State v. Anderson
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket2026-L-0030
JudgePatton
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as State v. Anderson, 2026-Ohio-4539.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-L-0030
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
TERRY A. ANDERSON,
Trial Court No. 2022 CR 001083
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: November 16, 2026
Judgment: Reversed and remanded
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Eric J. Foisel, Lake County Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Terry A. Anderson, pro se, PID# A804-372, Belmont Correctional Institution, 68518
Bannock Road, P.O. Box 540, St. Clairsville, OH 43950 (Defendant-Appellant).
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Terry A. Anderson (“Anderson”), appeals the
judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion, filed pro se,
requesting leave of court to access public records pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(8).
{¶2} On appeal, Anderson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his request. Anderson purports that the public records he wishes to obtain are
vital to pending and future claims related to his now closed criminal case, and Anderson
believes his claims are justiciable, therefore warranting his access to public records.
{¶3} Upon review, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
Anderson’s request. The trial court’s judgment entry summarily denied Anderson’s
request without making any finding as to whether his purported claims are justiciable or
whether the information he seeks is necessary to support a justiciable claim. Where an
inmate requests leave of court to request public records, the sentencing judge has “a
reciprocal obligation to render such a finding pursuant to the statute . . . .” (Emphasis
added.) State ex rel. Rittner v. Barber, 2006-Ohio-592, ¶ 38 (6th Dist.).
{¶4} A perfunctory denial that fails to address any of the R.C. 149.43(B)(8)
considerations and appears to misunderstand the requested relief does not meet that
obligation. Therefore, as the trial court disposed of Anderson’s motion without considering
whether a justiciable claim was presented and whether the public records sought are
necessary to support that claim, the trial court employed an erroneous legal framework.
{¶5} Accordingly, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is
reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for consideration of Anderson’s
motion under the correct legal standard.
Substantive and Procedural Facts
{¶6} Anderson is currently serving a six- to nine-year indefinite prison sentence
resulting from his convictions for one count of complicity to aggravated burglary, one
count of complicity to trespass in a habitation, one count of complicity to petty theft, and
two counts of complicity to burglary. Anderson previously appealed to this court, and his
convictions and sentence were affirmed. State v. Anderson, 2024-Ohio-2505 (11th Dist.),
motion for delayed appeal granted, 2024-Ohio-5104, and appeal not accepted, 2025-
Ohio-231.
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{¶7} On March 5, 2026, Anderson filed a pleading with the trial court captioned
“REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO REQUEST PUBLIC RECORDS PURSUANT TO R.C.
149.43(B)(8) and *** State ex rel Caster v. City of Columbus.” The seven-page motion
identifies a litany of documents and evidentiary materials relating to his convictions which
Anderson states he would use in pursuing claims including prosecutorial misconduct,
ineffective assistance of counsel, police misconduct, and Brady violations. Anderson also
asserts in his motion that he is actively involved in fighting to overturn his convictions via
extensive pleadings and appellate processes.
{¶8} The next morning, the trial court summarily denied the motion via judgment
entry. The entry stated, verbatim and in its entirety, as follows:
The within cause came on for consideration upon the
Defendant’s pro se Request for Leave to Request Public
Records Pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(8), filed on March 5,
2026.
Upon review of Defendant’s filing, the Court finds no Leave of
Court is necessary to make a public records request, therefore
said Motion is not well taken and ought to be denied.
WHEREFORE, it is the Order of this Court that the
Defendant’s pro se Motion for summary Maximum Sentence,
filed on January 21, 2026, [sic] is hereby denied. IT IS SO
ORDERED.
The Appeal
{¶9} Anderson timely appeals and raises, as his sole assignment of error, that
“the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to consider the reasons set forth by
[Anderson] regarding the basis for the public record request for the prosecutor’s
discovery[,] thus violating [Anderson’s] constitutional rights to due process and fair trial
and Crim.R. 16(D)(1-5), and Crim.R. 16(F).” Anderson argues that the trial court abused
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its discretion when it failed to consider whether the issues he presented in his motion
were justiciable claims. We agree.
{¶10} A trial court’s ruling on a criminal defendant’s R.C. 149.43(B)(8) request is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Parks, 2023-Ohio-4740, ¶ 7 (7th Dist.). A
trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal
decision-making. State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 64 (2d Dist.), citing Black’s Law
Dictionary (8th Ed.2004). “An abuse of discretion may be found when the trial court
‘applies the wrong legal standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on
clearly erroneous findings of fact.’” Cobb v. Shipman, 2015-Ohio-2604, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.),
quoting Thomas v. Cleveland, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).
{¶11} R.C. 149.43(B)(8) provides:
A public office or person responsible for public records is not
required to permit a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a
criminal conviction . . . to inspect or to obtain a copy of any
public record concerning a criminal investigation or
prosecution . . . unless the request to inspect or to obtain a
copy of the record is for the purpose of acquiring information
that is subject to release as a public record under this section
and the judge who imposed the sentence or made the
adjudication with respect to the person, or the judge’s
successor in office, finds that the information sought in the
public record is necessary to support what appears to be a
justiciable claim of the person.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶12} Pursuant to the statute, upon receipt of a defendant’s R.C. 149.43(B)(8)
request, courts engage in a three-part analysis: whether the defendant has an active
claim he is trying to support, whether that claim is legally justiciable, and whether the
records request is necessary to support the claim. Parks at ¶ 3. This court has previously
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clarified that R.C. 149.43(B)(8) “does not require that a justiciable claim is pending, only
that the inmate has a justiciable claim to be advanced.” State v. Askew, 2017-Ohio-1512,
¶ 12 (11th Dist.).
{¶13} Where an inmate fails to seek or obtain the judicial finding as required by
R.C. 149.43(B)(8), a public records custodian has “no clear legal duty to produce the
records identified in the . . . [public records] request.” State ex rel. Ellis v. Cleveland Police
Forensic Laboratory, 2019-Ohio-4201, ¶ 12. The effect of the statute is a “heightened
requirement[] for inmates seeking public records.” (Emphasis in original.) State ex rel.
Russell v. Thornton, 2006-Ohio-5858, ¶ 14. “The General Assembly clearly evidenced a
public-policy decision to restrict a convicted inmate’s unlimited access to public records
in order to conserve law enforcement resources.” Id.
{¶14} Here, Anderson attempted to comply with R.C. 149.43(B)(8) by filing his
motion for leave to file public records requests. In his motion, Anderson set forth several
claims he believed to be justiciable and a list of documents and evidentiary materials to
be used in support of pursuing such claims. The trial court did not provide any analysis
regarding whether the claims were justiciable or whether the requested materials were
necessary. The trial court simply denied the motion finding “no Leave of Court is
necessary . . . .”
{¶15} Although “[t]he precise reasoning of the trial court is unclear by its terse
entry,” it appears the trial court likely misunderstood Anderson’s request. State v. Totten,
2005-Ohio-6210, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). The trial court is correct, in the abstract, that Anderson
need not obtain leave of court to physically make a public records request. However, as
Anderson is an incarceree, absent the sentencing judge’s R.C. 149.43(B)(8) finding, a
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records custodian who receives Anderson’s request has “no clear legal duty to produce
the records . . . .” Ellis at ¶ 12. Anderson’s motion sought to create that duty. The trial
court’s entry is thus nonresponsive to the issue that Anderson’s motion presented.
{¶16} Therefore, “since it is an inmate’s burden to obtain a finding from his
sentencing judge allowing him access to public records, the sentencing judge must, by
inference, have a reciprocal obligation to render such a finding pursuant to the statute
upon the inmate’s motion.” (Emphasis added.) Barber, 2006-Ohio-592, at ¶ 38 (6th Dist.).
The trial court failed to comply with this duty by affording no consideration to the statute.
As the trial court did not adjudicate Anderson’s motion under the correct legal standard,
we are required to reverse.
{¶17} Anderson’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
Conclusion
{¶18} For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Lake County Court of
Common Pleas is reversed, and the case is remanded for the trial court’s consideration
of Anderson’s March 5, 2026 motion. On remand, the trial court should consider whether
Anderson has a legally justiciable claim he is trying to support and whether the public
records he seeks are necessary to support such a claim.
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,
SCOTT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, it is the judgment and order of
this court that the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and
this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion.
Costs to be taxed against appellee.
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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