In re A.C.

[Cite as In re A.C., 2026-Ohio-4426.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO WARREN COUNTY IN RE: : CASE NO. CA2026-03-038 A.C. : OPINION AND : JUDGMENT ENTRY 11/9/2026 : : : APPEAL FROM WARREN COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS JUVENILE DIVISION Case No. 16-C000228 Dearie, Fischer & Martinson LLC, and John A. Fischer and James A. Dearie, Sr., for appellant. Allen Law Firm LLC, and Ian S. Campbell and Mitchell W. Allen, for appellees. Lauren L. Clouse, guardian ad litem. ____________ OPINION M. POWELL, J. {¶ 1} Appellant ("Mother") appeals a decision of the Warren County Court of  Warren CA2026-03-038 Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting companionship rights to appellees, her daughter's paternal grandparents ("Paternal Grandfather" and "Paternal Grandmother" respectively, and "Paternal Grandparents" collectively). I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 2} Mother and Father are the parents of Lucy who was born in July 2016.1 Mother and Father were never married to each other. This case began when Paternal Grandmother received emergency custody of Lucy in December 2016. At the time, Father was incarcerated for assaulting Mother while she was pregnant with Lucy and for violating a protection order, and Mother had abandoned Lucy at Paternal Grandmother's home due to drug addiction. Paternal Grandmother moved for legal custody of Lucy. Maternal Grandmother likewise moved for legal custody of Lucy. The juvenile court consolidated the cases and placed Lucy in the temporary custody of Maternal Grandmother in January 2017. By then, Father had been released and was living with Paternal Grandparents. Father's paternity of Lucy was subsequently established and he was granted supervised parenting time. In May 2017, Father moved for legal custody of Lucy. A month later, Paternal Grandmother withdrew her motion for legal custody. {¶ 3} On February 8, 2018, the juvenile court denied Father's motion for legal custody but granted him supervised parenting time, and granted legal custody of Lucy to Maternal Grandmother. On July 8, 2020, the juvenile court terminated Father's parenting time with Lucy due to Father's violent nature and his being charged with third-degree felony domestic violence for attacking his brother-in-law. Father's subsequent motion to reinstate visitation was denied. {¶ 4} In May 2024, Mother moved for legal custody of Lucy. On July 15, 2024, the 1. "Lucy" is a pseudonym, adopted in the opinion for purposes of privacy and readability. In re B.T., 2025- Ohio-3019 (12th Dist.); The Supreme Court of Ohio Writing Manual, § 16, at 115 (3d. Ed. 2024). -2-  Warren CA2026-03-038 juvenile court granted legal custody of Lucy to Mother and ordered that Father's child support obligation to Maternal Grandmother be redirected to Mother via CSEA. The court retained "jurisdiction" over child support and "continuing jurisdiction" over the tax exemption. As Father was incarcerated, the court did not grant him parenting time. On August 2, 2024, Paternal Grandparents moved for companionship time with Lucy, ostensibly pursuant to R.C. 3109.12. At the time of the filing, Paternal Grandparents had cared for Lucy for about three months in 2016 when she was an infant, had not seen or had contact with her since July 2020 when Lucy was four years old, and had never sent cards or gifts to her on any occasion. At the time of Paternal Grandparents' filing, Mother resided with Lucy in Ohio. A year later, in August 2025, Mother and Lucy moved ten hours away to Georgia to be near Mother's sister. {¶ 5} A hearing was held on Paternal Grandparents' motion for companionship time with Lucy in late September 2025. The juvenile court heard testimony from Mother and Lucy's paternal and maternal grandmothers. The juvenile court also reviewed a guardian ad litem's report which recommended that Paternal Grandparents have companionship time with Lucy. Testimony revealed that Father has a criminal history of violent behavior that includes convictions for domestic violence against Paternal Grandmother and a girlfriend and several violations of protection orders. At the time of the hearing, Father was incarcerated for abducting and strangling a former girlfriend. His prospective release date is in 2028. Over the years, Father has resided on and off with Paternal Grandparents. In fact, even though she knew of Father's then pending charges for abduction and strangulation, Paternal Grandmother let Father stay at her home and he was later arrested there. {¶ 6} Testimony also revealed that Paternal Grandfather was twice convicted of domestic violence against Paternal Grandmother, and that there was a lot of yelling, -3-  Warren CA2026-03-038 screaming, and cussing between Paternal Grandparents and Father at their home. Specifically, Mother testified that Father would scream and yell at Paternal Grandparents if he wanted something from them, and that he always got what he wanted by manipulating them. Despite this, her admission that Father has a problem following any order, including court orders, and Paternal Grandfather's and Father's past convictions, Paternal Grandmother denied that Father was a dangerous individual or that her household was a turbulent or violent place. {¶ 7} Paternal Grandmother testified that she has three other grandchildren with whom she has a close relationship, and that she and Paternal Grandfather want companionship time with Lucy because "grandparents . . . have a big role in children's lives. We have three others and we are very active in their lives. . . . I just think grandparents just have an extra special little something that they can give to the kids." Paternal Grandmother asserted that if they were granted companionship time, they would agree to not have Father around Lucy and that "[w]e talked about it and he's in agreement with it." {¶ 8} On November 10, 2025, a magistrate granted Paternal Grandparents' motion, finding that companionship time with Paternal Grandparents was in Lucy's best interest. The magistrate recommended that beginning in December 2025, Paternal Grandparents have twice monthly Facetime visitation with Lucy, and that beginning in 2026, they additionally have four five-hour supervised visits with Lucy every year, twice in Ohio and twice in Georgia. Father was not to participate in the visits physically or by telephone. Mother filed objections to the magistrate's decision. {¶ 9} On February 18, 2026, the juvenile court overruled Mother's objections and adopted the magistrate's decision. The court stated that two findings made by the magistrate were crucial in its evaluation of Mother's objections: (1) Mother is a fit parent -4-  Warren CA2026-03-038 who has sincere fears about Father having any access to Lucy, given his violent nature and prior ability to control Paternal Grandparents; and (2) Paternal Grandparents have occasionally supervised short visitation periods with Lucy in the past but they do not have a strong bond with her. In granting companionship time to Paternal Grandparents, the court emphasized Lucy's "birthright" to know Paternal Grandparents and Father's extended family. {¶ 10} Mother now appeals, raising one assignment of error: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING COMPANIONSHIP TIME TO [PATERNAL GRANDPARENTS]. {¶ 11} Within her assignment of error, Mother raises three issues for review: (1) the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Paternal Grandparents' motion for companionship time; (2) the juvenile court erred in granting Paternal Grandparents companionship time with Lucy; and (3) R.C. 3109.12, the statute providing companionship time between a nonparent and the child of an unmarried woman, is unconstitutional. II. ANALYSIS A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction {¶ 12} Mother argues the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Paternal Grandparents' motion for companionship rights with Lucy, and thus, its February 18, 2026 judgment is void and must be vacated. In support of her argument, Mother cites this court's opinion in Rees v. Rees, 2026-Ohio-1235 (12th Dist.). Rees involved R.C. 3109.11, a statute that authorizes the "court of common pleas in the county in which the minor child resides" to grant reasonable companionship rights to relatives of a deceased parent. Paternal Grandparents argue that Rees is inapplicable because the case at bar involves R.C. 3109.12 which allows relatives of a child born to an unmarried -5-  Warren CA2026-03-038 mother to seek visitation with that child, and that their motion for grandparent visitation was filed in an existing custody case over which the juvenile court has continuing jurisdiction. {¶ 13} As relevant here, when a child's father has legally acknowledged paternity or a court has declared him to be the father of the child, R.C. 3109.12(A) authorizes "the court of appropriate jurisdiction of the county in which the child resides" to grant the parents of the father reasonable visitation, provided a complaint is filed and visitation is in the child's best interest. Of note, whereas R.C. 3109.11 and the section of R.C. 3109.12 dealing with the parents of an unmarried mother both refer to "the court of common pleas of the county in which the child resides," the section of R.C. 3109.12 dealing with the father's parents refers instead to "the court of appropriate jurisdiction of the county in which the child resides." The applicable portion of the statute does not specify that the complaint must be brought in a juvenile court or any other particular division of the court of common pleas. {¶ 14} "Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and decide a case upon its merits" and "defines the competency of a court to render a valid judgment in a particular action." Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 (1972). "Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged at any time." Pratts v. Hurley, 2004-Ohio-1980, ¶ 11. "If a court acts without jurisdiction, then any proclamation by that court is void." Id. {¶ 15} While common pleas courts and probate courts are established by the Ohio Constitution, juvenile courts exist solely by virtue of statute. In re Z.R., 2015-Ohio-3306, ¶ 14, citing R.C. Chapter 2151. See Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 4(C) ("Unless otherwise provided by law, there shall be a probate division and such other divisions of the courts -6-  Warren CA2026-03-038 of common pleas as may be provided by law"). As a statutory creation, a juvenile court "possesses only the jurisdiction that the General Assembly has expressly conferred upon it." In re Gibson, 61 Ohio St.3d 168, 172 (1991); Rowell v. Smith, 2012-Ohio-4314, ¶ 13. {¶ 16} R.C. 2151.23(A) and (B) set forth the "exclusive original" and "original jurisdiction" of the juvenile courts, respectively. Visitation is not included within those grants of authority. In re R.G., 2021-Ohio-93, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.). R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) grants the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving delinquent, unruly, abused, neglected, or dependent children. R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) grants juvenile courts exclusive original jurisdiction "to determine the custody of any child not the ward of another court of this state." This includes custodial claims brought by nonparents. Rowell at ¶ 13. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that R.C. 2151.23(A)(2) "does not confer jurisdiction on the juvenile court to determine '[t]he complaint of a grandparent seeking only visitation with a grandchild.'" Id. at ¶ 17, quoting In re Gibson at syllabus. {¶ 17} In support of their argument that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider their R.C. 3109.12 motion for companionship time with Lucy, Paternal Grandparents cite Brunner v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2011- Ohio-271 (5th Dist.), In re J.L.M., 2018-Ohio-2175 (9th Dist.), and this court's opinion in In re O.A., 2023-Ohio-1782 (12th Dist.). {¶ 18} In re O.A. was a case where a paternal grandmother filed a complaint for custody of her grandson, or alternatively for companionship time with him pursuant to R.C. 3109.12. The juvenile court awarded the paternal grandparents companionship time with their grandson. This court discussed subject-matter jurisdiction in the context of whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction to award the grandfather companionship time since he had neither moved for companionship time nor joined in the grandmother's motion. We found that the juvenile court did not have such subject-matter jurisdiction. In -7-  Warren CA2026-03-038 re O.A. at ¶ 16. However, we did not discuss or consider whether the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider the grandmother's complaint for companionship time. Thus, In re O.A. does not stand for the proposition that a juvenile court has subject- matter jurisdiction to consider a R.C. 3109.12 motion for companionship time. {¶ 19} In Brunner, a children's services agency filed a complaint for the temporary custody of two children, alleging abuse, neglect, and dependency. The children's great aunt moved for joinder and legal custody. Her motion for joinder was denied and she subsequently withdrew her motion for custody. She then filed a R.C. 3109.12 complaint for companionship time in the juvenile court. The juvenile court dismissed the complaint as a "backdoor" attempt to circumvent the court's exclusive original jurisdiction after the great aunt was denied intervention in the dependency action. Citing Juv.R. 13(B)(2)(c), which allows a juvenile court to enter temporary visitation orders in a pending dependency, neglect, or abuse case, the Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the juvenile court's decision and found "no bar to the filing of an R.C. 3109.12 action when an R.C. 2151.353 action is pending." Brunner, 2011-Ohio-271, at ¶ 14-18 (5th Dist.). {¶ 20} In re J.L.M. was a case that also originated as a dependency, neglect, and abuse action. After the children were adjudicated and the great grandparents were awarded legal custody of the children, the juvenile court closed the case. After the children's mother died, the maternal grandmother moved to intervene and for visitation with the children. The juvenile court granted both motions. The Ninth District Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not err in determining it had jurisdiction to consider the grandmother's motions to intervene and for visitation. In re J.L.M., 2018-Ohio-2175, at ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). The court of appeals noted that "the juvenile court has no jurisdiction to consider a grandparent's complaint solely for visitation brought pursuant to [R.C.] 2151.23(A)(2), which grants it exclusive original jurisdiction 'to determine custody of any -8-  Warren CA2026-03-038 child not a ward of another court of this state[.]'" Id. at ¶ 11. The court, however, found that the juvenile court was properly exercising its continuing jurisdiction over the children pursuant to R.C. 2151.23(A)(1), which grants exclusive original jurisdiction to juvenile courts concerning children alleged to be dependent, neglected, or abused. Id. {¶ 21} Both Brunner and In re J.L.M. originated as a dependency action, over which the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1). The Ohio Supreme Court has clarified that a juvenile court's exclusive original jurisdiction terminates once the court has adjudicated the child dependent, abused, or neglected, and subsequently issued a dispositional order under R.C. 2151.353(A). State ex rel. Allen Cty. Children Servs. Bd. v. Mercer Cty. Common Pleas Court, Probate Div., 2016-Ohio- 7382, ¶ 21, 23. Thereafter, the juvenile court "shall retain jurisdiction over any child for whom the court issues an order of disposition" pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A) until the child reaches the age of 18 or 21 years or until "the child is adopted and a final decree of adoption is issued." Id. at ¶ 22, citing R.C. 2151.353(F)(1). Thus, the juvenile court "retain[s] continuing jurisdiction pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(F)(1) and 2151.417(B)." Id. at ¶ 23. As Brunner and In re J.L.M. involved cases filed under R.C. 2151.23(A)(1) and in which the juvenile court statutorily retained continuing jurisdiction, we find that neither case is applicable here. {¶ 22} We likewise find that In re Gibson does not apply here. That case involved a grandparent seeking visitation with a grandchild who was in the custody of his married parents. Moreover, there was no prior custody-related action before the juvenile court at the time the grandparent filed a complaint for visitation. {¶ 23} Here, as Mother and Father were never married to each other, the case originated as a custody action over which the juvenile court possessed exclusive original jurisdiction under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2). As stated above, upon granting Mother legal -9-  Warren CA2026-03-038 custody of Lucy, the juvenile court retained "jurisdiction" over child support and "continuing jurisdiction" over tax exemption. Although there are no statutes specifically providing a juvenile court the authority to award visitation or companionship time, we find that the juvenile court retained continuing jurisdiction over Lucy. As the applicable section of R.C. 3109.12 refers to the "court of appropriate jurisdiction" for paternal grandparents' visitation rights, and as the juvenile court has previously exercised jurisdiction over Lucy, that court is the court of appropriate jurisdiction and the most appropriate forum to hear related matters such as grandparent visitation. Moreover, the juvenile court's express retention of jurisdiction indicates that the court's jurisdiction over Lucy has not been terminated and is continuing. In other words, the juvenile court's previously exercised jurisdiction over Lucy combined with the court's express retention of jurisdiction implicates the court's continuing jurisdiction. {¶ 24} In light of the foregoing, Mother's first issue for review is not well taken. B. Paternal Grandparents' Companionship Rights {¶ 25} In her second issue for review, Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in granting companionship time to Paternal Grandparents against her wishes. Mother asserts that the juvenile court failed to give special weight to her wishes and concerns regarding Paternal Grandparents' visitation with Lucy. {¶ 26} An appellate court will not reverse a trial court's decision granting or denying visitation rights absent an abuse of discretion. King v. King, 2006-Ohio-5985, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.). An abuse of discretion implies that the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Id. {¶ 27} It is undisputed that a parent has a fundamental right to raise his or her child. In re N.C.W., 2014-Ohio-3381, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.). "Parents have a 'fundamental liberty interest' in the care, custody, and management of the child. Further, it has been - 10 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 deemed 'cardinal' that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside, first, in the parents." Anderson v. Anderson, 2009-Ohio-5636, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.), quoting In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990). {¶ 28} By contrast, grandparents have no constitutional right of association with their grandchildren. In re Martin, 1994-Ohio-506, ¶ 14; In re Schmidt, 25 Ohio St.3d 331, 336 (1986) (grandparents' "visitation privilege cannot reasonably be construed as an absolute or constitutionally protected 'right' of association"). In addition, "the law does not provide grandparents with inherent legal rights based simply on the family relationship." In re H.W., 2007-Ohio-2879, ¶ 9. Instead, companionship or visitation rights for grandparents and other nonparents are only as provided by statute. In re Martin at ¶ 14. Because a fit parent has a fundamental right to parent whereas the nonparent has only a statutory right to request visitation, the nonparent advocating visitation has the burden to prove that visitation will be in the child's best interest. In re E.T.B., 2015-Ohio-2991, ¶ 27 (12th Dist.). {¶ 29} Paternal Grandparents sought companionship time with Lucy under R.C. 3109.12. Pursuant to R.C. 3109.12(B), a trial court may grant visitation rights to grandparents only if it determines that such visitation is in the best interest of the child. In determining whether to grant visitation rights to a grandparent, the trial court is required to consider the 16 factors listed in R.C. 3109.051(D). As especially pertinent to this case, and pursuant to the 15th factor, a trial court must consider "the wishes and concerns of the child's parents, as expressed by them to the court." R.C. 3109.051(D)(15). "Although the trial court can consider any factors it considers relevant, consideration of the parents' wishes and concerns is mandatory." Harrold v. Collier, 2005-Ohio-5334, ¶ 42. In addition, the parent's wishes and concerns must also be weighed against the other R.C. 3109.051(D) factors. In re O.A., 2023-Ohio-1782, at ¶ 25 (12th Dist.). - 11 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 {¶ 30} Although rebuttable, there is a presumption that "fit parents act in the best interest of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000); Harrold at ¶ 44. Absent an allegation of parental unfitness, the parents' determination of their child's best interest must be afforded "special weight." Troxel at 69; Harrold at ¶ 12, 42-43 (Ohio courts are obligated to afford some special weight to a parent's wishes when considering petitions for nonparental visitation under R.C. 3109.12). The juvenile court found that Mother is a fit parent. {¶ 31} Under Ohio's nonparental visitation statutes, a trial court "afford[s] parental decisions the requisite special weight, [and] take[s] into consideration the best interest of the child and balance[s] that interest against the parent's desires." Harrold, 2005-Ohio- 5334, at ¶ 43. "[T]he manner in which this standard is to be applied to each case must be 'elaborated with care.' Thus, there must be some meaningful rationale given for either abiding by or overriding the wishes of the parent." Celek v. Celek, 2009-Ohio-4990, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), citing Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. See also In re O.A., 2023-Ohio-1782, at ¶ 25 (12th Dist.); In re E.B.T., 2015-Ohio-2991, at ¶ 31(12th Dist.). {¶ 32} In her decision, the magistrate correctly identified Mother's reasons for opposing companionship time with Paternal Grandparents as follows: (1) Paternal Grandparents are aggressive and manipulative and Mother has witnessed a lot of screaming, yelling, and fighting in their home; (2) Paternal Grandparents are strangers to Lucy; and (3) Paternal Grandparents cannot protect Lucy from Father because they are unable to control him. The magistrate cited the applicable legal principles and listed the 16 factors of R.C. 3109.051(D) but did not balance or weigh the factors against each other or otherwise discuss them. In granting Paternal Grandparents' motion for companionship time with Lucy, the magistrate noted that they have never harmed Lucy and simply want the opportunity to see or interact with her. The magistrate adopted the guardian ad litem's - 12 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 recommendation for a slow implementation of visitation, and found that "a companionship time schedule can be composed that is tailored to Mother's concerns for [Lucy's] safety and wellbeing. The Court believes it is in the best interest of [Lucy] to have a relationship with [Paternal Grandparents] so long as they strictly follow court orders." {¶ 33} In its decision, the juvenile court found that Mother's reasons for opposing companionship time with Paternal Grandparents were legitimate but did not articulate them, found that the magistrate and the guardian ad litem "accorded Mother's concerns special weight," cited some applicable legal principles, and did not balance or weigh the R.C. 3109.051(D) factors against each other or otherwise discuss them. The court identified the issue before it as "the balancing of Mother's concerns with the foreclosure of the birthright of [Lucy]." The court then adopted the magistrate's decision based solely upon Lucy's "birthright" to know Paternal Grandparents and Father's extended family. {¶ 34} Specifically, the juvenile court observed that "[m]any children have parents that have concerning histories. Yet, in consideration of the heritage and legacy of a child, these are birthrights of a child that should not be discarded lightly." The court next observed that a child's access to relatives "can provide for emotional and social development. Alternatively, deprivation of those relationships can constitute painful voids in the life of a child." Turning to Lucy, the court held, A birthright is a right or privilege to which a person is entitled by birth. It is this Court's position that depriving [Lucy] of her access to her extended family, a birthright in the view of this Court, is an opportunity cost too great. Father is imprisoned. Presently, there is no better time for [Lucy] to develop these extended family relationships, which serves [Lucy] better than simply denying her the opportunity to experience them. This is the difference accorded to the opportunity sufficient to overcome the special weight accorded to Mother's wishes. The Magistrate has taken great care to craft a schedule that minimizes [Lucy's] potential exposure while allowing her to be enriched by the potential for - 13 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 relationships with her paternal family. {¶ 35} Upon reviewing the record, we find that the juvenile court abused its discretion by granting companionship time to Paternal Grandparents. The juvenile court did not give the requisite special weight to Mother's wishes and concerns and instead solely focused on Lucy's "birthright" to know Paternal Grandparents and Father's extended family. {¶ 36} The juvenile court was required to evaluate and balance the factors set forth in R.C. 3109.051(D) while placing the burden of proof on Paternal Grandparents to establish that their visitation request was in Lucy's best interest. As the court found Mother to be a fit parent, it was also required to give special weight to Mother's wishes and concerns and proper weight to the presumption that Mother was acting in the best interest of her child when opposing Paternal Grandparents' visitation request. In re B.B.W., 2024- Ohio-3030, ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). Additionally, in performing the analysis above, there must be a meaningful rationale given for overriding the wishes of the parent. In re O.A., 2023- Ohio-1782, at ¶ 25 (12th Dist.). {¶ 37} In finding that granting companionship time to Paternal Grandparents was in Lucy's best interest, the juvenile court did not discuss and balance the factors in R.C. 3109.051(D) and never weighed Mother's wishes and concerns against them. Notwithstanding its acknowledgment that Mother "has legitimate reasons for opposing companionship time between Paternal Grandparents and [Lucy]," that "special weight" must be given to a parent's concerns and wishes, and that a fit parent is presumed to act in the best interest of his or her child, the juvenile court did not discuss Mother's wishes and concerns other than to state her opposition to Paternal Grandparents' request for companionship time with Lucy, did not address the evidentiary basis upon which Mother's valid concerns were based, and did not give the requisite special weight to those wishes - 14 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 and concerns. Nor did the court recognize that Mother's wishes carry with it the presumption that she is acting in the best interest of Lucy by asking that companionship time be denied. Simply citing applicable legal principles is not the same as applying them to the facts of a case in an articulated analysis. {¶ 38} Instead, the juvenile court generally discussed the importance of a child's "heritage" and "legacy" and solely focused on Lucy's "birthright" to know Paternal Grandparents and Father's extended family. In other words, the court approved the magistrate's decision based simply upon a general notion that a child's best interests are served by having a relationship with the other parent's extended family. However, cases like this may not be decided based upon generalities, but upon specific evidence demonstrating companionship time with these grandparents is in the child's best interest. {¶ 39} While biological relationships may be important considerations, they are not controlling when ascertaining a child's best interest. See In re A.S., 2017-Ohio-1166, ¶ 74 (4th Dist.). Indeed, the general birthright principle relied upon by the juvenile court in affirming the grant of companionship time to Paternal Grandparents would be present in almost all cases where a nonparent relative seeks companionship time with a child. However, grandparents have no constitutional right of association with their grandchildren. In re Martin, 1994-Ohio-506, at ¶ 14; In re Schmidt, 25 Ohio St.3d at 336. Further, "the law does not provide grandparents with inherent legal rights based simply on the family relationship." In re H.W., 2007-Ohio-2879, at ¶ 9. {¶ 40} The juvenile court found that Mother is a fit parent who has "legitimate reasons for opposing companionship time between Paternal Grandparents and [Lucy]." But instead of giving some special weight to Mother's concerns, the juvenile court subordinated them to the general principle that Lucy's best interests are served by having contact with Father's extended family. Additionally, the only articulated reasoning for - 15 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 overriding Mother's objections to Paternal Grandparents having companionship time with Lucy was that Father's current imprisonment and the companionship time schedule crafted by the magistrate minimized Lucy's potential exposure to Father and "[t]his is the difference accorded to the opportunity sufficient to overcome the special weight accorded to Mother's wishes." However, this ignores Mother's concerns about Paternal Grandparents themselves and their volatile home environment, their past inability or unwillingness to stand up to Father, Paternal Grandfather's two domestic violence convictions in which Paternal Grandmother was the victim, the distance involved between Mother's home and that of the Paternal Grandparents, and the absence of any bond between Paternal Grandparents and Lucy who are virtual strangers to each other. Furthermore, the juvenile court's focus was upon whether the crafted companionship schedule mitigated Mother's concerns. However, what companionship schedule is appropriate should not be considered until after it is determined that any companionship time is in the child's best interest. {¶ 41} In view of Mother's legitimate reasons for opposing companionship time, something more is required in order for Mother's constitutional right to the care and management of Lucy to be subordinated to Paternal Grandparents' statutory right to companionship time. In re O.A., 2023-Ohio-1782, at ¶ 34 (12th Dist.). A trial court may not presume visitation with a grandparent is in the best interest of the child. Rather, the burden is on the grandparent to prove visitation would be in the best interest of the child. Id. Paternal Grandmother testified she and her husband want companionship time with Lucy because grandparents generally "have a big role in children's lives" and "an extra special little something that they can give" to grandchildren. Paternal Grandparents have not seen or had contact with Lucy for five years, in the interim have never sent her gifts or cards on any occasion, and have no bond with her. Other than Paternal Grandmother's - 16 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 testimony, no evidence was presented in support of Paternal Grandparents' motion for companionship time with Lucy. There was no evidence as to how Lucy's best interests would be served by her having contact and companionship time with Paternal Grandparents. {¶ 42} We fully acknowledge that a fit parent's wishes to oppose visitation with a nonparent are not irrebuttable, as nothing in Troxel suggests that a parent's wishes should be placed before a child's best interest. See Rowell, 2012-Ohio-4313, at ¶ 21. Even so, the well-established law is that a fit parent is presumed to act in the best interest of his or her child. The juvenile court's decision did not incorporate that presumption into its analysis, and although it indicated it had given "special weight" to Mother's wishes, it actually gave more weight to the prospective development of a bond and relationship between Paternal Grandparents and Lucy. We therefore find that the juvenile court abused its discretion by granting Paternal Grandparents' motion for companionship time with Lucy. {¶ 43} Mother's second issue for review is well taken and sustained. C. Constitutionality of R.C. 3109.12 {¶ 44} In her third issue for review, Mother argues that R.C. 3109.12 unconstitutionally infringes on her fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her child based solely on her status as an unmarried mother, thereby denying her the equal protection of the law. Our resolution of Mother's second issue for review renders the third issue for review moot. Accordingly, we need not address its merits. See State v. Stringer-Smith, 2026-Ohio-2976 (12th Dist.), citing App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). {¶ 45} In light of all the foregoing, Mother's assignment of error is sustained to the extent discussed in her second issue for review. - 17 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 III. CONCLUSION {¶ 46} We reverse the judgment of the juvenile court granting Paternal Grandparents' motion for companionship time with Lucy and remand the matter to the juvenile court. On remand, the juvenile court shall accord special weight to Mother's wishes and concerns as set forth in this opinion, shall balance the R.C. 3109.051(D) factors, and shall properly place the burden of proof on Paternal Grandparents to demonstrate that the evidence they presented through Paternal Grandmother's testimony has proven that companionship time with Lucy is in Lucy's best interest. In re N.C.W., 2014-Ohio-3381, at ¶ 37-38 (12th Dist.). The balancing of factors will not require any additional hearings or evidence, as both parties were presented with the opportunity to present their case. Id. at ¶ 37. In doing so, the juvenile court must recognize and start with the presumption that Mother is acting in Lucy's best interest by opposing Paternal Grandparents' motion for companionship time and requesting that it be denied. In re O.A., 2023-Ohio-1782, at ¶ 36 (12th Dist.). {¶ 47} Judgment reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. SIEBERT, J. concurs. PIPER, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. PIPER, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. {¶ 48} I concur with the majority's resolutions on the first and third issues. However, I respectfully disagree with my colleagues' analysis and conclusion on the second issue. Mother's Arguments and Standards of Review {¶ 49} Under the second issue, Mother's brief presents two distinct branches of - 18 -  Warren CA2026-03-038 argument. The first argument is: (A) The Trial Court Erred by Ignoring the Presumption that Mother was Acting in the Child's Best Interest and by Overriding Her Decision when It Awarded Companionship Time to [Paternal Grandparents]. {¶ 50} The second stated argument is: (B) The Trial Court Decision Was Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence. {¶ 51} The two arguments require different standards of review. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court misapplies the correct legal standard. In re L.R.M., 2015-Ohio-4445, ¶ 16 (12th Dist.). By contr