Full Opinion

[Cite as Dickard v. Jackson & Jackson, L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-4530.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BUTLER COUNTY DENNIS A. DICKARD, et al., : CASE NO. CA2025-07-072 Appellees, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 11/16/2026 JACKSON & JACKSON, LLC, : Appellant. : : CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Case No. CV2023-10-2062 Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Stephen M. Wagner, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees. Suder, LLC, and John P. Burleigh and Sean S. Suder, for appellant. ____________ OPINION DONOVAN, J. {¶ 1} Appellant, Jackson & Jackson, LLC ("Jackson & Jackson"), appeals from the decision of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas which granted a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Butler CA2025-07-072 motion to dismiss filed by Appellees, Dennis A. Dickard and the Butler County Board of Commissioners. For the reasons discussed below, we sustain Jackson & Jackson's assignments of error in part, affirm the common pleas court's decision in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. I. Background Law {¶ 2} This appeal is more about the law than the particular facts of the case, turning on questions regarding whether various statutes and legal concepts were correctly applied by the trial court in the context of a case involving an alleged regulatory taking of property. To assist the reader, we will explain some of those statutes and legal concepts before describing the specific facts and the litigation history of this case. A. Takings Under Federal Law {¶ 3} The United States Constitution provides protections to property owners with respect to government takings of private property. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause states, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const., amend. V. This means that when the federal government takes private property, such as when it uses its eminent domain power, it owes just compensation for that taking to the owner of the property. The Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause does not only bind the federal government; it is also applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123, fn. 3 (1978). {¶ 4} The United State Supreme Court has recognized that government regulation of property may constitute a taking of the property. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Such takings are known as "regulatory takings." "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a [regulatory] taking." Id. -2- Butler CA2025-07-072 B. Takings Under Ohio Law {¶ 5} Like the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution addresses property owners' rights with regard to takings of property by state government. Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, titled "Eminent Domain," provides in relevant part, where private property shall be taken for public use, a compensation therefor shall first be made in money, or first secured by a deposit of money, and such compensation shall be assessed by a jury, without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner. Ohio Const., art.I, § 19. Though the title of Article I, Section 19 refers to "eminent domain" takings, that state constitutional provision also concerns regulatory takings. See TMS Ents., Ltd. v. Cleveland, 2026-Ohio-3229, ¶ 38-40 (8th Dist.). C. Types of Takings Claims {¶ 6} In Ohio state courts, a private property owner who believes a regulatory taking has taken place has several options on how to proceed. These options differ based on whether the property owner seeks compensation for the regulatory taking or future non-enforcement of the regulation that created the regulatory taking, and based on whether the property owner seeks enforcement of federal or state property rights. We will outline these options below. 1. Federal Section 1983 Claim {¶ 7} First, if the property owner seeks compensation pursuant to his or her rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the property owner may bring a claim under a federal statute, 42 U.S.C. 1983 ("Section 1983"). Section 1983 provides a private cause of action against "every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State. . . " deprives another of any rights secured by federal laws or the United States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. 1983; Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Assn., 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). -3- Butler CA2025-07-072 Courts have long recognized that Section 1983 provides a mechanism for asserting a claim for just compensation arising out of a taking under the Fifth Amendment. See Williamson Cty. Regional Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019). 2. Petition for Writ of Mandamus {¶ 8} Second, if the property owner seeks compensation pursuant to his or her rights under Article I, Section 19 of the Ohio Constitution, the property owner may bring a petition for a writ of mandamus ordering appropriation proceedings under Chapter 163 of the Ohio Revised Code. In Ohio, "[a]n appropriation action is the procedural device provided by statute to carry out the state government's eminent domain power, otherwise known as a condemnation proceeding." Marchbanks v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2024-Ohio-5876, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a writ of mandamus is the "appropriate action to compel public authorities to institute appropriation proceedings where an involuntary taking of private property is alleged." State ex rel. Elsass v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Commr., 2001-Ohio-1276, ¶ 21, citing State ex rel. BSW Dev. Group v. Dayton, 83 Ohio St.3d 338, 341 (1998); accord State ex rel. Shemo v. Mayfield Hts., 2002-Ohio-1627. 3. Administrative Appeal {¶ 9} Third, rather than seeking compensation, a property owner may seek a use variance, appeal the denial of the variance to the court of common pleas, and then ask the common pleas court to reverse the denial of the use variance and/or find that the zoning regulation is unconstitutional as applied to the property. See Karches v. City of Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St.3d 12, 16 (1988). Such a finding of unconstitutionality would prevent future enforcement of the zoning regulation against the property. -4- Butler CA2025-07-072 {¶ 10} Because local zoning agencies may not decide constitutional issues, the property owner utilizing this procedure would not raise his or her constitutional argument for the first time until the matter reached the court of common pleas. In other words, the property owner would not be able to raise the constitutional argument before the zoning enforcement agency or the board of zoning appeals. 4. Declaratory Judgment Action {¶ 11} Fourth, rather than seeking compensation, a property owner may ask a court to issue a declaratory judgment that the regulation is unconstitutional as applied to the property, and prohibiting the government from enforcing the regulation against the property on a going-forward basis. See Karches at 16; Driscoll v. Austintown Assoc., 42 Ohio St.2d 263, 268 (1975). Such a declaratory judgment may be obtained pursuant to R.C. 2721.03, as discussed in more detail below, and may concern the constitutionality of a zoning regulation under either federal or state law. II. Factual and Procedural Background {¶ 12} This case was resolved on the pleadings pursuant to a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. The following facts are derived from Jackson & Jackson's counterclaim complaint, other pleadings, and any attachments, and are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. Haery v. Spaeth, 2025-Ohio-5801, ¶ 2 (12th Dist.) (in ruling on a pleading under Civ.R. 12[B][6] the trial court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.) A. Jackson & Jackson's Property Acquisition {¶ 13} The real estate at issue in this case ("the Property") consists of approximately nine acres of land and various improvements located at 5670 West Alexandria Road in Madison Township, Butler County, Ohio. -5- Butler CA2025-07-072 {¶ 14} The Property is and has been zoned R-1 "Suburban Residence District." While this zoning does not permit commercial uses, over the years the Property was used for a variety of non-residential, commercial functions. This included a golf driving range which opened in 2003. In 2009, a pizza business opened in conjunction with the driving range. And in 2018, a church began operating on the property. Notably, while the Property was not zoned for commercial use, the Butler County Auditor designated the Property as being for "Commercial" use. {¶ 15} On November 22, 2021, Jackson & Jackson acquired the Property from the previous owner for $270,000 through a general warranty deed. {¶ 16} Jackson & Jackson provides commercial electrical and emergency response services to help state and local governments restore power lines after storms or other events. Jackson & Jackson—aware of the Property's prior use for commercial purposes—acquired the Property with the intent to use it in conjunction with its business. After acquiring the Property, Jackson & Jackson began parking its trucks and other equipment on the Property's parking lot and using existing office space in one of the buildings for business functions. B. Zoning Violation Proceedings {¶ 17} Despite the prior use of the Property for commercial purposes, commercial use—and specifically Jackson & Jackson's commercial use—was not permitted under R- 1 District regulations. As a result, on or about May 9, 2023, the office of the Zoning Inspector for Butler County, Ohio served Jackson & Jackson with a notice of zoning violation and instructed Jackson & Jackson to cease and desist operating its business on the Property. {¶ 18} In response to the notice of violation, Jackson & Jackson applied for a use variance, seeking permission to park company vehicles and use the Property as an -6- Butler CA2025-07-072 administrative office. On August 17, 2023, the Butler County, Ohio Board of Zoning Appeals ("BZA") denied Jackson & Jackson's variance application. Jackson & Jackson did not appeal the BZA's decision to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, but it continued operating its business on the Property. C. The County's Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Jackson & Jackson's Answer and Counterclaim {¶ 19} In 2023, after Jackson & Jackson’s deadline to appeal the BZA decision to the common pleas court expired, Butler County Zoning Inspector Dennis Dickard filed a complaint against Jackson & Jackson in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. The complaint sought injunctive relief enjoining Jackson & Jackson from continuing to violate the applicable Butler County Zoning Resolution ("the Zoning Resolution"). Jackson & Jackson filed an answer and a counterclaim complaint. Jackson & Jackson's counterclaim added the "County of Butler, Ohio" as a counterclaim- defendant. D. Jackson & Jackson's First Amended Answer and Counterclaim {¶ 20} In December 2024, after the parties had engaged in a period of discovery and motion practice, Jackson & Jackson filed a First Amended Answers, Defenses, and Counterclaim Complaint against Dickard and the "Board of Commissioners of Butler County, Ohio," thus substituting the Board of Commissioners for the "County of Butler, Ohio." (In this opinion, we will refer to Dickard and the Board of Commissioners collectively as "the County.") Jackson & Jackson’s amended counterclaim included three counts. {¶ 21} Count One of Jackson & Jackson’s amended counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment that the Zoning Resolution as applied to Jackson & Jackson and the Property violated several constitutional provisions, including the Fifth and Fourteenth -7- Butler CA2025-07-072 Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 1, 16, and 19 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and was thus unenforceable. Specifically, Jackson & Jackson argued that these constitutional provisions were violated because preventing Jackson & Jackson's commercial use was "clearly arbitrary," "unreasonable," and without "substantial relation to the public, health, safety, morals or general welfare of the community" given the Property's "historic use . . . for commercial purposes and the clear commercial function of the Property's improvements." Jackson & Jackson also argued that the arbitrary enforcement of the Zoning Resolution against Jackson & Jackson and the Property prevented "the vast majority of revenue-generating land uses on the Property including but not limited to [Jackson & Jackson's] low-intensity uses." {¶ 22} Count Two of Jackson & Jackson’s amended counterclaim sought a declaratory judgment that the Zoning Resolution and the R-1 district regulations constituted a regulatory taking of the Property in two ways. First, Jackson & Jackson argued the County interfered with Jackson & Jackson's "reasonable investment-backed expectations when it acquired the Property," including "using the Property for a commercial purpose in keeping with the history and function of the Property," without compensation. In support, the company cited Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Second, Jackson & Jackson argued the County prevented Jackson & Jackson "from making any economically viable use of the Property at all," without compensation. In support, the company cited Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). Though not stated explicitly, Count Two appears to also rely on the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Sections 1, 16, and 19 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution, as those provisions are referenced in Count Two's caption. Count Two's caption also referenced 42 U.S.C. 1983, -8- Butler CA2025-07-072 but Section 1983 was not discussed in the body of Count Two. We therefore consider Count Two's reference to Section 1983 to be a typographical error. {¶ 23} Notably, Count Two only requests a declaratory judgment that the Zoning Regulations "result in an uncompensated taking as applied to Jackson [& Jackson] and the Property," and does not request compensation for this taking. {¶ 24} Count Three of Jackson & Jackson’s amended counterclaim sought two forms of damages pursuant to Section 1983. First, Jackson & Jackson sought "actual damages" pursuant to Section 1983 for the loss of its use of the Property after the County’s issuance of the zoning violation notice, which resulted "in a significant and detrimental impact on [Jackson & Jackson's] business." Second, Jackson & Jackson sought "just compensation" for the County’s regulatory taking of the Property pursuant to Section 1983 and "the self-executing Fifth Amendment." Though not specifically referenced in the body of Count Three, the caption of Count Three also listed the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (but not the Fifth Amendment) and Sections 1, 16, and 19 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution. We consider the reference to Ohio state constitutional provisions in the caption to Count Three to be typographical error because Section 1983 exists to enforce federal rights, not state rights. {¶ 25} In the "Prayer for Relief" section of the amended counterclaim, Jackson & Jackson further sought "such reasonable costs, expenses, expert fees, and attorney fees" as it may incur, "including but not limited to reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988." That statute "allows 'the prevailing party' in certain civil rights actions, including suits brought under Section 1983, to recover 'a reasonable attorney's fee.'" Simbo Properties,Inc. v. M8 Realty, L.L.C., 2019-Ohio-4361, ¶ 43, quoting Lefemine v. Wideman, 568 U.S. 1, 4 (2012). -9- Butler CA2025-07-072 {¶ 26} To summarize, Jackson & Jackson's counterclaim brought the following claims: Count Federal or State Claim Basis for Claim Claim Count One Federal and Declaratory U.S. Constitution: State Judgment – that Fifth and Zoning Resolution as Fourteenth applied is Amendments unconstitutional Ohio Constitution: Article I, Sections 1, 16, and 19 Count Two Federal and Declaratory U.S. Constitution: State Judgment – that Fifth and Zoning Resolution Fourteenth and R-1 district Amendments regulations constituted a Ohio Constitution: regulatory taking of Article I, Sections 1, Jackson & Jackson's 16, and 19 property Count Three Federal Section 1983 claim – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 compensation for regulatory taking E. The County's Motion to Dismiss and the Trial Court's Decision {¶ 27} The County moved to dismiss Jackson & Jackson's counterclaim complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). The County asserted three bases for its motion. {¶ 28} First, the County argued that Jackson & Jackson's federal Section 1983 claim (Count Three) should be dismissed because that claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims set forth in R.C. 2305.10. Specifically, the County argued that Jackson & Jackson's Section 1983 claim accrued when the company took title to the Property on November 22, 2021, and that the company did not file its counterclaim until May 22, 2024, more than two years later. - 10 - Butler CA2025-07-072 {¶ 29} Second, the County argued that all Jackson & Jackson's claims (Counts One, Two, and Three) should be dismissed because the company "failed to bring its claims in the form of a writ of mandamus to compel appropriation proceedings." Citing R.C. 2721.07, the County further argued only appropriation proceedings could provide Jackson & Jackson with an adequate remedy, and its failure to request such proceedings meant that its "complaint in its current form would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the action." The County also argued that, as pleaded, Jackson & Jackson's requested relief would be "a staggeringly massive windfall" because Jackson & Jackson would both keep the Property and receive "massive amounts of compensation from the [C]ounty." {¶ 30} Third, the County argued that Jackson & Jackson's Ohio state law declaratory judgment claims (Counts One and Two) should be dismissed because the company "failed to exhaust its administrative remedies" when it failed to appeal the BZA decision to the Butler County Court of Common Pleas. {¶ 31} Jackson & Jackson opposed the County's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, raising various arguments that are discussed later in this opinion. {¶ 32} After the matter was fully briefed, the trial court issued a Decision and Entry in which it agreed with the County's arguments and dismissed Jackson & Jackson's First Amended Complaint, including all the company's counterclaims. We will discuss the court's reasoning in more detail in "Law and Analysis" section of our opinion. {¶ 33} Following the trial court's decision, the parties entered into an Agreed Judgment Entry. In the Agreed Judgment Entry, the parties stipulated that the common pleas court's decision granting the County's motion to dismiss Jackson & Jackson's First Amended Complaint, including all of its counterclaims, disposed of all the core legal issues, and that the decision, if upheld on appeal, would entitle the County to judgment - 11 - Butler CA2025-07-072 as a matter of law on its complaint (which, again, sought to enjoin Jackson & Jackson from continuing to violate the Zoning Resolution). The Agreed Judgment Entry stated it would be immediately appealable and there was no just reason for delay. The court approved the Agreed Judgment Entry. {¶ 34} This appeal followed. Jackson & Jackson assigned three errors for our review. For ease of analysis, we will address those assignments of error out of the order presented. III. Law and Analysis A. Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss Standard and Appellate Standard of Review {¶ 35} All three of Jackson & Jackson's assignments of error relate to the question of whether the common pleas court correctly granted the County's Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss. {¶ 36} "Civ.R. 12(B)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint if it 'fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.'" Marchetti v. Blankenburg, 2011-Ohio-2212, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.), quoting Smith v. Village of Waynesville, 2008-Ohio-522, ¶ 6 (12th Dist.) "In order to prevail on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, 'it must appear beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling relief.'" Marchetti at ¶ 9, quoting DeMell v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2007-Ohio-2924, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). In ruling on a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), the trial court must presume that all factual allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988). But unsupported legal conclusions are not accepted as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. Schulman v. City of Cleveland, 30 Ohio St.2d 196, 198 (1972). - 12 - Butler CA2025-07-072 {¶ 37} "A trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is subject to de novo review on appeal." BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Kolenich, 2011-Ohio-3345, ¶ 35 (12th Dist.), citing Sparks v. Bowling, 2009-Ohio-5071, ¶ 10 (12th Dist.). This court must independently review the complaint to determine the appropriateness of the trial court's dismissal. Sparks at ¶ 10. B. Statute of Limitations {¶ 38} Jackson & Jackson's second assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING JACKSON & JACKSON’S REGULATORY TAKINGS CLAIM UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983 AS TIME-BARRED. {¶ 39} The trial court concluded that Jackson & Jackson's Section 1983 counterclaim (Count Three) was subject to the two-year statute of limitations set forth in R.C. 2305.10, which applies to tort claims. The court reasoned that the Section 1983 counterclaim accrued on November 22, 2021, when Jackson & Jackson purchased the Property—that is, more than two years before Jackson & Jackson filed its initial counterclaim complaint on May 22, 2024. As a result, the court dismissed the Section 1983 counterclaim as untimely filed and barred by the applicable statute of limitations. {¶ 40} On appeal, Jackson & Jackson argues that the trial court erred in concluding that its Section 1983 claim was time barred. The company argues that the applicable statute of limitations is that set forth in R.C. 2305.09(E), which prescribes a four-year limitations period, rather than the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.10. The company also argues that the Section 1983 counterclaim did not accrue in 2021, as concluded by the trial court, but rather in August 2023, when the BZA made a final decision on the company's variance request. If so, the company argues, the Section 1983 counterclaim was still timely filed even if the trial court was correct that the applicable statute of limitations was the two-year limitations period found in R.C. 2305.10. - 13 - Butler CA2025-07-072 1. Standard of Review {¶ 41} Application of a statute of limitations presents a mixed question of law and fact. Schmitz v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Assn., 2018-Ohio-4391, ¶ 11, citing Wells v. C.J. Mahan Constr. Co., 2006-Ohio-1831, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.). The issue of when a cause of action accrues is a question of fact. Id. Because this was a decision decided under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), we accept the factual allegations presented in Jackson & Jackson's counterclaim as true and make all reasonable inferences in favor of Jackson & Jackson. Id. But the application of the limitations period is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.; Mundy v. Centrome, Inc., 2024-Ohio-3358, ¶ 13 (12th Dist.) 2. What Statute of Limitations Applies? {¶ 42} In determining which statute of limitations applies to a particular cause of action, "'courts must look to the actual nature or subject matter of the case, rather than to the form in which the action is pleaded. The grounds for bringing the action are the determinative factors[;] the form is immaterial.'" Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co. v. Muething, 65 Ohio St.3d 273, 277-78 (1992), quoting Hambleton v. R.G. Barry Corp., 12 Ohio St.3d 179, 183 (1984). {¶ 43} R.C. 2305.10, which is Ohio's general provision on limitations periods applicable to torts, provides in relevant part: "an action based on a product liability claim and an action for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the cause of action accrues." {¶ 44} R.C. 2305.09, on the other hand, provides a four-year limitations period on "certain torts" other than those addressed by R.C. 2305.10. With relevance to this appeal, R.C. 2305.09(E) provides for a four-year limitations period on claims "[f]or relief on the grounds of a physical or regulatory taking of real property." This provision was added to the statute in 2004. - 14 - Butler CA2025-07-072 {¶ 45} A Section 1983 takings claim is a claim "on the grounds of a physical or regulatory taking of real property" and therefore, under a plain language interpretation of R.C. 2305.09(E), is subject to the four-year limitations period set forth in that statute. See State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 2011-Ohio-6117, ¶ 35, citing State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie MetroParks, 2010-Ohio-606, ¶ 29. ("the four-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2305.09[E], which was expressly promulgated by the General Assembly to address takings claims, is generally applicable to such claims.")1 {¶ 46} Nevertheless, the County argues in favor of the trial court's determination that R.C. 2305.10 applies, rather than R.C. 2305.09(E), by citing two cases it asserts stand for the proposition that Section 1983 claims have been designated tort actions by the United States Supreme Court and are subject to a state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. Those two cases are Trzebuckowski v. City of Cleveland, 319 F.3d 853 (6th Cir. 2003), and Riveredge Dentistry Partnership v. City of Cleveland, 2024 WL 639689 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2024). {¶ 47} In Trzebuckowski, the Sixth Circuit held, generally, that Section 1983 claims are subject to a state's general personal injury statute of limitations and that the parties agreed that the claim brought in that case (a claim "for alleged violations of various federal and state rights, including denial of due process and equal protection of the law") was subject to the two-year limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.10. Id. at 856. {¶ 48} But, upon our review, it does not appear that Trzebuckowski involved a takings claim asserted under Section 1983. Id. at 855. Further, Trzebuckowski was decided in 2003, before R.C. 2305.09 was amended to add the (E) subsection (effective 1. To be clear, Doner was decided in the context of a mandamus action. However, we see no reason why a Section 1983 claim would not also be included within the ambit of R.C. 2305.09(E). - 15 - Butler CA2025-07-072 May 31, 2004). Therefore, Trzebuckowski is of limited import in determining the applicability of R.C. 2305.09(E) to a Section 1983 takings claim. {¶ 49} Riveredge, on the other hand, was decided after the effective date of R.C. 2305.09(E) and squarely rejected the argument that R.C. 2305.09(E) applies to Section 1983 claims. 2024 WL 639689 at *13. In Riveredge, the plaintiff, argued that the four-year limitation period of R.C. 2305.09(E) applied citing McNamara v. City of Rittman, 473 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 2007). McNamara involved a regulatory taking that was commenced and decided by a district court before the passage and effective date of R.C. 2305.09(E). The Sixth Circuit in McNamara noted the passage of R.C. 2305.09(E) and stated that any takings actions brought after the effective date "should follow the four-year time bar." McNamara at 637, fn. 1. Nevertheless, the district court in Riveredge dismissed this language in McNamara as dicta. Riveredge at *13. In finding that R.C. 2305.10 applied to a Section 1983 takings claim and R.C. 2305.09(E) did not, the federal district court cited case law generally stating that Section 1983 claims are personal injury claims, not takings claims, and are "best characterized as tort actions." Id. But the Riveredge court engaged in no substantive legal or textual analysis as to why a Section 1983 takings claim would not be subsumed within the plain language of R.C. 2305.09(E). See generally Riveredge. The legal basis of the Riveredge decision is, essentially, that a Section 1983 claim is a tort claim, regardless of the nature of the claim. Id. {¶ 50} We conclude that Riveredge elevated form over substance. This is precisely what the Ohio Supreme Court has held we may not do in assessing the applicability of a statute of limitations. Lawyers Coop., 65 Ohio St.3d at 277-78, quoting Hambleton, 12 Ohio St.3d at 183 ("'courts must look to the actual nature or subject matter of the case, rather than to the form in which the action is pleaded.'"). Riveredge is an unreported - 16 - Butler CA2025-07-072 federal district court decision, is not binding on this court, and we do not find its reasoning persuasive. {¶ 51} Accordingly, we hold that Jackson & Jackson's Section 1983 takings claim was a claim "on the grounds of a physical or regulatory taking of real property" and was subject to the four-year statute of limitations period set forth in R.C. 2305.09(E). We further hold that, in applying that statute, the trial court should have found Jackson & Jackson's Section 1983 claim was timely when filed on May 22, 2024, regardless of whether the claim accrued for statute of limitations purposes when Jackson & Jackson purchased the Property on November 22, 2021, or when the BZA issued its final decision on August 17, 2023.2 The trial court erred in applying the R.C. 2305.10 two-year statute of limitations period and erred in finding the Section 1983 claim to be untimely filed. {¶ 52} Accordingly, we sustain Jackson & Jackson's second assignment of error. C. Effect of Failure to Plead Mandamus {¶ 53} Jackson & Jackson's first assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING JACKSON & JACKSON’S COUNTERCLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO PLEAD MANDAMUS. {¶ 54} The trial court dismissed all three of Jackson & Jackson's counterclaims (Counts One, Two, and Three) on the basis that those claims were barred by Jackson & Jackson's failure to plead mandamus. The court reasoned that if Jackson & Jackson had petitioned for writ of mandamus to compel appropriation proceedings, those proceedings could have resulted in the County being required to compensate Jackson & Jackson for a taking. But by foregoing mandamus, Jackson & Jackson could not be compensated, so 2. As a result of our analysis above, we do not need to analyze the parties' arguments or the trial court's reasoning regarding when Jackson & Jackson's Section 1983 claim accrued for purposes of R.C. 2305.10. - 17 - Butler CA2025-07-072 its three counterclaims would not end the controversy between the parties. As a result, the court concluded that declaratory judgment would be improper. The court further noted that Jackson & Jackson was asking the court for an award compensating it for the County's "taking" of its property while also allowing it to retain the property, and that this was a windfall not permitted under Ohio law. {¶ 55} In support of its first assignment of error, Jackson & Jackson argues that it presented viable claims, none of which were required to be pleaded in mandamus. The company presents this argument in two parts: first with respect to its federal Section 1983 claim, and second with respect to its declaratory judgment claims. We will address these two issues in turn. 1. Issue One: Federal Section 1983 Claim and Mandamus a. Jackson & Jackson's Argument {¶ 56} With respect to its Section 1983 claim, Jackson & Jackson relies on a United States Supreme Court opinion, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019), which it characterizes as holding that federal law provides that a property owner may present a state court with a federal claim under Section 1983 regardless of the availability of similar or equivalent state-law remedies. {¶ 57} Jackson & Jackson also asserts that the trial court may have believed that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the federal Section 1983 claim, though the trial court did not plainly state this in its decision. Jackson & Jackson argues that not only does a state court have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain a Section 1983 claim, but that the refusal to hear the Section 1983 claim is a violation of the Supremacy Clause. - 18 - Butler CA2025-07-072 b. Knick v. Twp. of Scott {¶ 58} Before analyzing Jackson & Jackson's reliance on Knick v. Twp. of Scott, we must provide context by explaining an older case, Williamson Cty. Regional Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In Williamson, the United States Supreme Court held that a property owner whose property had been taken by a local government had not suffered a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights and could not bring a federal takings claim in federal court until a state court denied his claim for just compensation under state law. Id. at paragraph 1(b) of the syllabus. {¶ 59} In Knick, the United States Supreme Court overruled Williamson. See generally Knick. The Supreme Court noted that the "state-litigation requirement" imposed in Williamson had led to an unintended "preclusion trap." Knick, 588 U.S. at 185. That is, if a state court denied a claim for just compensation under state law, such a decision would generally have a preclusive effect in any subsequent federal takings suit. Id. at 184. This led a plaintiff with a taking claim to a Catch-22 scenario in which he could not go to federal court without first going to state court, but if he went to state court and lost, his claim could be barred in federal court. Id. at 184-85. {¶ 60} In overruling Williamson, the Supreme Court held that a property owner has an actionable Fifth Amendment takings claim whenever the government takes his property without paying for it and therefore may bring his claim in federal court under Section 1983 at that time. Id. at 185.