11. At some point between December 2019 and prior to June 2020, Brindle, acting as an agent of American Mineral Solutions LLC (“AMS”), met with McFarland at the Property to solicit her to sell her Mineral Rights. Brindle was informed that McFarland would not sell her Mineral Rights or sign any document without first speaking to her lawyer. Brindle left his business card which identifies him as a Land Agent for AMS and left the property. 12. Sometime between June 24, 2020, and July 2, 2020, Daniel Spitznagel (“Spitznagel”), the sole member and owner of AMS, received at AMS’s business address a package in the mail from the Belmont County Recorder’s Office addressed to Terra Firma which contained a Mineral Deed (“June 2020 Mineral Deed”) allegedly signed by Ethel Mae McFarland on June 15, 2020, and recorded on June 24, 2020, which purported to convey McFarland’s Mineral Rights to Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC (“Terra Firma”). 13. The June 2020 Mineral Deed was purportedly notarized by Timothy P. Miller. The deed was allegedly notarized in Belmont County, Ohio, while Miller’s notarial seal identifies him as a notary in the state of West Virginia. Timothy P. Miller testified he did not witness Ethel Mae McFarland execute a deed in his presence on June 15, 2020, or witness McFarland sign any documents. 14. Brindle, sole member and owner of Terra Firma, at the request of Spitznagel and AMS, obtained an alleged corrective mineral deed purported to be signed by McFarland (“Corrective Mineral Deed”). 15. This Corrective Mineral Deed was allegedly signed by Ethel Mae McFarland on July 15, 2020, and recorded on July 23, 2020, was purportedly notarized by Timothy P. Miller, and was allegedly notarized in Belmont County, Ohio, while Miller’s notarial seal identifies him as a notary in the state of West Virginia. Timothy P. Miller did not witness Ethel Mae McFarland execute a corrective deed in his presence on July 15, 2020. 16. According to the analysis and opinion of Vickie L. Willard, a forensic document examiner identified by Plaintiff as an expert witness, neither the June 2020 Mineral Deed nor the Corrective Mineral Deed were signed by Ethel Mae McFarland. 17. McFarland’s alleged signature on the June 2020 Mineral Deed and Corrective Mineral Deed do not resemble her signatures on 35 other documents reviewed by Ms. Willard, a board-certified forensic document examiner, and there is no reasonable explanation for the differences in signatures. Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 –9– 18. Terra Firma executed a mineral deed dated June 17, 2020, which purported to convey the Mineral Rights to AMS. This deed was recorded on July 17, 2020. 19. AMS executed a mineral deed dated July 28, 2020, which purported to convey the Mineral Rights to Gateway. 20. No payments related to the Mineral Rights or mineral deeds had been exchanged between or among any of the parties at the time the most recent mineral deed was delivered to and accepted by Gateway. 21. Without conducting a title exam, confirming that McFarland had been compensated, or identifying the defective notarizations of the fraudulent deeds, Gateway agreed to purchase the Mineral Rights from AMS. 22. Terra Firma issued a payment to McFarland via check dated September 4, 2020 in the amount of $83,996.22. The check sent to McFarland identified the payment as “Oil and Gas Lease” and was for the exact amount of three lease bonus payments previously sent to McFarland by Ascent. 23. Just four months prior, in February 2020, Gateway had offered McFarland $545,000 for the same Mineral Rights. 24. At the time the Terra Firma payment was issued to McFarland, Gateway had already paid AMS, AMS had made payments to Terra Firma and others, Terra Firma had executed a deed conveying Mineral Rights to AMS, and AMS had executed a deed conveying the Mineral Rights to Gateway. 25. Rice Drilling D, LLC (“Rice”) and EQT Corporation (“EQT”) obtained an interest in the Mineral Rights after the instant lawsuit was filed. Rice acquired an interest in Plaintiff’s Mineral Rights … via an Assignment and Bill of Sale from Ascent … and via a Partial Assignment of Leases from XTO … which granted Rice an interest in the Paloma Lease limited only to those lands inside the Skyhawk 1 Unit. 26. AMS and Gateway knew or should have known McFarland had a contract with Paloma, as evidenced by the Memorandum of Lease recorded in Belmont County. AMS and Gateway knew or should have known Paloma had assigned its lease interests as evidenced by the assignment, also recorded in Belmont County. AMS and Gateway knew McFarland was the lessor under Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 10 – the lease agreement, as both AMS and Gateway contacted Ascent to advise it of the purported conveyance of the Mineral Rights. 27. AMS and Gateway instructed Ascent and EQT to stop paying McFarland lease payments and royalties under the lease agreement and to instead pay Gateway. These payments rightfully belong to McFarland as owner of the fee simple estate and leasehold interest in the fee simple estate. 28. Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway acted in concert with Brindle and Terra Firma to perpetuate the fraud and deprive Plaintiff of her rights. All three contacted Ascent and other lessees and worked in concert to make sure the lessees did not issue any further payments to McFarland. 29. Spitznagel and AMS prepared the deed from Terra Firma to AMS, backdated to show it was executed on June 17, 2020, which was admittedly false, and Spitznagel notarized the deed without witnessing Brindle sign it on that date. 30. As a result of the forged deeds, Gateway received $142,840.04 in royalty payments from Ascent as of March 31, 2023. 31. As a result of the forged deeds, Gateway received $150,396.95 in royalty payments from Rice and/or EQT as of January 2, 2023. 32. XTO never issued any royalty payments under the Lease to AMS or Gateway. 33. As of March 5, 2025, Gateway had failed to provide an accounting of the payments received from EQT as a result of the forged deeds. These funds should have been paid to Plaintiff. 34. Upon being served with the instant lawsuit, Gateway notified Ascent and XTO and instructed them to hold funds in suspense due to potential fraud and forgery. 35. As of March 31, 2023, Ascent was holding $356,874.67 in royalties in suspense. 36. Upon learning of the dispute presented in the above- captioned lawsuit, XTO suspended all royalty payments under the Lease. As of February 13, 2023, XTO was holding $8,748.64 in royalties in a suspense account. 37. McFarland did not sign the June 2020 Mineral Deed or Corrective Mineral Deed. The evidence establishes, clearly and Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 11 – convincingly, that McFarland’s purported signatures on both documents were forged. 38. Spitznagel and AMS were suspicious of the June 2020 Mineral Deed yet failed to make any further inquiry and instead worked with Brindle, Terra Firma, and Gateway to flip the Mineral Rights as quickly as possible. 39. The Corrective Mineral Deed was created by Brindle and Terra Firma upon the direction of Gateway, AMS, and Spitznagel. 40. This is not the first time these Defendants have engaged in similar behavior. Brindle, Terra Firma, Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway were named as defendants in Belmont County Common Pleas Case No. 20CV274, Connie Jo Gerritz v. Michael R. Brindle, et al. That lawsuit was resolved by an unwinding of deeds, transferring the mineral rights back to the rightful owner of the fee simple estate. 41. Brindle, Terra Firma, Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway deprived Plaintiff, at the time an 84-year-old widow, of the Mineral Rights that have been in her family for generations. Despite full understanding of their actions, they continued to intentionally deprive her of her property rights and the payments to which she was entitled under her lease agreements. 42. While the initial forged deed was created by Terra Firma, Brindle, and Miller, the continuing fraud perpetrated on Plaintiff could not have existed but for the reckless, intentional, and conspiratorial conduct of AMS, Spitznagel, and Gateway. These parties knew that Brindle forged another mineral rights deed in Belmont County yet refused to unwind the McFarland transaction. 43. Defendants AMS, Spitznagel, and Miller settled with Plaintiff, obtained a full release of Plaintiff’s claims, and were ultimately dismissed from Plaintiff’s case with prejudice by Agreed Entries and Notices of Dismissal of Claims. {¶32} Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court reaffirmed judgment in Lucas’s favor on the claims of Quiet Title, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Slander of Title, and Civil Conspiracy. The court ordered title to the mineral rights to be quieted in favor of Lucas and all deeds to the contrary to be voided. Lucas was awarded against Brindle, Terra Firma, and Gateway, jointly and severally, compensatory damages in the Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 12 – amount of $628,860.30, plus punitive damages in the amount of $1,886,580.90, plus her reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the action totaling $262,928.09. Additionally, Lucas was awarded against Gateway and Johnson, jointly and severally, reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in opposing Gateway’s Motion for Reconsideration and related sanctioned conduct totalling $19,057.00. Assignments of Error {¶33} Gateway filed a Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2026, and Johnson filed Notice on March 6, 2026.1 This Court consolidated the two appeals. On appeal, Gateway and Johnson raise the following assignments of error: [1.] The trial court erred in granting McFarland’s [Motion for Summary Judgment]. [2.] The trial court erred by sanctioning Gateway and its Counsel. [3.] The trial court erred in awarding McFarland Attorneys’ Fees. [4.] The trial court erred in denying Gateway’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Summary Judgment Standard of Review: Assignments of Error One, Three and Four {¶34} Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” i.e., when “reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor.” Civ.R. 56(C). 1. The February 12, 2026 Final Appealable Judgment and Journal Entry is also the subject of an appeal by Brindle and Terra Firma. See Lucas v. Brindle, Belmont App. No. 26 BE 0014. Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 13 – {¶35} “When reviewing the decision of a trial court granting or denying a party’s motion for summary judgment, an appellate court applies a de novo standard of review.” Smathers v. Glass, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 30. “The appellate court conducts an independent review of the evidence without deference to the trial court’s findings.” Id. “It examines the evidence available in the record, including deposition or hearing transcripts, affidavits, stipulated exhibits, and the pleadings, see Civ.R. 56(C), and determines, as if it were the trial court, whether summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. When a party seeks to resolve a case on summary judgment, the evidence cannot be weighed, only reviewed de novo. Id. at ¶ 32. “When factual ambiguities exist,” and even when they do not, “inferences must still be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. Whether Fraud was Pled with Particularity {¶36} Ohio Civil Rule 9(B) provides: “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Appellants argue that the Complaint failed to plead fraud with particularity and, therefore, the right to argue Fraud has been waived. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. v. Ohio Edison Co., 2011-Ohio-2627, ¶ 42 (7th Dist.) (“failure to plead fraud with particularity results in waiver of that claim”). {¶37} We note preliminarily that this issue is moot inasmuch as Lucas voluntarily dismissed the Fraud claim in the September 5, 2025 Agreed Entry. The implications of that dismissal for the Civil Conspiracy claim will be discussed below. {¶38} Furthermore, we agree with Lucas that the appellants waived the argument or defense by not asserting the failure to plead with particularity in a responsive pleading. Following the federal practice, Ohio appellate courts have held that “[a] plaintiff’s failure Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 14 – to plead fraud with particularity in the complaint is deemed waived if it is not raised in the first responsive pleading or an early motion.” Klasa v. Rogers, 2004-Ohio-4490, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.); Mihalca v. Malita, 2000 WL 372309, *5 (9th Dist.); Hoover v. Wherry, 1999 WL 333302, *2 (10th Dist.), citing 2A Moore, Federal Practice, Paragraph 9.03[9-35] (2d Ed. 1984). Whether a Forged Deed to Real Property Conveys Title {¶39} Fundamental to many of the issues raised in these appeals is whether title passed to Gateway so that Gateway may claim an interest in the mineral rights as a bona fide purchaser for value. {¶40} It is unequivocal that a forged deed does not pass title and that subsequent purchasers do not acquire an interest in the property regardless of bona fides. “A forged instrument is not merely voidable, but absolutely void.” Shinew v. First Natl. Bank, 84 Ohio St. 297 (1911), syllabus; Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405 (1878), paragraph two of the syllabus (“the act of the forger is void”). {¶41} Accordingly, “if one forges a deed for another’s property and puts it upon record, he neither acquires nor has power to convey any title to such property.” Ogden v. Ogden, 4 Ohio St. 182, 195 (1854). “The original fraud so taints the transaction that a bona fide purchaser from such source could claim as against the real owner, no title whatever to the property.” Id.; accord Montgomery Cty. Treasurer v. Rush Plaza Corp., 2025-Ohio-1484, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.) (“[a] forged deed is void and ineffective to pass any title or rights to the grantee”); Third Fed. S. & L. Assn. of Cleveland v. Shaver, 1976 WL Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 15 – 188844, *1 (9th Dist.) (“[a] forged deed is absolutely void and ineffective to pass any title or rights in the grantee”). Fraud and Forgery Distinguished {¶42} It will also be profitable in considering the appellants’ arguments to recognize the distinction between forgery and fraud, both criminally and civilly. {¶43} In criminal law, to defraud someone is to obtain something “by deception,” i.e., “deceiving another or causing another to be deceived by any false or misleading representation.” R.C. 2913.01(B) and (A). To forge, in contrast, is “to fabricate or create, in whole or in part and by any means, any spurious writing.” R.C. 2913.01(G). While deception and forgery are not unrelated (the purpose of a forgery is typically to deceive), they are recognized as distinct criminal acts. “The ‘act of obtaining another’s property is distinct from the act of fabricating documents.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Walker, 2016- Ohio-8615, ¶ 53 (5th Dist.); State v. Smith, 2014-Ohio-5076, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.) (“[t]he offense of Forgery by the fabrication or creation of spurious writings is not allied with the offense of Theft by deception”). {¶44} The “various elements” comprising civil fraud have been set forth as follows: “(1) a representation (or concealment of a fact when there is a duty to disclose) (2) that is material to the transaction at hand, (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or with such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be inferred, and (4) with intent to mislead another into relying upon it, (5) justifiable reliance, and (6) resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.” Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc., 2010-Ohio-2057, ¶ 27. Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 16 – {¶45} Contrast these elements in which a false representation and reliance are essential with the understanding of forgery in the civil context: “The forgery of the signature of another is a recognized variant of the tort known generally as invasion of privacy” and “amounts to the appropriation of the name or likeness of another.” (Citation omitted.) James v. Bob Ross Buick, Inc., 2006-Ohio-2638, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.); Economy Linen & Towel Serv., Inc. v. McIntosh, 2001 WL 1081376, *7 (12th Dist.) (“[i]t is the use of the person’s name as a symbol of his identity that gives rise to an action based on the right of privacy”). {¶46} The distinction between fraud and forgery is not irrelevant in the present case inasmuch as a forged deed is void and not subject to ratification while a deed obtained by fraud may only be voidable and subsequently ratified. Johnston v. Shale Play Land Servs. Inc., 2024-Ohio-5934, ¶ 38-44 (7th Dist.). It is also relevant because Lucas voluntarily dismissed the Fraud claim against Gateway and Gateway argues that, by doing so, she has forfeited her ability to bring other claims based on the purportedly fraudulent conduct. {¶47} This Court addressed those implications in R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. GBS Corp., 2009-Ohio-6808 (7th Dist.). This Court considered “whether forgery is fraud in the execution [as opposed to fraud in the inducement] and if so whether such is an affirmative defense [subject to Civil Rule 8].” Id. at ¶ 34. {¶48} This Court held, despite contrary authority, “that forgery is just another way of saying that the defendant never signed a contract and thus no contract ever existed.” Id. at ¶ 38. We acknowledge that Ohio Jurisprudence lists forgery of a signature as a type of fraud in the execution. 50 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (2002, Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 17 – Supp. 2007), Fraud and Deceit, Section 14. However, the case it cites for this proposition did not make such a pronouncement. It did say that if one forges a deed, he does not acquire title with power to convey to a bona fide purchaser because the original “fraud” taints the transaction. Ogden v. Ogden (1854), 4 Ohio St. 182, 195. This does not classify forgery of a signature as fraud in the execution. Furthermore, this was pure dicta. Ogden had nothing to do with a forged signature. Rather, the issues surrounded possible fraud in the procurement of an actual signature and a premature delivery of a deed contrary to its conditions. Id. at ¶ 37. {¶49} The proposition that a forged signature prevents an agreement or contract from coming into existence is wholly consistent with the foregoing law that a forged instrument is “absolutely void.” {¶50} Although the parties have argued that forgery is a type of fraud in the execution, we will adhere to our holding in R.C. Olmstead and treat it as grounds for finding that a contract, i.e., the deed transfers, never existed. Such a holding seems particularly sound given the substantive distinctions between fraud and forgery outlined above, especially the element of deception which is necessary for fraud but not forgery. Reasonable Minds Can Only Conclude that the June Mineral Deed and July Corrective Mineral Deed are Forged Instruments {¶51} The evidence presented by Lucas that the Mineral Deed and Corrective Mineral Deed transferring McFarland’s interest in the mineral rights to Terra Firma were forged is sufficient to satisfy the summary judgment standard. {¶52} The following statements were attested by affidavits in support of summary judgment. McFarland averred that she “did not sign the deeds,” “did not sell or convey my Oil and Gas Rights,” and “did not authorize anyone to sell or convey my Oil and Gas Rights.” She had previously received offers as high as $750,000 for the mineral rights and she refused all such offers. Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 18 – {¶53} McFarland’s son, Robert Lloyd McFarland, Jr., averred that Michael Brindle came to the residence where he and his mother resided and spoke with his mother about selling her mineral rights. “[I]t was explained to Mr. Brindle that [his] mother would not sell her mineral rights or sign anything without first speaking with her lawyer.” Brindle left a business card identifying himself as a “Land Agent” for AMS. {¶54} Timothy Miller, the notary who notarized the deeds, averred that he has never met McFarland and did not witness her sign either deed. Rather, he placed his notary stamp upon the deeds and signed his name to them “at the instruction of Michael R. Brindle.” {¶55} Vickie Willard, a certified forensic document examiner, analyzed the mineral rights deeds and compared McFarland’s signatures thereupon with thirty-five specimen signatures (thirty-four of which “were dated within a few days to six months of the date on the questioned deeds”). She found “no reasonable explanation for the differences observed between the specimen signatures and the [deed] signatures,” and opined “that the signatures on the Mineral Deed and Corrective Mineral Deed were not written by the same individual who signed the name ‘Ethel McFarland’, ‘Ethel M. McFarland’ or ‘Ethel Mae McFarland’ on the documents listed as K-1 through K-35.” {¶56} Finally, the fact that McFarland is to have sold the mineral rights to Terra Firma for $83,996.22 while, a few months earlier, rejecting an offer for the same rights for $545,000.00 is compelling circumstantial evidence that the sale was either fraudulent or fabricated. {¶57} No evidence or argument disputing the foregoing testimonies was presented in opposition to summary judgment. Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015 – 19 – {¶58} In light of the foregoing exposition, we will now consider the appellants’ arguments as they relate to specific claims on which judgment was granted. Quiet Title {¶59} Quiet Title is a statutory cause of action. “An action may be brought by a person in possession of real property, by himself or tenant, against any person who claims an interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse interest.” R.C. 5303.01. Whether the Appeal is Moot with Respect to Quiet Title {¶60} Lucas argues that the appeal became moot with respect to Quiet Title as that judgment was satisfied upon the recording of the Final Appealable Order and Journal Entry. The Final Appealable Order provided: “The Clerk of this Court is directed to cause a certified copy of this Journal Judgment Entry to be recorded in the Deed Records of Belmont County, Ohio, which recording shall quiet title to the Real Estate, the Real Estate’s Mineral Rights, including oil and gas rights, and the Lease, to Plaintiff Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland.” {¶61} Pursuant to a Confirmation Entry filed on February 20, 2026, the Journal Judgment Entry was recorded on February 17, 2026. On February 25, 2026, Gateway filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion for Stay of Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal. {¶62} “It is a well-established principle of law that a satisfaction of judgment renders an appeal from that judgment moot.” Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 245 (1990). “Generally, a party may avoid a voluntary s