Lemley v. Lorain

[Cite as Lemley v. Lorain, 2026-Ohio-3787.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF LORAIN ) CHRISTOPHER LEMLEY C.A. No. 25CA012399 Appellant v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE CITY OF LORAIN, et al. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO Appellees CASE No. 24CV213323 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: September 28, 2026 FLAGG LANZINGER, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher Lemley appeals from the judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms. I. {¶2} In January 2018, Lemley and his wife separated for a time. On February 13, 2018, while Lemley was at home in his garage, Lemley spoke to his wife on the phone, and she informed him that she wanted a divorce. The news was very upsetting to Lemley. Ultimately, officers from the Lorain Police Department were dispatched to Lemley’s house over concerns that Lemley might be suicidal. Police were informed that Lemley was in the garage and that there was a gun in the garage. {¶3} Lemley’s garage was detached and was surrounded by a locked privacy fence. Nonetheless, police could hear someone talking in the garage. Police contacted Lemley’s family to ask Lemley to step outside the garage to talk with police. Lemley came out of the garage but  2 remained behind the privacy fence. Lemley appeared to be crying and made some statements about friends that had previously committed suicide. Lemley’s statements were concerning to the police. {¶4} Police asked Lemley to step outside the fence several times and then ordered him to do so. Police planned to have Lemley sent for a mental health evaluation at a hospital. Lemley refused to step outside the fence and became angry. Lemley began yelling and started walking back to the garage. At that point, one of the officers tased Lemley, and he was taken to a hospital. Lemley was ultimately charged with obstructing official business, but the charge was later dismissed. {¶5} In August 2024, Lemley filed a complaint against the City of Lorain (“the City”), Jamie Ball, Adam Ehrke, and Richard Shiltz (collectively “the Officers”). The complaint contained two counts, one for malicious prosecution, and one for respondeat superior. The City and the Officers filed an answer, inter alia, raising governmental immunity as an affirmative defense. In September 2024, the City and the Officers filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the respondeat superior count. The trial court granted the motion. {¶6} In July 2025, the City and the Officers filed a motion for summary judgment. Therein, the City and the Officers argued that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there was probable cause to arrest Lemley and the City and the Officers were entitled to the benefit of governmental immunity pursuant to Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code. The City and the Officers supplied evidentiary materials in support of their motion. Lemley responded in opposition to the motion. He also relied upon evidentiary materials. He did not cite to federal law or make any argument that his claim was a federal claim in whole or in part. The City and the Officers filed a reply.  3 {¶7} In November 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting summary judgment to the City and the Officers. In so doing, the trial court concluded both that: (1) Lemley’s malicious prosecution claim failed as a matter of law because there was probable cause; and (2) the City and the Officers were entitled to the benefit of immunity. {¶8} Lemley has appealed, raising four assignments of error for our review. Some of the assignments of error will be addressed together and some will be addressed out of sequence to facilitate our review. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL POLICE DEFENDANT(S) WAS INVALID BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THEIR LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE CITY OF LORAIN BASED ON IMMUNITY BY THE OHIO POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT IMMUNITY ACT. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE CITY OF LORAIN WHERE IT FAILED TO CONSIDER MUNICIPAL LIABILITY UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983. {¶9} Lemley asserts in his second assignment of error that, to the extent that his malicious prosecution was based upon federal law, the City was not entitled to the benefit of immunity pursuant to Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code because of language in R.C. 2744.09. In his third assignment of error, Lemley argues that he asserted a federal claim for malicious prosecution and Lieutenant Ball was not entitled to summary judgment as to that claim.1 1 Elsewhere in his brief, Lemley declined to pursue this appeal as to the other two officers.  4 Lemley maintains in his fourth assignment of error that the City was not immune pursuant to Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). {¶10} Lemley did not raise any of these arguments in the trial court. In his motion in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Lemley never contended that his malicious prosecution claim was also, in part, a federal claim. Instead, Lemley repeatedly cited to state law, including as to the elements of malicious prosecution. See Richard P. Goddard, Baldwin’s Ohio Practice, Local Government Law – Municipal, § 30:38 (Sept. 2025) (discussing the differences between state and federal law malicious prosecution claims). As Lemley did not raise these arguments below, he cannot now raise them on appeal. In re Estate of von Meyer, 2017-Ohio- 5839, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). Further, had the trial court ruled on the motion based upon arguments not raised by the parties, it would have run afoul of the party presentation principle. See Snyder v. Old World Classics, L.L.C., 2025-Ohio-1875, ¶ 4. {¶11} Lemley’s second through fourth assignments of error are overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE INDIVIDUAL POLICE DEFENDANT(S) BASED UPON THE OHIO POLITICAL SUBDIVISION TORT IMMUNITY ACT WAS ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED TO THE INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICER DEFENDANT(S) BECAUSE THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN DISPUTE REGARDING WHETHER THEY ACTED RECKLESSLY AND WANTONLY IN PROSECUTING CHRIS LEMLEY FOR OBSTRUCTION OF OFFICIAL BUSINESS. {¶12} In his first assignment of error, Lemley asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Lieutenant Ball as there remained genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether Lieutenant Ball engaged in willful, wanton, and reckless conduct. Thus, Lemley maintains that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Lieutenant Ball is entitled to the benefit of immunity.  5 {¶13} As mentioned above, the trial court granted summary judgment to the City and the Officers on two independent bases: the trial court concluded both that the City and the Officers were entitled to the benefit of governmental immunity under Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code, and that there was probable cause to arrest Lemley, thereby addressing the merits of Lemley’s state law malicious prosecution claim. “When a trial court grants judgment on multiple, alternative bases and an appellant does not challenge one of those bases on appeal, this Court will uphold the judgment on the unchallenged basis.” Covel v. PNC Bank, NA 2022-Ohio-1477, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting Schutte v. Summit Cty. Sherriff’s Office, 2018-Ohio-2565, ¶ 21 (9th Dist.), citing Tabatabai v. Thompson, 2017-Ohio-361, ¶ 15 (9th Dist.). Thus, even if we were to assume that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Lieutenant Bell on the basis of immunity, Lemley has still failed to establish that the trial court’s alternate basis for granting summary judgment on the state law malicious prosecution claim was incorrect. See Covel at ¶ 7. Lemley has not argued in this appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Lieutenant Bell with respect to the state law malicious prosecution claim. {¶14} Lemley’s first assignment of error is overruled. III. {¶15} Lemley’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.  6 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. JILL FLAGG LANZINGER FOR THE COURT STEVENSON, J. MANNING, J. CONCUR. APPEARANCES: BRENT L. ENGLISH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. PATRICK D. RILEY, JOSEPH LAVECK, and SCOTT BOWLES, Attorneys at Law, for Appellees.