Moore v. Moore

[Cite as Moore v. Moore, 2026-Ohio-3345.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT April Bott Moore, : Plaintiff-Appellant, : No. 25AP-171 (C.P.C. No. 16DR-209) v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR) Robert Dean Moore, : Defendant-Appellee. : D E C I S I O N Rendered on August 27, 2026 On brief: April Bott Moore, pro se. Argued: April Bott Moore. On brief: Eugene R. Butler; Baker Hostetler LLP, and James A. Loeb, for appellee. Argued: Eugene R. Butler. APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations DINGUS, J. {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, April Bott Moore (“April”), appeals a judgment from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, which determined various marital property and child support issues on remand after we reversed the court’s May 2021 divorce decree in part in Moore v. Moore, 2022-Ohio-1862 (10th Dist.). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s decision regarding marital property, we affirm the court’s decision regarding child support as it applied to the period between January 2020 and May 2021, but we reverse the court’s decision regarding child support as applied to the period after May 2021. No. 25AP-171 2 I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} This is the sixth time the Moore divorce has visited this court. See Moore v. Moore, No. 18AP-866 (10th Dist. Dec. 31, 2018) (Journal Entry of Dismissal) (“Moore I”); 2022-Ohio-1862 (10th Dist.) (“Moore II”); No. 23AP-399 (10th Dist. Aug. 24, 2023) (Journal Entry of Dismissal) (“Moore III”); No. 23AP-516 (10th Dist. Oct. 6, 2023) (Journal Entry of Dismissal) (“Moore IV”); 2024-Ohio-5692 (10th Dist.) (“Moore V”). We would like to be brief with the background to the extent possible. But, because the issues in this appeal span the entirety of the case’s history, brevity is not a particularly obtainable goal. A. 2013-2016: marriage, child, and divorce {¶ 3} April and defendant-appellee, Robert Dean Moore (“Robert”) were married in 2013 and had a child in 2014. The parties maintained separate residences during their short marriage, with April residing in Dublin, Ohio (“the Dublin home”) and Robert residing in Belmont, Ohio (“the Belmont home”). April owned a home in Vero Beach, Florida prior to the marriage (“April’s Vero Beach home”), and the parties bought a second home in Vero Beach in 2014 (“Robert’s Vero Beach home”). The parties bought an additional home in New Albany, Ohio (“the New Albany home”) in mid-2015, and they began to take steps toward ending the marriage soon thereafter. In January 2016, April sued for divorce, and Robert counterclaimed for divorce. {¶ 4} Pursuant to an agreed temporary support order, Robert was responsible for any routine expenses related to the parties’ various residences in Ohio and Florida, insurance for the parties’ many vehicles, health insurance, and all the child’s routine expenses. April was responsible for her own personal expenses. Robert was obligated to pay $15,000 per month directly to April, with $7,500 designated as general child support, and $7,500 as reimbursement for the child’s nannies. B. 2016-2021: divorce trial and pre-decree proceedings {¶ 5} In October 2016, April dismissed her divorce complaint and stipulated that she would not seek spousal support. The parties agreed to parent the child pursuant to the terms of a shared parenting plan, which the court adopted in a shared parenting decree. The matter proceeded to trial on Robert’s counterclaim over the course of a few dozen days from October 2016 to October 2017. Toward the end of the trial proceedings, April filed a motion for temporary and permanent spousal support in August 2017. No. 25AP-171 3 {¶ 6} Post-trial proceedings languished while the parties filed dozens upon dozens of motions and attempted to pursue an interlocutory appeal, which this court dismissed for lack of a final appealable order in Moore I. A fair portion of the post-trial litigation focused on disestablishing Robert’s parentage of April’s new baby and cross accusations of contempt or requests for sanctions. During these protracted proceedings, the parties filed motions to modify the 2016 agreed temporary support order. In January 2020, a magistrate granted each party’s motion in part and adjusted Robert’s temporary support obligation. The magistrate’s changes were focused on mitigating the impact of the parties’ inability to collaborate on bill payment or reimbursement. {¶ 7} Among other changes to the temporary support order, the magistrate removed Robert’s obligation to reimburse April for the unspecified costs of the child’s routine expenses. Instead, the court increased Robert’s monthly support from $15,000 to $19,000 and ordered him to pay $10,000 in monthly child support through the Franklin County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”), and to pay $9,000 per month directly to April to pay for nannies and other child-related expenses. The magistrate held that the new support order would be effective January 1, 2020. The magistrate also removed Robert’s obligation to reimburse April for the payment of all bills and routine costs associated with the marital properties; instead, April became responsible for all routine costs associated with the Dublin home and one Vero Beach home, and Robert became similarly responsible for the New Albany and Belmont homes, along with the other Vero Beach home. April filed various motions to set aside the January 2020 order or to modify the temporary support order anew, all of which were eventually mooted by the May 2021 divorce decree. {¶ 8} As for issues related to property division, one of the pre-divorce decree matters still relevant to this appeal is the sale of the New Albany home. The parties purchased the home in May 2015 for $1.65 million in cash, from an account that was later determined to be 95.04 percent marital property and 4.96 percent Robert’s separate property. Toward the beginning of the divorce proceedings in 2016, Robert filed motions requesting permission to sell the New Albany home, stating that the property was vacant and that April would not allow him access into the home. The parties eventually stipulated that Robert would sell the property. No. 25AP-171 4 {¶ 9} The New Albany home remained on the market from 2017 to 2019, during which time April would not agree to reduce the sale price below $1.65 million. April eventually relented on the price, and in 2020 the house sold for $1.2 million, resulting in net proceeds of $1,116,485.03. Robert claimed he spent $223,203.00 toward the sale of the property. The parties stipulated that Robert would be reimbursed $35,000.00 for repair expenses related to the sale. The parties had previously stipulated that April would pay Robert $30,000.00 in attorney fees related to April’s attempt to disqualify Robert’s attorneys in October 2016. The court ruled that the $30,000.00 would be subtracted from April’s share of the sale proceeds. Ultimately, of the $1,116,485.03 in proceeds, the court awarded $59,520 to Robert for his separate interest and $35,000.00 for his repair expenses, the remaining $1,021,965.03 was equally divided, and $30,000.00 from April’s side of the ledger was moved to Robert’s side, totaling $480,982.52 to April and $635,502.51 to Robert. {¶ 10} The parties’ litigation ended with a divorce decree filed May 4, 2021. The trial court set a de facto termination date of the marriage as January 30, 2016. The trial court determined the parties’ separate and marital interests in assets that included three residences in Ohio, additional residential real estate, two residences in Florida, millions of dollars contained in various bank accounts, approximately ten vehicles, personal property, retirement accounts, and Robert’s various multi-million dollar bonuses, stock shares, and dividends. The trial court also determined the parties’ separate and marital obligations in debts, including April’s 2013 tax liability, debt for private jet services, and debts or expenses related to residential properties. The court denied April’s motion for spousal support, noting that April had expressly waived spousal support in October 2016. The trial court denied April’s request for Robert to reimburse April for certain bills she had paid during the course of the divorce, reasoning that Robert had paid most of the marital property expenses since 2016. The court further noted that April had improperly demanded that Robert reimburse her for her own personal expenses as well as expenses that Robert himself had originally paid, which the court described as “a frivolous double dip that demonstrates [April’s] lack of respect for this Court’s ethics and intelligence.” (May 4, 2021 Jgmt. Entry – Decree of Divorce at 87.) No. 25AP-171 5 {¶ 11} The court noted that it had already entered a shared parenting decree back in December 2016, and it finalized the shared parenting plan by addressing certain outstanding financial decisions, including child support. The court determined that Robert’s annual income for purposes of child support was $7,478,043. The court determined that April’s reported income, earned from self-employment through her own law firm, lacked credibility. The court pointed out various inconsistencies and improprieties in the law firm’s bookkeeping and noted April’s efforts to withhold information about her law firm’s alleged expenses. Because April had not provided credible evidence of her income, the trial court estimated her income by looking to the yearly cash flows reflected in her personal bank statements.1 From those figures, the trial court determined that April’s annual income for purposes of child support was $359,687. {¶ 12} The trial court believed that it was required to determine its support order for the parties’ child by plugging their incomes into its basic child support schedule worksheet. From its worksheet calculations, the court determined that Robert’s basic child support obligation was $37,710.49 per month. It rejected Robert’s argument that child support should be set at $0 to $7,500.00 per month, finding that Robert did not have an accurate understanding of the cost of the child’s needs or lifestyle. It rejected April’s argument for $100,000.00 per month, noting that April failed to provide documentation to support her “extraordinary” budget, which the trial court found to be “more related to how [April] would like to live than how [the child] actually lives.” (May 4, 2021 Jgmt. Entry – Decree of Divorce at 67.) The court noted that April’s budget included only $2,600 in monthly expenses specific to the child, apart from $10,300.00 per month for nannies. {¶ 13} The court held that the worksheet amount was presumed to be the proper amount pursuant to R.C. 3119.03. After considering the needs and lifestyle of the child, the court concluded that the worksheet amount was not inappropriate or unjust and that no deviations were appropriate, save for a monthly reduction of $30.77 for cash medical support. The court ordered that Robert would pay for the child’s private school tuition and health insurance. The court ordered that the parties should split the cost of the child’s other school and extracurricular expenses, as well as any extraordinary medical expenses, with 1 The trial court used the term “imputed” when determining April’s income. As we discuss below in April’s third assignment of error, the trial court’s use of the term “imputed” was improper, but the substance of its analysis was proper. No. 25AP-171 6 Robert paying 70 percent and April paying 30 percent. At the beginning of the trial court’s May 2021 decision, it indicated that the support order would not be retroactive, but by the end of the decision, it held that the effective date of the child support order would be January 1, 2020. C. 2021-2022: appeal of the divorce decree {¶ 14} Both parties appealed. Robert raised three assignments of error regarding the trial court (1) calculating child support at $37,710.49 per month and making it retroactive to January 1, 2020, (2) awarding April half of the full appraised value of Robert’s Vero Beach property rather than awarding her half of the stipulated marital portion of the property, and (3) awarding $775,000.00 in attorney fees to April. April’s 18 assignments of error covered topics including (1) potential judicial bias, (2) setting the de facto marriage termination date at January 30, 2016, (3) the overall adequacy of the division of marital property and the designation of separate or marital property and expenditures, (4) the calculation of each party’s income, (5) the categorization of approximately $1 million kept in a custodial account for the child’s benefit, (6) the valuation and award of certain personal property, (7) the decision to award Robert ownership of his Vero Beach property, (8) the allocation of marital debt related to the parties’ private jet services, (9) the calculation of April’s repayment to Robert related to April’s 2013 federal taxes and money that she moved from a marital account to a personal account in late 2015, and (10) the valuation of the parties’ New Albany home and the allocation of proceeds from its sale. In a separate filing, April additionally argued that this court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the trial court failed to fully address and divide all of the parties’ property as required by Civ.R. 75(F). {¶ 15} This court sustained Robert’s assignments of error regarding child support and the amount of the award to April for Robert’s Vero Beach property, and we overruled his assignment of error regarding attorney fees. Moore II at ¶ 93, 95, 104. Regarding Robert’s Vero Beach property, we held that the trial court mistakenly awarded April half the value of the $2.6 million property instead of half the value of the $1.7 million marital interest in the property. We noted that the court agreed with the parties’ stipulation to the marital value, and it made no findings indicating that it would divide the marital interest unevenly. Id. at ¶ 95. We reversed and remanded this discrete portion of the property No. 25AP-171 7 division with instructions for the trial court to correct the award amount. Id. at ¶ 96. We rejected April’s argument that such a reversal would require the trial court to re-evaluate and divide the entirety of the parties’ marital property. Id. {¶ 16} We held that both the calculation and the effective date of the child support award were problematic. The trial court’s calculation of $37,710.49 per month in child support was contrary to law because it was controlled by the rubric provided for combined incomes up to a maximum of $150,000.00 (now $336,467.04) in R.C. 3119.021 and was not determined based on the unique facts of the specific case under R.C. 3119.04 for combined incomes exceeding the statutory maximum. Id. at ¶ 75. We noted points at which the trial court indicated that the child’s needs and standard of living were far less than $37,710.49 per month. Id. at ¶ 83-88. Because the court’s case specific analysis of the child’s and parents’ needs and standard of living bore little to no relationship with the chosen amount of child support, we concluded that the court would have to revisit its child support decision on remand using the proper analysis. Id. at ¶ 91, 93. As for the start date of the child support obligation, we noted that the retroactive date of January 1, 2020 conflicted with the court’s earlier pronouncement in the decree that its child support order would not be retroactive. Id. at ¶ 92. We did not address the appropriateness of any particular starting date for the child support order, and we simply indicated that the court should resolve its conflicting statements. Id. {¶ 17} This court sustained April’s assignments of error regarding the allocation of debt related to the parties’ private jet debt, the payment of April’s 2013 taxes, and April’s withdrawals from a marital account in late 2015, as well as the allocation of funds from the New Albany home. Id. at ¶ 43, 49-54, 56, 63-66. Because we sustained Robert’s assignment of error regarding child support, we mooted April’s argument regarding the calculation of her income. Id. at ¶ 72. We overruled April’s remaining assignments of error, and we rejected her suggestion that the May 2021 divorce decree was not a final appealable order. Id. at ¶ 13, 105. {¶ 18} Regarding the allocation of debt, we agreed with April that the trial court incorrectly made April responsible for 100 percent, rather than 50 percent, of the $435,695.22 jet services debt, the $36,670.36 payment toward April’s 2013 tax liability, and April’s withdrawal of $20,459.99 from a marital account. Id. at ¶ 43, 56, 66. Our partial No. 25AP-171 8 reversal and remand instructed the court to correct these errors. Id. at ¶ 105. Regarding the New Albany residence, the court valued it at the time of the sale in 2020 rather than determining its value as of the de facto marriage termination date of January 1, 2016. We reversed and remanded this additional discrete portion of the property division with instructions for the trial court to “establish a value for the New Albany property as of the de facto termination date and adjust the related allocations as it then finds appropriate.” Id. at ¶ 54. D. 2022-2023: proceedings on remand {¶ 19} Before the trial court was able to address issues on remand pursuant to our instructions, it had to deal with the dozen or so motions that the parties filed while the appeal was pending and after this court’s remand. Pertinent to the present appeal, April filed motions in February 2022 and January 2023 to compel Robert to respond to discovery requests related to child support, Robert’s financial information, and other matters. In June 2022, Robert filed a motion to suspend or escrow his monthly child support obligation. Later in June 2022, April filed a motion asking the court to modify its temporary child support order and establish its final child support order. April argued that the parties’ incomes had changed since the last calculation of temporary child support in January 2020, and that the court should hold a hearing to modify the temporary child support order and to establish an ongoing child support order. The magistrate, considering the motion, allowed the parties to submit narrative affidavits and exhibits to support their positions on temporary child support. The magistrate also held that “issues that were remanded” by this court in Moore II would be determined based on the trial record “and consistent with the instructions from the 10th Appellate District - Ohio Court of Appeals set forth in its Decision.” (Nov. 18, 2022 Order at 1.) {¶ 20} Among the evidence that April provided regarding child support, she included documentation indicating that Robert may have earned over $10 or 11 million per year in 2017, 2019, and 2020, and over $16 million in 2018. She argued that Robert should be compelled to respond to her discovery requests to verify Robert’s more recent income. April reported that her income was $58,810 in 2019, $38,484 in 2020, and $160,470 in 2021 according to tax documentation prepared by a licensed CPA. She became a W-2 employee on October 24, 2022, with an annual salary of $160,000 plus a monthly vehicle No. 25AP-171 9 stipend. April asserted that support and maintenance for the child required $13,400 per month for shelter, $4,200 per month for a nanny, and $3,000 per month for food, for a total of $20,600 per month. She asserted that additional amounts should be awarded at the trial court’s discretion based on the lifestyle of the child and the parties. She argued that additional discovery was needed to assess Robert’s lifestyle, but she noted that Robert and the child regularly travel by private jet. {¶ 21} Robert asserted that April’s evidence from the 2016-2017 trial showed that the child’s monthly expenses totaled around $12,500, most of which was for nanny expenses. He argued that consideration of current income is unnecessary, as the focus in R.C. 3119.04 on families earning over $150,000 (now $336,367 per year under R.C. 3119.021) is based on the needs and living standards of the child and the parents. {¶ 22} The magistrate set temporary child support at $14,200 per month, effective January 1, 2023. The magistrate calculated the statutory baseline for child support based on evidence of the parties’ incomes from the 2016-2017 trial record, and it noted that considering current income would have only a negligible effect on the baseline amount. The magistrate determined that it should award more than the baseline amount based on the current information about the child’s expenses, as well as consideration of “the substantial disparity in the parties’ respective incomes.” (Feb. 21, 2023 Mag.’s Decision at 1.) {¶ 23} April moved to set aside the magistrate’s decision and moved for a full hearing regarding child support. The trial court denied these and other motions in a June 7, 2023 judgment entry. It held that the magistrate’s temporary support order was “fair and reasonable and will be approved as the Order of this Court.” (June 7, 2023 Jgmt. Entry at 4.) However, it held that the final order of child support would be based exclusively on the trial record. The court denied April’s motions related to updated financial information for child support, reasoning “there has not yet been a final order since the support issue is pending remand from the Court of Appeals. . . . There cannot be a change of circumstances for which discovery could be appropriate until a final order is issued.” (June 7, 2023 Jgmt. Entry at 3.) {¶ 24} A few days later, the trial court entered judgment adjusting aspects of its May 4, 2021 divorce decree in accordance with this court’s instructions in Moore II. The court reduced April’s obligations regarding jet services, tax payments, and account No. 25AP-171 10 withdrawals to $217,847.61, $18,355.18, and $10,229.99, respectively. It reduced April’s award for Robert’s Vero Beach property from $1.3 million to $863,448.00. Regarding the New Albany property, the court determined that Robert had a separate property interest of $81,840.00 and was owed additional funds from the sale proceeds in the amount of $35,000.00 for sale-related improvements and $30,000.00 for attorney fees. The court noted that although the property was valued at $1.65 million in 2016, “appraisals are estimates of valuation and not necessarily supported by market conditions.” (June 12, 2023 Jgmt. Entry – Decision upon Remand at 3.) The court found that it would not be “equitable to blindly shift the burden of any market loss, or to award the benefit of any market gain, to a particular party.” (June 12, 2023 Jgmt. Entry – Decision upon Remand at 3.) Of the $1,116,485.03 in net proceeds, the court awarded $484,822.52 to April, and $631,662.51 to Robert. (June 12, 2023 Jgmt. Entry – Decision upon Remand at 3.) {¶ 25} The trial court re-evaluated the appropriate amount of child support pursuant to this court’s guidance in Moore II. It noted that the standard monthly child support obligation for the statutory maximum combined income level of $150,000.00 was $1,239.00 per month, and that the same for the maximum combined income level of $336,467.04 is $1,926.00 per month. The court noted that if it wanted to award less than $1,239.00 (or $1,926.00) per month in this case, it would be required under R.C. 3119.04(B) to hold that such a high amount would be against the best interest of one or more parties, and it would be required to include findings to support such a determination. The court held that there was no reason to award less than the statutory amount, and that the facts supported an upward deviation. {¶ 26} The court considered the list of expenses that April provided in Exhibits BB,2 XXX, and YYY from the 2016-2017 trial. As with the original 2021 decree, the court noted that Exhibit BB only included $2,600 in monthly expenses that were specific to the child, apart from the $10,300 for two nannies. The court subtracted the cost of one nanny and concluded that April had established monthly expenses of $7,750 for the child. Relative to the cost of living, the court held that it was equally plausible that the child would have lived in Franklin County or Belmont County had the parties remained married. The court 2 The court referred to Exhibit PP, which is a summary of Robert’s net income from 2015 to 2017, but the cited information appears in Exhibit BB. No. 25AP-171 11 concluded that Robert’s child support obligation should be $8,500 per month, along with payment of 100 percent of the child’s school tuition and health insurance, and 70 percent of the child’s school expenses, extracurricular activities, and health care expenses. The court determined the child support order should maintain the effective date of January 1, 2020, and it further determined that all remaining portions of the original decree were incorporated, unchanged. {¶ 27} In a separate entry filed on June 21, 2023, the trial court modified a portion of the divorce decree relating to a restraining order to allow the custodian of two custodial accounts to withdraw up to $1,005,000 from the accounts and dismissed him as a party to the action. E. 2023-2024: a series of attempted appeals {¶ 28} Robert appealed the June 12, 2023 judgment entry, and April appealed all three of the court’s June 2023 judgment entries. This court dismissed the parties’ appeals for lack of a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02. Moore III. We held that the June 12, 2023 judgment entry was not a final appealable order because the court had retained jurisdiction to allow the CSEA to recalculate child support and to resolve any ensuing disputes about overpayment. We further held that the June 6, 2023 judgment entry was clearly interlocutory, and April failed to establish that the June 21, 2023 judgment entry affected a substantial right that would not be protected absent an immediate appeal. We docketed our dismissal of the appeals on August 24, 2023. {¶ 29} Meanwhile, Robert filed a motion to reduce the final property division award from the June 12, 2023 judgment entry to a lump sum judgment. The trial court granted Robert’s motion on August 21, 2023 and held that April owed Robert a total of $261,342. The court denied April’s request to redesignate a portion of Robert’s childcare-related payments to April as a gift rather than child support. April appealed the decision. We once again dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order, noting that the court had not yet resolved the issue of an overpayment of child support. Moore IV. {¶ 30} More motions lined up at the trial court. Robert moved to reduce his child support overpayment to a lump sum judgment, and April moved for a comprehensive de novo valuation and division of marital property. On November 21, 2023, the court reviewed the records of the CSEA and determined that Robert’s overpayments totaled $303,470.81. No. 25AP-171 12 The court denied Robert’s request for a lump sum judgment and instead ordered that Robert’s monthly child support obligation would be reduced by $3,000 until the overage was satisfied. It denied April’s motion for full reconsideration of the parties’ property division, noting that the court’s jurisdiction to alter the property division was limited to the matters on remand from Moore II. F. 2024-2025: one more attempted appeal and further trial court proceedings {¶ 31} April appealed the trial court’s November 2023 judgment entry. Yet again, we dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order. Moore V. We determined that although the trial court had resolved the outstanding overpayment issue, the court needed to incorporate all its piecemeal judgments into one final judgment, as required by Civ.R. 75(F), to create a final appealable order. {¶ 32} Back at the trial court, April filed a motion for the court to reconsider its June 2023 calculation of child support, and to hold an evidentiary hearing for updated information on the finances, needs, and lifestyles of the parents and child. Robert argued that consideration of new information was outside the mandate from this court in Moore II. The court denied April’s motion, holding that the June 12, 2023 judgment entry was a final order not subject to reconsideration—contrary to this court’s holding in Moore III that the June 12, 2023 judgment entry was not a final appealable order. It further held that reconsideration was not warranted because “the record on remand was clear that the original trial record would be the factual basis for the decision following remand.” (Jan. 3, 2025 Jgmt. Entry at 2.) {¶ 33} The trial court filed a notice asking the parties to propose a solution to the problem of creating a final appealable order. The court asked the parties to cooperate in drafting a proposed final order, or to file separate proposals in the absence of an agreement. Unsurprisingly, the parties did not reach an agreement on crafting a final appealable order. April’s proposed order stated that the May 2021 divorce decree would be vacated in full, the parties would conduct discovery and proceed to an evidentiary hearing on child support, the trial court would conduct a proper, comprehensive division of marital assets and debts, and the court would include the foregoing information along with a variety of other findings and orders in a future judgment entry. Robert’s proposed order simply stated that it fully No. 25AP-171 13 incorporated the judgment entries from June 7, 12, and 21, 2023, August 21 and November 21, 2023, and January 3, 2025, as well as all portions of the May 4, 2021 divorce decree that were unaffected by subsequent entries. The court’s ultimate order followed Robert’s proposal and incorporated the undisturbed portions of the 2021 divorce decree and all subsequent entries by reference. {¶ 34} April filed a timely notice of appeal, and the matter is now before this court. II. Assignments of Error {¶ 35} April assigns the following seven assignments of error for our review: [I.] The Trial Court Erred By Failing to Consider the Current Income, Needs and Lifestyle as Required by R.C. 3119 and Failing to Hold Evidentiary Hearings. [II.] The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Apply the Correct Version of R.C. 3119.04 and Failing to Follow the Statute’s Procedural Requirements. [III.] The Trial Court Erred by Setting Child Support at $8,500 Per Month Without Considering All of Requirements of R.C. 3119.04. [IV.] The Trial Court Erred by Applying Its Child Support Decrease Backward in Time and Granting Robert Repayment of the More than $300,000 in Child Support and $153,000 in Other Support. [V.] The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Award Ownership of the New Albany Home to Robert and Failing to Establish a de facto Date Marital Value. [VI.] The Trial Court Erred by Modifying Property Division Awards Set Out in the Decree and Did So While the Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Do So. [VII.] The Trial Court Erred by Failing to Comprehensively Divide All Property as Required by R.C. 3105.171 and by Awarding an Inequitable Property Division to April Without Justification. III. Discussion {¶ 36} We note that although April has identified seven assignments of error in her brief, some of her assignments of error contain collections of independent legal No. 25AP-171 14 arguments that would have been appropriate to present as separate assignments of error. We emphasize that our “role is to rule on assignments of error, not mere arguments.” State v. Tarver, 2025-Ohio-1190, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.). We will exercise our discretion to address April’s extraneous arguments where we see fit. {¶ 37} April’s first four assignments of error address the trial court’s calculation of child support, and the remaining three assignments of error address the court’s division of certain marital property following this court’s decision in Moore II. It is axiomatic that a trial court has the broad discretion to determine what is equitable in divorce proceedings. Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989); Cherry v. Cherry, 66 Ohio St.2d 348 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded in part by statute on other grounds. A determination of equity depends on the totality of unique circumstances, which defies rigid rules. Briganti v. Briganti, 9 Ohio St.3d 220, 221-22 (1984). We apply an abuse of discretion standard of review to child support orders. Wolf-Sabatino v. Sabatino, 2011- Ohio-6819, ¶ 87 (10th Dist.); Boone v. Holmes, 2015-Ohio-2242, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.); Thaher v. Hamed, 2010-Ohio-5257, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.). Likewise, the division of marital property in a divorce decree is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. Hayden v. Hayden, 2004-Ohio-6483, ¶ 21-23 (12th Dist.). An abuse of discretion connotes a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). However, the trial court does not have the discretion to apply the law incorrectly. Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 38. A. Determination of child support based on updated information {¶ 38} In her first assignment of error, April asserts the trial court’s calculation of child support in its June 12, 2023 judgment entry (hereinafter the “June 2023 decision”) was erroneous because it was based on the parties’ financial information from 2012 to 2015 and evidence of their needs and lifestyles as of 2016 to 2017 rather than their financial status and circumstances during later years up to the time of the proceedings on remand. April asserts that the court should have held an evidentiary hearing to update the evidence of the parties’ incomes and the child’s needs and standard of living. {¶ 39} When focusing on child support, the trial court’s review of financial and other relevant information is not limited to periods prior to trial; the court generally has the authority to review the parents’ “income over a reasonable period of years.” No. 25AP-171 15 R.C. 3119.05(H). If a trial court’s calculation of income needs to include bonuses, the court must consider bonuses within a period of either one or three years “immediately prior to the time when the person’s child support obligation is being computed.” R.C. 3119.05(D)(1) and (2). {¶ 40} The trial court’s second order of ongoing child support, which it finalized in February 2025, reached back a considerable amount of time to January 1, 2020. Various procedurally significant events occurred during that period of time, including (1) the magistrate’s modification of temporary child support, effective January 1, 2020; (2) various efforts to revisit the January 2020 order from June 2020 to April 2021; (3) the first divorce decree, journalized on May 4, 2021; (4) this court’s reversal and remand on June 2, 2022; (5) April’s motion to establish child support and modify temporary support on June 28, 2022; (6) the trial court’s temporary child support order, effective January 1, 2023; (7) the trial court’s determination of ongoing child support on June 12, 2023; (8) April’s December 2024 motion for reconsideration of child support; and (9) the second divorce decree, journalized on February 6, 2025. {¶ 41} To begin with, we note that according to the magistrate’s scheduling entry in November 2022, the parties agreed that matters within the scope of this court’s decision in Moore II would be decided based exclusively on the trial record. Moore II addressed trial matters up to the time of the May 2021 divorce decree. Accordingly, April has forfeited any error regarding the age of the evidence supporting the trial court’s child support decision as it applies to the period from January 2020 to May 2021. See State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 121 (2000) (a party’s agreement to a particular procedure waives all but plain error). Moreover, although we found error in the trial court’s application of child support law to the facts of the case in Moore II, we did not find error in the trial court’s consideration of the particular facts that were before it at the time of its May 2021 decision. Moore II at ¶ 75, 78. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court, in June 2023 and February 2025, to consider that same set of facts for its determination of Robert’s child support obligation from January 2020 to May 2021. We discern no error in the limited evidentiary scope of the trial court’s decision for that period, plain or otherwise. {¶ 42} As for Robert’s child support obligation from May 2021 onward, the trial court rejected April’s repeated requests to consider updated information. The court No. 25AP-171 16 reasoned that because the May 2021 child support order had been vacated, “[t]here has not yet been a final order,” and it held that “[i]n the absence of a final order, there cannot be a change of circumstances.” (June 7, 2023 Jgmt. Entry at 6.) The court concluded that it must determine child support based on the original record at trial. The court cited no legal authority supporting its conclusion that it could not consider information arising during the years’ long interval between the divorce trial and the entry of the final order of child support,