Scharf v. Scharf

[Cite as Scharf v. Scharf, 2026-Ohio-3076.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT Zachary Scharf, : Plaintiff-Appellant/ : Cross-Appellee, No. 24AP-443 : (C.P.C. No. 21DR-1981) v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Kristen Scharf, : Defendant-Appellee/ Cross-Appellant. : D E C I S I O N Rendered on August 11, 2026 On brief: Reash Law Offices, LLC, and Maryellen Reash, for appellant/cross-appellee. Argued: Maryellen Reash. On brief: Trolinger Law Offices, LLC, and Christopher L. Trolinger, for appellee/cross-appellant. Argued: Christopher L. Trolinger. APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations JAMISON, J. {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant/cross-appellee, Zachary Scharf (“Zachary”), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, granting a divorce and terminating his marriage to defendant-appellee/cross-appellant, Kristen Scharf (“Kristen”). Kristen has filed a cross-appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part. I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 2} The parties were married on September 19, 2015 in Montgomery County, Ohio. Two children were born during the marriage: Z.S. on April 20, 2018; and L.S. on No. 24AP-443 2 July 4, 2020. The marital residence was located on Audubon Avenue, Hilliard, Franklin County, Ohio. {¶ 3} Zachary filed a complaint for divorce on June 3, 2021. In that complaint, he alleged that the parties were incompatible, and that Kristen was guilty of gross neglect of duty. Kristen filed an answer and counterclaim on July 23, 2021. She admitted that the parties were incompatible but denied that she grossly neglected her duties. In her counterclaim, Kristen alleged that the parties were mutually incompatible and that Zachary acted with extreme cruelty and gross neglect in his duties. In his reply to Kristen’s counterclaim, Zachary admitted that the parties were mutually incompatible but denied that he acted with extreme cruelty and gross neglect in his duties. Christopher Heckert was appointed guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for the children. {¶ 4} On November 20, 2021, the magistrate issued temporary orders. Both parties were designated temporary residential parents and legal custodians. Alternating parenting time was ordered, wherein Kristen would have three consecutive days, followed by Zachary having three consecutive days. A temporary child support order was issued requiring Zachary to pay $950 per month. The parties agreed to a temporary order requiring them to engage in parent coaching with Wendi Stern. {¶ 5} Zachary filed a motion for a distributive award. In that motion, he alleged that Kristen, using a power-of-attorney, withdrew $26,000 from an account solely in Zachary’s name. He further alleged that these funds were separate property. {¶ 6} The parties filed competing motions to modify temporary orders. The magistrate ruled on those motions in an order dated March 31, 2023. As part of that order, Kristen was designated the temporary residential parent and legal custodian. Zachary was ordered to have parenting time pursuant to Loc.R. 27.1, Option D, which provided the party with parenting time on alternating weekends and each Wednesday. Zachary’s child support order was modified to $1,395.34 per month. Zachary filed a motion to set aside the magistrate’s order, which was denied by the trial court. {¶ 7} On October 17, 2023, Heckert filed a GAL report and recommendation. Heckert reported that Kristen wanted full custody of the children with Zachary’s parenting time allocated pursuant to Loc.R. 27.1, Option D. On the other hand, Zachary wanted Kristen to move back to central Ohio and obtain employment, a reduced child support No. 24AP-443 3 obligation, a shared parenting plan, control of school placement, and daily contact with the children. As for the children, Heckert was of the opinion that the children were too young to express their wishes. However, based on his observations, Heckert indicated that the children’s enjoyment of each parent was visible during visits. {¶ 8} Ultimately, Heckert opined that given the conflict between the parties and their inability to make mutual decisions regarding the children, a shared parenting plan would not work. He supported maintaining the temporary orders as final orders as it related to custody of the children. Heckert recommended that Kristen be designated the legal custodian of the children. He also recommended that the parties should follow Loc.R. 27.1, Option D, for parenting time. {¶ 9} Prior to the start of trial, the parties came to an agreement as to the division of marital assets and debt. The trial in this matter was held on the following dates: October 23 through 25, 2023; November 27 and 28, 2023; December 4 and 5, 2023; January 9, 2024; and January 22, 2024. {¶ 10} Dr. David Lowenstein testified that he performed a psychological evaluation of Zachary. He stated that his evaluation had some limitations due to his inability to speak with a number of relevant individuals, including Kristen. His initial impressions of Zachary were that he was very organized and was upset about the possibility of losing time with his children. Dr. Lowenstein observed the children in the home with Zachary. He stated that the children had a really good relationship with Zachary. Zachary was able to redirect them when they were about to break a rule and the children seemed comfortable and happy in the home. {¶ 11} Dr. Lowenstein conducted a number of assessments with Zachary. Dr. Lowenstein determined through the assessments that Zachary was presenting the best picture of himself, but not to the point that the evaluations were invalid. In Dr. Lowenstein’s opinion, Zachary was being honest during these assessments. Dr. Lowenstein observed that Zachary was firm and knew what he wanted, but not to the point that he was aggressive. Ultimately, Dr. Lowenstein opined that Zachary showed no signs of significant psychiatric or psychological difficulties that would interfere with his ability to parent his children. No. 24AP-443 4 {¶ 12} Eric Glassner testified that he was a family friend of the parties. He indicated that before and after the parties had children, their relationship seemed great. Glassner observed that both parties were good parents with happy children. {¶ 13} Zachary testified that during their engagement, Kristen gave him an ultimatum to transition from full-time Army service, to one weekend per month. This was due to the travel required by his position. The parties agreed to reside in central Ohio, with the condition that they live on the west side of Columbus so that Kristen was as close as possible to her family in Dayton. When their first child was born in April 2018, the parties decided that Kristen would be a stay-at-home parent because Zachary was making more money. Zachary testified that following the birth of their first child, he noticed changes in Kristen’s behavior. He described her behavior as being sad a lot of the time and losing interest in activities that they used to do together. Zachary testified that in order to help Kristen, he started doing more around the house and taking care of their child so that Kristen could get some breaks to recharge. He suggested counseling, but she rejected the idea. {¶ 14} At a certain point after the birth of Z.S. the parties discussed her obtaining her Orton-Gillingham certification, so that Kristen could tutor students in the evenings when Zachary got home from work. The goal was for her to do ten sessions per week at $60 per hour. Zachary testified that Kristen planned to go back to work full-time after they had their second child and that child reached school age. {¶ 15} After L.S. was born, Zachary noticed Kristen being more and more sad and withdrawing. He also noticed that her hygiene began to slip. He was worried about her and again proposed counseling. Zachary testified that Kristen’s neglect of her hygiene negatively impacted their sex life. He admitted that he was unfaithful during the marriage and confessed that to Kristen. He testified that he had three separate one-night stands. Kristen left the marital residence with the children a few days after he confessed his infidelity. Zachary testified that Kristen indicated she would be back in a few days. However, she never returned, except to move out her belongings. Following Kristen’s departure, Zachary did not see or talk to the children for a month. No. 24AP-443 5 {¶ 16} Zachary testified that Kristen used a power-of-attorney to transfer $26,000 from his bank account to hers. He indicated that the power-of-attorney was expressly for a situation in which he were to be killed during a military deployment. {¶ 17} Zachary testified that when the parties had equal parenting time under the initial temporary orders, things went well after a period of adjustment. {¶ 18} Regarding his participation in parent coaching with Wendi Stern, Zachary testified he had approximately 40 sessions with her. Later on in his testimony, he revised that number downward. After an initial period of resistance, he had a good working relationship with Stern. However, that relationship deteriorated toward the end because Zachary felt she was presuming he was guilty of abuse allegations made by Kristen. At that point, he terminated the counseling relationship with Stern. {¶ 19} Zachary testified that in August 2022, L.S. had a seizure while in Kristen’s care. He alleged that he was not informed about the situation until hours later. He also alleged that when he attempted to garner information from the hospital, he was unable to do so. The evening before the third day of trial, L.S. had another seizure and was taken to the hospital. Zachary testified that communication from Kristen was much better and that he was able to see his son at the hospital. In general, at the time of his testimony, Zachary believed that the communication between he and Kristen was moving in a positive direction. {¶ 20} Zachary alleged that he had a non-existent relationship with Heckert. He indicated that he reached out to Heckert many times and never received replies. Zachary admitted that on one occasion when he did not feel Heckert was doing enough to press Kristen to be more accommodating, Zachary told Heckert to “get off your ass and do your damn job.” (Tr. Vol. III at 200.) Zachary indicated that the relationship with Heckert changed immediately after that. He alleged that Heckert believed that Zachary’s military service was problematic for his potential custody of the children. At the time of his testimony, Zachary was in the Individual Ready Reserve in the Army. That position required zero travel and no training. He believed it would be extremely unlikely that he would ever be deployed. {¶ 21} Zachary was employed at Integrated Data Services (“IDS”) building “dashboards” for websites. (Tr. Vol. III at 222.) He testified his salary was $120,000 per No. 24AP-443 6 year. As of the second to last day of trial, Zachary obtained additional full-time employment as a business intelligence analyst at Natera making $55.2863 per hour. With the two jobs, his hours were 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. At various times, he had project-based, temporary side jobs to make extra money. {¶ 22} Zachary and Kristen stopped filing their taxes jointly. Kristen was claiming the children as dependents, which, according to Zachary, led to an additional $8,500 in tax liability for him in 2022. Zachary testified that additional child support, spousal support, and attorney fees to Kristen would cause his budget to go into a massive deficit. {¶ 23} Kristen testified that she left the marital residence on May 13, 2021, and moved into her current residence sometime in August of that year. She claimed that she informed Zachary where she was going when she left the marital residence. At first, she intended to return, but Kristen alleged that Zachary blamed her for his infidelity. Kristen testified that Zachary did not permit her to return to the residence to collect her belongings. Kristen stated that she frequently offered Zachary extra time with the children, but he often declined. Kristen believed that communication with Zachary was getting worse. She did not believe that they would be able to make joint decisions regarding the children. {¶ 24} Upon having their first child, Zachary did not help her with anything around the house. Kristen testified that Zachary rarely cared for the children. To Kristen, everything had to be Zachary’s way. He frequently engaged in what Kristen described as coercive or intimidating behavior. Kristen alleged that if she did not do what he wanted, he would tell her about all the other women he could find who were better than her. {¶ 25} Kristen testified that Zachary was “sexually violent” to her during the marriage. (Tr. Vol. VI at 615.) She explained that she believed he would withhold sex as a coercive tactic. As far as physical abuse, Kristen testified that Zachary would strike or kick her while they were sleeping. Zachary claimed that he did not remember doing so and was asleep if or when it happened. It should be noted that in his testimony, Zachary denied Kristen’s allegations of abuse. There were no allegations that Zachary was ever physically abusive to the children. Kristen was diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). She attributed that to her experiences during her marriage to Zachary. {¶ 26} As for her education history, Kristen has a bachelor’s degree in psychology and Spanish. She also has a master’s degree in education and school counseling. Kristen No. 24AP-443 7 obtained a certification in Orton-Gillingham. She explained that Orton-Gillingham is a methodology for helping students who struggle with reading, typically due to dyslexia. Kristen is a licensed school counselor and a licensed bullying prevention trainer. She testified that she was employed as a school counselor at Archbishop Alter High School making approximately $42,000 per year. Her employment there began in July of 2021. Her hours during the school year were 7:30 a.m. until 3:30 p.m. She was occasionally called into work during the summer. {¶ 27} Kristen testified about her expenses. At the time of her testimony, she indicated she was paying for some utilities, internet, gym membership, and her and her parents’ phone service. Her parents paid for some utilities, and she paid them what she was able to pay. At the time of trial, she was paying her parents $950 per month for rent. {¶ 28} Katherine Gonzalez testified that she was Kristen’s twin sister. When Kristen left the marital residence with Z.S. and L.S. in May 2021, she stayed with Katherine until August of that year. Katherine testified that approximately one week after Kristen began residing with her, Katherine started communicating with Zachary to facilitate video calls with the children and meetings at a local park. In her opinion, Kristen was a very attentive mother. Kristen had a strong support system of family and friends in the Dayton area. Katherine alleged that there were times that Zachary was behaving aggressively, including the most recent time L.S. was hospitalized for a seizure. {¶ 29} The day before the second to last day of trial, Zachary filed a proposed shared parenting plan. Kristen filed a motion to strike said plan as untimely. Kristen’s motion to strike was granted by the trial court. {¶ 30} The trial court issued a judgment entry/decree of divorce on June 18, 2024. The court found that the parties be granted a divorce on the grounds of incompatibility, living separate and apart for a continuous period of over one year, and Zachary’s adultery. It was ordered that Kristen be the children’s sole legal custodian and residential parent. Zachary was ordered to have parenting time pursuant to Loc.R. 27.1, Option D. The trial court gave Zachary the right to claim Z.S. as a dependent for tax purposes. Kristen was entitled to claim L.S. as a dependent for tax purposes. Zachary was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $2,168.16 per month. Zachary was ordered to be responsible for 60 percent of extraordinary medical expenses, with Kristen being responsible for the other No. 24AP-443 8 40 percent. The trial court did not order spousal support and ordered the parties to pay their own attorney fees. {¶ 31} It is from that decision that the parties now appeal. II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶ 32} Zachary assigns the following as trial court errors: [1.] The trial court abused its discretion in striking Appellant’s proposed shared parenting plan, based on objection that the mid-trial filing of the plan deprived Appellee of due process, when the parties operated under a shared parenting arrangement for 16 months on temporary orders, and the particulars of the proposed plan were proposed in settlement discussions and were specifically detailed during trial, giving Appellee ample opportunity to respond. [2.] The trial court abused its discretion in failing to award shared parenting to Appellant, based on the recommendation of the GAL, after evidence of his bias was made clear to the court. [3.] The trial court abused its discretion in failing to award shared parenting to Appellant, when it awarded all privileges normally included in shared parenting arrangements. [4.] The trial court abused its discretion in awarding sole custody to Appellee, given evidence that Appellee had abused her custodial privileges, had exhibited dishonesty on the stand at trial, had strategized with blatant dishonest [sic] to impugn the character of Appellant in the eyes of the court to further her plan to deprive Appellant of parental rights, had demonstrated a pattern of interference with the relationship between Appellant and the Children, and had a history of mental instability that would place the Children in jeopardy. {¶ 33} Kristen assigns the following as trial court errors: [1.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in the determination of incomes for both parties and by imputing income to each party without a finding of unemployment or underemployment for either party and by failing to make adequate findings and conclusions of law to support its income determinations or indicate any consideration of the factors contained in R.C. 3119.01(C)(10),(13) and (18) as it relates to the determination of incomes. No. 24AP-443 9 [2.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in failing to make adequate findings and conclusions to support the income calculations for purposes of spousal support, failing to appropriately consider the statutory factors under R.C. 3105.18 and by failing to award spousal support to appellee/cross-appellant. [3.] The trial court erred and failed to correctly complete the child support worksheet in the cost of health insurance and the work-related childcare costs. [4.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion in awarding a tax exemption to the noncustodial parent and failing to consider and make findings on the statutory requirements of R.C. 3119.82 and the children’s best interest to award tax exemption to noncustodial parent. [5.] The trial court abused its discretion in failing to award attorney fees to appellee/cross-appellant under R.C. 3105.73. III. STANDARD OF REVIEW {¶ 34} When deciding child custody matters, a trial court must follow R.C. 3109.04. However, “it has broad discretion to determine the appropriate allocation of parental rights and responsibilities.” Lupia v. Lupia, 2026-Ohio-1059, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). “The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). As such, “[t]he standard of review in domestic relations cases is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Scinto v. Scinto, 2010-Ohio-1377, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.); In re B.D., 2021-Ohio-3792, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.) (reviewing a trial court’s decision to disregard an untimely shared parenting plan under an abuse of discretion standard); Wagenbrenner v. Wagenbrenner, 2011-Ohio-2811, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.) (an award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion); Serra v. Serra, 2016-Ohio-950, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.) (“[a]n appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision allocating tax exemptions for dependents under an abuse of discretion standard”). {¶ 35} An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Most decisions involving abuses of discretion are unreasonable, as opposed to unconscionable or No. 24AP-443 10 arbitrary. Aetna Better Health, Inc. v. Colbert, 2012-Ohio-6206, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.). “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.” Id. Furthermore, “[w]hen reviewing an assignment of error for an abuse of discretion, an appellate court may not merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Asbanyoli v. Haddadin, 2024-Ohio-170, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Zachary’s Assignments of Error {¶ 36} At the outset, we note that a discussion of Zachary’s lack of compliance with the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure is warranted. Zachary’s amended brief failed to include a table of contents in violation of App.R. 16(A)(1), a table of cases, statutes, and other authorities cited in violation of App.R. 16(A)(2), and a statement of the issues presented for review in violation of App.R. 16(A)(4). Moreover, Zachary’s discussions for each of his assignments of error contain very little, if any, citations to the record or legal authority. Per App.R. 16(A)(7), an appellant’s brief shall contain arguments “with respect to each assignment of error . . . and the reasons in support of the contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which appellant relies.” Although there are citations to the record and legal authorities within the sections preceding Zachary’s discussions of his assignments of error, his failure to include them within those discussions forces this court to seek out those citations and determine on its own to which assignment(s) of error those citations belong. Nevertheless, in the interests of justice, we will thoroughly review the record and rule on the merits of Zachary’s assignments of error. {¶ 37} For ease of discussion, we will first address Zachary’s fourth assignment of error. In his fourth assignment of error, Zachary contends that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding sole custody of the children to Kristen. In a divorce case, a trial court is required to allocate parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the minor children of the marriage. R.C. 3109.04(A). In doing so, the trial court must consider what would be in the best interest of the child. R.C. 3109.04(B)(1). In determining the best interest of a child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, those outlined in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Factors regarding a determination that shared parenting is in the best interest of the child are contained in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2). No. 24AP-443 11 {¶ 38} A review of the trial court’s judgment entry/decree of divorce reveals that the court thoroughly reviewed the record and carefully considered each of the statutory factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Regarding the wishes of the parents, the court noted that Zachary desired a shared parenting plan. Zachary testified that he would prefer that Kristen and the children move back to central Ohio, but he understood the children were currently doing well in Montgomery County. He was also in agreement with Kristen being the school placement parent. On the other hand, Kristen wanted to be designated the sole residential parent and legal custodian of the children. The court also noted, at the beginning of the case, the temporary orders designated both parents as temporary legal custodians and residential parents. See R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a). {¶ 39} In its discussion of the children’s interactions and interrelationships with each other, their parents, and any other parties, the trial court noted that it presumed the children were bonded with each other because they have always resided together and there was no evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, all witnesses testified that the children had strong bonds and good relationships with each parent. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c). The trial court went on to note that despite the drastic changes in their lives, the children were doing well in their school/daycare placements and had friends in their community in Montgomery County. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(d). Neither party testified that they had significant physical or mental health concerns that would negatively impact on their ability to parent the children. The trial court did note that Kristen had a diagnosis of PTSD, but she was working with a mental health provider and taking medication. Although Kristen expressed concerns for several personality traits she observed in Zachary, Dr. Lowenstein testified that Zachary did not possess any mental health difficulties that would prevent him from caring for the children. As for Z.S. and L.S., both were previously engaged with Help Me Grow due to minor delays, and Z.S. was engaged in counseling. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(e). {¶ 40} Regarding which parent was more likely to honor and facilitate parenting time, visitation, and companionship rights, the trial court noted that neither party testified about continuous willful denials of court-ordered parenting time. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f). However, both parties displayed difficulties agreeing on court order interpretation and had communication issues regarding parenting time between the children and the non- possessory parent. The court went on to state that Kristen actively engaged with the court No. 24AP-443 12 ordered parent-coach, but Zachary’s engagement was “lackluster at best.” (June 18, 2024 Jgmt. Entry/Decree of Divorce at 17.) Finally, Zachary, as the child support obligor, was current on all of his child support and consistently made payments throughout the pendency of the case. {¶ 41} Despite striking Zachary’s shared parenting plan, the trial court still thoroughly addressed and considered the factors outlined in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2). With regards to the parents’ ability to cooperate and make decisions jointly, the trial court noted that both parents, as well as the GAL, testified to concerns regarding the parties’ ability to cooperate and make joint decisions with respect to the children. R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(a). Both parents testified that they wanted their children to have good relationships with the other parent. Thus, the court concluded that both parents could encourage love, affection, and contact between the children and the other parent. R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(b). As for the history of or potential for domestic violence, the trial court articulated the differing opinions of the parties without making a finding either way. R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(c). There were no allegations of child abuse. The judgment entry noted that the parties live approximately one hour from each other. R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(d). Finally, the court noted Heckert’s recommendations. R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(e). {¶ 42} The trial court also considered the factors regarding parenting time set out in R.C. 3109.051(D). The judgment entry reiterated the relevant findings from R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) and (3). The court noted that Z.S. was five years old and L.S. was three years old. R.C. 3109.051(D)(4). Additionally, the parents worked full-time and exhibited the ability to work around their parenting time, as well as the children’s school and other activities. R.C. 3109.051(D)(3). As for the children’s health and safety, the trial court noted Zachary’s concerns with Kristen’s alcohol use and bouts of crying in front of the children. Heckert expressed no concerns about the children’s health and well-being with either parent. R.C. 3901.051(D)(7). The court noted that the parents have demonstrated the ability to agree on make-up parenting time but concerns still remained regarding the parties’ communication and cooperation. R.C. 3109.051(D)(10). {¶ 43} Upon our review of the record and the trial court’s decision, we cannot find that the court’s determination in this matter as to child custody was an abuse of discretion. As illustrated above, the court thoroughly addressed and considered each of the applicable No. 24AP-443 13 statutory factors regarding the best interest of the children, shared parenting, and parenting time. The court’s specific factual findings appear for the most part to be neutral in nature, considering each parent’s respective positions. For example, the judgment acknowledged the positive relationships each child has with each parent. Additionally, the trial court neutrally addressed Kristen’s allegations of domestic abuse without siding with one party over the other. In short, the court carefully considered each party’s position and made findings of fact that were supported by the testimony and evidence presented at trial. {¶ 44} The trial court’s conclusion to grant Kristen sole legal custody of the children was driven, at least in part, by the parties’ communication difficulties and the challenges they had in making joint decisions regarding the children. The parties were engaged in a highly contentious, approximately three-year-long divorce and custody dispute. The record is replete with instances of both parties causing difficulties in communication and decision making. For example, Kristen testified that Zachary did not permit her to return to the marital residence for her belongings. On the other hand, Zachary testified about Kristen’s chaotic communication about important issues. Zachary indicated that Kristen would continuously make time changes to events on the Our Family Wizard (“OFW”) calendar, often in very small increments. Furthermore, when it came time for Z.S. to enroll in school, Kristen went back and forth as to which school the child would attend. Although there is no evidence in the record to suggest that these were done with malicious intent, these issues speak generally to the difficulties the parties had in communication and cooperation. {¶ 45} Decisions involving the custody of children are accorded great deference on review. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d at 74. We find that the trial court’s decision to award sole custody to Kristen was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. The record shows that Kristen was the primary caregiver for the children their entire lives. The evidence presented at trial established that after a period of adjustment, the children appeared to be doing well in the Dayton area. There was extensive testimony regarding a strong, dependable family support system Kristen had to help support both her and the children in Dayton. Kristen testified that the parties’ communication was getting worse and that she did not believe they could make joint decisions regarding the children. Although Zachary testified the communication was getting better and believed he and Kristen could cooperate, the trial court was in the best position to determine the credibility of the No. 24AP-443 14 witnesses. Harrison v. Harrison, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 831, *17 (10th Dist. Feb. 25, 1992). Given the evidence before the trial court, it was not unreasonable for it to have concerns regarding the ability of the parties to co-parent and accordingly award sole custody to Kristen. Asbanyoli, 2024-Ohio-170, at ¶ 20 (10th Dist.) (not an abuse of discretion to award sole custody to appellee given justifiable concerns over the parties’ ability to co-parent). {¶ 46} Based on the foregoing, appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 47} It is axiomatic that if a trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a parent sole legal custody, it also is not an abuse of discretion to deny the other parent’s proposed shared parenting plan. Thus, our resolution of Zachary’s fourth assignment of error is dispositive of his remaining assignments of error. Nevertheless, we will address them on their merits. {¶ 48} In his first assignment of error, Zachary alleges that the trial court abused its discretion in striking his proposed shared parenting plan as untimely. More specifically, Zachary alleges that Kristen was not deprived of due process because the parties operated under a shared parenting plan for 16 months under temporary orders, and the particulars of the plan were brought up during settlement negotiations, as well as Zachary’s testimony during trial. {¶ 49} R.C. 3109.04(G) states that a plan for shared parenting “shall be filed . . . at a time at least thirty days prior to the hearing on the issue of the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the children.” A number of appellate courts have held that the aforementioned deadline is discretionary, not mandatory. See Harris v. Harris, 105 Ohio App.3d 671, 674 (2d Dist. 1995). As such, trial courts are afforded a reasonable degree of flexibility in considering plans for shared parenting filed outside of R.C. 3109.04(G)’s time limit. Id. However, those courts have also recognized that the untimely filing of a shared parenting plan interferes with an opposing party’s right to due process. Id. A determination as to whether a party’s due process rights were protected focuses on whether said party had an adequate opportunity to respond to the plan. Id. {¶ 50} In this case, it is undisputed that Zachary did not file his proposed shared parenting plan within the 30-day time limit set forth in R.C. 3109.04(G). The plan was filed on January 8, 2024, the day before the eighth day of trial and a little over 2.5 years after Zachary originally filed for divorce. In fact, the plan was filed after Zachary had already No. 24AP-443 15 rested his case-in-chief. For several reasons, Zachary argues that Kristen had an adequate opportunity to respond to the plan. First, he argues that he provided the plan to all of the parties in June 2023. However, he fails to point to the portion of this case’s voluminous record that supports this assertion. Second, he states that Kristen had adequate notice because the parties operated under temporary shared parenting orders for the first 16 months this matter was pending. However, in March 2023, those temporary orders were modified to grant Kristen status as the temporary residential parent and legal custodian. Finally, Zachary argues that he testified at trial about his desired shared parenting provisions. Indeed, Zachary testified that he “would like to have a shared parenting arrangement.” (Tr. Vol. V at 453.) However, he also testified that he “accepted that the children [were] going to grow up in Dayton.” Id. He also testified that he “conceded” that Kristen would be the school residence parent and was “okay with the children residing in Dayton.” (Tr. Vol. III at 248; Tr. Vol. IV at 393.) Thus, it was not necessarily clear whether he was requesting shared parenting or simply expanded parenting time. {¶ 51} In sum, although trial courts may exercise a reasonable degree of flexibility with regards to R.C. 3109.04(G)’s time limit, “it is not abuse of discretion when [the trial court] merely declin[es] to grant that flexibility.” In re B.D., 2021-Ohio-3792, at ¶ 24 (11th Dist.). This court has previously reversed a trial court’s order of shared parenting where the plan was not timely shared or filed. Jarvis v. Jarvis, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 3142, *15- 16 (10th Dist. July 25, 1995); see also In re Minnick, 2003-Ohio-4245, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.); Creighton v. Creighton, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 388, *5-6 (5th Dist. Feb. 7, 2000). Thus, upon review of the record before us, it cannot be said that the trial court’s decision to strike Zachary’s plan for shared parenting was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. {¶ 52} Based on the foregoing, we overrule Zachary’s first assignment of error. {¶ 53} In his second assignment of error, Zachary contends that the trial court erred in failing to award shared parenting based on the recommendation of an allegedly biased GAL. “Courts have recognized that the allegation of bias (or prejudice) in a guardian ad litem is not accurate when it reflects the guardian ad litem fulfilling his or her duty to his ward.” Lee v. Starr, 2020-Ohio-1649, ¶ 56 (5th Dist.). On appeal, Zachary fails to cite any specific duty outlined in Sup.R. 48.03(D) that Heckert failed to fulfill. Similarly, our review of the record has not uncovered any neglect on the part of Heckert regarding the No. 24AP-443 16 responsibilities of a GAL. Furthermore, Zachary failed to object to Heckert’s behavior or seek to have him removed