In re D.W.

[Cite as In re D.W., 2026-Ohio-3316.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT WOOD COUNTY In re D.W. Court of Appeals No. {87}WD-26-016 Trial Court No. 2025 4012 DECISION AND JUDGMENT Decided: August 25, 2026 ***** Alex M. Savickas, for appellee. Anthony J. Richardson, II, for appellant. ***** DUHART, J. {¶ 1} This is an expedited appeal filed by appellant, J.M. (“father”), from the February 18, 2026 judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division (“trial court”). The trial court found father’s consent unnecessary for the adoption of his biological child, D.W. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. {¶ 2} Father sets forth three assignments of error: (1.) The trial court committed error by finding that [father] did not maintain more than de minimis contact with, or provide sufficient support for, D.W. (2.) The trial court committed error by finding that [father] did not have legal justification when failing to maintain more than de minimis contact with or when failing to provide sufficient support for D.W.  (3.) The trial court committed error by terminating [father’s] parental rights, where finding his consent not necessary before the adoption of D.W. is unconstitutional as applied to [father] and D.W. Background {¶ 3} Father and mother, R.W., are the natural parents of D.W., born November 2015, in Bowling Green (“BG”), Ohio. Mother and father have never been married to each other, although they did live together in BG for a while until father left Ohio in 2016 or 2017. D.W. has always lived with mother. Father has not seen D.W. since he left Ohio. {¶ 4} Mother is married to petitioner, M.W., and they have three children together. Father is not married. {¶ 5} In January 2019, the Wood County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”), issued a judgment entry which established a child support order for D.W. Father was ordered to pay $51.00 monthly, plus processing, for support and $10.00 monthly, plus processing, for arrears, for a total monthly obligation of $61.20. {¶ 6} On August 28, 2024, father filed for visitation with D.W. in juvenile court. The matter was mediated between mother and father, and a temporary agreement was reached wherein father could call D.W. every Friday. The calls started in the summer of 2025. Father estimated he called and spoke with D.W. a dozen times. {¶ 7} On June 26, 2025, petitioner filed a petition to adopt D.W. in the trial court. On June 30, 2025, petitioner filed an amended petition to adopt D.W. 2.  {¶ 8} On January 1, 2026, D.W. was diagnosed with leukemia and immediately started treatment, which included surgery, chemotherapy, a bone marrow biopsy and a lumbar puncture. {¶ 9} On February 11, 2026, a hearing was held on the issue of whether or not father’s consent to the adoption of D.W. was required. Mother, petitioner, father and father’s mother (“grandmother”) testified. {¶ 10} On February 18, 2026, the trial court issued its judgment entry, finding father’s consent to the adoption of D.W. was not required. Father appealed. Trial Court’s February 18, 2026 Judgment Entry {¶ 11} What follows are the relevant portions of the trial court’s 21-page judgment entry. On February 11, 2026, a hearing was held . . . to determine whether or not the consent of the biological father of the minor child is necessary for this adoption. . . The court received evidence. Based upon a review of the evidence and applicable law, the court makes the following findings and orders. FINDINGS ... 4. On June 26, 2025, a [“]Petition for Adoption of Minor[”] was filed . . . on behalf of [petitioner]. The petitioner is the husband of mother and the stepfather of [D.W.]. The petition requests this court approve the adoption of [D.W.] by the petitioner and approve a legal change of name. ... 6. On June 30, 2025, an [“]Amended Petition for Adoption of Minor[”] was filed . . . [and] again asserts the consent of father is not necessary for this adoption to proceed. The . . . amended petition asserts that father has failed without justifiable cause to have more than de minimis contact with [D.W.] 3.  for a period of one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition and that father has failed without justifiable cause to provide meaningful and regular maintenance and support for [D.W.] as required by law or judicial decree for a period of one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition. The . . . amended petition effectively amends the adoption petition to reflect changes in Ohio adoption law. ... 17. On February 11, 2026, a contested consent hearing was held. . . The court received evidence on the issue of the necessity of father’s consent. The matter was then taken under advisement. 18. The amended petition asserts father’s consent is not necessary under R.C. 3107.07(A) . . . [which] provides that the consent of a biological parent is not required for an adoption when: …it is alleged in the adoption petition and the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide for the meaningful and regular maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition. . . 19. . . . [Regarding] . . . burdens of proof . . . [i]n interpreting R.C. 3107.07 (A), the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court have noted the following: The party who is petitioning for adoption must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent failed to support or communicate with the child during the applicable one-year period and that there was not justifiable cause for the failure. In re Adoption of Holcomb[,] . . . 18 Ohio St. 3d 361 . . . [(1985)], paragraph four of the syllabus; In the Matter of the Adoption of K.L.K.-F, aka K.L.L., . . . 2009-Ohio-2543, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.). After the petitioner has made this showing, the burden shifts to the parent to show a facially justifiable cause for the failure. In re Adoption of Bovett[,] . . . 33 Ohio St.3d 102 . . . [(1987)], paragraph two of the syllabus; In the Matter of the Adoption of K.L.K.-F, aka K.L.L., supra. “The burden of proof, however, remains with the petitioner,” who must establish the lack of justifiable cause by clear and convincing evidence. Bovett, supra, at paragraph two of the syllabus. . . 4.  In re Adoption of B.G.[,] . . . [2010-Ohio-5025, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.).] 20. . . . Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as “. . . that measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.” See Cross v. Ledford[,] . . . 161 Ohio St. 469 [(1954)]. 21. . . . [T]he court finds the applicable one year look back period in this matter would run from June 26, 2024, through June 26, 2025. 22. The court further notes that while the applicable one year look back period is the focus of a court’s attention when reviewing the issue of parental consent to an adoption, a “probate court is not restricted to focusing solely on the one year statutory period.” In re Adoption of Z.H., 2022[-]Ohio[-]3926, ¶ 46 (6th Dist.)[.] Rather, a trial court may consider evidence outside the one year look back period when determining whether parental consent is required in order to address certain subjective elements of justifiable cause - such as evidence of the ongoing relationship and interaction between the parties. See for example the discussions in In re Adoption of Z.H. . . and In re Adoption of M.M., 2023[-]Ohio[-]397, [¶ 7,] . . . [fn.] 2. 23. The petitioner asserts father’s consent is not necessary for this adoption due to father’s lack of support and lack of contact during the applicable one year look back period. For purposes of clarity, the court will address the lack of support and lack of contact issues separately. Petitioner’s Claim Father Has, Without Justifiable Cause, Failed to Provide Meaningful and Regular Maintenance and Support For [D.W.] During the Applicable One Year Look Back Period ... 25. The term “meaningful and regular maintenance and support” is a relatively new term as it relates to the amount of support necessary to determine that a parent’s consent is necessary for an adoption to proceed. . . [under the] current version of R.C. 3107.07(A). . . 26. In . . . discussing the maintenance and support requirement within R.C. 3107.07(A) -- and specifically the consistent language referencing “as required by law or judicial decree,” -- the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals, [in In re Adoption of B.L., 2021-Ohio-1221, ¶ 78, 79 (6th Dist.)], referenc[ed] . . . 5.  . . . In re Adoption of A.C.B., . . . 2020-Ohio-629. . ., [where] the Ohio Supreme Court . . . stated: . . . The starting point -- and because the language is clear, the ending point -- for our analysis is the text of the statute. The plain text of R.C. 3107.07(A) instructs a trial court to determine whether a natural parent provided maintenance and support “as required by law or judicial decree” for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition. Id. at ¶ 8. ... [T]he judicial decree sets forth precisely what father was required to pay: $85 per week, for a total of $4,420 over the course of a year. Father did not pay what the judicial decree required. He paid only $200 for the entire year before stepfather filed the adoption petition. Thus, under the plain language of the statute, father did not “provide for the maintenance and support” of A.C.B. “as required by law or judicial decree” for the requisite one-year period. Id. . . . 27. In the B.L. case . . . [t]he evidence established the parent paid 31% of the required child support payments and 50% of the required payments on [her] arrearage. The trial court, and the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals, concluded the probate court did not abuse its discretion in finding the parent had failed to make support payments as required by law or judicial decree and finding that the parent had the ability to make one hundred percent of certain support obligations for the one year look back period. 28. In addressing whether the failure to pay support is [“]justifiable[”] as used in the adoption statutes . . .: . . . Ohio courts have recognized that in addition to its legal connotations, the term [“]justifiable[”] also contains a moral component. In re Adoption of B.I., . . . 2017-Ohio-9116, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), citing Black’s Law Dictionary . . . (8th Ed.[]2004). To this end, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that in assessing whether the failure to support a child is justified, a distinction is made between a parent who is unwilling but financially able to support, and a parent who is willing to support but financially unable to do so. In re: Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163, 166, . . . (1986). “The latter could 6.  constitute justification.” Id. Thus, it reasonably follows that evidence demonstrating a parent’s inability to obtain gainful employment during the relevant one-year time period, despite his or her best efforts, would be a significant factor in assessing whether the parent was willing, but financially unable to comply with a child support obligation.” In re Adoption of A.R.M.R., 2019[-]Ohio[-] 253, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.)[.] 29. Ohio courts have further noted that a parent’s substance abuse addiction and rehabilitation efforts can lead to a finding of [“]justifiable cause[”] for failure to pay support in certain instances. See for example the discussion in Matter of Adoption of L.G., 2019[-]Ohio[-]4410 (5th Dist.). 30. As to how payments of monies for a child made outside of the Child Support Enforcement Agency [(“CSEA”)] should be considered, R.C. 3121.45 states: . . . Any payment of money by the person responsible for the support payments under a support order to the person entitled to receive the support payments that is not made to . . . the [CSEA] administering the support order . . ., shall not be considered a payment of support under the support order and, unless the payment is made to discharge an obligation other than support, shall be deemed to be a gift. . . 31. In the case at bar, father was ordered to pay child support through an order issued by the . . . Juvenile Court on January 17, 2019. . . In this order, father was required to pay a total of $61.20 per month in support, arrears, and processing fees. Father’s total yearly support obligation amounted to $734.40. 32. It appears undisputed that during the applicable one year look back period, child support payments for father were made through the [CSEA] for five out of twelve months. . . Father’s total support payments through the Wood County [CSEA] amounted to $306.00. Father made less than one half of the minimum child support ordered to be paid during the applicable one-year period of time. 33. During the February 11, 2026[] hearing, father testified he was unemployed . . . - without any substantive or documentary collaborating information - that his mental health and substance abuse service providers have advised him he cannot work. Father presented Exhibit H 7.  demonstrating that [he] is receiving public assistance in the form of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance and Medical Assistance (“SNAP”) benefits. Father presented no other evidence as to his inability to work or otherwise support [D.W.]. 34. In addressing whether father’s mental health and substance abuse related issues rise to the level of “justifiable cause” for father’s failure to pay support for [D.W.] as required within the applicable one year look back period, the court notes the following. • A review of the January 17, 2019[] order establishing father’s support order - admitted as Exhibit A - reveals that [his] child support obligation expressly took into consideration [his] then admission into a treatment facility where [he] was, at that time, expected to remain for the next twenty[-]four months. In short, father’s reduced minimum support order already factored in [his] substance abuse or mental health issues. • The January 17, 2019[] support order, specifically noted the minimum support order made could be modifiable upon a change of circumstances such as father leaving the treatment facility. Through the one year look back period, there was no evidence of father requesting modification of the underlying support order. • As noted, father provided no other independent information - other than [his] statement and a statement by [grandmother] - supporting the assertion that [he] was simply unable to work. In addition, Exhibit H the document provided by father establishing that father is receiving SNAP benefits, actually references certain allowed expenses should an individual be “employed or seeking employment through job-search, or in training.” It is obvious the receipt of SNAP benefits is not proof that someone is unable to become employed. • As also noted, during the applicable one year look back period, father was able to make just five of twelve scheduled payments. There is no definitive evidence presented establishing what happened in the other seven months other than a general reference that father did not receive his SNAP benefits. Regardless of whether father did or did not receive his SNAP benefits, it remained [his] responsibilities to ensure the sum of $61.20 per month be sent to support [D.W.]. Father did not ensure this was done. 35. During the February 11, 2026[] hearing, there was testimony surrounding [grandmother’s] effort to send mother certain monies for [D.W.’s] [“]support[”] during times when payments were not received 8.  through the [CSEA]. A review of copies of certain text messages between [grandmother] and mother’s father . . . and mother’s mother . . . - admitted as Exhibits I and K - reflects at least one check, which was not cashed or received by mother, was sent as a Christmas gift. This is not in the nature of support and occurred well before the applicable one year look back period. Additional checks which [grandmother] testified as to sending were not cashed and there was no definitive evidence that they were ever received by mother. [Grandmother’s] sending a gift of cash or monies cannot be considered satisfaction of father’s child support obligation. 36. Mother and the petitioner testified that, due to the inconsistency in receiving support payments from father, any support received from father was not considered by them to be regular. 37. From the evidence presented, the court finds clear and convincing evidence exists to conclude that father failed to provide, without justifiable cause, meaningful and regular maintenance and support for [D.W.] during the applicable one year look back period. Father did not ensure that his reduced child support obligation was paid as required by court order. The evidence further demonstrates that father did not have justifiable cause for his failure to provide support. Petitioner’s Claim Father Has Failed, Without Justifiable Cause, to Have More Than De Minimis Contact With [D.W.] During the Applicable One Year Look Back Period 38. With the court’s conclusion relatively to father’s failure to provide meaningful and regular maintenance and support, father’s consent to this adoption can be found to be not necessary without further analysis. [However,] . . . petitioner further claims father has failed, without justifiable cause, to have more than de minimis contact with [D.W.] during the applicable one year look back period resulting in father’s consent not being necessary for this matter to move forward. Although not necessary, the court will address father’s contact and communication with [D.W.] given the evidence presented. 39. . . . When addressing the requirement [of R.C. 3107.07(A) as it relates to contact between a parent and child,] . . . Ohio courts have noted: . . . The . . . [adoption] statute was amended in 2008, and has been in effect since April 7, 2009. Prior to the amendment, R.C. 3107.07 (A) stated that consent to adoption would not be required of a parent of a minor when “the parent has failed 9.  without justifiable cause to communicate with the minor . . . for a period of at least one year immediately preceding either the filing of the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the petitioner.” . . . By changing the standard from [“]communicate,[”] which could imply a single contact, to [“]more than de minimis contact,[”] which seems to imply more than a single contact, the legislature indicated its intent to require more effort from the parent to have contact and communication with the child. . . In re J.D.T., 2012-Ohio-4537, . . . ¶ 79 (7th Dist.). In the Matter of the Adoption of J.R.H.[,] . . . 2013-Ohio-3385[,] . . . ¶ . . . 20 & 21 [(2d Dist.).] 40. When addressing [“]justifiable cause[”] specifically on the issue of failure to have contact or communicate with a child in an adoption context, the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals, [in In re Petition for Adoption of A.V., 2022-Ohio-2969, ¶ 33 (6th Dist.)] has further noted: . . . A custodial parent’s significant interference or significant discouragement of contact between the child and the non- custodial parent may constitute justifiable cause for the non- custodial parent’s failure to have contact with the child. Id. Once the non-custodial parent presents evidence of significant interference or discouragement of contact, it becomes necessary for petitioner to demonstrate that the lack of contact was not justifiable. In re Adoption of Riegle, . . . 2002-Ohio- 694 [(3d Dist.)]. In determining whether the failure to provide contact is justifiable, the issue is not whether it was possible for the natural parent to have done more to overcome the interference. In re Adoption of C.N.A., 2018-Ohio-897, . . . ¶ 17. . .[(3d Dist.)] ... 41. When discussing what constitutes “justifiable cause” for a non-custodial parent’s failure to communicate, Ohio courts have further held: . . . Significant interference by a custodial parent with communication between the non-custodial parent and the child, or significant discouragement of such communication, is required to establish justifiable cause for the non-custodial parent’s failure to communicate with the child. . . 10.  In re Adoption of Myers[,] . . . 2013[-]Ohio[-]5152[,] . . . ¶ 21 [(5th Dist.),] citing Holcomb, supra, paragraph three of the syllabus. 42. In addition, when reviewing the efforts of a parent to make contact with or communicate with a child during the applicable one year look back period, the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeals [in In re Petition for Adoption of Z.H., 2022-Ohio-3926, at ¶ 48 (6th Dist.),] has further pointed out that: . . . the issue to be resolved is not whether [the parent] could have done more to contact her child but whether she did enough, such that it can be said that it was “more than de minimis.” ... 43. Impacting the discussion surrounding justifiable cause and whether the consent of a parent is needed for an adoption, the Ohio Supreme Court -- while rejecting the proposition that a probate court may never proceed with an adoption proceeding if there are parenting matters pending in a juvenile court -- has held “that a probate court must consider the existence of pending parenting time matters when determining whether an exception to the requirement of parental consent to adoption applies.” In re Adoption of M.G.B.-E. . . , 2018[-]Ohio[-]1787, ¶ 1. 44. The Ohio Supreme Court’s discussion in M.G.B.-E. [at ¶ 40,] acknowledges that, in reviewing whether justifiable cause exists for failing to communicate or have contact with a minor child for purposes of the adoption consent standard: . . . The probate court must strictly construe R.C. 3107.07(A) in favor of [a] father to protect his rights as a natural parent. In re Adoption of Schoeppner, 46 Ohio St.2d 21, 24 . . . (1976). And strictly construing R.C. 3107.07(A) in favor of [a] father requires the probate court to take into account [a] father’s efforts to reestablish parental rights and responsibilities through the domestic-relations court during the year preceding the filing of the adoption petitions, as well as mother’s efforts to impede father’s contact with the children. . . ... 11.  45. At the February 11, 2026[] hearing, the evidence presented relevant to father’s contact or communication with [D.W.] during the one year look back period and other applicable times included, but was not limited to: • The evidence established father’s last face to face contact with [D.W.] occurred in 2017. • Father testified that [he] left . . . [BG] area in roughly 2017 to reside in the State of Alabama with [his] parents. [D.W.] was roughly two years of age at that time when father left. • Eventually, father returned with his parents to the State of New York. • On August 28, 2024 - some ten months before the subject matter adoption proceedings began - father filed a [“]Pro Se Motion[”] in the . . . Juvenile Court. This motion requested father receive parenting time/visitation with [D.W.]. . . • Father suggested he filed his pro se motion for parenting time due to an inability to reach an agreement with mother relative to parenting time with [D.W.]. • Until the August 28, 2024[] filing of father’s motion in . . . Juvenile Court, there had been no requests made by any party for court orders relative to parenting time impacting [D.W.]. • While father’s pro se motion for parenting time was pending in . . . Juvenile Court - the subject matter adoption proceedings were initiated on June 26, 2025. • The evidence established that in the late summer or fall, 2025, the parties reached a mediated temporary agreement in . . . Juvenile Court relative to father’s parenting time. Namely, father was provided the opportunity to begin phone calls with [D.W.] on Fridays. • During the February 11, 2026[] hearing, the petitioner and mother were questioned as to why the underlying adoption proceedings were initiated while father’s pro se parenting time motion was pending in . . . Juvenile Court. The petitioner and mother testified that the adoption proceeding was not done in retaliation for father filing his motion, but rather was primarily due to the fact that [D.W.] had expressed a desire to have her name be similar to her siblings; father’s overall lack of involvement with [D.W.]; the stability of father; and to solidify the family structure surrounding [D.W.]. 12.  • Father’s motion in . . . Juvenile Court is currently stayed pending a decision on the pending adoption proceedings. • During the February 11, 2026[] hearing, father presented [Exhibits [I through P which] . . . were copies of emails or text messages from father or [grandmother] sent to mother or mother’s father . . . or mother’s mother . . ., which father submits demonstrates [his] efforts to establish contact or communication with [D.W.]. • Exhibit I is a text message from [grandmother] to [mother’s father] dated January 29, 2023[, which] . . . references [grandmother’s] attempts to send a card and check to [D.W.] for Christmas. Exhibit I was sent outside the one year look back period and was apparently presented in an effort to establish the context of efforts made by or on behalf of father. • Exhibit J is a copy of a text message from [grandmother] to [mother’s mother] dated March 19, 2023. In this text, [grandmother] indicates attempts to contact mother have not been successful and requests [mother’s mother] contact mother to “make arrangements” as to when the best time to come and visit [D.W.] would be. Exhibit J was sent outside the one year look back period and is not clear as to who was desirous of visiting with [D.W.] - father himself or [grandmother] and [grandmother’s] husband. • Exhibit K is an email from father to mother dated November 24, 2024. In this email, father sends happy birthday greetings to [D.W.]. This email is within the one-year look back period. Significantly, in this email, father makes no request to see [D.W.]. • Exhibit L is an email from father to mother dated March 29, 2025. The email sends along a link to an ice-skating video. This email is within the one-year look back period. Significantly, in this email, father makes no request to see [D.W.]. • Exhibit M is an email from father to mother dated May 2, 2025. The email thanks mother for all that mother is doing. This email is within the one-year look back period. Significantly, in this email, father makes no request to see [D.W.]. • Exhibit N is an email from father to mother dated May 11, 2025. In this email, father wishes mother a happy Mother’s Day and expresses what a “great mom” mother is and asks mother to say hi to [D.W.]. This email is within the one-year look back period. Significantly, in this email, father makes no request to see [D.W.]. 13.  • Exhibit O is an email from father to mother dated May 20, 2025. In this email, father expresses displeasure on not knowing how [D.W.] is doing or receiving information. This email is within the one-year look back period. Once again, in this email, father makes no actual request to see [D.W.]. • Exhibit P is an email from father to mother dated August 30, 2025. This email reminds [D.W.] to “always listen” to mother and to [D.W.’s] grandmother. This email is outside the one year look back period. This email makes no request to see [D.W.]. 46. Based on the court’s review of the testimony surrounding Exhibits I through P, it is noteworthy the messages were not sent or meant to be communications or contact with [D.W.]. There are also no requests to see or communicate with, or contact, [D.W.]. 47. Even taking into consideration father’s pending motion in . . . Juvenile Court - which is perhaps the only substantive effort taken by father to establish some sort of contact with [D.W.] - the court finds father’s efforts as presented in the exhibits and testimony, simply do not rise to more than de minimis contact during the applicable look back period. Father’s actions are de minimis and not sufficient to require [his] consent for this adoption to proceed. 48. The court further finds justifiable cause for father’s lack of contact with [D.W.] has not been established. The court finds from the actual evidence presented that there were no efforts by mother to hide where mother and [D.W.] lived or to otherwise [“]substantially interfere[”] with father’s ability to make contact with [D.W.] during the applicable one year look back period. Mother testified she had the same phone number since the fifth-grade. It was apparent from the evidence that father was aware of where mother and [D.W.] resided or was able to reach mother and [D.W.] should he desire to make requests for parenting time or contact [D.W.]. 49. Based on all the evidence before the court, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that father has failed without justifiable cause to provide more than de minimis contact with [D.W.] during the applicable one year look back period. Based on the findings above and all the evidence presented, the court issues the following orders. 14.  IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, the consent of . . . the biological father of the minor child in this matter, is found not necessary for this adoption to proceed. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED this matter shall be set for a hearing to determine whether the proposed adoption is in the best interest of the minor child. . . . (Emphasis added.) Assignments of Error {¶ 12} We will analyze father’s first and second assignments of error together. De Minimis Contact {¶ 13} Father argues the trial court incorrectly held that his consent was not necessary where he maintained more than de minimis contact with, and provided sufficient support for, D.W. He contends that the record contains unchallenged testimony and evidence which shows that although he did not get to physically see his daughter, he and his mother still made efforts and attempted to contact D.W. through and with cards, calls, emails, text messages and gifts. He maintains that this contact is certainly beyond a single occurrence and should be deemed sufficient to maintain more than de minimis contact considering he lives in another state. He submits this court should find that competent, credible evidence in the record supports that he maintained more than de minimis contact with D.W. Justification {¶ 14} Father also argues that he was justified in not having de minimis contact with D.W., as he certainly attempted to maintain contact and has within the look back period been granted time to call and build a relationship with her. He likens his case to, 15. inter alia, In re B., 2025-Ohio-2801 (6th Dist.). Father submits, assuming his attempted contact is not enough, this court should consider his state of mind and the barriers he faced trying to contact D.W., with whom he concedes he does not have too much of a relationship, yet. {¶ 15} Father contends he deals with mental health issues, which led to temporary incarceration and was a barrier for communication with D.W., and he is dependent on others to assist him with his affairs. He further asserts that his attempts and effort were not embraced, and there was no effort on mother’s part to assist in developing his relationship with D.W. He submits “[p]erhaps [mother], along with petitioner, was biased and never followed up or encouraged her daughter to build a relationship with [father] and [father] sensed it and, unfortunately, respected [mother’s] clear desire.” {¶ 16} Father maintains that he could not have a Facebook connection with mother, and he communicated through other avenues by including grandmother and mother’s parents in an effort to convey messages to and see D.W. He claims mother’s testimony supports these facts and further reveals potential bias toward him as she expressed how short calls with him were problematic, and she admitted that she did not share her address with him. {¶ 17} Father argues “[w]ith the mental health issues, the incarceration, and the covert plot against him [by mother and petitioner], father stood no chance to do anything but what the Juvenile Court would grant him, which was only phone calls.” He claims he “had justifiable cause to not accomplish more contact than he did.” 16. Support {¶ 18} Father argues the trial court erred when it found that he did not provide sufficient gifts and financial contribution to constitute maintenance and support for purposes of R.C. 3107.07(A). He concedes he did not pay all of his child support payments but claims that, through grandmother, he attempted to pay nine out of the twelve months due, and they also sent numerous gifts and cards for D.W.’s birthday and Christmas. He also maintains that he reached out and expressed he was willing to support D.W. further if she needed anything. Justification {¶ 19} Father again argues that he and grandmother were sending payments to support D.W., but not consistently as ordered by the Juvenile Court. He speculates that mother and petitioner “did not need, forgot about, and/or ignored the payments” and “showed no interest in receiving any financial interest from [father], and as a result any failure attributable to [father] should be deemed justifiable.” He also claims “it makes sense that [mother and petitioner] would stage the situation to look like [father] did not want to support his child.” {¶ 20} Father submits that he attempted to support D.W. to the best of his ability and, “based on his medical professional mother” he needs help when dealing with his affairs, including making child support payments and sending gifts to D.W. He further claims that he could not work and has yet to receive his social security benefits, which would help cover all costs including his child support. 17.  {¶ 21} Finally, father requests that this court hold, consistent with other appellate courts like In re Adoption of Sunderhaus, 63 Ohio St.3d 127 (1992), that because mother failed to allow him to visit D.W. and refused to accept the support payments, there is justifiable cause and his consent is needed in order for the adoption to proceed. Law Consent to Adoption {¶ 22} Written consent is generally required of parents before an adoption may proceed. R.C. 3107.06. There are exceptions, however, which are set forth in R.C. 3107.07, which states in pertinent part: {¶ 23} Consent to adoption is not required of any of the following: A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petition and the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to have more than de minimis contact with the minor or to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition. {¶ 24} Since R.C. 3107.07(A) is written in the disjunctive, either a parent’s failure to have contact or a parent’s failure to provide maintenance and support for the one-year time period is sufficient suffices to obviate the need for that parent’s consent. In re Adoption of McDermitt, 63 Ohio St.2d 301, 304 (1980). {¶ 25} The consent provisions of R.C. 3107.07(A) must be strictly construed in order to protect the interests of the non-consenting parent. In re Adoption of Sunderhaus, 63 Ohio St.3d at 132. 18. De Minimis Contact/Justification {¶ 26} “The term ‘contact’ is not defined in t