Sturt v. Sturt
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketL-25-00255
JudgeOsowik
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Sturt v. Sturt, 2026-Ohio-4621.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
Willard H. Sturt Court of Appeals No. L-25-00255
Appellee
Trial Court No. DR2014-0071
v.
Diane E. Sturt DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: November 20, 2026
*****
Joseph W. Westmeyer, III, for appellee.
Jay E. Feldstein, for appellant.
*****
OSOWIK, P.J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Diane F. Sturt, appeals the September 23, 2025 judgment
of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Division, which vacated a
finding of contempt against defendant-appellee, Willard H. Sturt, reduced the amount a
magistrate ordered him to pay as a purge condition, and vacated an award of attorney fees
that the magistrate ordered Willard to pay. For the following reasons, we reverse.
I. Background
{¶ 2} Diane Sturt and Willard Sturt were married on June 12, 1993, and divorced
January 6, 2015. They have two adult daughters, born in 1993 and 1996. The final
judgment entry of divorce provided for the division of property, including real estate
located in Minturn, Colorado (“the Colorado Property”). That judgment specified that
the Colorado Property would be held in an irrevocable trust for the benefit of Diane and
Willard with a right of survivorship to their daughters, with Diane and Willard to be
designated co-trustees. Important to the present appeal, the judgment allocated
responsibility for expenses associated with the Colorado Property and provided as
follows:
[Diane] shall be permitted to add an alarm system to the Colorado
property. . . . [Willard] shall be responsible for and shall pay and assume,
all expenses connected with the Colorado Property, including but not
limited to any mortgage, real estate taxes, utilities, and maintenance; and
[Diane] shall reimburse [Willard] either one-half of the actual expenses or
$5,000.00, whichever is less, on an annual basis and after presentation to
[Diane] by [Willard] of all bills, invoices, and cancelled checks written by
[Willard] to pay for said expenses. The parties shall purchase insurance for
the Colorado Property and shall divide the cost evenly between them.
[Diane] will purchase the insurance and [Willard] will reimburse [Diane]
for one-half of the premium amount. In the event [Diane] uses any of his
family members to perform work at the Colorado Property, written invoices
must also be provided and are subject to [Diane]’s review and approval.
Emphasis added.
2.
{¶ 3} On September 19, 2023, Diane filed a motion to show cause why Willard
should not be held in contempt for violating the terms of the judgment entry of divorce.
Simply stated, Diane alleged that with regard to the Colorado Property, Willard failed to
pay maintenance expenses, real estate taxes, insurance premiums, and utilities, forcing
Diane to incur these expenses herself. She sought reimbursement for the expenses she
incurred.
A. The Trial Evidence
{¶ 4} A trial was held on October 1, 2024 before a magistrate. Diane testified that
Willard stopped paying expenses of the Colorado Property in late 2020. She claimed that
he had failed to pay utilities, property taxes, and homeowners’ insurance and had not
performed necessary maintenance. Diane said that some of the utilities were on the verge
of being turned off. She insisted that she attempted to inform Willard that bills needed to
be paid and repairs were needed. She explained that she had written to Willard at home
and tried contacting him at his office, but she received no response. Believing that
payment of these bills and maintenance expenses was needed to preserve and protect the
property, Diane testified that she paid the utilities, taxes, homeowners’ insurance, and
maintenance expenses herself and sought reimbursement via her motion to show cause.
Diane described that additional work needed to be done, such as carpet replacement and
fireplace repair, and additional bills were coming due.
3.
{¶ 5} Concerning utilities, taxes, and insurance, Diane presented evidence—via
testimony and/or invoices—that she incurred the following expenses for homeowners’
insurance:
Date Amount Payee
2020 $3,806 Safeco
2021 $4,217 Safeco
2022 $3,472 Safeco
2023 $4,348 Safeco
TOTAL $15,843
MINUS 50% $7,921.50
She presented evidence that she paid the following for real estate taxes:
Date Amount Payee
2021 $6,145.02 Eagle County
2022 $6,045.15 Eagle County
2023 $6,103.84 Eagle County
2023 $152.60 credit card fee
TOTAL $18,446.61
She presented evidence that she paid the following for water bills:
Date Amount Payee
2022 $1,060.34 Eagle River
Water/Sanitation
2024 $2,500 Eagle River
Water/Sanitation
TOTAL $3,560.34
And she presented evidence that she paid $58 per month to Xfinity for Internet, which
she testified was needed to maintain the alarm system that was installed in accordance
with the parties’ judgment entry of divorce. At some point, Diane did not specify when,
the monthly rate increased to $72. One bill for $58 was admitted into evidence at trial.
4.
{¶ 6} Concerning maintenance, Diane presented evidence that she incurred the
following expenses:
Date Amount Payee Nature of Work
10/4/2021 $3,200 Kinona Painting Sand and stain decks
4/15/2022 $13,911 Rocky Mountain Copper caps on exposed log posts to
Creations prevent water intrusion, deck/railing
work, railing replacement
7/24/2022 $796.93 Affordable Drain To repair leak in basement ceiling caused
Plumbing by broken backflow
9/10/2022 $48,821 Colorado Cabin Two-part exterior log restoration because
and Restoration logs were turning gray/deteriorating, deck
thereafter railings/posts rotting and falling off
5/7/2022- $1,300 All Seasons Winterize sprinkler system, monthly yard
10/7/2022 Service, Inc. maintenance
11/17/2022 $594.79 The Paint Bucket Paint deck near girls’ bedroom
1/2023 $385 Valley Lock & Address doors that could not be unlocked
Key on upper floors and other issues
throughout the home
2/8/2023 to $2,128.56 Sundance Remove/replace failed boiler pump,
7/24/2024 Plumbing and control board replacement, glycol/annual
Heating inspection circulation/zone issues
3/2023 $1,800 Tile Setters Repair cracked shower floors and leaking
12/9/2023 $163.23 Home Depot Sealant for stone walls and shower
3/13/2024 $908 Skyline Heating/zone repairs, master bedroom
Mechanical heat and boiler leak repairs
3/15/2024 $3,683.32 Alpine Glass Install Euro shower due to mold
8/5/2024 $2,700 Erik’s Painting Power wash and stain exterior deck
8/12/2024 $5,000 Umbrella Cedar shake/shingle and underlayment
Roofing leak repair/maintenance
9/11/2024 $8,200 Eagle Valley Installed heat tape in valleys, gutters,
Electric/Nathan downspouts, and trouble areas
LaCrosse, LLC
$2,144 Home Depot Replace 20-year-old refrigerator
TOTAL $95,735.83
{¶ 7} Diane testified that for the last two to three years, she and Willard’s daughter
and son-in-law had been living at the Colorado Property. Diane said that she visits the
property about twice a year, but Willard has not been there since their daughter moved in.
5.
She said that even before he stopped paying bills, Willard had performed very little
maintenance.
{¶ 8} On cross-examination, Diane confirmed that despite living at the Colorado
Property, her daughter pays for none of the utilities. She disagreed that her daughter
residing there prevents others from using the property. She conceded that she does not
know if Willard ever received her correspondence about the repairs she believed were
necessary, and she did not obtain his consent before incurring expenses. She
acknowledged that it was not her responsibility to maintain the property, and the
judgment entry of divorce does not say that Diane may incur expenses for maintenance
and utilities then seek reimbursement from Willard. Diane agreed that Willard spends
part of the year in Mexico, yet she tried to reach him at his Ohio residence and
workplace.
{¶ 9} Willard testified that he did not remember if he received specific letters from
Diane or her attorney, but agreed that he had received some “nasty” letters from Diane.
Willard said that he has no phone, but maintained that Diane could have found him at his
office; he acknowledged that he no longer goes to his office. Willard explained that
Diane could have reached him on his wife’s phone, however, he said that Diane and his
current wife do not get along. He conceded that if Diane called his wife, his wife would
not take the call because she does not want Willard to talk to Diane.
{¶ 10} Willard acknowledged that he had paid the expenses of the property before
his daughter moved in. He testified that the house is 4,000 square feet and is heavily
landscaped, and water bills routinely run $160 per month. He recognized that the alarm
6.
system may require internet service to operate, which he did not pay for. He did not
dispute that he had paid no real estate taxes since 2020. Willard claimed that his daughter
moved into the home without his consent. He complained that he could not use the house
with his daughter living there, but he acknowledged that at almost 90 years old, he is too
old to ski anyhow.
{¶ 11} Willard agreed that work needed to be done on the house in 2021, and said
that he would have had it done, but he wanted to do it “at the right time” and “use the
right people.” He criticized the amount Diane paid to have the work done. He explained
that he wanted to use the people who had helped build the house, which he acknowledged
were Mexicans who were no longer in the area. He said the younger guys Diane wanted
to hire were too expensive. Willard agreed that the work was necessary, but claimed that
he could do a lot of the work himself. He just did not like who Diane employed to
perform the work.
{¶ 12} When asked what work performed on the house was not necessary, he
agreed that much of the work performed was necessary. Nevertheless, Willard denied
that the redwood deck needed to be sanded and painted. He conceded that he did not pay
anything for insurance and he had not been to the house in at least three years. He
acknowledged that railings had fallen off the deck, but claimed that he “always figured on
fixing all that stuff when [he] got the right person”; he obtained no estimates for the
work—he “was looking for the people that helped [him] put [it] up.” Willard recognized
that he used the wrong kind of pine when he built the house and it rotted too fast.
7.
{¶ 13} Willard denied that heating coils needed to be installed to prevent ice from
forming on the roofline. He acknowledged that ice dams build up in the roof if the roof
isn’t cleaned, but he said someone just needed to “get up there and clean the roof off,” a
task he used to perform himself before he started “getting up in age.” He claimed that
because his daughter was living there with a man, he did not come to trim the trees and
clean off the roof like he used to do.
{¶ 14} Willard agreed that winterizing the sprinkler system is regular maintenance.
He acknowledged that the fireplace—a large stone Indian fireplace—does not work, but
said that it just required a new fan because “they” kept the fan running all the time. He
recognized that the large stones needed to be removed to access the fan. Willard agreed
that the carpet needs to be replaced, but said that he did not consent to replace the carpet.
He didn’t believe that a new refrigerator was needed even though the original refrigerator
was more than 20 years old. He conceded on cross-examination that if he were living
there, he would have bought a new refrigerator. Willard said that he did not know about
cracks in the shower floor, but he said that this is something that happens. He also denied
being aware of a problem with the shower or with heating, except for the bathroom
heating, which he said always had problems, and he denied knowing that there were
problems with the locks.
{¶ 15} Willard agreed that the exterior and deck needed work “for a period of
time,” but he insisted that he wanted the right people to perform the work with the right
materials. He claimed that he could fix the deck himself. He complained that Diane did
not tell him she was having it fixed before the work was performed. Willard testified that
8.
his consent was not sought before copper caps were installed on the wood posts. He
claimed that he could have done that himself for a couple hundred dollars rather than the
$4,000 Diane paid for the work. Willard acknowledged that Diane had told him that
there were defects with the roof, but denied giving his consent for work to be performed
on the roof. He insisted that he had not consented to the house being painted. The
bottom line was that Willard wanted to either make repairs himself or hire them out to
whom he wanted when he wanted. He just hadn’t done so.
{¶ 16} Finally, according to Willard, since 2015, Diane has never paid him
anything toward maintenance of the property. He said that he sought reimbursement but
Diane complained that he had not sent her the invoices.
B. The Magistrate’s Decision
{¶ 17} After the hearing, the magistrate issued her decision. She found that the
judgment entry of divorce made clear that Willard was required to pay one half of the
home insurance and all expenses for the Colorado property including half the insurance
and real estate taxes, utilities, and maintenance, with Diane to pay half of these expenses
up to $5,000. Despite these clear obligations and despite notice, Willard admittedly paid
nothing toward the property for at least two to three years and paid no taxes or insurance
since 2020. The magistrate disapproved of Diane’s resort to self-help, but found Diane’s
claim credible that she had been unable to reach Willard. The magistrate admonished that
Diane should have filed a motion or contacted Willard through his attorney rather than
incurring expenses and seeking reimbursement.
9.
{¶ 18} The magistrate found Diane credible that she paid insurance on the
property for 2021 to 2024 in the estimated amount of $16,868. She found that Willard
was responsible for half this, for a total of $8,434.
{¶ 19} The magistrate found that Diane paid real estate taxes of $6,145.02 for
2021, $5,869.08 plus interest of $176.07 for 2022, and $6,256.44 for 2023. She found
that 2024 taxes were still owed in the amount of $7,837.28. She awarded the amounts
she found were paid but not the amount still owed.
{¶ 20} The magistrate found that Diane paid water bills of $1,060.34 in September
of 2022, and $2,500 in March of 2024, and awarded these amounts to Diane.
{¶ 21} The magistrate found that Diane paid $1,450 for internet between
December 2022 through December 2024, but only submitted an invoice for $58. She
awarded $58 per month for internet from December 2022 through December 2024—a
total of $1,450.
{¶ 22} The magistrate distinguished “maintenance” from upgrades, and found that
the following bills were maintenance:
Date Amount Payee
7/24/2022 $796.93 Affordable Drain Plumbing
4/15/2022 $9,501 Rocky Mountain Creations
10/4/2021 $3,200 Kinona Painting
11/17/2022 $594.79 The Paint Bucket
5/7/2022- $200 and All Season Service
10/7/2022 $1,100
8/12/2024 $5,000 Umbrella Roofing
3/13/2024 $150 and Skyline Mechanical
$758
8/5/2024 $2,700 Erik’s Painting
10.
2/8/2023 to $2,128.56 Sundance Plumbing and
7/24/2024 Heating
TOTAL $26,129.28
{¶ 23} The magistrate subtracted out Diane’s required payment toward these
expenses, and based on the timing of those expenses, totaled Diane’s share at $18,248.73.
Between real estate taxes, utilities, and maintenance, then adding in $8,434 for one-half
of the home insurance, the magistrate found that Willard owed Diane a total of
$40,171.50.1
{¶ 24} The magistrate found that Willard failed to comply with the court’s
judgment of divorce and was, therefore, in contempt. She imposed a sentence of 30 days
in the Lucas County Corrections Center. She found that Willard could purge himself of
the contempt by paying Diane $40,171.50, plus 2024 real estate taxes by March 10, 2025.
{¶ 25} The magistrate found that Diane failed to present evidence of attorney fees,
but considering the time and labor expended in the case, attorney fees of $5,000 were
reasonable. She also charged costs to Willard of $150.
{¶ 26} The magistrate instructed that (1) future utility bills and insurance invoices
must be provided to Willard for payment through his attorney, and (2) Diane shall
provide information concerning future maintenance to Willard through his attorney
before completing any such maintenance.
C. The Parties’ Objections
{¶ 27} Both Diane and Willard filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.
1
We believe that the magistrate made a $400 math error in Diane’s favor.
11.
{¶ 28} Diane argued that the trial court should have awarded an additional
$7,837.28 for taxes because they had actually accrued in 2023. She claimed that she
should have been awarded an additional $2,746.42 for the water bill because Willard
stopped making payments at the end of 2020 and Diane paid a total of $6,306.76. Diane
claimed she should have been awarded an additional $758 for internet because she paid
this bill for 46 months. She claimed that she paid insurance totaling $20,579—not
$16,868. Diane argued that cabin restoration was “maintenance”—not an “upgrade”—
thus she should have been awarded $47,971 for cabin restoration. She argued that the
sprinkler system expenses should have been awarded as maintenance, as should have
been the plumbing repairs and new refrigerator. Finally, she claimed that she should have
been awarded $11,419.43 for attorney fees and costs.
{¶ 29} Willard argued that attorney fees should not have been awarded at all
because no evidence of attorney fees was presented. Willard also claimed that he should
not have been found in contempt because the divorce judgment did not specify when
maintenance must be completed and there was no evidence of any utility being shut off
due to nonpayment. He maintained that there is no provision in the judgment entry
permitting Diane to take it upon herself to pay bills or incur maintenance costs without
notice to Willard then seek reimbursement. Willard complained that his daughter now
lives in the Colorado home, which had previously been used as a vacation home only, and
having her as a permanent resident has increased expenses and wear and tear on the
house and has hindered Willard from being able to use the property for its intended
purpose as a vacation home. He claimed that Diane allowed their daughter to move in
12.
without consulting Willard and has charged her no expenses, instead placing the burden
of the expenses on Willard.
{¶ 30} Willard also challenged some of the expenses that the magistrate
determined were “maintenance” expenses. He claimed that the work performed by
Rocky Mountain Creations was for renovation, not maintenance. He insisted that even to
the extent that some of the expenses were maintenance expenses, he should have been
given the opportunity to complete the work himself, look for his own contractor, or at
least consent to the work before it was performed. He believed that he should not have to
pay expenses for work he could have performed himself or that was done without his
consent.
D. The Trial Court Judgment
{¶ 31} The trial court resolved the parties’ objections in an order journalized on
September 23, 2025.
{¶ 32} As to Willard’s objections, the trial court agreed with Willard that the
judgment of divorce did not authorize Diane to take it upon herself to arrange work to be
done then seek reimbursement. It found that Willard was to undertake these expenses
then seek reimbursement from Diane for up to half, but not to exceed $5,000 annually.
The court agreed that the proper procedure to remedy violation of the court’s order was to
file a motion to show cause and to compel the party to follow the order. The court found
that Diane bypassed proper procedure by unilaterally deciding what work to have done,
who would do it, and how much would be paid for the work. As such, Willard was not
13.
able to review, challenge, or pay the bills before Diane made payment. Because there
was no clear, specific language in the order authorizing Diane to do this and requiring
Willard to reimburse her, the court found that there was no basis to find Willard in
contempt. The court characterized Diane’s strategy as using the court as leverage to
collect money for work that she arranged without his authorization.
{¶ 33} As to Willard’s claim that some of the work was for home improvement
and not mere maintenance, the court found that Willard was responsible for all expenses,
including but not limited to maintenance. However, the court found that because it had
determined that Willard was not in contempt for violating the court order, the objection
was rendered moot.
{¶ 34} As to Willard’s claim that attorney fees should not have been awarded, the
court found that this issue was moot because it had determined not to award attorney fees
in ruling on Diane’s objections.
{¶ 35} As to Diane’s objection that she should have been awarded attorney fees of
$11,419, the court found that this objection lacked merit because she failed to present
sufficient documentation or evidence at the hearing and, in any event, it was rendered
moot by the court’s decision not to award attorney fees.
{¶ 36} As to Diane’s objection to the magistrate’s failure to award amounts due for
2024 real estate taxes, the court found no merit to this objection because Diane testified at
the hearing that she did not think she had yet paid the 2024 taxes because they were due
in January.
14.
{¶ 37} As to Diane’s objection that the magistrate failed to award additional water
bills paid by Diane totaling $6,306.76, the court found that there was insufficient credible
evidence in the record to support her claim that she paid this amount on top of the
$1,060.34 and $2,500 awarded by the magistrate.
{¶ 38} As to Diane’s objection that she should have been awarded an additional
$758 for internet service, the court found that there was insufficient credible evidence in
the record to establish that this additional amount should have been awarded.
{¶ 39} And as to Diane’s claim that she should have been awarded $20,2082 for
insurance rather than the $16,868 recognized by the magistrate, the court found that there
was insufficient credible evidence in the record to establish that she should have been
awarded this additional amount.
{¶ 40} In sum, the court found that Willard was not in contempt “regarding the
work on the Colorado property arranged by” Diane, but the finding of contempt with
respect to the payment of real estate taxes, insurance, water bills, and internet bills
“remains as ordered, as well as the purge provisions related to the contempt for these
issues.”
{¶ 41} The court further concluded that its determination not to find Willard in
contempt regarding the maintenance and home improvement work to the Colorado
Property necessitated reconsideration of the issue of attorney fees and costs. It denied the
request for attorney fees and cost. It found that “[n]either party was prevented from fully
2
Diane’s objections actually claimed that $20,579 should have been awarded—not $20,
208.
15.
litigating his/her rights and both parties’ legal interests have been adequately protected
without an award of attorney fees or costs.” The court stated that it had considered all
R.C. 3105.73 factors and determined that it was equitable not to award attorney fees or
costs.
{¶ 42} The court clarified that the following orders would remain in effect:
(1) all future utility bills related to the Colorado property are to be
provided in a timely manner by Ms. Sturt to Mr. Sturt for payment; (2)
yearly invoices for home insurance for the property are to be provided in a
timely manner by Ms. Sturt to Mr. Sturt for payment or reimbursement; and
(3) Ms. Sturt is to provide information to Mr. Sturt concerning future home
maintenance/improvement issues for the property prior to the completion of
any such maintenance/improvement.
{¶ 43} Diane appealed. She assigns the following errors for our review:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1: The trial court erred by sustaining
Willard’s objection to the Magistrate’s finding of contempt for failing to
comply with the parties’ Divorce Judgment that required him to be
responsible for and pay expenses for the Colorado Property and in failing to
adopt the Magistrate’s decision in that regard.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2: The trial court erred by failing to
order sanctions against Willard in the form of money that Diane paid for
maintenance expenses for the Colorado Property as reasonable purge
conditions within the discretion of the trial court and in failing to adopt the
Magistrate’s decision in that respect.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3: The trial court erred by impermissibly
modifying the terms of the parties[’] Divorce Judgment by finding
Willard’s consent was required before Diane could pay necessary expenses
to maintain the Colorado Property when Willard failed to do so and was on
notice such expenses were necessary.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4: The trial court erred by overruling
Diane’s objection as to the calculation of reimbursement owed to Diane for
the payment of real estate taxes, insurance, maintenance and utilities.
16.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5: The trial court erred by sustaining
Willard’s objection as to the Magistrate’s award of attorney’s fees and costs
in favor of Diane and by overruling Diane’s objection as to the amount of
the award.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 44} In her first assignment of error, Diane argues that the trial court erred when
it sustained Willard’s objection and rejected the magistrate’s contempt finding in regard
to Willard’s failure to pay the expenses of the Colorado Property. In her second
assignment of error, Diane argues that the trial court erred when it failed to adopt purge
conditions in the amount that Diane paid for expenses. In her third assignment of error,
Diane argues that the trial court modified the terms of the divorce judgment by finding
that Willard’s consent was required before Diane could pay expenses necessary to
maintain the Colorado Property. In her fourth assignment of error, Diane argues that the
trial court erred when it overruled her objection to the magistrate’s calculation of amounts
owed to her for the payment of real estate taxes, insurance, maintenance, and utilities.
And in her fifth assignment of error, Diane argues that the trial court erred when it
sustained Willard’s objection to the magistrate’s award of attorney’s fees and costs and
overruled Diane’s objection to the amount of that award.
A. Contempt for Failing to Pay Maintenance Expenses
{¶ 45} In her first assignment of error, Diane challenges the trial court’s judgment,
which found well-taken Willard’s objection to the magistrate’s contempt finding. She
maintains that she presented clear and convincing evidence that Willard violated the
17.
Divorce Judgment by abandoning his obligation to maintain the property despite being
aware that such maintenance was necessary.
{¶ 46} “Contempt of court is defined as disobedience of an order of a court.”
Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d 55 (1971), paragraph one of the syllabus.
“Generally, the trial court enforces the provisions of a separation agreement incorporated
into a divorce decree through a contempt action.” (Internal quotations and citations
omitted.) Liggett v. Liggett, 2022-Ohio-4700, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.). See also Andrews v.
Andrews, 2023-Ohio-293, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.). In a contempt action, the movant has the
burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the non-movant is in contempt of
court. Kelley v. Kelley, 2022-Ohio-4306, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.). We review the trial court’s
decision in a civil-contempt proceeding for an abuse of discretion. Id., citing State ex rel.
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hunter, 2013-Ohio-5614, ¶ 21. “A trial court will be found to
have abused its discretion when its decision is contrary to law, unreasonable, not
supported by the evidence, or grossly unsound.” State v. Nisley, 2014-Ohio-981, ¶ 18 (3d
Dist.), citing State v. Boles, 2010-Ohio-278, ¶ 16-18 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 47} The trial court agreed with Willard that there was no basis to find him in
contempt because the judgment of divorce did not authorize Diane to take it upon herself
to arrange work to be done then seek reimbursement. The court found that because there
was no clear, specific language in the order authorizing Diane to do this and requiring
Willard to reimburse her, there was no basis to find Willard in contempt. We disagree.
{¶ 48} The judgment of divorce made clear that Willard was responsible for
paying “all expenses connected with the Colorado Property, including but not limited to
18.
any mortgage, real estate taxes, utilities, and maintenance.” At the hearing on Diane’s
show-cause motion, Willard admitted that he completely stopped paying all expenses
relating to the property. He admitted that he knew work needed to be done on the house,
yet he obtained no estimates for the work. He claimed that he intended to either perform
the work himself—despite being almost 90 years old and despite not having visited the
property in more than three years—or hire the original workers, even though he knew
those workers were unavailable. Willard admitted that railings had fallen off the deck, he
used the wrong kind of pine when he built the house and it rotted too fast, he hadn’t
performed tree-trimming in years, the sprinkler system required annual winterization, the
refrigerator was original to the house and would have been replaced if he was living
there, ice dams would build up in the roof if the roof wasn’t cleaned, the exterior and
deck needed work, and there were defects with the roof that Diane told him about.
Willard also conceded that he knew the fireplace did not work, there was a problem with
the bathroom heating, and cracks could form in the shower floor. And while Willard
criticized Diane for hiring some work to be done—like installing copper caps on the
wood posts—his criticism was that he could have done it more cheaply himself, not that
the work wasn’t necessary.
{¶ 49} Diane testified to her attempts to reach Willard. The magistrate found
Diane’s testimony credible. Willard admitted that he had received letters from Diane, and
he admitted that he was largely unreachable because he had no phone, was usually in
Mexico, and his current wife would not accept calls from Diane.
19.
{¶ 50} While the judgment of divorce did not expressly contemplate Diane hiring
out the work herself and later seeking reimbursement with the help of the court, neither
did it permit Willard to simply ignore his obligation to maintain the property and pay
taxes, insurance, and utilities. See Drake v. Drake, 2003-Ohio-813, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.)
(ordering husband to reimburse wife for debts that he was required to pay under the
divorce decree but which she paid in his stead). Because it was undisputed that Willard,
in fact, purposefully ignored his obligations, we find that Diane presented clear and
convincing evidence of Willard’s disobedience of the judgment of divorce, and the trial
court abused its discretion when it granted Willard’s objection and rejected the
magistrate’s finding of contempt. The trial court’s judgment was unreasonable, not
supported by the evidence, and was grossly unsound.
{¶ 51} We find Diane’s first assignment of error well-taken.
B. Purge Conditions in the Form of Money Paid for Maintenance Expenses
{¶ 52} In her second assignment of error, Diane argues that the trial court erred
when it failed to adopt the purge conditions imposed by the magistrate as sanctions
against Willard—i.e., reimbursement to Diane for maintenance expenses that she paid
when Willard failed to abide by the terms of the judgment of divorce. Willard responds
that Diane was not authorized to incur expenses then seek reimbursement from Willard,
and the trial court correctly concluded that there was no basis for sanctions. He maintains
that “[i]t is not a question of ability to pay but a question of compliance with the order.”
20.
{¶ 53} “‘[A] sanction for civil contempt must allow the contemnor the opportunity
to purge himself or herself of contempt.’” Angotti v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-3222, ¶ 27 (6th
Dist.), quoting Burchett v. Miller, 123 Ohio App.3d 550, 552 (6th Dist. 1997). A purge
condition must be reasonable and compliance must be possible. Id. We review the
reasonableness of a purge condition for an abuse of discretion. Id. “The party who is in
contempt bears the burden of presenting sufficient evidence at the contempt hearing to
establish that the trial court’s purge conditions are unreasonable or impossible for him to
satisfy.” (Internal citations and quotations omitted.) Id.
{¶ 54} For the reasons articulated in the preceding section, we agree with Diane
that Willard was properly found by the magistrate to be in contempt for purposefully
neglecting his duty under the divorce judgment to pay maintenance and other expenses.
Sanctions and purge conditions that include the unpaid maintenance expenses were
reasonably ordered by the magistrate. The trial court abused its discretion when it
granted Willard’s objection and removed the maintenance expenses from the purge
conditions.
{¶ 55} We find Diane’s second assignment of error well-taken.
C. Consent to Incur Maintenance Expenses
{¶ 56} In her third assignment of error, Diane argues that the trial court erred by
finding that Willard’s consent was required before Diane could pay necessary expenses to
21.
maintain the Colorado property when Willard himself failed to do so. She maintains that
Willard was on notice that these expenses were necessary, and by requiring Diane to
obtain Willard’s consent before incurring such expenses, the trial court impermissibly
modified the terms of the parties’ divorce judgment.
{¶ 57} Willard responds that it is Diane who seeks to modify the terms of the
agreement. He maintains that there is no language in the divorce judgment that would
allow Diane to unilaterally determine what maintenance was needed, hire and pay
contractors, then seek reimbursement. “In fact,” he argues, “the language states the
opposite when it states Willard shall be responsible for and shall pay for utilities and
maintenance.”
{¶ 58} “A separation agreement is a contract and, as such, is subject to the same
rules of construction as other contracts.” Brennan v. Brennan, 1994 WL 518152, *2 (6th
Dist. Sept. 23, 1994), citing Forstner v. Forstner, 68 Ohio App.3d 367, 372 (11th Dist.
1990); Uram v. Uram, 65 Ohio App.3d 96, 99 (9th Dist. 1990). A separation agreement
must, therefore, “be interpreted to give effect to the parties’ intention.” Id., citing
Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St.2d 244 (1974), paragraph one of the
syllabus. The parties’ intention must be ascertained from the language of the agreement.
Id. “ If the terms of the agreement are plain and unambiguous, the words must be given
their plain, common and ordinary meaning.” Id., citing Forstner at 372.
{¶ 59} Under the plain language of the parties’ divorce judgment, Willard was
responsible for “all expenses connected with the Colorado Property.” The agreement
does not say that Willard’s consent was required before expenses could be incurred, it
22.
does not say that only Willard could decide what maintenance was needed, and it does
not say that Diane could not incur expenses and seek reimbursement. Certainly, the
agreement contemplated that Willard would be proactive, would pay the expenses, and
would seek reimbursement from Diane up to $5,000 per year after he himself incurred the
expenses. It did not contemp