Six Bros. Invest. Properties, L.L.C. v. Valley Auto Fin., Inc.

[Cite as Six Bros. Invest. Properties, L.L.C. v. Valley Auto Fin., Inc., 2026-Ohio-4227.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY SIX BROTHERS INVESTMENT CASE NO. 2026-T-0039 PROPERTIES, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellee, Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas - vs - VALLEY AUTO FINANCE, INC., Trial Court No. 2026 CV 00432 Defendant-Appellant. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Decided: October 26, 2026 Judgment: Reversed and vacated; remanded Scott C. Essad, 5500 Market Street, Suite 99, Youngstown, OH 44512 (For Plaintiff- Appellee). George V. Pilat, Gertsburg Licata Co., L.P.A., 600 Granger Road, Suite 200, Cleveland, OH 44131 (For Defendant-Appellant). EUGENE A. LUCCI, J. {¶1} Appellant, Valley Auto Finance, Inc. (“Valley Auto”), appeals from the April 6, 2026 judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, which denied Valley Auto’s motion to dismiss, granted appellee, Six Brothers Investment Properties, L.L.C. (“Six Brothers”), a writ of restitution of two commercial properties conditioned upon Valley Auto’s payment of sums the court fixed, and ordered the parties to exchange and to escrow rent payments. Six Brothers confesses error as to Valley Auto’s first assignment of error, acknowledging that the trial court granted relief without conducting the hearing that R.C. Chapter 1923 requires, and it asks that the matter be remanded for a hearing upon the first cause of its complaint. Upon our own review of the record, we agree. We hold that the jurisdictional-priority rule affords no basis for dismissal, because both cases were pending in the same court; that the trial court erred in granting restitution and other relief upon no evidence; and that Valley Auto’s alternative contentions, that the trial court was required to stay or to consolidate the proceedings, are moot.1 We therefore vacate the April 6, 2026 judgment in its entirety and remand the matter for further proceedings. Facts and Procedural History {¶2} Prior to the underlying proceedings, on January 15, 2025, Valley Auto filed a complaint in case number 2025 CV 00107 (“case number 00107”) against Six Brothers for declaratory judgment and breach of contract. The declaratory judgment action sought relief declaring the rights and obligations under two properties; namely 945 East Market Street, Warren, Ohio 44483 and 1025 South State Street, Girard, Ohio 44420. Valley Auto recognized Six Brothers owned the properties but alleged it had a lease with Six Brothers, which it had not breached, and the lease was in full force and effect at the time of the pleading. The case was assigned to and presided over by Judge Sean O’Brien in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. {¶3} Six Brothers subsequently filed, on February 13, 2025, two complaints against Valley Auto for forcible entry and detainer in two separate municipal court cases in Trumbull County (“eviction cases”). The eviction cases were transferred to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas and consolidated with Valley Auto’s declaratory judgment action. Six Brothers answered Valley Auto’s complaint and filed counterclaims, one of 1. On September 8, 2026, in Valley Auto Fin., Inc. v. Six Bros. Invest. Properties, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-3513 (11th Dist.), this court reversed the trial court’s judgment in the prior case and remanded the matter to the trial court. Nevertheless, that matter was pending before this court when the complaint in the underlying matter was filed as well as when the judgment, which is the subject of this appeal, was entered. PAGE 2 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039 which sought a declaratory judgment declaring no lease existed and any potential lease alleged by Valley Auto was void ab initio for failing to comply with general contract principles. {¶4} Case number 00107 was heard before the trial court’s magistrate on July 31, 2025 and September 11, 2025. The magistrate, however, did not file a written decision or recommendation in the trial court. Valley Auto Fin., Inc. v. Six Bros. Invest. Properties, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-3513, ¶ 7 (11th Dist.). Accordingly, no objections were filed, and no transcript of the proceedings before the magistrate was filed in the trial court. Id. at ¶ 14- 17. Nevertheless, on December 10, 2025, Judge O’Brien issued a judgment with findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at ¶ 8. {¶5} In that judgment, the trial court determined that the lease agreements at issue were not enforceable; the parties had an oral, month-to-month lease agreement for the properties; Six Brothers could not evict Valley Auto for the alleged failure to pay certain rents; and judgment was granted in favor of Valley Auto because Six Brothers failed to serve the former with a 30-day notice to terminate tenancy. Id. at ¶ 8. Judge O’Brien’s judgment concludes by stating that “[n]othing in this Magistrate’s Decision bars Six [Brothers] from serving a 30-day notice and refiling a forcible entry and detainer action for the premises.” (Emphasis added.) Id. Judge O’Brien signed the entry. {¶6} On January 6, 2026, Valley Auto appealed that judgment to this court, where it was docketed as 11th Dist. App. No. 2026-T-0001. That appeal took issue with, inter alia, the trial court’s alleged failure to comply with the mandates of Civ.R. 53 as well as alleged errors in the trial court’s determination(s) that the leases at issue were invalid and unenforceable. See Valley Auto Fin., Inc. at ¶ 9-10. PAGE 3 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039  {¶7} That matter was heard on August 18, 2026, and this court, on September 8, 2026, reversed the judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings due to procedural irregularities in the trial court’s issuance of its judgment. See generally Valley Auto Fin. Inc. 2026-Ohio-3513, at ¶ 14-20. This court remanded the matter to the point of error and directed that the magistrate issue a decision, as Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a) requires, upon the eviction hearing held on July 31 and September 11, 2025. Id. at ¶ 20. Based upon this court’s remand order, that case is again pending in the trial court. {¶8} On December 12, 2025, two days after the judgment in case number 00107, Six Brothers served Valley Auto with 30-day notices terminating the tenancies at each property effective January 31, 2026, and, on February 2, 2026, it served notices to leave the premises under R.C. 1923.04. On February 13, 2026, notwithstanding the pending appeal filed from case number 00107, Six Brothers filed a two-count complaint in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, case number 2026 CV 00432 (“case number 00432”), alleging forcible entry and detainer as to the same properties at issue in case number 00107 (Count one) and breach of contract for unpaid rent and other damages (Count two). The complaint expressly rested upon the judgment then on appeal, alleging that “[t]here is no lease; the Defendant is a month-to-month tenant,” and that, “[i]n fact on December 10, 2025 the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas . . . ruled that: ‘The Court finds that the leases in question . . . are month-to-month.’” This matter was assigned to Judge Ronald Rice in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. On March 10, 2026, Judge Rice set a hearing date on the eviction action for March 31, 2026 “in courtroom 2” at “9:45 a.m.” PAGE 4 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039  {¶9} On March 26, 2026, Valley Auto filed a motion to dismiss “for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the jurisdictional[-]priority rule or, alternatively, to stay the proceedings during [Valley Auto’s] pending appeal to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals.” In short, Valley Auto argued that Judge O’Brien’s order in case number 00107 was a substantive, final order on appeal with this court, and Six Brothers’ attempt to commence litigation on the same subject matter relating to the appealed case required either dismissal of case number 00432 or a stay of the same. Six Brothers did not respond to this motion. {¶10} After filing its motion to dismiss or stay the proceedings, Valley Auto requested a continuance of the March 31, 2026 hearing on the merits of Six Brothers’ eviction action in case number 00432. On March 30, 2026, Six Brothers opposed the request. On April 1, 2026, Judge Rice denied the request without explanation. {¶11} Subsequently, in a judgment dated April 6, 2026, the trial court noted the matter was before the court “for a first cause eviction hearing on March 31, 2026.” 2 The court recognized that Valley Auto filed a motion to dismiss, claiming “the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter while a related case, case number 2025 CV 107, is pending on appeal.” The trial court, without analysis, found the motion “not well-taken” and “DENIED” it. {¶12} The trial court, however, proceeded to rule on the merits of the underlying complaint “after hearing from Counsel.”3 The court ordered Six Brothers to return “all 2. We point out that the trial docket does not reflect an oral hearing was held; further, other than the motions and memoranda in opposition that were filed, no specific briefs were filed in support of Six Brothers’ complaint or by Valley Auto in opposition to the complaint. And nothing in the docket indicates the trial court either requested or ordered the parties to file pre-hearing briefs. 3. It is unclear what the trial court meant when it stated its judgment was premised upon “hearing from Counsel,” because no evidentiary hearing occurred and arguments of counsel, to the extent they existed, are not evidence. See e.g. Acosta v. Rubalcava, 2023-Ohio-1794, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.) (“Arguments of counsel, PAGE 5 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039 uncashed rent checks for February 2025 to March 2026” to Valley Auto, and ordered Valley Auto to “replace these with new payments/checks” within three business days. It further ordered Valley Auto to pay $5,000 per month for each property, $10,000 per month in all, “starting in February 2026 and moving forward,” with one-half paid directly to Six Brothers and one-half deposited into an interest-bearing account in the names of both parties, the funds of which were not to be disbursed “without an Order from the Court.” The court further stated that the “Writ of Restitution for the subject real property is granted but shall not issue so long as [Valley Auto] is current on payments as set forth herein. If payments are more than [three] days late, the Writ of Restitution shall issue immediately.” The court added that nothing in its order prevented Valley Auto from pursuing its pending appeal, and it set a status conference for July 7, 2026. This judgment is the order from which Valley Auto appeals. {¶13} Notwithstanding the substantive ruling on April 6, 2026, on April 9, 2026, Valley Auto filed a motion to consolidate case number 00432 with case number 00107. Valley Auto emphasized that the former should be consolidated with the latter because case number 00107 “was the first case filed by Valley Auto and is the oldest pending action between the parties.” It also pointed out that “[t]he cases involve the exact same parties and issues and [therefore] should be consolidated.” {¶14} Valley Auto underscored, pursuant to Civ.R. 42(A), which vests a trial court with the discretion to consolidate cases, that both actions involve multiple common questions of law and/or fact. Specifically, Valley Auto pointed out that the parties are identical; both cases involve the same, discrete pieces of real property; both cases are however, are not evidence.”). Id., citing State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Forsthoefel, 2022-Ohio-3580, ¶ 15. PAGE 6 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039 based upon Six Brothers’ ownership and Valley Auto’s occupancy; both cases involve the issue of whether Valley Auto possessed a written lease or a month-to-month tenancy; both cases focus upon a dispute regarding whether Valley Auto’s alleged written lease is valid; and each case alleged breaches of duties by and/or against both parties. {¶15} Six Brothers opposed the motion to consolidate arguing the motion was a “back door way of asking for a stay of the eviction without posting a bond.” Six Brothers substantively asserted there was no specific commonality of issues. Six Brothers also argued that case numbers 00107 and 00432 were distinct and did not involve the same parties. To wit, while Six Brothers acknowledged that it and Valley Auto were both parties to case number 00107 and 00432, they noted that the former case involved other individual defendants (presumably agents of Valley Auto). Moreover, Six Brothers pointed out that the relief sought in case number 00432 was simply an action in forcible entry and detainer; alternatively, the original case involved actions for declaratory judgment regarding an alleged underlying lease as well as various other claims for breach of contract and other torts. Accordingly, Six Brothers’ concluded the two cases did not have commonality of issues or law. {¶16} On May 1, 2026, the trial court denied Valley Auto’s motion to consolidate, entering the following judgment: Upon review, the Court finds that the Court currently does not have jurisdiction to hear this matter under case number 2025 CV 00107 as that matter is currently on appeal to the Eleventh District. Further, while this matter involves the same parties, property, and leases, this matter is based upon the Court’s findings in the previous case and facts that occurred thereafter. PAGE 7 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039  {¶17} The trial court apparently determined that because case number 00107 was on appeal from a separate entry in a different judge’s court, it lacked jurisdiction to consolidate the two cases. The trial court additionally appeared to conclude that, although, case number 00432 was based upon findings from case number 00107 (in the matter over which Judge O’Brien presided), it also involved facts occurring after the judgment appealed in case number 00107. {¶18} On May 6, 2026, Valley Auto filed a timely notice of appeal from the April 6, 2026 judgment, which subsumed the trial court’s interlocutory denial of its motion to dismiss. Assignments of Error {¶19} Valley Auto assigns two errors for this court’s review. They provide, respectively: [1.] The trial court committed reversible error and denied appellant due process of law by granting a writ of restitution and other relief not even requested by appellee without holding any hearing as required by applicable law. [2.] The trial court committed reversible error by denying appellant Valley Auto’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the jurisdictional[-]priority rule or, alternatively, to stay the proceedings during appellant’s pending appeal to the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, or to consolidate the underlying case with case number 2025 CV 00107 pending in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas. {¶20} We address the jurisdictional component of Valley Auto’s second assignment of error first, because it questions the trial court’s authority to act at all. We then address the first assignment of error, which is dispositive of this appeal. Law and Analysis PAGE 8 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039  {¶21} Before addressing the assigned errors, we confirm our own jurisdiction. The complaint pleaded a second cause of action for damages, which remains pending, and the April 6, 2026 judgment contains no determination under Civ.R. 54(B). Neither circumstance defeats our jurisdiction. “Appeals involving the right to possession fall under an exception to Civ.R. 54(B),” and, “[b]ecause actions in forcible entry and detainer are special proceedings, a judgment giving present possession is immediately appealable even though all claims have not been adjudicated.” Knop v. Davet, 2017-Ohio-1416, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.), citing Skillman v. Browne, 68 Ohio App.3d 615, 618-619 (6th Dist. 1990), and Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Jackson, 67 Ohio St.2d 129, 132 (1981); see also App.R. 4(B)(5); Knop at ¶ 10. That the writ of restitution was granted but withheld does not alter the analysis, for the judgment determined the parties’ respective rights to possession and directs that the writ “shall issue immediately” upon a default, without further order of the court. The notice of appeal, filed within 30 days of the April 6, 2026 judgment, was timely. App.R. 4(A)(1). {¶22} Next, with respect to the jurisdiction of the trial court, “[d]etermination of a court’s jurisdiction is a question of law we review de novo.” (Citation omitted.) Lloyd v. Thornsbery, 2021-Ohio-240, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.). Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard in granting restitution without a trial is likewise a question of law, which we review de novo. See OTR Hous. Assocs., Ltd. v. Engleman, 2025-Ohio-3171, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.). {¶23} Valley Auto first contends that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under the jurisdictional-priority rule. We disagree. PAGE 9 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039  {¶24} “The jurisdictional-priority rule provides that as between state courts of concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal whose power is first invoked acquires exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the whole issue and settle the rights of the parties.” State ex rel. Consortium for Economic & Community Dev. for Hough Ward 7 v. Russo, 2017-Ohio- 8133, ¶ 8, citing State ex rel. Dunlap v. Sarko, 2013-Ohio-67, ¶ 9. The rule “exists to promote judicial economy and avoid inconsistent results.” Russo at ¶ 10, citing Sarko at ¶ 12. {¶25} In Russo, the Supreme Court of Ohio explained that parties whose related cases are pending in the same court before different judges have a method of vindicating those interests that is unavailable when the cases are filed in different courts, namely, a motion for consolidation, and that “the appellate courts have been correct to recognize that the rule has no applicability when the cases are pending in the same court.” Id. at ¶ 10. {¶26} Here, case number 00107 and case number 00432 were both pending in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, General Division, albeit before different judges. Valley Auto acknowledges as much, conceding in its brief that “there was no issue of concurrent jurisdiction because both cases are pending in the exact same Common Pleas Court.” The jurisdictional-priority rule therefore has no application, and it affords no basis for concluding that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over case number 00432. To that extent, Valley Auto’s second assignment of error lacks merit. {¶27} Valley Auto contends in the alternative that the trial court was required to stay the proceedings under Civ.R. 62(B) during the pendency of the appeal in 11th Dist. App. No. 2026-T-0001, or to consolidate this case with case number 00107 under Civ.R. PAGE 10 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039 42(A). Because we sustain the first assignment of error and vacate the judgment in its entirety, and because this court has since decided the appeal in 11th Dist. App. No. 2026- T-0001 and remanded that matter to the trial court, see Valley Auto Fin., Inc., 2026-Ohio- 3513, at ¶ 20 (11th Dist.), the stay Valley Auto sought can no longer be granted, and whether these cases should be consolidated is a question addressed in the first instance to the sound discretion of the trial court upon remand. See Civ.R. 42(A); Russo at ¶ 10. Those contentions are therefore moot. App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). {¶28} With these points in mind, a final legal point relating to Valley Auto’s second assignment of error deserves attention. “[O]nce an appeal is perfected, a trial court is not divested of all jurisdiction—the trial court retains jurisdiction over issues not inconsistent with the appellate court’s jurisdiction and to act in aid of the appeal.” (Emphasis in original.) State ex rel. L.N.B. v. Lawson, 2021-Ohio-1365, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.), citing In re S.J., 2005-Ohio-3215, ¶ 9. This rule strips a trial court of jurisdiction “to proceed on claims that ‘could be affected by’ or ‘might be subject to’ the issues pending on appeal.” LEXISNEXIS v. Murrell, 2021-Ohio-3527, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2011-Ohio-626, ¶ 14. Similarly, this court has held that when “‘a trial court’s ruling could potentially conflict with the disposition of the pending appeal,’” it is inconsistent with jurisdiction. Krueger v. Krueger, 2025-Ohio-5283, ¶ 12 (11th Dist.), quoting Salyers v. Salyers, 2025-Ohio-2739, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.). {¶29} As discussed above, Valley Auto filed an appeal to this court in case number 00107 challenging specific legal procedures (the proceedings before the magistrate and the trial judge’s subsequent actions) as well as substantive legal determinations regarding PAGE 11 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039 the validity of the alleged leases of the same properties upon which Six Brothers filed its forcible entry and detainer action in case number 00432, the underlying matter. Those issues, particularly the possible validity of its claimed lease, distilled to their essence, involve facts and legal points that are inherently intertwined with the forcible entry and detainer matter in case number 00432. {¶30} Although this court has issued its opinion and judgment in Valley Auto Fin., Inc., 2026-Ohio-3513 (11th Dist.), it had not done so at the time of the proceedings below. This court, in the instant appeal, is directly faced with both procedural and substantive legal challenges relating to the same parties, the same properties, and the same alleged leases in the appeal from case number 00107. As such, the trial court’s issuance of an order purporting to set forth the parties’ relative rights and obligations in its April 6, 2026 judgment in case number 00432 could have potentially interfered with and could have been inconsistent with this court’s appellate jurisdiction to affirm, reverse, or modify the trial court’s judgment (dealing with the same properties and parties) in case number 00107. {¶31} The parties, particularly Valley Auto, did not argue this point below or in this court. “[A]ppellate courts should not decide cases on the basis of a new, unbriefed issue without ‘giv[ing] the parties notice of its intention and an opportunity to brief the issue.’” State v. Tate, 2014-Ohio-3667, ¶ 21, quoting State v. 1981 Dodge Ram Van, 36 Ohio St.3d 168, 170 (1988). Still, because jurisdiction is a matter an appellate court must consider de novo, and Valley Auto put the question of jurisdiction in play in its motion to dismiss, it would be neither wrong nor improper to address the jurisdictional points outlined above. Given the manner in which the case was argued and pleaded, as well as PAGE 12 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039 this court’s disposition of Valley Auto’s first assignment of error, however, we decline to fully examine the unbriefed jurisdictional point. We accordingly do not reach, and express no opinion upon, whether the pendency of the appeal in 11th Dist. App. No. 2026-T-0001 divested the trial court of jurisdiction to enter the April 6, 2026 judgment.. {¶32} Valley Auto’s second assignment of error is without merit in part and moot in part. {¶33} We turn to Valley Auto’s first assignment of error, in which it contends that the trial court granted a writ of restitution and other relief without conducting a hearing. Six Brothers confesses error. It “admits that no trial was held” and states that “[t]he matter should be remanded to the trial court for a full first cause eviction hearing on the facts alleged in the complaint.” A party’s concession does not relieve this court of its duty to examine the record and to determine for itself whether error occurred. See State v. Wright, 2022-Ohio-1537, ¶ 130 (6th Dist.) (Despite an appellee’s concession to an assignment of error, an appellate court is not mandated to accept it without further review.). Indeed, if the trial court error is clear, an appellate court will accept the concession as part of its analysis. Toledo v. Brock, 2016-Ohio-2866, ¶ 9 (6th Dist.); see State v. Trotter, 2015- Ohio-416, ¶ 4-6 (8th Dist.). We have independently examined the record for error, and we agree that the judgment cannot stand. {¶34} “Under Ohio law, tenants holding leasehold estates have a recognized property interest.” Jones v. Norwood, 2013-Ohio-350, ¶ 58 (1st Dist.), citing R.C. 5321.01, R.C. 5321.04; and Carroll Weir Funeral Home v. Miller, 2 Ohio St.2d 189, 191 (1965). Possessory interests in property invoke the protection of procedural due process. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972). This legal point is “well-established.” Thomas v. Cohen, PAGE 13 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039 304 F.3d 563, 576 (6th Cir. 2002). Generally, due process requires notice as well as a hearing prior to an eviction. Id. Constitutionally, an eviction affects an important property interest. Id. When a plaintiff has a protected property interest, a pre-deprivation hearing is generally required to satisfy the dictates of due process. See Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 742 (6th Cir. 2000). (Abrogated on different grounds pertaining to the weighing of factors necessary for granting a preliminary injunction.); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 53 (1993) (“The right to prior notice and a hearing is central to the Constitution’s command of due process.”). “Due process requires that a party be provided adequate notice of a proposed action as well as an opportunity to be heard.” (Citation omitted.) Zamos v. Zamos, 2009-Ohio-1321, ¶ 45 (11th Dist.). The opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Holz v. Holz, 2001 WL 1453900, *3 (11th Dist. Nov. 16, 2001). {¶35} Considering these constitutional points, an action in forcible entry and detainer is a summary statutory proceeding, and R.C. Chapter 1923 contemplates a trial upon the first cause. R.C. 1923.06(H)(1) provides that “[t]he claim for restitution of the premises shall be scheduled for hearing in accordance with local court rules, but in no event sooner than the seventh day from the date service is complete.” R.C. 1923.09(A) provides that, where the action is not continued, the place of trial is not changed, and no jury is demanded, a judge of the court shall try the cause and, “[a]fter hearing the evidence,” shall enter judgment against the plaintiff for costs if the complaint is not true; if the judge finds the complaint to be true, “the judge shall render a general judgment” against the defendant for restitution of the premises and costs. PAGE 14 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039  {¶36} Applying R.C. 1923.06(H)(1), the First District Court of Appeals recently reversed a judgment of eviction entered without a trial, observing that a tenant holds a property interest in the leasehold and that “[b]efore being divested of that property interest, due process requires both notice and a hearing,” which “is exactly what Ohio law provides in the mandatory hearing provision of R.C. 1923.06(H)(1).” Engleman, 2025- Ohio-3171, at ¶ 8 (1st Dist.). Both constitutional and statutory due process require notice and an opportunity to be heard under the circumstances of the matter at issue. The First District’s conclusion comports with both, and we accordingly agree with its reasoning in Engleman. {¶37} The record here discloses no hearing in any meaningful sense. The April 6, 2026 judgment recites that the matter came before the court “for a first cause eviction hearing on March 31, 2026,” that counsel for both parties appeared, and that the court ruled “after hearing from Counsel.” No witness was sworn, no exhibit was offered or admitted, and no fact was stipulated upon the record. Six Brothers does not contend otherwise. Because the judgment of restitution rests upon no evidence, it cannot stand. {¶38} The infirmity extends to the balance of the judgment. The trial court ordered the exchange of fourteen months of rent checks within three business days, fixed monthly payments of $10,000, and created a court-controlled escrow. The notice of the March 31, 2026 hearing advised the parties that the court would conduct a first cause eviction hearing; it gave no notice that such relief would be considered. Nor was any evidence taken upon the amount of rent due, the fair rental value of the properties, or the status of the tendered payments. {¶39} Valley Auto’s first assignment of error has merit. PAGE 15 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039  Conclusion {¶40} For the reasons set forth above, the April 6, 2026 judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and vacated in its entirety, and this matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including a hearing upon the first cause of Six Brothers’ complaint. Upon remand, the trial court may consider, in the exercise of its discretion, whether this case should be consolidated with case number 00107, which is again pending before that court. MATT LYNCH, P.J., SCOTT LYNCH, J., concur. PAGE 16 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039  JUDGMENT ENTRY For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s first assignment of error is with merit. Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit in part and moot in part. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and vacated in its entirety, and this matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to be taxed against the parties equally. JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure. PAGE 17 OF 17 Case No. 2026-T-0039