Pollitt v. Pollitt

[Cite as Pollitt v. Pollitt, 2026-Ohio-4326.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO CLERMONT COUNTY THOMAS M. POLLITT, : CASE NO. CA2025-11-090 Appellee, : OPINION AND vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY 11/2/2026 ALEXIA POLLITT, : Appellant. : : APPEAL FROM CLERMONT COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION Case No. 2023 DRB 00649 Michael E. Clancey, for appellee. Zachary D. Smith, LLC, and Zachary D. Smith, for appellant. ____________ OPINION M. POWELL, J. {¶ 1} Alexia Pollitt appeals the decree of divorce entered by the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, which terminated her marriage  Clermont CA2025-11-090 to Thomas Pollitt, appellee, and divided the parties' property. We conclude that the court erred in cutting off Alexia's credit for post-separation mortgage payments and in dividing the parties' debt. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. I. Factual and Procedural Background {¶ 2} The parties married on June 30, 2013. No children were born of the marriage. On June 22, 2023, after nearly ten years of marriage, Thomas filed for divorce. The parties stipulated a separation date of June 16, 2023, and the divorce decree fixes the length of the marriage as running from June 30, 2013, to that date. {¶ 3} Throughout their marriage, both parties were self-employed. Thomas operated T&T Welding LLC (which closed in 2021), a towing business, and Quality Crane & Rigging LLC, the latter being his primary source of income. Alexia ran a cabinetry business that she sold in 2019, and she also managed two other businesses focused on buying, renovating, and reselling residential real estate. Additionally, in April 2020, she received $666,410.71 in net settlement proceeds from a personal-injury claim related to a dog bite, which the trial court classified as her separate property. In 2018 or 2019, she established Hays for Zorses LLC, a USDA-licensed farm and zoo located on the parties' land that housed livestock and exotic animals. {¶ 4} The marital residence, located at 2011 Jones Florer Road in Bethel, was purchased on June 29, 2018, for $495,000 and is titled in Alexia's name. Spanning roughly 57 acres, the property features a one-and-a-half-story log home with an indoor pool, a pond, a condemned house, and outbuildings modified for animal housing. Under temporary orders issued in July 2023 and upheld after a September hearing, Alexia was granted exclusive use of the residence and responsibility for paying the mortgage and utilities. Thomas has not contributed to the mortgage since mid-June 2023. {¶ 5} The parties filed two sets of stipulations, the first on September 11, 2024, -2-  Clermont CA2025-11-090 and the second on April 25, 2025. These stipulations covered several key matters, including the mortgage balances on the Jones Florer property ($393,381.20 as of the valuation date and $383,351 as of the stipulation) and the liens against it. They also stipulated to the dates and amounts of the competing appraisals prepared by their respective appraisers, an itemized personal-property valuation, and the details surrounding the sale of their 2020 Dodge Charger Hellcat. Finally, they stipulated that a July 11, 2023 USDA inspection accurately represented the animals present at the farm and zoo on the parties' date of separation. {¶ 6} A two-day trial took place on September 10 and 11, 2024. Both parties testified, along with the two real estate appraisers, a livestock auctioneer, and a zookeeper (who detailed the specialized care and facilities the animals required). Regarding debts, Alexia presented evidence of an unpaid balance of $7,940.85 for chimney work on the marital residence, an unpaid income tax liability of $3,059 from 2020, and $41,265.67 in credit card debt. Meanwhile, Thomas presented evidence of income tax liabilities from 2016, 2021, and 2022, totaling $54,443. {¶ 7} On July 1, 2025, the trial court entered a decision on divorce resolving the contested issues. Finding neither real estate appraisal reliable, the court ordered the marital residence to be listed for sale within 30 days. The sale proceeds are first to cover the costs of sale and approximately $441,184 in encumbrances. From the remaining balance, Alexia will receive the first $25,976, representing a $10,302 credit for post- separation mortgage payments and an asset equalization payment, with the remainder divided equally. The livestock, valued at $165,013 based on an appraisal and sales reported on her 2023 federal tax return, was awarded to Alexia. The Dodge Charger Hellcat was valued at $72,000, leaving marital equity of $24,014.64 (after subtracting the $47,985.36 loan balance), which was charged to Alexia. The court also classified -3-  Clermont CA2025-11-090 Thomas's $54,443 in tax liabilities and Alexia's $41,265.67 in credit card debt as marital, assigning each to the respective party, and it treated all other debts as the separate liability of the party in whose name each was held. Finally, the court denied spousal support to both parties. {¶ 8} Alexia filed a motion for reconsideration, clarification, or modification of the decision, submitting an amended 2023 federal tax return that showed significantly lower livestock sales than the $49,588 figure originally used. The trial court denied the motion. On October 21, 2025, the court entered the final decree of divorce, which incorporated all findings and orders from the earlier decision on divorce. {¶ 9} Alexia appealed. II. Analysis {¶ 10} Alexia raises five assignments of error, directed at the disposition of the marital residence, the allocation of two debts, the disposition of the Hellcat, the denial of spousal support, and the valuation of livestock. A. Disposition of the Marital Residence {¶ 11} The first assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DISPOSITION OF THE 2011 JONES FLORER ROAD PROPERTY. {¶ 12} In her first assignment of error, Alexia challenges three aspects of the trial court's handling of the marital residence. Specifically, she contends that the court erred by rejecting her appraiser's valuation, ordering the property to be sold, and failing to credit her for mortgage payments she made after the final hearing. 1. The Trial Court's Refusal to Adopt Either Appraisal {¶ 13} A trial court enjoys broad discretion in valuing marital property and is "neither required to use a particular valuation method nor precluded from using any -4-  Clermont CA2025-11-090 method." Gregory v. Kottman-Gregory, 2005-Ohio-6558, ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). Nor is the court bound to accept the opinion of any expert. See Oakes v. Oakes & Leadwise, Inc., 2024- Ohio-6051, ¶ 53 (2d Dist.) ("When parties present substantially different valuations of an asset, a trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of any witnesses' testimony."). A trial court's discretion in dividing marital property "extends to the court's decision to order the sale of the marital residence." Cox v. Cox, 1995 WL 399419, *3 (12th Dist. July 10, 1995), citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). Accordingly, "an order requiring the parties to sell the residence is subject to the abuse of discretion standard." Id., citing Booth at 144. {¶ 14} The trial court was presented with two expert opinions that differed by more than $100,000. Thomas's appraiser, Harry Kessel, valued the property at $602,500, while Alexia's appraiser, Ron Sears, valued it at $497,000, just $2,000 more than the purchase price five years earlier. The experts disagreed on both the final value and their underlying methodologies. Additionally, their valuation dates differed: Sears appraised the property as of July 27, 2023, shortly after the marriage ended, whereas Kessel appraised it nearly ten months later, on May 14, 2024. Consequently, the opinions reflected the property at different points in time and under different conditions. Kessel noted no storm damage and appraised the property "as is," while Sears identified roughly $75,000 in necessary tornado-damage repairs. Furthermore, Kessel based his acreage adjustments on vacant- land sales, whereas Sears used improved parcels. Sears cited the per-acre value and the treatment of the indoor pool as the primary reasons for the discrepancy between their opinions. {¶ 15} The trial court concluded that neither expert provided a compelling reason to prefer his valuation over the other. Noting that it could not determine which expert was more credible regarding the extent and cost of the needed repairs, or how those repairs -5-  Clermont CA2025-11-090 affected the fair market value, the court ultimately decided that the only way to establish the true value of the Jones Florer property was through an arm's-length sale. {¶ 16} Alexia primarily contends that the trial court mischaracterized Sears's testimony when the court stated that Sears agreed it was difficult to find comparable properties and that both experts emphasized the challenges of appraising such a unique property. She maintains that Sears successfully located three recent log-cabin sales in the area, expressed full confidence in his opinion, and never acknowledged any difficulty. While Alexia agrees that the court properly discounted Kessel, who explicitly described Jones Florer as a very difficult property to appraise, she argues the court unfairly applied that same criticism to Sears. {¶ 17} The evidence does not support Alexia's contention. Sears's own report acknowledged that the property's amenities were unique to the rural area and conceded that all comparable sales listed were in superior condition, requiring value adjustments. The property is plainly difficult to appraise: every comparable sale required condition adjustments, the acreage required per-acre extrapolations that the experts could not agree on, and Sears himself conceded the amenities were unique. Therefore, the trial court's characterization was a reasonable view of the evidence. Sears's confidence in his valuation does not guarantee its accuracy, and the court could reasonably conclude that his methodology failed to reliably capture the fair market value. {¶ 18} In Cox, 1995 WL 399419 (12th Dist.), the trial court similarly faced a significant gap between competing appraisals of a marital residence. Rather than arbitrarily assigning a value, the court ordered the property sold. We affirmed that decision, explaining that the court "was not required to arbitrarily assign a value to the home absent supporting evidence" and that "[t]he value of the residence will be the sale price of the property." Id. at *2. That reasoning applies even more strongly here, where -6-  Clermont CA2025-11-090 the appraisal gap is five times larger and is based on irreconcilable factual differences regarding the property's condition. 2. The Order of Sale {¶ 19} Alexia contends that an order of sale must rest on findings of financial necessity, pointing to the trial court's finding in Cox that the wife could not refinance the property, and to Chitwood v. Chitwood, 1988 WL 88397, *3 (12th Dist. Aug. 22, 1988), where the sale order gave each party an opportunity to buy out the other. But neither case establishes the requirements Alexia proposes. Cox and Chitwood identified circumstances sufficient to sustain a sale order. Neither enumerated the circumstances necessary to sustain one. What's required is a reasonable basis for the sale, supported by the record. See Kirby v. Kirby, 1982 WL 3306, *2 (12th Dist. Dec. 22, 1982) (affirming sale where "only by sale could there be a division of property"). {¶ 20} Such a basis exists here. Because the trial court reasonably concluded that neither appraisal was reliable, it could not calculate the equity needed to set a buyout price. With encumbrances around $441,184, the marital equity was highly uncertain, making an arm's-length sale a reasonable method to both determine value and divide the asset. {¶ 21} Nor was the sale order impermissibly prejudicial merely because Hays for Zorses operates on the property. Alexia's argument that she must relocate all the animals within 30 days misreads the decree. The property must be listed within 30 days, but the animals can remain until the closing date. The trial court also retained jurisdiction to supervise all aspects of the sale. While relocating a private zoo is practically difficult, that challenge is inherent to the asset she requested and was awarded, rather than a flaw in the court's order. {¶ 22} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the property sold. -7-  Clermont CA2025-11-090 3. Mortgage Payments Made After the Final Hearing {¶ 23} The third issue has merit. The parties stipulated that the mortgage balance on the Jones Florer property was $393,381.20 as of the valuation date and $383,351 as of the stipulation. The trial court found that Thomas made no mortgage payments after June 16, 2023, the agreed end date of the marriage, and that Alexia alone paid the mortgage thereafter. On that basis, the court determined that Alexia "is entitled to be reimbursed for the mortgage paydown in the amount of $10,302.00," representing the reduction in principal between the end of the marriage and the final hearing, to be paid to her from the sale proceeds before the remainder is divided equally.1 The basis of that award makes sense: when one spouse reduces the principal on marital property with funds that are hers alone, an equal division of the resulting equity would hand the other spouse half the value of her separate contribution. A court must "indicate the basis for its award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that the award is fair, equitable and in accordance with the law." Kaechele v. Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d 93, 97 (1988). And the basis the trial court described here was equity in the paydown of principal after the marriage ended. {¶ 24} The problem is that the court applied this principle to only part of the post- marriage period, abandoning it for the rest without explanation. The credit runs through September 11, 2024, the final day of the hearing, and the choice of that date is understandable. It was the day the evidence closed and the date of the stipulation fixing the "current" mortgage balance. While a court typically divides property based on the trial record, here the divorce decision was not entered until July 1, 2025; the final divorce 1. The trial court derived the amount from the stipulated mortgage balances of $393,381.20 on the separation date and $383,351 as of the hearing date, a difference of $10,030.20 rather than $10,302. Neither party raises the discrepancy, and we do not disturb it. -8-  Clermont CA2025-11-090 decree was not entered until October 21, 2025; and the actual division of the asset will not occur until a future closing. Throughout this entire period, by court order, Alexia must pay the mortgage alone. Each payment she makes reduces the principal and increases the remaining funds that will be divided equally at closing. Consequently, Thomas will receive half the equity created by Alexia's post-hearing payments—the exact outcome the trial court's $10,302 award was intended to prevent. {¶ 25} A property division that, without explanation, applies an equitable principle to only part of the period it covers is internally inconsistent, and a division based on such inconsistency is unreasonable. See Herrmann v. Herrmann, 2000 WL 1671045, *10 (12th Dist. Nov. 6, 2000) (a court that departs from consistent valuation dates "must adequately explain its reasons for doing so"). The Fourth District has applied the same principle, finding error where a trial court used a de facto termination date for some purposes but, without explanation, denied the wife credit for post-termination mortgage payments. Eddy v. Eddy, 2002-Ohio-4345, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.). Here, the trial court properly applied the principle by awarding Alexia a $10,302 credit, but it failed to explain why her identical payments made after the record closed should be treated differently from those made before. {¶ 26} While a different rationale might have justified the trial court's cutoff, it was not the one the court actually adopted. For instance, because Alexia had exclusive use of the residence and her zoo operated there rent-free, a court could have reasonably treated her mortgage payments as the cost of occupancy rather than a reimbursable contribution. But the trial court explicitly awarded her a credit for the 15 months leading up to the trial, during which her occupancy was exactly the same. Having established that principle, the court could not silently rely on her occupancy to deny her the exact same credit for the months that followed. -9-  Clermont CA2025-11-090 {¶ 27} Thomas argues that because the parties rested on September 11, 2024, there was no evidence of post-hearing payments for the court to consider, and thus the court cannot be faulted for denying the credit. This argument would be valid if Alexia were asking to reopen the trial, but she is not. The divorce decree already anticipates a future accounting at closing, where the mortgage payoff, taxes, and liens will be settled using standard sale documents. Furthermore, the trial court expressly reserved jurisdiction over the disbursement of the net proceeds. The principal reduction can easily be verified using the same lender records required for the payoff, and any disputes can be resolved under the court's reserved jurisdiction. Ultimately, extending the credit simply requires applying the court's already established distribution formula consistently with its own findings. {¶ 28} The first assignment of error is sustained in part. On remand, the trial court must modify the decree to ensure that, before the remaining proceeds from the sale of the Jones Florer property are divided, Alexia receives, in addition to the $10,302 already ordered, a credit equal to the reduction in principal resulting from mortgage payments she made after September 11, 2024, through the date of closing. In all other respects, the first assignment of error is overruled. B. Allocation of Marital Debts {¶ 29} The second assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ALLOCATION OF MARITAL DEBTS. {¶ 30} In her second assignment of error, Alexia contends that the trial court failed to classify and allocate two specific debts: a $7,940.85 obligation to Chimney Works Inc. for repairs to the marital residence, and her $3,059 federal income tax liability from 2020. 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review {¶ 31} In a divorce, the trial court must determine what constitutes marital and - 10 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 separate property and divide it equitably between the spouses. R.C. 3105.171(B). We have applied the same R.C. 3105.171 framework to parties' debts. Cooper v. Cooper, 2013-Ohio-4433, ¶ 13, 15 (12th Dist.). "Marital debt includes any debt that is incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties or for a valid marital purpose." Id. at ¶ 18, citing Nichols-Ross v. Ross, 2009-Ohio-1723, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.). Debts accumulated during the marriage are presumed marital, and the party seeking to have such a debt classified as the separate debt of the other spouse bears the burden of proving that status. Id. The name in which a debt is held does not, by itself, determine its status, just as the holding of title to property by one spouse individually does not determine whether the property is marital or separate. R.C. 3105.171(H); id.; see Singh v. Singh, 2003-Ohio- 2372, ¶ 7 (12th Dist.) (account titled in husband's name alone properly classified as marital). {¶ 32} We review the trial court's classification of a debt as marital or separate under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, and its allocation of debt within the overall division for an abuse of discretion. Cooper at ¶ 13; Grow v. Grow, 2012-Ohio- 1680, ¶ 11, 13 (12th Dist.). Whatever division the court makes, it "must indicate the basis for its division of marital property in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine whether the award is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law." Grow at ¶ 12, citing Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d at 97; R.C. 3105.171(G). A failure to divide marital property at all violates R.C. 3105.171(B). Cooper at ¶ 32-33. {¶ 33} Because neither debt is mentioned in the trial court's findings, the parties' dispute centers on the divorce decree's residuary clause. This clause states: "Regarding all other liabilities, not otherwise addressed in this Decree, each party is responsible for satisfying any debt, including penalties and interest, in his or her respective name as his or her separate liability, holding the other harmless thereon." The central question for - 11 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 each debt is whether this clause provided a proper disposition. 2. The Chimney Works Debt {¶ 34} Alexia testified that Chimney Works repaired a leak at the marital residence. The invoice reflects work performed on November 29, 2022, about seven months before the parties separated. Uncontroverted documentary evidence, including an invoice for $7,940.85 for work performed on November 29, 2022, and a collection letter from August 24, 2023, supported her claim. Despite this, the divorce decision made no mention of the debt. {¶ 35} Thomas argues the debt is post-marital because the collection letter is dated after the marriage ended on June 16, 2023. But this confuses the collection date with the date the obligation arose. The work was completed in November 2022, while the parties were married and living together in the home. A post-separation collection letter does not convert a marital obligation into a separate one. The debt was incurred for the marital purpose of repairing the residence and is presumptively marital, a presumption Thomas failed to rebut. {¶ 36} Because the invoice is in Alexia's name, the residuary clause arguably assigned the debt to her as a separate liability, holding Thomas harmless. But this default disposition is problematic. Under R.C. 3105.171(H), the name on an obligation does not determine its character, and a court cannot classify by default what the statute requires it to classify by decision. If viewed as a classification, the residuary clause improperly labels a debt as separate when the manifest weight of the evidence shows it is marital. Alternatively, if viewed as a catchall that simply ignored the debt, the clause leaves a proven marital debt undivided, which violates R.C. 3105.171(B). {¶ 37} The trial court's handling of other obligations highlights the issue. The court classified $41,265.67 in credit card debt as marital—even though it was in Alexia's - 12 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 name—and assigned it to her, adjusting her column in the recapitulation accordingly. It did the same for Thomas's $54,443 in tax liabilities. In both instances, the allocation was paired with a proper classification and a corresponding adjustment to the equal division. But the Chimney Works debt received no such treatment. This omission is significant. The current recapitulation leaves Alexia with a net marital value of $240,788 and Thomas with $272,137. The $31,349 difference results in a $15,674 equalization payment, which, combined with her $10,302 mortgage credit, totals the $25,976 she is owed from the sale proceeds. If the Chimney Works debt is marital and assigned to Alexia, deducting it from her column would increase the difference to $39,289.85, raising her equalization payment by nearly $4,000. Because the decision does not clarify whether this omission was intentional or an oversight, it fails to meet the R.C. 3105.171(G) requirement to provide a sufficiently detailed basis for the division to allow for appellate review. 3. The 2020 Tax Liability {¶ 38} The 2020 tax debt presents a different problem, because the trial court made the necessary finding but failed to follow through with it. Alexia submitted her 2020 federal tax return at trial, which showed a balance owed of $3,059. The court's decision explicitly stated that "[w]ith respect to taxes from the date of marriage through 2022, the parties are equally responsible for any taxes owed by either party, as well as any interest and penalties." The 2020 liability clearly falls under this determination. {¶ 39} While the decision addresses the $54,443 in marital tax debt assigned entirely to Thomas for 2016, 2021, and 2022, Alexia's 2020 liability is neither assigned nor mentioned, leaving its status unclear. If the court's equal-responsibility determination applies, the debt is a joint obligation, with Thomas owing half. But if the residuary clause applies because the return is in Alexia's name, the decree effectively converts a debt the court declared joint into her separate liability—without explanation and without the - 13 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 recapitulation adjustment Thomas received. Because the decree does not clarify which disposition was intended, and because the two outcomes result in materially different divisions, the decree fails to provide a sufficiently detailed basis for review. {¶ 40} Thomas argues that Alexia forfeited the issue by failing to request in her closing arguments that the debt be treated as marital. But R.C. 3105.171(B) mandates that the court determine and equitably divide the parties' marital interests based on the evidence presented at trial. Because Alexia properly introduced the debt into evidence, she was not required to reiterate it in her closing argument to preserve the court's statutory duty to address it. Thomas has cited no authority suggesting otherwise. {¶ 41} We note that while Alexia's 2020 federal tax return establishes the amount owed when it was filed, no testimony was offered regarding whether a balance remained at the time of trial. Nothing precludes the trial court from determining on remand that little to no debt remains outstanding. {¶ 42} The second assignment of error is sustained. We do not dictate how either debt must ultimately be allocated. On remand, the trial court must classify the Chimney Works debt and, if it is found to be marital, account for it in the recapitulation. Similarly, the court must allocate Alexia's 2020 tax liability in a manner consistent with its finding that pre-2023 tax debt is a joint responsibility, or explain any contrary treatment, and adjust the recapitulation and equalization payment accordingly. C. Disposition of the Hellcat {¶ 43} The third assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DISPOSITION OF THE DODGE CHARGER HELLCAT. {¶ 44} In her third assignment of error, Alexia challenges the trial court's handling of the parties' 2020 Dodge Charger Hellcat, which she sold while the case was pending. - 14 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 She raises two main issues: first, that the court erred by valuing the vehicle at its $72,000 appraised value rather than the $51,500 she actually received; and second, that the court failed to credit her for $3,749.91 in loan principal she paid after the marriage ended. 1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review {¶ 45} Before dividing marital property, a trial court must assign a value to the parties' assets and must indicate the basis for its award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that the award is fair, equitable, and in accordance with the law. R.C. 3105.171(G); Kaechele, 35 Ohio St.3d at 97; Grow, 2012-Ohio-1680, at ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). A trial court has broad discretion to determine the value of property, and its valuation will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Grow at ¶ 21. In valuing a marital asset, the court "is neither required to use a particular valuation method nor precluded from using any method." Gregory, 2005-Ohio-6558, at ¶ 15 (12th Dist.). 2. The $72,000 Valuation {¶ 46} The essential facts are undisputed. The parties purchased the Hellcat during their marriage, which ended on June 16, 2023. David Lewis, the appraiser whose valuations the parties accepted for nearly all other personal property, appraised the vehicle at $72,000 in August 2023, noting it had 20,394 miles on the odometer. Although Alexia maintained the vehicle after the separation, she received no offers higher than $51,500. In February 2024, she requested the trial court's permission to sell the vehicle for the best available price. During the March 12, 2024 pretrial, the court deferred her motion and granted Thomas until the next pretrial on April 16, 2024, to find a buyer willing to pay the appraised value. Unbeknownst to the court, the vehicle had already been sold. Alexia had sold it back to the dealership in February for $51,500, a fact she did not disclose until April 16. The trial court ultimately valued the vehicle at $72,000, finding that - 15 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 her failure to comply with its order deprived Thomas of the opportunity to sell the car for its appraised value. {¶ 47} Alexia contends that the $51,500 sale conclusively established the vehicle's fair market value, rendering the appraisal purely speculative. She relies on the standard definition of fair market value as "'that price which would be agreed upon between a willing seller and a willing buyer in a voluntary sale on the open market.'" Hamilton v. Hamilton, 2002-Ohio-2417, ¶ 47 (12th Dist.), quoting Wray v. Stvartak, 121 Ohio App.3d 462, 471 (6th Dist. 1997). Furthermore, relying on Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Fountain Square Assoc., Ltd., 9 Ohio St.3d 218, 219 (1984), she argues that appraisals are only appropriate when an arm's-length sale has not occurred or when the sales price does not reflect the property's true value. {¶ 48} This argument fails. Fountain Square is a real-property tax case interpreting the statutory requirement for auditors to determine "true value." Even there, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that a sales price yields to an appraisal when the price does not reflect true value. Id. at 219. The record here provided the trial court with ample reason to conclude that the dealership sale fell into this category. The transaction was not a voluntary, open-market exchange; rather, Alexia sold the vehicle under financial pressure because she could no longer afford the monthly payments and insurance. Additionally, the sale occurred eight months after the marriage ended, whereas the appraisal was tied to August 2023, a date close to the end of the marriage and consistent with the valuation dates used for the parties' other assets. See Herrmann, 2000 WL 1671045, at *10 (12th Dist.) (a trial court should consistently apply the same set of dates when valuing marital property). {¶ 49} Additionally, the trial court did not simply prefer one valuation over another. It found that Alexia sold the vehicle below the $72,000 floor Thomas had agreed to, - 16 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 without leave and while her own motion to sell was pending, and then allowed the court to order Thomas to find a buyer for a car she no longer owned. And she concealed the sale from the court for two months. Because of her disobedience, it will never be known whether the vehicle could have actually sold for $72,000. A party who eliminates the opportunity to verify an appraised value cannot then demand that her forced sale be accepted as the definitive market measure. The trial court reasonably favored an appraisal from an expert, whose values both parties otherwise accepted, over a price generated by a secretive distress sale. Indeed, the parties stipulated to David Lewis's values for every item on Exhibit A except four, and the Hellcat (item 1, $72,000) was not among the exceptions. {¶ 50} On this record, the court's valuation was not an abuse of discretion. 3. The Loan-Paydown Credit {¶ 51} Alexia's second argument relies on the principle that post-marital payments made from a spouse's separate funds should not increase the marital property subject to division. See Eddy, 2002-Ohio-4345, at ¶ 26 (4th Dist.) (trial court erred in denying a spouse credit for mortgage payments made after the de facto termination date). The trial court did not violate this principle. {¶ 52} It is necessary to examine the figures, because the parties' stipulation is internally inconsistent. The September 11, 2024 stipulation states that the loan "was paid off in the amount of $47,985.36 with net proceeds received by Alex in the amount of $7,264.55." These two figures cannot both be correct: a $51,500 sale price less a $47,985.36 payoff would yield net proceeds of only $3,514.64, not $7,264.55. The trial court resolved this discrepancy in the only way the arithmetic allows. It found that the loan payoff at the time of sale was actually $44,235.45; subtracting this from the $51,500 sale price equals the stipulated $7,264.55. The court then correctly used $47,985.36 as the - 17 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 loan balance at the date of separation, which is supported by the record. Therefore, Alexia's suggestion that the court adopted an incorrect loan balance misreads the decision, and Thomas's insistence that the payoff was $47,985.36 contradicts the net proceeds to which he also stipulated. The trial court simply gave the stipulated figures the only meaning that reconciles them. {¶ 53} In sum, the loan balance at the time of separation was $47,985.36. By the time of the sale, Alexia's payments had reduced the balance to $44,235.45, a paydown of $3,749.91, and she received net proceeds of $7,264.55. The trial court calculated the marital equity by subtracting the separation-date loan balance from the appraised value ($72,000 minus $47,985.36), resulting in $24,014.64. This method effectively credited Alexia the $3,749.91 she now demands. By using the end-of-marriage value and debt, the court properly fixed the marital equity as of the date the marriage ended. Alexia's post- separation principal payments were entirely excluded from the marital calculation, and the additional equity those payments generated was realized solely by her through the sale proceeds she retained. There was no factual error, and the court did not abuse its discretion. {¶ 54} The third assignment of error is overruled. D. Denial of Spousal Support {¶ 55} The fourth assignment of error states: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO AWARD SPOUSAL SUPPORT. {¶ 56} Both Alexia and Thomas requested spousal support, with Alexia seeking $3,000 monthly for three years and Thomas specifying no amount. The trial court denied both requests, concluding that spousal support was inappropriate for either party. In her fourth assignment of error, Alexia contends the court abused its discretion. She highlights - 18 -  Clermont CA2025-11-090 the disparity between her lack of earnings and Thomas's 2023 income of $178,047, challenges the court's findings under R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a) and (b), and argues the court improperly attributed hypothetical zoo profits to her. 1. The Governing Standard {¶ 57} "The purpose of spousal support is to mitigate the drastic and abrupt lifestyle changes occasioned upon either party by divorce." (Cleaned up.) Mullen v. Mullen, 1998 WL 391385, *4 (12th Dist. July 13, 1998). In deciding whether support is "appropriate and reasonable," a trial court has a statutory duty to conduct a careful and full balancing of the factors enumerated in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). Kane v. Kane, 2026-Ohio- 73, ¶ 12 (12th Dist.). The court need not comment on each factor individually but "'must indicate the basis for its award in sufficient detail to enable a reviewing court to determine that the award is fair, equitable and in accordance with the law.'" Bixler v. Bixler, 2017- Ohio-7022, ¶ 17