Coughlin v. Coughlin

[Cite as Coughlin v. Coughlin, 2026-Ohio-2535.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA KIMBERLY M. COUGHLIN, : Plaintiff-Appellee/ : Cross-Appellant, : No. 115353 v. : KYLE C. COUGHLIN, : Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Appellee. : JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 2, 2026 Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Division Case No. DR-23-393996 Appearances: Stafford Cruz Law Company and Kelley R. Tauring, for appellee/cross-appellant. Spengler Nathanson, L.L.P., and Karin L. Coble, Esq., for appellant/cross-appellee. MARY J. BOYLE, P.J.: Former spouses, appellant/cross-appellee Kyle Coughlin (“Husband”) and appellee/cross-appellant Kimberly Coughlin (“Wife”) appeal and cross-appeal the judgment entry issued by the domestic relations court granting the parties a divorce and, raising the following assignments of error for review: Husband’s Assignments of Error Assignment of Error One: The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to permit a full Daubert voir dire of the vocational “expert,” thereby admitting unreliable expert testimony in violation of Evid.R. 702. Assignment of Error Two: The trial court abused its discretion in awarding spousal support by imputing $86,000 in additional income to [Husband], where the finding that he was employable and voluntarily underemployed was against the manifest weight of the evidence, especially because Exhibits W and X were not admitted into evidence. Assignment of Error Three: The trial court erred in finding [Husband] committed financial misconduct. Assignment of Error Four: The trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital property by accepting [Wife’s] lower valuation of the marital residence and rejecting [Husband’s] evidence of the home’s higher fair market value. Assignment of Error Five: The trial court erred and exceeded its statutory authority under R.C. 3105.171(E) when it granted both a distributive award and an unequal division of marital property based on the same finding of financial misconduct. Assignment of Error Six: The trial court abused its discretion by awarding attorney fees.  Wife’s Cross-Assignments of Error Cross-Assignment of Error One: The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion in calculating [Husband’s] spousal support. Cross-Assignment of Error Two: The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by failing to hold [Husband] in contempt of court for his admitted noncompliance with court orders. Cross-Assignment of Error Three: The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion by failing to award [Wife] treble damages for [Husband’s] financial misconduct. Cross-Assignment of Error Four: The trial court erred as matter of law and abused its discretion in issuing its division of marital debt. After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. We reverse the financial misconduct and attorney fees awards and remand for a proper determination under the applicable statutes, and we affirm the remainder of the judgment. I. Facts and Procedural History Husband and Wife were married in 1996, and had three children as issue of their marriage; the children were emancipated at the time Wife initiated the current divorce proceedings on March 17, 2023.1 Husband filed his answer and counterclaim in June 2023. The matter proceeded to a trial before a magistrate on 1 We note that in April 2021, Husband filed for divorce in Cuyahoga C.P. No. DR- 21-384903. On March 7, 2023, Husband voluntarily dismissed his case, without prejudice. four separate dates in October 2024. Initially, Husband appeared remotely by Zoom because he was living in Jordan.2 The following relevant evidence was presented. At the time of trial, the parties were 54 years old and had been married for over 28 years. Wife was employed at her father’s (“Father”) insurance company as well as the cannabis insurance company started by her brother. According to Wife, she made approximately $35,000 per year at Father’s company and $42,000 a year at her brother’s company, for a total income of approximately $75,000 a year. During the marriage, Wife supported Husband’s military career, including relocations throughout the United States, and was the primary caretaker for their children. Husband became a pilot while in the military. According to Wife, they had financial struggles early in their marriage, including filing for bankruptcy. Wife testified that she had to work at Father’s insurance company approximately “six hours a week” to supplement their income. (Tr. 73.) In 2011, Husband began working overseas as a private, military contractor in Afghanistan. Husband completed tactical military missions while abroad. He started off as a pilot and worked his way up to deputy program manager. Husband worked overseas until 2022. According to Husband, he had to quit because of his post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) diagnosis. Husband’s pilot job paid well, “more money than [the parties have] ever made or ever seen.” (Tr. 76.) His schedule required him to be in Afghanistan for three months and then 2 Prior to living in Jordan and when he returned to the United States, Husband lived with his father in his father’s Rocky River home. home for a month and then redeploy. Also during that time frame, Husband worked for the State Department from 2017-2018 as a pilot flying dignitaries in and out of the United States. Husband testified that while working overseas, he would deposit his paychecks directly into Wife’s bank account. He earned approximately $275,000 annually for his work abroad. According to Husband, Wife controlled the finances while he was overseas. Husband further testified he spent little money while abroad and estimated that he had sent approximately $3 million in income to the household. Husband stated that he returned home to “boxes and boxes full of debt that will never be paid.” (Tr. 16.) Husband testified that he has tax debt for the 2021-2024 tax years. The only evidence, however, he provided in support of this contention was a three-page printout stating that he has not filed his 2023 tax return and that as a result he owes $27,792.04. (Husband’s exhibit N.) Husband did not provide the court with any detailed account balances, nor did he provide any tax returns for the 2022 or 2023 tax years. At the time of trial, Husband had not filed a return for the 2023 tax year. Husband also had balances on several credit cards. Wife testified that Husband has not “given her a cent since August of 2022” and Father was paying the mortgage because she could not afford it. (Tr. 109.) Wife entered into a loan agreement with Father for the money he loaned her to pay for the marital home, the car, and insurance during the pendency of the divorce. At the time of trial, Wife owed Father $84,502.10. Father paid $66,390.97 in mortgage payments, $11,506.78 in car payments, and $6,604.35 in insurance premiums. Wife further testified that the marital debt was the result of Husband’s spending. According to Wife, one of their credit cards had a balance of approximately $32,000 that Husband spent on trips to Dubai and trips with the children. Additionally, Wife incurred $12,000 in debt as the cosigner on an educational loan for one of their children. Wife also has several other credit cards with balances totaling approximately $40,000. Husband’s income decreased significantly between the filing of his complaint for divorce in 2021 and the trial of this matter in 2024. In 2021, he earned $264,119. His W-2 for 2022 demonstrated that he earned $266,196. In May 2022, the Department of Veterans Affairs determined that Husband had been 100 percent disabled since September 2020. Husband also provided a benefit verification letter indicating the Social Security Administration found that he had become disabled under their rules in December 2022. Husband’s veteran disability benefit is $47,746.20 annually and his Social Security benefit is $39,060 annually, making his total annual income $86,806.20. Husband also testified about his retirement account with T. Rowe Price (“T. Rowe”). He acknowledged that he had liquidated the account, totaling approximately $100,000, because he “needed it to live on.” (Tr. 47.) After the early withdrawal penalty, he received $70,000. According to the October 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020 statement for this account, there was a balance of $203,439.33 with an outstanding loan balance of $14,739.82. (Wife’s exhibit No. 30(A).) In December 2020, the parties withdrew $100,000 to pay off a portion of their debt. The account remained intact until sometime around September 30, 2022, when Husband withdrew $119,271.62. Husband stated that the money was deposited into his bank account. After Wife threatened to freeze his bank accounts, he took the money out of the account and used it to buy precious metals. He explained he spent $50,000 on attorney fees and $20,000 on “travel fees for coming back to trial four separate times.” (Tr. 48.) Husband maintained that the liquidation occurred during the brief period after he voluntarily dismissed the initial divorce case and before Wife refiled. He further maintained that there was no court order in effect restricting his access to those funds at the time of the withdrawal. Husband’s Bank of America statements demonstrated that there were two deposits from a Fidelity account between March 10 and 15, 2023, into his Bank of America account totaling $101,023.24. (Wife’s exhibit No. 45.) Husband’s Coinbase account statement dated March 21, 2023, to October 11, 2023, indicated that he withdrew $5,291.87 from his account and in March 2023, he spent $20,958.15 to purchase silver bars through his JM Bullion account. (Wife’s exhibit Nos. 31 and 32). Husband testified that he resold his silver and gold for cash, but he could not locate any documentation concerning the sale of the silver. Husband further testified that he purchased the gold in Romania with cash from his Bank of America account, but also could not recall any details of when he sold the gold.  Husband further testified about his experiences overseas and the lasting effects of his PTSD stemming from his military service in the middle east. He explained that his work involved “direct ground to ground combat operation [and] air to ground” engagements, often targeting “Taliban protected poppy fields and drug labs” and that “back on the base we would receive ground attacks or indirect fire . . . probably weekly.” (Tr. 12-13.) Husband experienced flashbacks, hypervigilance, paranoia, and sensory triggers such as the smell of gunpowder. He explained that the constant state of adrenaline in combat became “normalized” and that once removed from that environment, the underlying emotions of fear and anxiety “get exaggerated because you don’t have adrenaline to go with it.” (Tr. 28.) Husband further testified that the PTSD manifests in his life with sleeplessness, “compounding so many sleepless nights in a row where you can’t tell day from night. It’s kind of a dream world to live in and just panicky hyper vigilantly when you are awake. And the headaches, paranoia, compounded by lack of sleep, you can’t pay attention, and very forgetful.” (Tr. 29.) He explained that these symptoms initially felt “normal” to him and he went untreated until he was screened by his unit’s medical staff. He was sent for an evaluation, which confirmed his PTSD diagnosis. Husband testified that he sees a counselor once a week, does PTSD progress therapy twice a week, and is on medication. He also sees a psychiatrist every 90 days. Husband has also been diagnosed with migraine headaches, fibromyalgia, lumbosacral or cervical strain, and persistent adjustment disorder.  According to Husband, his diagnoses substantially impair his daily functioning. He testified that he does not trust his own judgment, cannot focus long enough “to go anywhere or do anything,” and experiences panic attacks and sleepless nights if he leaves the house. (Tr. 30.) Husband further testified that his condition renders him “incapable of going back to work[.]” (Tr. 120.) Wife called vocational consultant Anne Veh (“Veh”) to testify regarding Husband’s employability and earning capacity. Veh has a Masters of Arts in Guidance and Counseling and is a licensed social worker in the State of Ohio. She also is a licensed professional clinical counselor and a certified life care planner. Veh testified that she has been accepted as an expert in Cuyahoga County. Husband’s counsel then requested the opportunity to conduct an inquiry pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), before Veh began her testimony. When counsel asked Veh about the frequency of her interviews with Husband, the court stated, “[Y]ou can question her as an expert, but you can save that for cross-examination.” (Tr. 8.) When asking Veh about her methodology, the court stated that this line of questioning was “for your regular cross-examination.” (Tr. 9.) Husband’s counsel then stated that his purpose was to examine Veh’s methodology and the reliability of her opinions, not challenge her credibility. The magistrate concluded, “You can ask her about her general qualifications, and you can cross-examine her on cross about this particular case.” (Tr. 10.) At that point, counsel ended his Daubert inquiry, preserving his objection for the record to the court’s limitation on his ability to conduct a Daubert challenge. Counsel additionally objected that Veh’s curriculum vitae (“CV”) was not attached to her report or disclosed in advance. Veh then continued with her testimony. She interviewed Husband on one occasion by Zoom. She also reviewed Husband’s resume and described several of the positions he held throughout his career, including service as a United States Marine, a Life Flight helicopter medic transporting patients in emergency conditions, and his work with the Department of State and other agencies on international narcotics and law-enforcement missions in the middle east. Veh also reviewed documentation from the Department of Veterans Affairs. According to Veh, Husband advised that he was diagnosed with PTSD in 2017 and he stopped working in December 2022. While Husband worked as a private contractor, he reported earning $275,000-$280,000 annually. Ultimately, Veh testified that Husband could obtain full-time employment with an earning capacity between $86,430 and $103,000 annually as a self-employed consultant. During cross-examination, Veh acknowledged that she did not complete any collateral interviews or any vocational testing. Veh further acknowledged that she reviewed Husband’s medical history from the Veterans Administration. When questioned about the symptoms reflected in Husband’s records, Veh admitted that she had not discussed them with Husband during her interview with him. Veh testified that she “didn’t make specific reference to the 145 pages [of medical records] that [Husband] provided [her]” in her report because she has “no doctor that’s saying [Husband] cannot work” or any “evidence that restricts him vocationally.” (Tr. 61.) She explained, “I have nothing from a physician, or psychiatrist, or his therapist, or whatever that’s deeming him unemployable.” (Tr. 62.) Both parties testified regarding the value of the marital residence, but neither provided an appraisal or supporting documentation. There is a mortgage lien on the property. The parties purchased the home in 2015 for $350,000. Wife estimated the value to be $450,000 and testified that the mortgage totaled $318,000. Husband valued the home at approximately $520,000. As of November 2024, the parties’ mortgage statement indicated that the outstanding principal balance on the mortgage was $286,541.84. Wife testified that she did not want to sell the marital home because she and one of the parties’ adult children reside there. Whereas, Husband requested that the house be sold and the proceeds split after paying the parties’ PNC credit card debt and his tax debt. The trial concluded with testimony regarding Wife’s claim for attorney’s fees. Husband objected to the fee bill Wife submitted because it was not provided to him as set forth in the trial court’s orders and the bill was dated October 23, 2024, with no subparts to it. According to Husband’s counsel, “[I]t’s one big long . . . statement as to alleged fees and time and expenses.” (Tr. 217.) The magistrate noted the objection and stated he would rule on the objection in his decision. Wife’s attorney testified to the bill, stating that it started with a meeting in April 2021 and then nothing transpired until October 2021. The bill included redacted portions that concerned “matters of attorney/client privilege.” (Tr. 218.) Wife’s counsel also testified to some of the difficulties of the case, the expenditures and counsel’s hourly rate. Counsel stated, at the beginning of the case, his “hourly rate was $600. In 2023 [his] rate increased to $700 an hour. The rates for associates [was] $300 an hour, that hasn’t changed.” (Tr. 220.) The rate for paralegals was $150 an hour. Counsel further stated, the bill was “reasonable and necessary of the time” and the total time entered on the bill is $82,325. (Tr. 221.) The “out-of-pocket time” was $8,185, making the total $90,510 as of October 23, 2024. (Tr. 222.) On cross-examination, Wife’s counsel admitted that his fee bill included time from April 1, 2021, to March 17, 2023, relating to the prior case filed by Husband, which was dismissed. Wife’s counsel further admitted that Wife did not file a counterclaim in the prior case. Following the conclusion of the trial, the magistrate issued his decision granting the parties a divorce, apportioning the martial property between the parties, finding that Husband committed financial misconduct and ordering him to pay Wife $156,904.12 as a distributive award, ordering Husband to pay Wife spousal support in the amount of $1,250 month, for 108 months, plus $500 per month towards his arrearage, and awarding Wife $12,500 in attorney fees. Relevant to the appeal, the magistrate found: Real Estate The parties own the real estate located [in] Rocky River, Ohio[.] . . . The parties purchased the real estate in 2015 for $350,000.00. . . . [Wife] testified that the real estate was worth $450,000.00 and that the mortgage presently totaled $318,000.00. [Husband] testified that the house was worth $520,000.00, but he later testified that he did not know how he arrived at that conclusion. [Wife’s] testimony as to the value of the real estate is more credible than that of [Husband]. The parties’ November 1, 2024, mortgage statement provides that the outstanding principal balance on the mortgage was $286,541.84. . . . Consequently, the undersigned finds that the marital interest in the real estate is $450,000.00 less the mortgage balance of $286,541.84 for a total of $163,458.16. ... The equity in the parties’ home is marital and should be divided between the parties. However, [Husband’s] interest in the marital home, totaling $81,729.08 will be offset elsewhere herein. Consequently, [Wife] shall be awarded the marital home in its entirety free and clear from any claim of [Husband]. ... Retirement Accounts [Husband] was the owner of a retirement account earned through his employment . . . administered through [T. Rowe]. On October 1, 2020, this account had a balance of $203,439.33 with an outstanding loan balance of $14,739.82. . . . During the parties’ first divorce proceeding, the account remained intact until [Husband] withdrew $119,271.62 on or about September 30, 2022, during the pendency of the parties’ first case. It is unclear how he was able to do this while he was operating under a restraining order. In the intervening months, [Husband] converted these funds to precious metals and cryptocurrency (a “Coinbase” account). As a result of [Husband’s] actions in liquidating his retirement account in order to prevent it from being restrained, the undersigned finds that the duration of the marriage for the purpose of the parties’ retirement accounts is February 18, 1996 to September 30, 2022. ... Financial Misconduct ... The undersigned finds that [Husband] engaged in a course of conduct designed to conceal and fraudulently dispose of marital assets for the intended purpose of defeating [Wife’s] legitimate marital interest in his . . . retirement account held at [T. Rowe]. ... [Wife] also asserts that [Husband] liquidated a Fidelity retirement account during the parties’ marriage. [Wife] bases this assertion solely on two deposits into [Husband’s] Bank of America account in March of 2023. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 45. She provided no other evidence of the alleged Fidelity account, where it came from or what it represents. It is just as likely to be another vehicle used by [Husband] to disguise his 401 (k) account as it is likely to be a separate asset. [Wife] did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was an independent Fidelity account separate from other retirement accounts that [Husband] liquidated inappropriately. The undersigned finds that [Husband] committed acts of financial misconduct in liquidating the [T. Rowe] account in the amount of $119,271.62. Consequently, [Wife] should be awarded $238,543.24 relative to [Husband’s] retirement accounts. The undersigned finds that [Husband] has committed acts of financial misconduct as set forth above. He has willfully taken actions designed to defeat [Wife’s] interest in marital property. Further, having taken actions to hide marital assets, [Husband] has then dissipated those marital assets. Alternatively, he may be continuing to conceal them both from [Wife] and this Court. Consequently . . . [Wife] is entitled to a distributive award and a greater degree of marital property as set forth herein. [Wife’s] interest in the parties’ marital residence in the amount of $81,729.08 should be offset against this award. After the offset of the marital residence, [Husband] owes [Wife] an additional $156,814.16. Debts Between them, the parties have numerous credit accounts and owe substantial sums. Each party holds some unsecured debt in their own name and other debt is held in the parties’ names jointly. ... The total amount of [marital] debt [resulting from credit cards in Wife’s name] is $39,182.68, resulting in each party being responsible for $19,591.34. ... The evidence demonstrated that the debt to [Wife’s] father related to the payment of the mortgage and several of her other expenses while the divorce was pending. Pursuant to the Temporary Support Order journalized on November 1, 2023, [Husband] was ordered to pay one- half of the mortgage on the marital residence and the parties were otherwise ordered to pay their own expenses. To the extent that [Husband] was ordered to pay those expenses, it will be addressed herein as a temporary support arrearage. To additionally divide the debt incurred to pay the expenses that [Husband] was ordered to pay under the Temporary Support Order or to further order [Husband] to pay the debt incurred to pay the mortgage in addition to awarding [Wife] a temporary support arrearage would result in a windfall to [Wife]. Therefore, [Wife] will be responsible for the debt to her father. ... [The total amount of marital debt resulting from credit cards in Husband’s name] is $11,263.29 and dividing them equally between the parties results in each party being responsible for approximately $5,581.64. [With regard to Husband’s IRS debt] . . . the undersigned finds that [Husband] should be responsible for this tax liability and if there is a refund it shall be his free from any claim of [Wife]. Temporary Support Arrearage On November 1, 2023, the Court issued a Magistrate’s Order for Temporary Spousal Support. That order was effective July 6, 2023, and provided as follows: IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each party shall be equally responsible for the mortgage payment for the marital residence located [in Rocky River, Ohio]. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that [Wife] shall be responsible for the payment of the associated utilities at the marital residence. ... The mortgage payments from July of 2023 through October [2024] total $47,159.31 and that total is included in the debt to [Wife’s ] father. . . . Consequently, there is a temporary support deficiency of $23,579.66 owed from [Husband] to [Wife]. Spousal Support ... [Wife’s] . . . total income is $74,363.11 annually. [Husband]’s income has decreased significantly between the filing of his initial Complaint for Divorce and the trial of this matter. . . . [Husband]’s total annual income is presently $86,806.20. ... (b) The relative earning abilities of the parties [Wife] asserts that [Husband] is capable of employment and that he is, therefore, underemployed. ... [Husband] presented several hundred pages of medical history which included multiple diagnoses. . . . However, he failed to identify a single medical report saying that he was unable to work. [Husband] may have the diagnosis that he alleges. However, [Husband] did not identify any of those medical records as proof that he is disabled to the point that he could not maintain employment. [Husband] offered his own self- serving testimony as to the impact of his conditions. While the Courts have held that expert medical testimony is not required to establish an inability to work, [Husband’s] testimony is simply not credible. [He is] able to travel extensively throughout Europe and the Middle East. Further, he was able to go to considerable lengths to hide or shield the funds that he liquidated from his retirement account. Finally, despite being diagnosed with service-related conditions as early as 2018, according to the medical records that he provided, [Husband] continued to work until the Court imposed a substantial temporary support obligation based on his employment. As it specifically relates to [Husband’s] Veterans’ Administration Disability . . . [t]hose documents list several diagnoses but do not establish that [Husband] is 100% disabled and cannot maintain employment. . . . Therefore, the undersigned finds that [Husband] is voluntarily underemployed. ... Accordingly, the Court must then determine what income should be imputed to [Husband]. [Wife] offered the expert testimony of [Veh]. The undersigned finds that [Veh] is qualified to testify as an expert. She reviewed [Husband’s] employment history, interviewed [Husband], and reviewed medical records provided by [Husband], including, but not limited to, disability determinations from both the Veterans’ Administration and the Social Security Administration. [Veh] testified consistently with her report, which reads[:] It is my opinion that should [Husband] choose another path, a viable option would be for him to begin his own company as a Self-Employed Consultant. These individuals set their own hourly or project pay but the general pattern is approximately $42 to $50 per hour or $86,430 to $103,00 per annum, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. As a result of the foregoing, the undersigned finds that [Husband] could earn $86,000.00 annually and maintain his VA disability benefits totaling $47,746.20 annually. Therefore, [Husband’s] total annual income for the purposes of spousal support is $133,746.20. ... After a review of all the [statutory factors], the undersigned finds that it is necessary and appropriate that [Husband] be ordered to pay to [Wife] spousal support in the amount of $1,250.00 per month for a period of 108 months. This order shall be modifiable both as to amount and term. This order shall terminate upon the death of either of the parties and may also be modifiable upon [Wife’s] remarriage. Additionally, [Husband] shall be ordered to pay an additional $500.00 per month to be credited toward his arrearage as defined above, until such time as it is satisfied in full. A withholding order shall be issued for this spousal support award to the Social Security Administration.  Attorney Fees [Wife] seeks an award of attorney fees in this matter. She alleges misconduct throughout the litigation process. . . . [Wife] requests an award of $90,510.19 in attorney fees from [Husband]. ... Counsel’s fee statement included charges from the parties’ previous litigation in addition to charges related to the litigation currently pending before this Court. The undersigned declines to award any fees for litigation not currently before the Court. For the present litigation, [Counsel] expended 61.3 hours. [Counsel] testified that he bills at a rate of $700.00 per hour, which totals $42,910.00. [Counsel’s] associates billed a total of 33.8 hours on this matter. [Counsel] testified that they bill at $350.00 per hour, which totals $11,830.00. Consequently, [Counsel] attorney fees total $54,740.00 for the litigation presently before the Court. Upon considering . . . the totality of the circumstances related to this litigation, the undersigned finds that [Husband’s] actions caused an increase in [Wife]’s attorney fee expenses and warrant an award of a portion of her fees. Consequently, [Husband] shall be ordered to pay to [Wife] the sum of $12,500.00 in attorney fees. THE MAGISTRATE’S DECISION IS TO ORDER: ... That [Wife] shall retain the marital home free and clear from any claim of [Husband]. She shall be responsible for all mortgages, taxes, and insurance on the marital home. ... That [Husband] shall pay to [Wife] the sum of $156,904.12 representing the remainder of the distributive award, as set forth above, after offsets for [Husband]’s interest in [Wife’s] 401(k), [Wife’s] Universal Life Insurance Policy, and an equalization of the marital debt of the parties, for which judgment is rendered and execution may issue. (Emphasis added.) (Magistrate’s Decision, Dec. 27, 2024.)  Both parties filed preliminary objections to the magistrate’s decision and supplemental objections. On June 24, 2025, the trial court entered its judgment entry ruling on the objections and finalizing the divorce. The court overruled all the objections from both parties and adopted the magistrate’s decision with one modification. Specifically, Husband argued that Wife should be required to refinance the mortgage on the marital residence and use the proceeds to pay off marital debt, with the remainder divided equally. The trial court ordered that Wife shall retain the residence free and clear of any claim by Husband and shall refinance the mortgage or remove Husband’s name from the mortgage within six months. If Wife is unable to do so, the house would be sold, with 100 percent of the proceeds awarded to Wife. Husband now appeals and Wife cross-appeals, each raising several assignments of error for review. We will combine our discussion of their assigned errors where appropriate. II. Law and Analysis A. Standard of Review We review the propriety of the trial court’s determinations in a domestic relations case under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). A trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises “its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. As the Ohio Supreme Court has stated, “While a reviewing court in any domestic-relations appeal must be vigilant in ensuring that a lower court’s determination is fair, equitable, and in accordance with law, an appellate court must refrain from the temptation of substituting its judgment for that of the trier-of-fact, unless the lower court’s decision amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Martin v. Martin, 18 Ohio St.3d 292, 295 (1985). B. Daubert Challenge In Husband’s first assignment of error, he argues the trial court abused its discretion by qualifying Veh as an “expert” without a full Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), inquiry and by relying on her testimony as the sole basis for imputing an additional $86,000 to Husband’s income. A trial court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. State v. Froman, 2020-Ohio-4523, ¶ 87. Additionally, it is within the trial court’s discretion to decide whether a witness meets the qualifications of Evid.R. 702 to testify as an expert. In re A.I.H., 2024-Ohio-4483, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.). Therefore, we will not disturb a trial court’s evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Asriian v. Pribish, 2026-Ohio-1650, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing In re J.G., 2025-Ohio-1933, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). Expert witness testimony is governed by Evid.R. 702, which “permits a witness to testify as an expert only if his opinion or testimony will aid the trier of fact in the search for truth.” Watkins v. Affinia Group, 2016-Ohio-2830, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Clark, 101 Ohio App.3d 389 (8th Dist. 1995). “An expert’s testimony assists the trier of fact if it meets a threshold standard of reliability.” Id., citing Daubert at 589-590 and 1994 Staff Notes to Evid.R. 702. “Daubert provides the analytical framework for determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under Evid.R. 702.” Id. at ¶ 21. Husband argues that the court erred when it restricted his counsel’s ability to question the reliability of Veh’s methodology as mandated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert and adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 80 Ohio St.3d 607 (1998). In Daubert, the Court recognized that a trial court has an important “gatekeeping function” to ensure that evidence is both relevant and reliable. Id. at 589. To that end, the Daubert Court listed several, nonexhaustive factors to consider when determining whether scientific evidence is reliable. Id. at 593-594. These factors include (1) whether a theory or technique has been tested; (2) whether it has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the methodology has gained general acceptance. Id. The Court explained that “in order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method.” Id. Contrary to Husband’s “mandated” assertion, the “reliability test outlined in Daubert is ‘flexible.’” Asriian, 2026-Ohio-1650, at ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 and 150 (1999). Indeed, “Ohio courts have held that a Daubert hearing is not required to determine the admissibility of an expert’s testimony in every case.” Id. at ¶ 23, 24-25, citing State v. Kegg, 2025-Ohio-2651 (4th Dist.); Sliwinski v. St. Edwards, 2014-Ohio- 4655 (9th Dist.); and Cleveland v. Newell, 2024-Ohio-2064 (8th Dist.).  In this case, Husband’s counsel requested the opportunity to conduct a Daubert inquiry before Veh began her testimony. The magistrate permitted the questioning. When Husband’s counsel asked Veh about the frequency of her interviews with Husband, the court stated, “[Y]ou can question her as an expert, but you can save that for cross-examination.” (Tr. 8.) Husband’s counsel explained that his purpose was to examine Veh’s methodology and the reliability of her opinions, not challenge her credibility. The magistrate concluded that counsel could “ask her about her general qualifications” and could “cross-examine her on cross about this particular case.” (Tr. 10.) Husband contends that this ruling demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the trial court’s gatekeeping role because the reliability of Veh’s methodology, including the frequency of her interviews, her transferable skills analysis, and her labor market survey, was not a matter of witness credibility for cross-examination, but rather was a matter of admissibility pursuant to Evid.R. 702. We disagree. As we stated in Anderson-Fye v. Mullinax-Fye, 2024-Ohio-5909 (8th Dist.): “The concept of voir dire as applied to an expert witness is concerned with the qualification of that witness as an expert, not the content of his testimony.” Hirschfeld v. Spring Creek Gravel Co., 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 9530, at *7 (3d Dist. Mar. 5, 1984). It is reasonable that, prior to permitting an expert to testify and give expert opinion testimony, his qualification must be established. Id. The opposing side is then given an opportunity, before the witness enters any substantive testimony, to cross-examine solely on the issue of qualification. Id. at ¶ 77. While Husband contends that his Daubert challenge was denied by the magistrate, the record reflects that Husband was given the opportunity to challenge Veh. Rather than addressing her methodology, counsel cross-examined Veh on the substance of her findings and report. At that point, the Daubert inquiry ended and Husband had the opportunity on cross-examination to challenge Veh’s qualifications, her interview with Husband, and the reliability of her methodology. Based on these facts, we find that the court properly limited the Daubert challenge. Husband further contends the court compounded the error by excusing Wife’s counsel from complying with Civ.R. 26(B)(7)(b) and allowing counsel to present Veh’s CV for the first time while she was on the stand in contravention to the rule, which requires parties to submit expert reports and CVs in accordance with the time schedule established by the trial court. Wife’s failure