Full Opinion

[Cite as VineBrook Homes, L.L.C. v. Lasky, 2026-Ohio-4612.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY VINEBROOK HOMES, LLC, ET AL. : : C.A. No. 30871 Appellants : : Trial Court Case No. 2025 CV 05798 v. : : (Civil Appeal from Common Pleas LAURENCE LASKY, ET AL. : Court) : Appellees : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE EDELSTEIN, J. and DINGUS, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30871 DAVID K. STEIN, JACK MAIB, CONNOR D. HICKS, DAVID C. ROPER, Attorneys for Appellants DAVID C. GREER, CATHERINE H. JACKSON, Attorneys for Appellees EPLEY, J. {¶ 1} VineBrook Homes, LLC and NREA VB III, LLC (collectively “VineBrook”) appeal from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas which granted summary judgment to their former attorney, Laurence Lasky, and his law firm, Lasky & Sharrer (collectively “Lasky”) on their legal malpractice claim. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the issues raised in Lasky’s motion for summary judgment that were not considered in the first instance. I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} VineBrook’s legal malpractice claim stems from Lasky’s handling of its forcible entry and detainer action against Dana Steele and David Luttrell, who rented the residence located at 1351 Oakdale Avenue from NREA. The parties’ summary judgment evidence established the following facts. {¶ 3} VineBrook, as the authorized agent for NREA, leased the property in question to Steele and Luttrell, beginning on December 21, 2022. In early October 2023, NREA received a notification from the City of Dayton that the property had been declared a public nuisance due to felony drug violations. The city determined that Steele and two others were responsible for the nuisance. {¶ 4} The following month, VineBrook filed a forcible entry and detainer action against Steele and Luttrell in the Dayton Municipal Court, alleging that they had failed to pay the 2 required rent and owed $1,635. VineBrook sought restitution of the premises and a monetary judgment of $1,635, plus back rent and damages. In December 2023, VineBrook filed an amended complaint, requesting eviction based on the drug-related nuisance violation. Lasky represented VineBrook throughout the forcible entry and detainer action. {¶ 5} On January 11, 2024, the parties appeared for an eviction hearing before a magistrate, but the hearing did not proceed because the parties had reached an agreement that the tenants would vacate the property by March 15, 2024. The parties were to file an agreed entry, but none was prepared due to disagreement about other terms. {¶ 6} On February 29, 2024, the magistrate held a hearing on a motion by VineBrook to journalize the agreement made by the parties on January 11, 2024. The magistrate found that the tenants had agreed to vacate the premises by midnight on March 15, 2024, and that there was no agreement as to payment of rent. The agreement further provided that if the tenants failed to vacate by that deadline, a writ of restitution would be issued. An entry memorializing the parties’ agreement was signed by the magistrate and the trial judge and filed on March 12, 2024. The same day, VineBrook requested a writ of restitution. {¶ 7} On March 14, 2024, the day before the tenants were to vacate the Oakdale Avenue home, Steele filed a bankruptcy petition in bankruptcy court. It is unclear whether a notice of the bankruptcy filing was promptly sent to the municipal court, but the magistrate was not immediately aware of the filing. Five days later, Lasky filed a motion for relief from stay in the bankruptcy court. The tenants did not leave the property as they had agreed. {¶ 8} On March 20, 2024, the municipal court issued a writ of restitution. A move-out was attempted then delayed until April 1, 2024. On the morning of Thursday, March 28, 2024, a notice of the bankruptcy case filing was faxed to the municipal court. The notice was docketed by the municipal court clerk on the morning of Monday, April 1, 2024. 3 {¶ 9} On April 2, 2024, the magistrate held an emergency hearing to address whether the scheduled move-out was stayed by Steele’s bankruptcy filing. Lasky appeared for VineBrook, and Steele appeared with her attorney. After reviewing the history of the case, the magistrate heard from counsel. Lasky reminded the magistrate that there had been a nuisance complaint and said that the home was likely being operated as a drug house. He told the magistrate that, a week and a half prior to the hearing, his client had served a 24- hour notice to inspect and was refused entry. Lasky expressed frustration with defense counsel’s communication and stated his belief that the exception to the automatic stay set forth in 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(22) applied. {¶ 10} Steele’s counsel had three arguments in response. First, he asserted that the applicability of the automatic stay was a matter for the bankruptcy court to resolve, and he noted that VineBrook had already filed the appropriate motion with the bankruptcy court. Second, he questioned why there had been a request for a writ of restitution and a writ granted prior to March 15. Third, he raised the three-day notice requirement for eviction. Counsel did not address his client’s continued occupancy in the residence. {¶ 11} When the magistrate asked Lasky why he had filed a motion for relief from stay in the bankruptcy court, Lasky responded that he did it “just in case because of my prior dealings with [Steele’s counsel] where he makes representations and does not honor them.” Plaintiff’s Ex. A, p. 23. Lasky stated that he had been a bankruptcy trustee, that he had a “working knowledge of bankruptcy court,” and that the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were intended to “prevent just these kinds of chicanery” in which a party files for bankruptcy after reaching an agreement. Lasky told the magistrate that Steele had the following remedies if she were unhappy: The move goes forward. The court has immunity and I don’t. I am willing to 4 accept that in this case. Let them go to court if they feel they have a case. Let them sue me as a violation of the stay because I’m standing on Section 22. The fact is that the tenant in this case made a commitment through her lawyer in open court and didn’t keep it. Now that they are confronted with that they still will not respond to that issue. When is an agreement an agreement and I think when you balance all the equities here and when the court looks at Section 22 that’s what it’s for. It’s to remove people like this who reach an agreement where there’s a judgment or an agreement and they haven’t left and we are allowed to utilize the court. Thank you. Plaintiff’s Ex. A, p. 24. {¶ 12} Steele’s counsel asserted that VineBrook had breached the agreement by requesting a writ of restitution prior to March 15, but the magistrate found that there had been no breach, considering that the writ had not been issued until March 20, 2024. When counsel reiterated that the matter of the automatic stay should be addressed in the bankruptcy court and noted that the bankruptcy court had contempt powers, Lasky interrupted, saying “Bring them! Bring them!” Id. at p. 26. {¶ 13} The magistrate orally found that the March 12, 2024 entry amounted to an eviction judgment, and she ruled that the eviction could go forward. The magistrate ordered Steele to vacate the residence by the end of the following day (April 3) and indicated that the bailiff would execute the writ on the day after that (April 4). {¶ 14} On April 3, 2024, the magistrate issued an order consistent with its oral pronouncement. The order stated that the March 12, 2024 entry, which journalized and adopted the agreed entry, was equivalent to a judgment for possession and that the judgment of possession predated Steele’s bankruptcy petition. The magistrate concluded 5 that, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(22), the bankruptcy automatic stay did not apply and the move-out could proceed. (That section states that there is no stay where “the lessor has obtained before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition, a judgment of possession . . . .”) The magistrate reiterated that the tenants had to vacate the Oakdale residence by 11:59 p.m. on April 3, 2024, and that the bailiff would execute the writ on April 4, 2024. {¶ 15} None of the parties presented any evidence regarding what occurred after the April 3, 2024 order. However, they agree that the tenants were evicted from the Oakdale Avenue home. They further agree that, on April 18, 2024, Steele commenced an adversarial proceeding against NREA in her bankruptcy case for violating the automatic stay. {¶ 16} Approximately 18 months later, on October 15, 2025, VineBrook sued Lasky in the common pleas court, raising claims of legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. In the legal malpractice claim, VineBrook alleged that Lasky had violated his duties to his client by (1) continuing to prosecute the eviction action without obtaining relief from the bankruptcy stay; (2) failing to inform VineBrook about the bankruptcy case, the stay, the available options, and the risk of proceeding without relief from the stay from the bankruptcy court; (3) failing to prosecute the motion to lift the stay; (4) failing to provide competent legal services during the eviction action; (5) failing to provide competent legal services regarding the bankruptcy case; (6) failing to seek eviction based on illegal drugs; (7) taunting Steele to commence litigation if she felt her removal was a violation of the automatic stay; (8) exhibiting unprofessional behavior in court; (9) failing to inform VineBrook about the proper legal precautions related to the automatic stay; (10) misrepresenting his experience and understanding of bankruptcy law; and (11) allegedly failing to turn over personal property and/or properly facilitate the return of Steele’s personal property, including her cat. 6 {¶ 17} VineBrook attached five documents to its complaint: (1) the public nuisance notification; (2) the forcible entry and detainer complaint and attached exhibits, which included a notice under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, a notice to vacate, and the lease between VineBrook, Steele, and Luttrell; (3) a transcript of the April 2, 2024 emergency hearing in the municipal court; (4) a non-file-stamped copy of the complaint for an adversarial proceeding against NREA in Steele’s bankruptcy case; and (5) a copy of a May 24, 2024 correspondence from Lasky to VineBrook, informing the landlord of the adversarial proceeding and advising it to contact its insurance carrier. {¶ 18} In his answer, Lasky denied that he had engaged in improper conduct and raised several defenses, including that the three claims should be considered a single claim of legal malpractice. The trial court set a scheduling conference for December 15, 2025. {¶ 19} On December 11, 2025, Lasky moved for summary judgment on three grounds: res judicata, intervening cause, and mootness. He argued that the claims were barred by res judicata because the municipal court had already resolved the enforceability of the March 12, 2024 judgment and the applicability of the automatic stay. Lasky further asserted that the landlord’s claims failed due to intervening acts of the Dayton Municipal Court, namely the court’s April 3, 2024 judgment finding that the automatic stay was not applicable and its issuance of and enforcement of a writ of restitution. Lasky claimed that the decisions by the Dayton Municipal Court occurred independently of any of his actions. Finally, Lasky contended that VineBrook’s claims were moot, as Steele had been evicted. {¶ 20} Lasky supported his summary judgment motion with an affidavit from his attorney, who authenticated the public nuisance notification (Exhibit A), the forcible entry and detainer complaint and attached exhibits (Exhibit B), the April 3, 2024 magistrate’s order (Exhibit C). the March 12, 2024 judgment entry (Exhibit D), and the March 20, 2024 writ of 7 restitution (Exhibit E). Lasky’s counsel also authenticated a copy of an unpublished opinion in In re Maggiore, Case No. 16-60234 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2016) (Exhibit F), which addressed the automatic stay provision in 11 U.S.C. 362(a)(3), the exception to the stay for eviction actions in 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(22), and the exception to 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(22) found in 11 U.S.C. 362(l). Lasky did not provide any affidavits detailing his communications with VineBrook, nor did he offer an affidavit from an expert addressing whether his conduct conformed with an attorney’s standard of care. {¶ 21} After the scheduling conference, the trial court issued an order under which VineBrook was required to identify its experts and provide expert reports to opposing counsel by February 13, 2026, and it had until March 15, 2026, to respond to the summary judgment motion. Lasky had 14 days thereafter to file a reply. Lasky’s deadline to identify his experts and provide expert reports was April 3, 2026. {¶ 22} VineBrook filed its memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on March 13, 2026. It asserted that Lasky’s representation had failed to meet the standard of care required of him and that his motion failed to meet his initial summary judgment burden. Specifically, VineBrook argued that res judicata did not apply, because Lasky was not a party to the eviction case and the eviction matter did not adjudicate his standard of care. It further contended that the municipal court’s orders did not break the chain of causation and there were questions of fact regarding Lasky’s involvement. Third, VineBrook asserted that the matter was not moot because this action was not a re-litigation of the eviction case. VineBrook emphasized that “[w]hat remains at issue are Plaintiffs’ ongoing defense costs, along with potential bankruptcy liability and reputational harm” and that it was sufficient that Lasky’s handling of the eviction case after the bankruptcy filing foreseeably exposed VineBrook to a stay‑violation claim, an ongoing adversary proceeding, 8 and significant legal fees. {¶ 23} VineBrook attached a copy of the transcript of the April 2, 2024 emergency hearing to its opposition memorandum. It did not provide any affidavits detailing its communications with Lasky, nor did it offer an affidavit from an expert addressing whether Lasky’s conduct had violated his standard of care. {¶ 24} Lasky filed a reply memorandum, emphasizing that VineBrook had failed to offer expert testimony in support of its legal malpractice claim and that the exception to the expert requirement did not apply. He contended that a lay person would not know, without expert testimony, whether his actions demonstrated a lack of caution or reasonable strategy as to the bankruptcy filing. Lasky further argued that the filing of Steele’s bankruptcy petition never triggered an automatic stay due to the prior judgment of possession, pursuant to Section 362(b)(22). {¶ 25} Pursuant to the scheduling order, on April 2, 2026, Lasky identified two attorneys as his expert witnesses and filed their expert reports. Both opined that Lasky had acted reasonably and within the standard of care during the eviction process when he relied on 11 U.S.C. 362(b)(22) to request the eviction process to proceed after the bankruptcy petition was filed. VineBrook did not identify an expert or provide a report. {¶ 26} On April 3, 2026, the trial court asked the parties to brief whether Counts 2 and 3 of the complaint were justiciable separately from the legal malpractice claim in Count 1. Lasky responded that all the claims should be analyzed as legal malpractice claims. VineBrook acknowledged that case law supported the conclusion that Counts 2 and 3 were not separately cognizable from Count 1. {¶ 27} On April 20, 2026, the trial court granted Lasky’s motion for summary judgment. After concluding that Counts 2 and 3 were subsumed within Count 1, the court 9 held that Lasky was entitled to judgment on the legal malpractice claim. The court found that VineBrook had failed to provide any facts to oppose Lasky’s expert opinions, to offer any expert opinion to rebut Lasky’s experts’ conclusions, and to present evidentiary materials relevant to the standard of care. The court further found that “that this case clearly is not one where the applicable standard of care is clear such that no legal opinion is necessary to prosecute the claims.” {¶ 28} VineBrook appeals the trial court’s judgment, raising two assignments of error. We will address them together. II. Review of a Summary Judgment Decision {¶ 29} In its first assignment of error, VineBrook claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Lasky, because Lasky never carried his initial burden under Civ.R. 56. Its second assignment of error contends that the trial court erred in holding that VineBrook’s legal malpractice claim required expert testimony, as the claim rests on Lasky’s failure to communicate material information regarding the tenant’s bankruptcy, the automatic stay, and the associated risks of litigation. A. Summary Judgment Standard {¶ 30} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper when (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, can only conclude adversely to that party. Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, Inc., 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370 (1998). The moving party carries the initial burden of affirmatively demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact remains to be litigated. Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St.3d 112, 115 (1988). To this end, the movant must be able to point to evidentiary materials of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) that a court is to consider in 10 rendering summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). {¶ 31} Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings. Dresher at 293; Civ.R. 56(E). Rather, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to respond, with affidavits or as otherwise permitted by Civ.R. 56, setting forth specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Dresher at 293. Throughout, the evidence must be construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. {¶ 32} We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Martcheva v. Dayton Bd. of Edn., 2021-Ohio-3524, ¶ 35 (2d Dist.). De novo review means that this court uses the same standard that the trial court should have used, and we examine all the Civ.R. 56 evidence, without deference to the trial court, to determine whether, as a matter of law, no genuine issues exist for trial. Ward v. Bond, 2015-Ohio-4297, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.). B. Summary Judgment Evidence under Civ.R. 56 {¶ 33} We begin with a review of the evidence that is properly before us. According to Civ.R. 56(C), the only types of evidence that may be considered in rendering summary judgment are “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and any written stipulations of fact.” Civ.R. 56(C); U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Higgins, 2012-Ohio-4086, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). In addition, other types of documents that are not specifically listed in the rule may be introduced as evidentiary material through incorporation by reference in a properly framed affidavit. Bank of America, N.A. v. Shailer, 2021-Ohio-3939, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). {¶ 34} A plaintiff’s unverified complaint is not evidence under Civ.R. 56(C). Indeed, it is well established that a plaintiff cannot rest on the allegations in the complaint to oppose a summary judgment motion. Dresher at 293; Civ.R. 56(E). Correspondingly, unauthenticated 11 attachments to an unverified complaint cannot be considered under Civ.R. 56(C). Compare Johnson v. Clark Cty. Aud., 2020-Ohio-3201, ¶ 39 (2d Dist.) (complaint and attachments thereto were properly considered under Civ.R. 56(C) where the complaint was verified and further indicated that the exhibits attached to the complaint were true and accurate copies of those items). {¶ 35} In this case, two of the five exhibits attached to VineBrook’s complaint–the public nuisance notification and the forcible entry and detainer complaint with exhibits–were authenticated by Lasky’s counsel and offered in support of the motion for summary judgment. Those two exhibits are, therefore, properly before us. The third exhibit–a copy of the transcript of the April 2, 2024 emergency hearing in municipal court– was attached to VineBrook’s opposition memorandum. Although the transcript was not authenticated, Lasky did not object to the trial court’s consideration of the transcript in his reply memorandum. In the absence of an objection, the trial court had the discretion to disregard the lack of authentication and consider the transcript. See, e.g., Johnson at ¶ 38, fn. 5. The last two attachments to the complaint–the purported complaint in the adversarial proceeding and Lasky’s correspondence–were neither authenticated nor presented by any party in support of or opposition to the summary judgment motion. Accordingly, Exhibits D and E to the complaint are not proper Civ.R. 56(C) evidence, and we will not consider them. {¶ 36} The trial court relied on the expert reports filed by Lasky on April 2, 2026. However, neither of the expert reports was sworn to, certified, or incorporated into an appropriate affidavit, and, thus, they did not comply with Civ.R. 56(C). See, e.g., Jochum v. Listati, 2019-Ohio-166, ¶ 16, fn. 4 (8th Dist.) (attorney’s unsworn expert report regarding counterclaim for unpaid legal fees and expenses did not comply with Civ.R. 56(C)). Accordingly, Lasky’s expert reports should not have been considered in ruling on the 12 summary judgment motion, and we will disregard them here. {¶ 37} In his appellate brief, Lasky argues that nothing prevented VineBrook from moving to strike the expert reports or requesting the opportunity to file a surreply. He points to case law concerning a party’s failure to object to improper evidentiary materials offered in support of or opposition to summary judgment, as well as case law concerning the attachment of new evidence or arguments in a reply brief. Neither of these lines of cases is relevant to the circumstances here. {¶ 38} Lasky did not provide any expert report in support of his summary judgment motion, nor was any expert report filed with the reply memorandum. Moreover, Lasky did not ask the trial court to consider the expert reports for summary judgment purposes when they were filed on April 2, 2026, after summary judgment briefing had concluded (the limited additional briefing at the court’s request, notwithstanding). To the contrary, Lasky’s memorandum accompanying the filing of the expert reports acknowledged that briefing on the summary judgment motion was complete, that the motion was ripe for determination, and that the expert reports were being filed for the purpose of complying with the court’s scheduling order should the experts’ testimony be necessary in the future. {¶ 39} Additionally, the trial court provided no notice to the parties that it would consider Lasky’s expert reports when ruling on the summary judgment motion. VineBrook had no reason to believe that the unsworn expert reports would be considered by the trial court in ruling on the summary judgment motion. Moreover, we cannot conclude that VineBrook acquiesced in the court’s consideration of Lasky’s expert reports by failing object to the court’s consideration of the expert reports or to request an opportunity to file a surreply. C. VineBrook’s Legal Malpractice Claim {¶ 40} To establish a legal malpractice claim based on negligent representation, a 13 plaintiff must show: “(1) that the attorney owed a duty or obligation to the plaintiff, (2) that there was a breach of that duty or obligation and that the attorney failed to conform to the standard required by law, and (3) that there is a causal connection between the conduct complained of and the resulting damage or loss.” Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 (1997), paragraph one of the syllabus. An attorney is entitled to summary judgment on a legal malpractice claim when, construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, establish one or more of the elements of the claim. Monroe v. Richards, 2025-Ohio-4394, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). {¶ 41} A breach of the duty to provide appropriate representation occurs when an attorney fails to “exercise the knowledge, skill, and ability ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession similarly situated, and to be ordinarily and reasonably diligent, careful, and prudent in discharging the duties he has assumed.” (Citations omitted.) R&J Solutions, Inc. v. Moses, 2021-Ohio-1315, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.); Monroe at ¶ 12. {¶ 42} Typically, expert testimony is necessary to establish a breach of the duty of representation. Monroe at ¶ 12; McInnis v. Hyatt Legal Clinics, 10 Ohio St.3d 112, 113 (1984) (“Generally, expert testimony would be required in regard to professional standards of performance.”). However, expert testimony is not required if the breach (or lack thereof) is within the common understanding of laypeople or “so obvious that it may be determined by the court as a matter of law.” E.g., Monroe at ¶ 12. We note that “not every violation of the ethical rules contained in the Rules of Professional Conduct constitutes legal malpractice, and not every act of legal malpractice constitutes a violation of ethical rules requiring discipline.” Powell v. Rion, 2012-Ohio-2665, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.). Unprofessional conduct is not synonymous with legal malpractice. {¶ 43} VineBrook asserts that there is consensus among Ohio courts that expert 14 testimony is not required in legal malpractice actions when the claim is based on an attorney’s failure to communicate or notify the client about basic, material aspects of the representation. To support that proposition, it cites to McInnis, Paldino v. Johnson, 2017- Ohio-2727 (11th Dist.), and Flynn v. Pollock, 2017-Ohio-966 (8th Dist.). {¶ 44} In McInnis, the client in a divorce proceeding told his attorney that he did not want the proceedings to be in a newspaper, and his attorney assured him in writing that they would not. Later, the attorney effectuated service on the client’s spouse by publication in the newspaper. The Ohio Supreme Court held that, while the attorney could not commit malpractice by complying with the notice provisions pertaining to service by publication, he could be liable for effecting publication of the divorce, contrary to the specific instructions of his client and his written assurance. McInnis at 112-113. Given the parties’ agreement, the attorney should have informed his client of the necessity of the publication. Id. at 113. The supreme court further held that expert testimony regarding the professional standards was unnecessary, as the claimed breach of profession duty was well within the common understanding of the laypeople on the jury. Id. {¶ 45} Paldino involved malpractice claims against two attorneys. VineBrook focuses on the second attorney, for which the malpractice claim arose from that attorney’s representation in an appeal from the denial of a motion for reconsideration of the denial of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Although the attorney’s alleged improper actions also included the failure to communicate with the client, the Eleventh District focused on the attorney’s filing of the appeal. It concluded that it should have been obvious to the trial court that the attorney committed malpractice when he filed the appeal, as a motion for reconsideration after a final judgment is a legal nullity. Paldino at ¶ 38. Moreover, because the malpractice was obvious, an expert was not required to support the client’s claims. Id. 15 {¶ 46} In Flynn, the attorney was hired by the family of Glenna Lankford, who was in a nursing home, to handle some matters regarding Lankford’s estate, including the filing of a Medicaid application. The attorney met with the family twice but thereafter failed to file the application, to communicate with the family, or to respond to the attorney from the nursing home. The Eighth District concluded that expert testimony was not required as “[a]n ordinary layperson has or should have the ability to judge if Pollock fulfilled her agreement with the Lankfords.” Flynn, 2017-Ohio-966, at ¶ 15. Expert testimony is not required where the alleged errors are so simple and obvious. Id. {¶ 47} Neither McInnis, Paldino, nor Flynn supports VineBrook’s broad contention. Unlike McInnis, this case does not involve a failure to communicate prior to taking actions contrary to the parties’ express agreement. Paldino and Flynn are likewise factually distinguishable. Unlike Paldino, Lasky did not take actions that were obviously frivolous, and unlike Flynn, he did not cease to communicate with VineBrook or fail to take action on its behalf. (Indeed, Lasky was hired to evict a tenant, and the tenant was evicted.) None of the cases support the conclusion that no expert testimony is required whenever there is a claim of failure to communicate. While we find these cases instructive on the general issue of the need for an expert, they are not dispositive here. {¶ 48} In this case, VineBrook’s legal malpractice claim alleges an array of deficient actions taken by Lasky during his representation of VineBrook, including his behavior at the April 2, 2024 emergency hearing, his alleged failure to consult with VineBrook about the bankruptcy petition and its implications, taunting Steele to file the adversarial proceeding in her bankruptcy case, and his failure to provide competent legal services during his representation in the eviction and bankruptcy cases. VineBrook does not allege that Lasky’s conduct resulted in an unsatisfactory resolution of the forcible entry and detainer action. 16 Rather, it primarily claims that Lasky took actions, in part without consulting with VineBrook, that exposed VineBrook to additional litigation and possible liability. {¶ 49} We agree with the trial court that an expert legal opinion is needed to establish VineBrook’s claims. For example, while VineBrook points to Lasky’s unprofessional discourse at the emergency hearing, we disagree with VineBrook that it is “so obvious” that the communication amounted to legal malpractice, as opposed to an expression of his belief in the correctness of this argument, particularly when the outbursts themselves did not result in any sanctions from the magistrate. Moreover, whether Lasky should have discussed the potential implications of the bankruptcy petition with VineBrook before continuing to pursue eviction (as opposed to waiting on a decision on the motion for relief from stay) is not a matter that is so obvious or simple to the court or would be commonly understood by laypeople as improper. Accordingly, VineBrook’s second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 50} Neither Lasky nor VineBrook provided expert opinions in support of their respective summary judgment memoranda; we cannot consider Lasky’s expert reports in determining Lasky’s entitlement to summary judgment. In Dresher, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the situation where neither party provided evidentiary materials demonstrating that there were no material facts in dispute. See Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293. The Court emphasized that where the moving party could point to no evidence demonstrating that the non-moving party lacked proof of the negligence claim, the moving party did not satisfy its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 and the motion for summary judgment must be denied. Id. at 295-296; see also Shaeffer v. FC Industries Inc., 2023-Ohio-3732, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). {¶ 51} In his summary judgment motion, Lasky did not concede negligence or breach of duty. However, neither did he argue and present Civ.R. 56 evidence that he was entitled to summary judgment because his conduct was reasonable and conformed to the required 17 standard of care. Because Lasky’s expert report was not part of his summary judgment motion, he failed to satisfy his initial burden to show that he did not breach his duty to VineBrook. Thus, the burden did not shift to VineBrook to present an expert opinion to the contrary. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Lasky based on VineBrook’s failure to present evidence regarding the standard of care. {¶ 52} VineBrook’s first assignment of error is sustained. IV. Conclusion {¶ 53} The trial court’s judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of the issues raised in Lasky’s motion for summary judgment that were not considered in the first instance. ............. EDELSTEIN, J., and DINGUS, J., concur. 18