Lucas v. Brindle
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket26 BE 0013, 26 BE 0015
JudgeS. Lynch
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Lucas v. Brindle, 2026-Ohio-4592.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
BELMONT COUNTY
DIANA L. LUCAS, EXECUTRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF
ETHEL MAE MCFARLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL R. BRINDLE, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
Civil Appeals from the
Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
Case No. 21 CV 44
BEFORE:
Scott Lynch, John J. Eklund, Eugene A. Lucci, Eleventh District Judges, sitting by
assignment.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
–2–
Atty. Richard O. Hamilton, Jr. and Atty. Adam J. Turer, Robbins, Kelly, Patterson &
Tucker, L.P.A., 312 Elm Street, Suite 2200, Cincinnati, OH 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland.
Atty. Joshua E. O’Farrell and Atty. J. Alex Quay, Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs,
L.L.C., 4277 Munson Street, N.W., Canton, OH 44718, for Defendants-Appellants,
Gateway Royalty V, LLC and Molly K. Johnson.
Dated: November 17, 2026
SCOTT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Defendants-appellants, Gateway Royalty V, LLC, and Attorney Molly K.
Johnson, appeal the judgment of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas, granting
summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Diana L. Lucas, Executrix for the Estate
of Ethel Mae McFarland, and sanctioning Gateway and Johnson for frivolous conduct.
{¶2} We affirm the grant of summary judgment with respect to Lucas’s claims for
Quiet Title and Conversion on the grounds that a forged instrument cannot pass title or a
colorable claim of title. We reverse the grant of summary judgment with respect to her
claims for Tortious Interference, Slander of Title, and Civil Conspiracy finding that genuine
issues of material fact exist regarding Gateway’s complicity in the underlying forgery. For
similar reasons we reverse the award of punitive damages and attorney fees. The malice
necessary to sustain a punitive award cannot be established as a matter of law for
summary judgment purposes in the present case. We find the economic loss rule
inapplicable in the present case and affirm the award of compensatory damages. Finally,
we reverse the sanctions awarded for frivolous conduct as there were legitimate grounds
for moving for reconsideration.
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
–3–
{¶3} Accordingly, the judgment of the court below is affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Substantive and Procedural Background
{¶4} On March 19, 2021, Ethel Mae McFarland filed a Complaint against Michael
R. Brindle; Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC; American Mineral Solutions, LLC
(“AMS”); Daniel F. Spitznagel; Gateway Royalty V, LLC; Ascent Resources – Utica, LLC;
Timothy Paul Miller; Paloma Partners III, LLC; Gulfport Energy Corporation (as successor
in interest to Paloma Partners); and XTO Energy Inc.
{¶5} According to the Complaint, McFarland owned real estate and the
associated oil and gas rights in Belmont County. The oil and gas rights (hereafter mineral
rights) are subject to lease agreements with defendants, Ascent, Paloma, Gulfport, and
XTO. The Complaint alleged that Brindle, Terra Firma, AMS, Sptiznagel, Gateway, and
Miller had fraudulently conspired to deprive McFarland of her mineral rights by forging
deeds transferring the rights to Terra Firma. Thereafter, the mineral rights were
transferred to AMS and then to Gateway.
{¶6} With respect to Gateway, the Complaint raised claims of Quiet Title; Fraud;
Tortious Interference; Conversion; Equitable Disgorgement; Slander of Title; Breach of
Accounting / Specific Performance; Civil Conspiracy; and Punitive Damages.
{¶7} On April 20, 2021, Gateway filed an Answer and counterclaimed against
McFarland raising claims of Quiet Title, Declaratory Judgment, Breach of Contract, and
Unjust Enrichment. Gateway asserted its ownership of the mineral rights as a bona fide
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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purchaser in good faith and alleged that McFarland had breached an agreement to
execute a deed transferring the mineral rights to Terra Firma.
{¶8} On July 25, 2022, the trial court entered default judgment in favor of
McFarland against Brindle and Terra Firma.
{¶9} On October 18, 2022, a Suggestion of Death was filed on behalf of
McFarland. Thereafter, Lucas, as executrix of McFarland’s estate, was substituted as the
new party plaintiff.
{¶10} On December 13, 2022, Lucas filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
as to Gateway’s Counterclaim.
{¶11} On January 27, 2023, the trial court dismissed Gateway’s counterclaims
against substitute plaintiff Lucas.
{¶12} On February 14, 2023, Lucas filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway.
{¶13} On March 14, 2023, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Ascent.
{¶14} On March 15, 2023, Gateway filed a Motion for Summary Judgment as to
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
{¶15} On April 6, 2023, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Miller.
{¶16} On April 19, 2023, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against XTO.
{¶17} On May 16, 2024, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Lucas and overruled Gateway’s competing Motion for Summary Judgment. Counsel for
Lucas was granted until June 10, 2024, “within which to submit a proposed Judgment
Journal Entry containing Plaintiff’s recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
–5–
damage, and/or a hearing, if requested, for punitive damages as to Plaintiff’s ownership
of the subject mineral rights.”
{¶18} On July 2, 2024, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Spitznagel
and AMS.
{¶19} On July 15, 2024, Gateway filed a Motion for Status Conference and Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Unresolved Claims, asserting that Lucas’s claims for Fraud,
Equitable Disgorgement, Breach of Accounting / Specific Performance, and Punitive
Damages remained unresolved by the grant of summary judgment in Lucas’s favor.
{¶20} On July 17, 2024, the trial court “direct[ed] all counsel to sign an Agreed
Entry listing all pending claims and suggesting a briefing schedule.”
{¶21} On September 5, 2024, an Agreed Entry was issued which provided, in
relevant part:
By agreement and stipulation, Plaintiff’s claim for fraud as
against Defendant Gateway is hereby dismissed. Plaintiff’s claims
for equitable disgorgement, accounting/specific performance, and
punitive damages are hereby mooted to the extent that these are
remedies sought by Plaintiff, not additional claims against
Defendants. Accordingly, Defendant Gateway’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Unresolved Claims filed herein on July 15, 2024 is moot
and is hereby withdrawn.
{¶22} On February 11, 2025, Gateway filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asking
the trial court to reconsider, inter alia, the dismissal of its counterclaims against Lucas
and the grant of summary judgment in her favor.
{¶23} On February 20, 2025, Lucas filed her opposition to reconsideration as well
as a Motion for Sanctions against Gateway, and its Counsel, Johnson, pursuant to R.C.
2323.51, Civil Rule 11, and Civil Rule 56(G).
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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{¶24} On March 5, 2025, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, supplementing the earlier grant of summary judgment in Lucas’s favor. The court
expressly determined that Lucas was entitled to judgment against Gateway, Brindle, and
Terra Firma on her claims for Quiet Title, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Slander of
Title, and Civil Conspiracy. The court awarded against these defendants, “jointly and
severally, compensatory damages in the amount of $658,860.30, plus punitive damages
in the amount of $1,976,580.90, plus her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred
in this action.”
{¶25} On March 6, 2025, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and
granted the Motion for Sanctions. The court noted that “the Grace Affidavit is self-serving,
untimely, and ill-suited as the summary judgment deadline passed previously,” while “[t]he
supposed new, direct, and binding authority cited by Gateway fails to meet those
descriptions.”
{¶26} On March 24, 2025, a sanctions hearing was held.
{¶27} On April 22, 2025, Lucas filed a Motion to Determine Attorneys’ Fees and
Costs pursuant to the trial court’s finding that Gateway acted in bad faith and award of
punitive damages and attorney fees.
{¶28} On May 21, 2025, the trial court issued a “proposed” Judgment and Journal
Entry, reaffirming its finding that Gateway’s Motion for Reconsideration was groundless
and granting Lucas’s Motion for Sanctions against both Gateway and Johnson.
{¶29} On June 3, 2025, Lucas filed, pursuant to court order, an Affidavit of Adam
J. Turer for Plaintiff’s Fees and Costs limited to the Opposition of Gateway’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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{¶30} On October 20, 2025, a hearing was held to determine Lucas’s attorney
fees and costs.
{¶31} On February 12, 2026, the trial court issued a Final Appealable Judgment
and Journal Entry. The court found, in relevant part, as follows:
3. Plaintiff’s family has owned the subject property known as
50050 Methodist Ridge Road, St. Clairsville, OH 43950 (“Property”)
for over 100 years. Ethel Mae McFarland was the sole owner of the
Property from her husband’s death on August 6, 2006, until Ethel’s
death on October 5, 2022. Ethel was also the owner of the mineral
rights and oil and gas rights on the Property (collectively, “Mineral
Rights”).
4. On or about August 26, 2013, Ethel Mae McFarland granted
an Oil and Gas Lease to Paloma Partners III, LLC (“Paloma”).
5. On or about July 10, 2015, Paloma subsequently assigned
the Lease to XTO Energy Inc. (“XTO”).
6. On or about November 21, 2017, XTO assigned 95% of the
working interest in the Lease to Ascent Resources – Utica, LLC
(“Ascent”), and retained a 5% non-operating working interest via a
Stipulation and Cross Conveyance effective November 21, 2017.
7. XTO subsequently assigned its 5% non-operating working
interest in the Paloma Lease to Ascent via Assignment and Bill of
Sale effective July 1, 2022.
8. Upon learning of the [present] dispute, Ascent and XTO
each suspended all royalty payments under the Lease.
9. In November 2018, June 2019, and August 2020, Ascent
made three payments to McFarland in the amount of $83,996.22
each as consideration for an Amendment and Ratification of Oil and
Gas Lease executed by McFarland.
10. In November 2019, Gateway Royalty V, LLC (“Gateway”)
made an offer to McFarland to purchase her Mineral Rights for up to
$763,560; the offer was good through December 15, 2019.
McFarland did not accept this or any other offer to sell her Mineral
Rights.
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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11. At some point between December 2019 and prior to June
2020, Brindle, acting as an agent of American Mineral Solutions LLC
(“AMS”), met with McFarland at the Property to solicit her to sell her
Mineral Rights. Brindle was informed that McFarland would not sell
her Mineral Rights or sign any document without first speaking to her
lawyer. Brindle left his business card which identifies him as a Land
Agent for AMS and left the property.
12. Sometime between June 24, 2020, and July 2, 2020,
Daniel Spitznagel (“Spitznagel”), the sole member and owner of
AMS, received at AMS’s business address a package in the mail
from the Belmont County Recorder’s Office addressed to Terra Firma
which contained a Mineral Deed (“June 2020 Mineral Deed”)
allegedly signed by Ethel Mae McFarland on June 15, 2020, and
recorded on June 24, 2020, which purported to convey McFarland’s
Mineral Rights to Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC (“Terra
Firma”).
13. The June 2020 Mineral Deed was purportedly notarized
by Timothy P. Miller. The deed was allegedly notarized in Belmont
County, Ohio, while Miller’s notarial seal identifies him as a notary in
the state of West Virginia. Timothy P. Miller testified he did not
witness Ethel Mae McFarland execute a deed in his presence on
June 15, 2020, or witness McFarland sign any documents.
14. Brindle, sole member and owner of Terra Firma, at the
request of Spitznagel and AMS, obtained an alleged corrective
mineral deed purported to be signed by McFarland (“Corrective
Mineral Deed”).
15. This Corrective Mineral Deed was allegedly signed by
Ethel Mae McFarland on July 15, 2020, and recorded on July 23,
2020, was purportedly notarized by Timothy P. Miller, and was
allegedly notarized in Belmont County, Ohio, while Miller’s notarial
seal identifies him as a notary in the state of West Virginia. Timothy
P. Miller did not witness Ethel Mae McFarland execute a corrective
deed in his presence on July 15, 2020.
16. According to the analysis and opinion of Vickie L. Willard,
a forensic document examiner identified by Plaintiff as an expert
witness, neither the June 2020 Mineral Deed nor the Corrective
Mineral Deed were signed by Ethel Mae McFarland.
17. McFarland’s alleged signature on the June 2020 Mineral
Deed and Corrective Mineral Deed do not resemble her signatures
on 35 other documents reviewed by Ms. Willard, a board-certified
forensic document examiner, and there is no reasonable explanation
for the differences in signatures.
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
–9–
18. Terra Firma executed a mineral deed dated June 17,
2020, which purported to convey the Mineral Rights to AMS. This
deed was recorded on July 17, 2020.
19. AMS executed a mineral deed dated July 28, 2020, which
purported to convey the Mineral Rights to Gateway.
20. No payments related to the Mineral Rights or mineral
deeds had been exchanged between or among any of the parties at
the time the most recent mineral deed was delivered to and accepted
by Gateway.
21. Without conducting a title exam, confirming that
McFarland had been compensated, or identifying the defective
notarizations of the fraudulent deeds, Gateway agreed to purchase
the Mineral Rights from AMS.
22. Terra Firma issued a payment to McFarland via check
dated September 4, 2020 in the amount of $83,996.22. The check
sent to McFarland identified the payment as “Oil and Gas Lease” and
was for the exact amount of three lease bonus payments previously
sent to McFarland by Ascent.
23. Just four months prior, in February 2020, Gateway had
offered McFarland $545,000 for the same Mineral Rights.
24. At the time the Terra Firma payment was issued to
McFarland, Gateway had already paid AMS, AMS had made
payments to Terra Firma and others, Terra Firma had executed a
deed conveying Mineral Rights to AMS, and AMS had executed a
deed conveying the Mineral Rights to Gateway.
25. Rice Drilling D, LLC (“Rice”) and EQT Corporation (“EQT”)
obtained an interest in the Mineral Rights after the instant lawsuit
was filed. Rice acquired an interest in Plaintiff’s Mineral Rights …
via an Assignment and Bill of Sale from Ascent … and via a Partial
Assignment of Leases from XTO … which granted Rice an interest
in the Paloma Lease limited only to those lands inside the Skyhawk
1 Unit.
26. AMS and Gateway knew or should have known
McFarland had a contract with Paloma, as evidenced by the
Memorandum of Lease recorded in Belmont County. AMS and
Gateway knew or should have known Paloma had assigned its lease
interests as evidenced by the assignment, also recorded in Belmont
County. AMS and Gateway knew McFarland was the lessor under
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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the lease agreement, as both AMS and Gateway contacted Ascent
to advise it of the purported conveyance of the Mineral Rights.
27. AMS and Gateway instructed Ascent and EQT to stop
paying McFarland lease payments and royalties under the lease
agreement and to instead pay Gateway. These payments rightfully
belong to McFarland as owner of the fee simple estate and leasehold
interest in the fee simple estate.
28. Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway acted in concert with
Brindle and Terra Firma to perpetuate the fraud and deprive Plaintiff
of her rights. All three contacted Ascent and other lessees and
worked in concert to make sure the lessees did not issue any further
payments to McFarland.
29. Spitznagel and AMS prepared the deed from Terra Firma
to AMS, backdated to show it was executed on June 17, 2020, which
was admittedly false, and Spitznagel notarized the deed without
witnessing Brindle sign it on that date.
30. As a result of the forged deeds, Gateway received
$142,840.04 in royalty payments from Ascent as of March 31, 2023.
31. As a result of the forged deeds, Gateway received
$150,396.95 in royalty payments from Rice and/or EQT as of
January 2, 2023.
32. XTO never issued any royalty payments under the Lease
to AMS or Gateway.
33. As of March 5, 2025, Gateway had failed to provide an
accounting of the payments received from EQT as a result of the
forged deeds. These funds should have been paid to Plaintiff.
34. Upon being served with the instant lawsuit, Gateway
notified Ascent and XTO and instructed them to hold funds in
suspense due to potential fraud and forgery.
35. As of March 31, 2023, Ascent was holding $356,874.67 in
royalties in suspense.
36. Upon learning of the dispute presented in the above-
captioned lawsuit, XTO suspended all royalty payments under the
Lease. As of February 13, 2023, XTO was holding $8,748.64 in
royalties in a suspense account.
37. McFarland did not sign the June 2020 Mineral Deed or
Corrective Mineral Deed. The evidence establishes, clearly and
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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convincingly, that McFarland’s purported signatures on both
documents were forged.
38. Spitznagel and AMS were suspicious of the June 2020
Mineral Deed yet failed to make any further inquiry and instead
worked with Brindle, Terra Firma, and Gateway to flip the Mineral
Rights as quickly as possible.
39. The Corrective Mineral Deed was created by Brindle and
Terra Firma upon the direction of Gateway, AMS, and Spitznagel.
40. This is not the first time these Defendants have engaged
in similar behavior. Brindle, Terra Firma, Spitznagel, AMS, and
Gateway were named as defendants in Belmont County Common
Pleas Case No. 20CV274, Connie Jo Gerritz v. Michael R. Brindle,
et al. That lawsuit was resolved by an unwinding of deeds,
transferring the mineral rights back to the rightful owner of the fee
simple estate.
41. Brindle, Terra Firma, Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway
deprived Plaintiff, at the time an 84-year-old widow, of the Mineral
Rights that have been in her family for generations. Despite full
understanding of their actions, they continued to intentionally deprive
her of her property rights and the payments to which she was entitled
under her lease agreements.
42. While the initial forged deed was created by Terra Firma,
Brindle, and Miller, the continuing fraud perpetrated on Plaintiff could
not have existed but for the reckless, intentional, and conspiratorial
conduct of AMS, Spitznagel, and Gateway. These parties knew that
Brindle forged another mineral rights deed in Belmont County yet
refused to unwind the McFarland transaction.
43. Defendants AMS, Spitznagel, and Miller settled with
Plaintiff, obtained a full release of Plaintiff’s claims, and were
ultimately dismissed from Plaintiff’s case with prejudice by Agreed
Entries and Notices of Dismissal of Claims.
{¶32} Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court reaffirmed judgment in
Lucas’s favor on the claims of Quiet Title, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Slander of
Title, and Civil Conspiracy. The court ordered title to the mineral rights to be quieted in
favor of Lucas and all deeds to the contrary to be voided. Lucas was awarded against
Brindle, Terra Firma, and Gateway, jointly and severally, compensatory damages in the
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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amount of $628,860.30, plus punitive damages in the amount of $1,886,580.90, plus her
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in the action totaling $262,928.09.
Additionally, Lucas was awarded against Gateway and Johnson, jointly and severally,
reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in opposing Gateway’s Motion for
Reconsideration and related sanctioned conduct totalling $19,057.00.
Assignments of Error
{¶33} Gateway filed a Notice of Appeal on February 25, 2026, and Johnson filed
Notice on March 6, 2026.1 This Court consolidated the two appeals. On appeal, Gateway
and Johnson raise the following assignments of error:
[1.] The trial court erred in granting McFarland’s [Motion for Summary
Judgment].
[2.] The trial court erred by sanctioning Gateway and its Counsel.
[3.] The trial court erred in awarding McFarland Attorneys’ Fees.
[4.] The trial court erred in denying Gateway’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
Summary Judgment Standard of Review: Assignments of Error One, Three and
Four
{¶34} Summary judgment is properly granted when “there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and … the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,”
i.e., when “reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party
being entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s
favor.” Civ.R. 56(C).
1. The February 12, 2026 Final Appealable Judgment and Journal Entry is also the subject of an appeal
by Brindle and Terra Firma. See Lucas v. Brindle, Belmont App. No. 26 BE 0014.
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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{¶35} “When reviewing the decision of a trial court granting or denying a party’s
motion for summary judgment, an appellate court applies a de novo standard of review.”
Smathers v. Glass, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 30. “The appellate court conducts an independent
review of the evidence without deference to the trial court’s findings.” Id. “It examines
the evidence available in the record, including deposition or hearing transcripts, affidavits,
stipulated exhibits, and the pleadings, see Civ.R. 56(C), and determines, as if it were the
trial court, whether summary judgment is appropriate.” Id. When a party seeks to resolve
a case on summary judgment, the evidence cannot be weighed, only reviewed de novo.
Id. at ¶ 32. “When factual ambiguities exist,” and even when they do not, “inferences
must still be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.
Whether Fraud was Pled with Particularity
{¶36} Ohio Civil Rule 9(B) provides: “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Appellants
argue that the Complaint failed to plead fraud with particularity and, therefore, the right to
argue Fraud has been waived. Allied Erecting & Dismantling Co., Inc. v. Ohio Edison
Co., 2011-Ohio-2627, ¶ 42 (7th Dist.) (“failure to plead fraud with particularity results in
waiver of that claim”).
{¶37} We note preliminarily that this issue is moot inasmuch as Lucas voluntarily
dismissed the Fraud claim in the September 5, 2025 Agreed Entry. The implications of
that dismissal for the Civil Conspiracy claim will be discussed below.
{¶38} Furthermore, we agree with Lucas that the appellants waived the argument
or defense by not asserting the failure to plead with particularity in a responsive pleading.
Following the federal practice, Ohio appellate courts have held that “[a] plaintiff’s failure
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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to plead fraud with particularity in the complaint is deemed waived if it is not raised in the
first responsive pleading or an early motion.” Klasa v. Rogers, 2004-Ohio-4490, ¶ 39 (8th
Dist.); Mihalca v. Malita, 2000 WL 372309, *5 (9th Dist.); Hoover v. Wherry, 1999 WL
333302, *2 (10th Dist.), citing 2A Moore, Federal Practice, Paragraph 9.03[9-35] (2d Ed.
1984).
Whether a Forged Deed to Real Property Conveys Title
{¶39} Fundamental to many of the issues raised in these appeals is whether title
passed to Gateway so that Gateway may claim an interest in the mineral rights as a bona
fide purchaser for value.
{¶40} It is unequivocal that a forged deed does not pass title and that subsequent
purchasers do not acquire an interest in the property regardless of bona fides. “A forged
instrument is not merely voidable, but absolutely void.” Shinew v. First Natl. Bank, 84
Ohio St. 297 (1911), syllabus; Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405 (1878), paragraph two
of the syllabus (“the act of the forger is void”).
{¶41} Accordingly, “if one forges a deed for another’s property and puts it upon
record, he neither acquires nor has power to convey any title to such property.” Ogden
v. Ogden, 4 Ohio St. 182, 195 (1854). “The original fraud so taints the transaction that
a bona fide purchaser from such source could claim as against the real owner, no title
whatever to the property.” Id.; accord Montgomery Cty. Treasurer v. Rush Plaza Corp.,
2025-Ohio-1484, ¶ 36 (2d Dist.) (“[a] forged deed is void and ineffective to pass any title
or rights to the grantee”); Third Fed. S. & L. Assn. of Cleveland v. Shaver, 1976 WL
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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188844, *1 (9th Dist.) (“[a] forged deed is absolutely void and ineffective to pass any title
or rights in the grantee”).
Fraud and Forgery Distinguished
{¶42} It will also be profitable in considering the appellants’ arguments to
recognize the distinction between forgery and fraud, both criminally and civilly.
{¶43} In criminal law, to defraud someone is to obtain something “by deception,”
i.e., “deceiving another or causing another to be deceived by any false or misleading
representation.” R.C. 2913.01(B) and (A). To forge, in contrast, is “to fabricate or create,
in whole or in part and by any means, any spurious writing.” R.C. 2913.01(G). While
deception and forgery are not unrelated (the purpose of a forgery is typically to deceive),
they are recognized as distinct criminal acts. “The ‘act of obtaining another’s property is
distinct from the act of fabricating documents.’” (Citation omitted.) State v. Walker, 2016-
Ohio-8615, ¶ 53 (5th Dist.); State v. Smith, 2014-Ohio-5076, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.) (“[t]he
offense of Forgery by the fabrication or creation of spurious writings is not allied with the
offense of Theft by deception”).
{¶44} The “various elements” comprising civil fraud have been set forth as follows:
“(1) a representation (or concealment of a fact when there is a duty to disclose) (2) that
is material to the transaction at hand, (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or with
such utter disregard and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may
be inferred, and (4) with intent to mislead another into relying upon it, (5) justifiable
reliance, and (6) resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.” Volbers-Klarich v.
Middletown Mgt., Inc., 2010-Ohio-2057, ¶ 27.
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
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{¶45} Contrast these elements in which a false representation and reliance are
essential with the understanding of forgery in the civil context: “The forgery of the
signature of another is a recognized variant of the tort known generally as invasion of
privacy” and “amounts to the appropriation of the name or likeness of another.” (Citation
omitted.) James v. Bob Ross Buick, Inc., 2006-Ohio-2638, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.); Economy
Linen & Towel Serv., Inc. v. McIntosh, 2001 WL 1081376, *7 (12th Dist.) (“[i]t is the use
of the person’s name as a symbol of his identity that gives rise to an action based on the
right of privacy”).
{¶46} The distinction between fraud and forgery is not irrelevant in the present
case inasmuch as a forged deed is void and not subject to ratification while a deed
obtained by fraud may only be voidable and subsequently ratified. Johnston v. Shale
Play Land Servs. Inc., 2024-Ohio-5934, ¶ 38-44 (7th Dist.). It is also relevant because
Lucas voluntarily dismissed the Fraud claim against Gateway and Gateway argues that,
by doing so, she has forfeited her ability to bring other claims based on the purportedly
fraudulent conduct.
{¶47} This Court addressed those implications in R.C. Olmstead, Inc. v. GBS
Corp., 2009-Ohio-6808 (7th Dist.). This Court considered “whether forgery is fraud in the
execution [as opposed to fraud in the inducement] and if so whether such is an affirmative
defense [subject to Civil Rule 8].” Id. at ¶ 34.
{¶48} This Court held, despite contrary authority, “that forgery is just another way
of saying that the defendant never signed a contract and thus no contract ever existed.”
Id. at ¶ 38.
We acknowledge that Ohio Jurisprudence lists forgery of a signature
as a type of fraud in the execution. 50 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (2002,
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
– 17 –
Supp. 2007), Fraud and Deceit, Section 14. However, the case it
cites for this proposition did not make such a pronouncement. It did
say that if one forges a deed, he does not acquire title with power to
convey to a bona fide purchaser because the original “fraud” taints
the transaction. Ogden v. Ogden (1854), 4 Ohio St. 182, 195. This
does not classify forgery of a signature as fraud in the execution.
Furthermore, this was pure dicta. Ogden had nothing to do with a
forged signature. Rather, the issues surrounded possible fraud in
the procurement of an actual signature and a premature delivery of
a deed contrary to its conditions.
Id. at ¶ 37.
{¶49} The proposition that a forged signature prevents an agreement or contract
from coming into existence is wholly consistent with the foregoing law that a forged
instrument is “absolutely void.”
{¶50} Although the parties have argued that forgery is a type of fraud in the
execution, we will adhere to our holding in R.C. Olmstead and treat it as grounds for
finding that a contract, i.e., the deed transfers, never existed. Such a holding seems
particularly sound given the substantive distinctions between fraud and forgery outlined
above, especially the element of deception which is necessary for fraud but not forgery.
Reasonable Minds Can Only Conclude that the June Mineral Deed and July
Corrective Mineral Deed are Forged Instruments
{¶51} The evidence presented by Lucas that the Mineral Deed and Corrective
Mineral Deed transferring McFarland’s interest in the mineral rights to Terra Firma were
forged is sufficient to satisfy the summary judgment standard.
{¶52} The following statements were attested by affidavits in support of summary
judgment. McFarland averred that she “did not sign the deeds,” “did not sell or convey
my Oil and Gas Rights,” and “did not authorize anyone to sell or convey my Oil and Gas
Rights.” She had previously received offers as high as $750,000 for the mineral rights
and she refused all such offers.
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
– 18 –
{¶53} McFarland’s son, Robert Lloyd McFarland, Jr., averred that Michael Brindle
came to the residence where he and his mother resided and spoke with his mother about
selling her mineral rights. “[I]t was explained to Mr. Brindle that [his] mother would not
sell her mineral rights or sign anything without first speaking with her lawyer.” Brindle left
a business card identifying himself as a “Land Agent” for AMS.
{¶54} Timothy Miller, the notary who notarized the deeds, averred that he has
never met McFarland and did not witness her sign either deed. Rather, he placed his
notary stamp upon the deeds and signed his name to them “at the instruction of Michael
R. Brindle.”
{¶55} Vickie Willard, a certified forensic document examiner, analyzed the mineral
rights deeds and compared McFarland’s signatures thereupon with thirty-five specimen
signatures (thirty-four of which “were dated within a few days to six months of the date on
the questioned deeds”). She found “no reasonable explanation for the differences
observed between the specimen signatures and the [deed] signatures,” and opined “that
the signatures on the Mineral Deed and Corrective Mineral Deed were not written by the
same individual who signed the name ‘Ethel McFarland’, ‘Ethel M. McFarland’ or ‘Ethel
Mae McFarland’ on the documents listed as K-1 through K-35.”
{¶56} Finally, the fact that McFarland is to have sold the mineral rights to Terra
Firma for $83,996.22 while, a few months earlier, rejecting an offer for the same rights for
$545,000.00 is compelling circumstantial evidence that the sale was either fraudulent or
fabricated.
{¶57} No evidence or argument disputing the foregoing testimonies was
presented in opposition to summary judgment.
Case Nos. 26 BE 0013 & 26 BE 0015
– 19 –
{¶58} In light of the foregoing exposition, we will now consider the appellants’
arguments as they relate to specific claims on which judgment was granted.
Quiet Title
{¶59} Quiet Title is a statutory cause of action. “An action may be brought by a
person in possession of real property, by himself or tenant, against any person who claims
an interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse interest.”
R.C. 5303.01.
Whether the Appeal is Moot with Respect to Quiet Title
{¶60} Lucas argues that the appeal became moot with respect to Quiet Title as
that judgment was satisfied upon the recording of the Final Appealable Order and Journal
Entry. The Final Appealable Order provided: “The Clerk of this Court is directed to cause
a certified copy of this Journal Judgment Entry to be recorded in the Deed Records of
Belmont County, Ohio, which recording shall quiet title to the Real Estate, the Real
Estate’s Mineral Rights, including oil and gas rights, and the Lease, to Plaintiff Diana L.
Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland.”
{¶61} Pursuant to a Confirmation Entry filed on February 20, 2026, the Journal
Judgment Entry was recorded on February 17, 2026. On February 25, 2026, Gateway
filed a Notice of Appeal and Motion for Stay of Execution of Judgment Pending Appeal.
{¶62} “It is a well-established principle of law that a satisfaction of judgment
renders an appeal from that judgment moot.” Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243,
245 (1990). “Generally, a party may avoid a voluntary s