Logan v. Logan

[Cite as Logan v. Logan, 2026-Ohio-3363.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY HEATHER L. LOGAN : : C.A. No. 30801 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 DR 00643 v. : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- STEVEN A. LOGAN : Domestic Relations) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on August 28, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Costs to be paid as follows: 50% by appellee and 50% by appellant. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.  OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30801 ANNE HARVEY, Attorney for Appellant CHRIS BECK, Attorney for Appellee HANSEMAN, J. {¶ 1} Steven A. Logan appeals from a final judgment and decree of divorce issued by the Domestic Relations Division of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. In the appeal, Steven challenges the trial court’s orders pertaining to child support, child custody, and the division of the parties’ equity in their real estate. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Facts and Course of Proceedings {¶ 2} Steven and the appellee, Heather L. Logan, were married on August 6, 2011, in Perry, Georgia. Two children, a daughter and a son, were born as issue of their marriage. Their daughter is currently 11 years old, and their son is currently 7 years old. Heather filed a complaint for divorce on October 8, 2024, and Steven filed an answer and counterclaim on November 5, 2024. The trial court held a divorce hearing on November 4, 2025. During the hearing, Steven and Heather entered into the following stipulations, which were cited in the final judgment and decree of divorce. 1. The parties are incompatible. 2. For purposes of determining the division of assets, the term of the parties’ marriage began on August 6, 2011, and terminated on December 31, 2023. 2 3. Heather earns an annual income of $115,000 through her employer, Scientific Games. 4. Steven earns $108,259.92 through his employer, Herren Associates. 5. Heather has the parties’ children enrolled in a health insurance plan through her employer at an annual cost of $5,512. 6. Except as otherwise indicated in the divorce decree, the parties have no joint debts. The parties shall retain any debt in their individual names and shall hold the other harmless and blameless thereon. 7. The parties’ joint bank accounts have been divided to their mutual satisfaction and there are no remaining joint bank accounts other than the accounts for the benefit of the parties’ children. The parties agree to equally divide the children’s accounts and deposit the funds into accounts for the benefit of the children. The parties shall retain bank accounts in their individual names free and clear from any claim of the other except as expressly contained otherwise in the divorce decree. 8. There shall be no exchange of spousal support, and the court will not retain jurisdiction over spousal support. 9. There are no known tax deficiencies, and the parties are current with tax filings. The parties shall file separate tax returns for 2025 and each year thereafter. 10. Neither party has a life insurance policy with a cash value. The parties shall maintain any employer sponsored life insurance and shall list the children as beneficiaries so long as an obligation to support the children exists. 3 Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce (Feb. 24, 2026), p. 2-3. {¶ 3} While the parties’ stipulations resolved several issues, the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and the treatment of certain inheritance funds that Steven received from his grandmother’s estate were contested issues that the trial court had to rule on. The following is a summary of the testimony and evidence that was presented on those matters during the divorce hearing. Allocation of Parental Rights and Responsibilities {¶ 4} Steven requested the trial court to order a shared parenting plan whereby each party would get equal parenting time. Heather, on the other hand, requested an arrangement whereby she would be the primary residential parent and Steven would get parenting time with the children every other weekend and on one weekday during his off week. {¶ 5} The trial court heard testimony from the parties concerning their schedules, their children’s activities, schooling, and care, their parenting philosophies and practices, and their ability to communicate. The court declined to issue an order for shared parenting. The court found that a shared parenting plan would be difficult for the parties to engage in because they could not communicate effectively with one another and because they had different parenting philosophies and practices. {¶ 6} The trial court designated Heather as the primary residential parent and legal custodian of the children. It granted Steven parenting time in accordance with the Montgomery County Standard Order of Parenting Time, which provides the non-residential parent with parenting time on alternating weekends from Friday evening to Sunday evening. The trial court did extend Steven’s alternating weekends to be from Thursday evening to Sunday evening. The trial court indicated that it had reached its custody decision after considering the statutory factors under R.C. 3109.04. 4  {¶ 7} In addition to the custody order, the trial court ordered Steven to pay Heather a monthly child support obligation of $1,336.14. The trial court arrived at that amount using the standard Child Support Computation Worksheet, which the court attached to the final judgment and decree of divorce. The worksheet shows that the trial court did not apply a 10% downward deviation of Steven’s child support obligation under the authority of R.C. 3119.051. Nor did the trial court apply any additional downward deviation under R.C. 3119.23. Steven’s Inheritance Funds {¶ 8} Steven testified that his grandmother passed away in November 2018 and that, beginning in May 2019, he had received several disbursements of inheritance funds from her estate, which totaled $185,047.60. Steven provided the trial court with a list of the disbursement dates and the amount of each disbursement. Defendant’s Exhibit B1. The list showed that Steven received $70,000 on May 10, 2019; $10,000 on July 8, 2019; $50,047.60 on August 20, 2019; $5,000 on December 9, 2019; $30,000 on May 3, 2023; and $20,000 on November 13, 2024. Steven testified that he had received the $20,000 disbursement after the parties had terminated their marriage and that he had placed that money into a separate bank account. Steven, however, deposited the remaining disbursements into a joint savings account that he had shared with Heather. {¶ 9} Steven provided the trial court with bank statements from the parties’ joint savings account and highlighted certain deposits that he claimed represented his inheritance funds. The highlighted deposits showed that $69,759 was deposited on May 20, 2019; 5 $9,000 was deposited incrementally between July 9, 2019, and July 18, 2019;1 $50,000 was deposited on September 24, 2019; and $30,000 was deposited on May 9, 2023. Defendant’s Exhibit D, p. 2-4; Defendant’s Exhibit E, p. 3. Steven testified that those deposits corresponded with the disbursements of inheritance funds that he had received from his grandmother’s estate. {¶ 10} In addition to the deposits, Steven highlighted a withdrawal of $65,334.26 that occurred on October 13, 2020. Defendant’s Exhibit E, p. 6. Steven testified that this withdrawal was made to pay the downpayment on the parties’ real property at 32 Williamsburg Lane in Dayton, Ohio (“Williamsburg property”). {¶ 11} The joint savings account statements also showed a withdrawal of $44,596.54 that occurred on November 30, 2023. Defendant’s Exhibit E, p. 2. Steven testified that this withdrawal was made to paying the downpayment on the parties’ real property at 7428 Yorkshire Drive in Dayton, Ohio (“Yorkshire property”). Heather testified that she had moved into the Yorkshire property in December 2023. She agreed that the withdrawals of $65,334.25 and $44,596.54 coincided with the purchases of the Williamsburg and Yorkshire properties. {¶ 12} To determine the equity in the parties’ real estate, they agreed that the Williamsburg property had a fair market value of $420,000 and an outstanding mortgage balance of $233,667.49. The parties also agreed that the Yorkshire property had a fair market value of $198,000 and an outstanding mortgage balance of $159,000. Accordingly, 1 . Steven testified that he deposited $9,000 incrementally because his bank would sometimes place holds on the account when making transfers. Steven explained that his bank had no branches in Ohio and that the only way he could deposit his inheritance funds into the parties’ joint savings account was to first deposit them into a joint checking account and then transfer them to the joint savings account. 6 the trial court found that the parties had $186,333 worth of equity in the Williamsburg property and $39,000 worth of equity in the Yorkshire property.2 {¶ 13} Steven testified that the funds in the parties’ joint savings account were a mix of the parties’ money and that they used the funds in the joint savings account to pay marital bills. The trial court reviewed the joint savings account statements provided by Steven and found that because there were several large withdrawals and deposits made during the time period in question, Steven had failed to trace his inheritance funds to the downpayments for the Williamsburg and Yorkshire properties. More specifically, the trial court found that Steven’s act of depositing his inheritance funds into the joint savings account and then using the account to pay several marital debts transmuted the inheritance funds into marital property. 3 The trial court determined that the parties’ equity in the Williamsburg and Yorkshire properties was marital property for which each party was entitled to an equal share. {¶ 14} Because the trial court split up the equity equally and the parties had agreed that Steven was keeping the Williamsburg property and that Heather was keeping the Yorkshire property, the trial court ordered Steven to pay Heather $64,666.50 to offset the greater amount of equity that was in the Williamsburg property. The $64,666.50 payment represented Heather’s half of the equity in the Williamsburg property ($93,166.50), less 2. The trial court rounded up the equity in the Williamsburg property from $186,332.51 to $186,333. 3. Steven points out that the trial court’s decision stated that that his inheritance funds were “transmuted into separate property” as opposed to marital property. When reading the trial court’s entire decision, it becomes clear that this was a clerical error. The decision as a whole indicates that the trial court determined that Steven’s inheritance funds began as separate property and later transmuted into marital property when he deposited the funds into the parties’ joint savings account and then used the funds from that account to pay several marital debts. 7 Steven’s half of the equity in the Yorkshire property ($19,500) and his half of the equity in a Subaru vehicle ($9,000), which had a fair market value of $18,000. {¶ 15} On February 24, 2026, the trial court issued its final judgment and decree of divorce that reflected its orders regarding parenting time, child support, and the division of the parties’ equity in their real estate. Steven now appeals from that judgment, raising three assignments of error for review. First Assignment of Error {¶ 16} Under his first assignment of error, Steven claims that the trial court erred by failing to apply a 10% downward deviation to his child support obligation as required by R.C. 3119.051 and by failing to consider whether an additional downward deviation was appropriate under R.C. 3119.23. Standard of Review {¶ 17} “We review child support decisions under an abuse of discretion standard.” Mangen v. Mangen, 2021-Ohio-3693, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), citing Booth v. Booth, 44 Ohio St.3d 142, 144 (1989). Therefore, “[t]he decision whether to deviate from the child support guidelines and worksheet is a discretionary matter and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Id., citing Hattenbach v. Watson, 2016-Ohio-5648, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), citing Havens v. Havens, 2012-Ohio-2867, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.). That said, “as a general rule, . . . the governing law is not a matter left to the discretion of the court.” Matter of A.H., 2021-Ohio- 4055, ¶ 39 (11th Dist.), citing Conneaut v. Buck, 2015-Ohio-2593, ¶ 22 (11th Dist.). Therefore, “‘where a specific action, ruling or order of the court is required as a matter of law, involving no discretion, that test of “abuse of discretion” should have no application.’” Id., quoting Rohde v. Farmer, 23 Ohio St.2d 82, 89 (1970). 8  R.C. 3119.051 and 3119.231 {¶ 18} R.C. 3119.051 provides: (A) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a court or child support enforcement agency calculating the amount to be paid under a child support order shall reduce by ten per cent the amount of the annual individual support obligation for the parent or parents when a court has issued or is issuing a court-ordered parenting time order that equals or exceeds ninety overnights per year. This reduction may be in addition to the other deviations and reductions. {¶ 19} “The use of the word ‘shall’ in R.C. 3119.051 indicates a 10% downward deviation is a mandatory adjustment to the child support worksheet when the obligor parent has overnight parenting time 90 or more times per year.” Mangen v. Mangen, 2021-Ohio- 3693, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), citing Caleshu v. Caleshu, 2020-Ohio-4075, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). The plain language of the statute makes it clear that the evidence used to establish the 90-overnight threshold is the court-ordered parenting time order itself. Therefore, the parenting time order must equal or exceed 90 overnights per year in order for the 10% downward deviation under R.C. 3119.051 to apply. {¶ 20} R.C. 3119.231 provides: (A) If court-ordered parenting time exceeds ninety overnights per year, the court shall consider whether to grant a deviation pursuant to section 3119.22 of the Revised Code for the reason set forth in division (C) of section 3119.23 of the Revised Code. This deviation is in addition to any adjustments provided under division (A) of section 3119.051 of the Revised Code. 9  (B) If court-ordered parenting time is equal to or exceeds one hundred forty-seven overnights per year, and the court does not grant a deviation under division (A) of this section, it shall specify in the order the facts that are the basis for the court’s decision. {¶ 21} “Despite containing a similar threshold of parenting time of 90 overnights, the R.C. 3119.051 10% downward deviation is a separate issue from the R.C. 3119.231(A) consideration of whether to grant an additional downward deviation.” Mangen at ¶ 24. “The first is an automatic adjustment while the second is a discretionary decision centered on whether R.C. 3119.23(C) justifies an additional downward deviation.” Id. “[T]he language of R.C. 3119.231(A) indicates the court has discretion concerning whether an additional downward deviation is justified due to ‘[e]xtended parenting time or extraordinary costs associated with parenting time’ as set forth in R.C. 3119.23(C).” Id. “[I]f the court does not grant the R.C. 3119.231(A) additional deviation and overnight parenting time equals or exceeds 147 nights, the court must specify the facts that are the basis for the court’s decision to deny further deviation.” (Emphasis deleted.) Id. {¶ 22} In summary, “the enactment of [R.C. 3119.051 and R.C. 3119.231] created three new deviation thresholds for a trial court’s consideration: (1) 90 or more overnights mandates a 10% downward adjustment to child support without any consideration of other deviation factors (R.C. 3119.051); (2) 91 or more overnights compels the judge to consider whether to grant an additional downward deviation in addition to the mandatory adjustment (R.C. 3119.231(A)); and (3) 147 overnights triggers the requirement the trial court provide an explanation for its decision to deny further deviation (R.C. 3119.231(B)).” Mangen, 2021- Ohio-3693, at ¶ 24 (2d Dist.). 10  Analysis {¶ 23} In this case, the trial court’s parenting-time order provides that Steven is the non-residential parent and that he “shall have parenting time in accordance with the Montgomery County Standard Order of Parenting Time with the exception that his every other weekend parenting time will be from Thursday evening at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. Otherwise, all other provisions of the Standard Order of Parenting Time shall apply.” Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce (Feb. 24, 2026), p. 6. {¶ 24} The Montgomery County Standard Order of Parenting Time is attached to the parties’ final judgment and decree of divorce. It provides that the “non-residential parent shall have parenting time from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. each Wednesday evening or another weekday by agreement.” It also provides that the “non-residential parent shall have parenting time on alternate weekends from Friday at 6:00 p.m. to Sunday at 6:00 p.m.” The trial court modified the latter provision by giving Steven parenting time from Thursday at 6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m., so as modified, the standard parenting time order provides Steven with three overnights every other week. {¶ 25} The standard order of parenting time indicates that the weekly-evening and alternating-weekend parenting-time schedule applies during the school year. A different schedule applies during the children’s summer vacation. During summer vacation, the “parties shall exercise summer parenting time in alternating one-week increments beginning the first Friday after the last day of school,” with each period beginning “on Friday at 6:00 p.m. and until the following Friday at 6:00 p.m.” This alternating-week schedule ends once the children return to school. Depending on whether it is an even- or odd-numbered year, the non-residential parent also gets overnight parenting time during the children’s Christmas Break or spring break. 11  {¶ 26} The evidence established that the parties’ children have attended Enon Montessori School since February 2025. We take judicial notice of the school’s online calendar, 4 which indicates that its 2026 summer break is 11 weeks long (from Friday, May 22, 2026, until Monday, August 10, 2026), and that its 2027 summer break begins on Friday, May 21, 2027.5 Therefore, with the alternating-week schedule of parenting time in the summer, Steven would get at least five weeks’ worth of overnights with the children during their summer vacation. This amounts to 35 overnights. {¶ 27} During the 41 weeks of the school year,6 the regular, alternating-weekend schedule applies except during the children’s Christmas and spring breaks. Other than the weeks of those breaks, Steven gets the children for three nights every other week for approximately 19 weeks, which amounts to 57 overnights. Totaling the 57 overnights during the school year, the 35 overnights during the summer, and any additional overnights during Christmas and/or spring break, it is clear that the trial court’s parenting-time order provides Steven with over 90 overnights a year. Therefore, Steven is entitled to the mandatory 10% downward deviation under R.C. 3119.051. 4 . Pursuant to Evid.R. 201(B), courts may take judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute. State ex rel. Ohio Republican Party v. FitzGerald, 2015-Ohio-5056, ¶ 18; State v. Bevers, 2018-Ohio-4135, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.); McArthur v. Brabrand, 610 F. Supp. 3d 822, 831, fn. 2 (E.D.Va. 2022) (taking judicial notice of public school district’s standard school year calendar for the purpose of determining what dates were teacher workdays as opposed to school days); H.C. v. School Board of Palm Beach Cty., 2022 WL 22983592, *2, fn. 2 (S.D.Fla. Nov. 10, 2022) (taking judicial notice of an official school calendar to determine the beginning and end dates of the 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 school years); Stephens v. Gateway School Dist., 2025 WL 3130856, *3, fn. 6 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 15, 2025) (taking judicial notice of school district’s public academic calendar for the 2024-2025 school year to determine dates of closure for the Thanksgiving holiday). 5. Enon Montessori, School Calendar, https://www.enonmontessori.org/school-calendar-1- page (accessed July 28, 2026) [https://perma.cc/3JPX-PTMC]. 6 . Subtracting the children’s 11-week summer vacation from the length of a year, we calculate that the school year is 41 weeks long. 12  {¶ 28} “According to the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services Child Support Guideline Manual, Revised March of 2019, the R.C. 3119.051 deviation is provided for on Line 19 of the Ohio Child Support Worksheets while the R.C. 3119.231 deviation is provided for on Line 25(b).” Mangen, 2021-Ohio-3693 at ¶ 27 (2d Dist.). Line 19 of the Child Support Worksheet in this case shows that the trial court did not apply a 10% downward deviation to Steven’s child support obligation. Because the mandatory downward deviation of R.C. 3119.051 applies to Steven, we find that the trial court erred when it did not apply the statute in calculating his child support obligation. {¶ 29} Additionally, because Steven was granted over 90 overnights of parenting time, according to R.C. 3119.231, the trial court should have also considered whether an additional deviation was appropriate due to “extended parenting time or extraordinary costs associated with parenting time, including extraordinary travel expenses when exchanging the child or children for parenting time.” R.C. 3119.231(C). On remand, the trial court must make that consideration. The trial court, however, is not required to specify the facts that are the basis for the court’s decision on that matter because there is no dispute that Steven was not awarded 147 or more overnights. {¶ 30} Steven’s first assignment of error is sustained. Second Assignment of Error {¶ 31} Under his second assignment of error, Steven challenges the trial court’s child custody order designating Heather as the primary residential parent and legal custodian of the children. Steven claims that, in light of the evidence presented at the divorce hearing, the trial court should have instead imposed a shared parenting plan that provided him with equal parenting time. 13  Standard of Review {¶ 32} “When a judge makes a decision regarding the custody of children and when the decision is supported by a substantial amount of competent and credible evidence, the decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Winfield v. Winfield, 2003-Ohio- 6771, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.). Therefore, “‘[t]he issue of parenting time is a matter entrusted to the discretion of the trial court.’” Tellis v. Tellis, 2021-Ohio-1976, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.), quoting Szeliga v. Szeliga, 2012-Ohio-1973, ¶ 12 (2d Dist.). “‘[A]bsent an abuse of that discretion, we will not reverse a trial court’s decision on parenting time.’” Id., quoting Szeliga at ¶ 12. {¶ 33} “‘A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.’” (Citation omitted.) Amesse v. Wright State Physicians, Inc., 2018-Ohio-416, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Williams, 2016-Ohio-322, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). “The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be afforded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” Tellis at ¶ 11, citing Beismann v. Beismann, 2008-Ohio-984, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). “The knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record.” Id., citing Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). Therefore, “[a]buse of discretion will not be found where the reviewing court simply could maintain a different opinion were it deciding the issue de novo.” (Emphasis deleted.) Williams v. Nored, 2005-Ohio-605, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.), citing AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). R.C. 3109.04 {¶ 34} “R.C. 3109.04 establishes the process for allocating parental rights and responsibilities between the parents of a minor child.” Bruns v. Green, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 8. 14 “Under its provisions, the court must allocate the parental rights and responsibilities for children of divorcing parties.” Snyder v. Snyder, 2002-Ohio-2781, ¶ 53, citing R.C.3109.04(A). “The statute allows the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to designate one parent as the residential parent and legal custodian of the child and divide other rights accordingly, or to allocate rights to both parents under a shared parenting plan.” Id. {¶ 35} “When making the allocation of the parental rights and responsibilities for the care of the children . . . , the court shall take into account that which would be in the best interest of the children.” R.C. 3109.04(B)(1). R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) instructs the trial court to consider all relevant factors and certain listed factors when making the best-interest determination. Some of the listed factors “include such things as the parents’ wishes; the child’s wishes, if the court has interviewed the child; the child’s interaction with parents, siblings, and others who may significantly affect the child’s best interests; adjustment of the child to home, school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all involved persons.” In re D.S., 2014-Ohio-2444, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), citing R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). {¶ 36} In addition, R.C. 3901.04(F)(2) provides factors the court should consider when determining whether shared parenting is in the best interest of the children. Those factors are: (a) The ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly, with respect to the children; (b) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, affection, and contact between the child and the other parent; (c) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other domestic violence, or parental kidnapping by either parent; 15  (d) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other, as the proximity relates to the practical considerations of shared parenting; (e) The recommendation of the guardian ad litem of the child, if the child has a guardian ad litem. R.C. 3109.04(F)(2). {¶ 37} “This list is nonexclusive as the trial court is not limited to the statutory factors. . . .Though there should be some indication in the judgment entry that the trial court considered the best interests of the child pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(F), there is no requirement it make specific findings in its entry as to each and every factor.” (Citation omitted.) Molzon v. Molzon, 2022-Ohio-1634, ¶ 70 (11th Dist.). Accordingly, “[t]he trial court is not required to discuss the factors in R.C. 3109.04 individually when making its best- interest determination.” Jensen v. Jensen, 2019-Ohio-4703, ¶ 29 (2nd Dist.). {¶ 38} “‘While no factor in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) is dispositive, effective communication and cooperation between the parties is paramount in successful shared parenting.’” Earley v. Earley, 2012-Ohio-4772, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.), quoting Seng v. Seng, 2008-Ohio-6758, ¶ 21 (12th Dist.). “Ohio courts . . . have held that shared parenting is not appropriate where the parents cannot communicate, cooperate and make joint decisions.” Milner v. Milner, 1999 WL 1139965, *4 (10th Dist. Dec. 14, 1999) (citing cases). This court has recognized that lack of communication between parents hinders the effective functioning of shared parenting. Rengan v. Rengan, 2001 WL 726800, *2 (2d Dist. June 29, 2001). {¶ 39} Parenting style is another appropriate consideration when engaging in the best-interest analysis. See Smith v. Smith, 2018-Ohio-1531, ¶ 38 (2d Dist.) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the mother’s parenting style was in the child’s best interest); Brandt v. Brandt, 2012-Ohio-5932, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.) (affirming custody order where 16 the parties’ parenting styles were among the factors considered in the R.C. 3109.04 best- interest analysis). “Further, when a court considers the best interests of a child, the court should consider which parent is the child’s primary caregiver.” Francis v. Francis, 2003- Ohio-1940, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.); accord In re P.W., 2026-Ohio-1478, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). Analysis {¶ 40} In this case, the trial court conducted a thorough review of the parties’ testimony and indicated that it had considered the factors under R.C. 3109.04 before making its child custody decision. The trial court’s decision contains multiple findings that align with the best-interest analysis set forth in R.C. 3109.04. {¶ 41} The trial court found that Steven and Heather do not communicate effectively and cited several incidents supporting that finding. For example, the trial court noted that Steven had waited a day to advise Heather that their son had been taken to urgent care for a dental injury and then failed to advise Heather about the follow-up appointment for the injury. Steven also failed to consult with Heather before having the children vaccinated for COVID. The trial court also considered that Steven had complained about Heather putting their daughter in counseling without consulting him first and about Heather’s failure to provide him with updates on their son’s speech therapy. Although Steven claims that the parties could communicate effectively, Heather specifically testified that she had difficulty communicating with Steven and that their communication was limited to text messages and emails. Heather also testified that the court-ordered application for communication was helpful but that Steven did not use it. The trial court’s finding that the parties did not communicate effectively was supported by competent, credible evidence. {¶ 42} Aside from the trial court’s finding on the parties’ lack of effective communication, it found that Steven and Heather have different parenting philosophies and 17 practices. For example, Steven testified that he was against Heather signing the children up for various sports activities year-round. He expressed that he would instead like the children to have more down time and to be more active in nature-based activities through the local farm systems. Heather testified that she opposed Steven allowing the children to have excessive amounts of screen time on their electronic devices. Steven testified that he allowed the children to play video games for three hours on school days and sometimes even more if he overrode their time limits. Heather stated that she had access to the children’s Roblox video game application and that, on Saturdays with Steven, the application had recorded the children playing up to six to eight hours. Owing to this evidence, the trial court indicated concern with the excessive amount of screen time that the children had while they were in Steven’s care. {¶ 43} The evidence also established that Steven and Heather had differing views about health precautions, particularly those related to COVID. Steven testified that he had a high risk for respiratory problems and said that he tested the children for COVID every time he received them from Heather. He stated that he wore a mask inside his home until the children’s COVID tests came back negative. Steven also always required the children to wear masks in public and had them use nasal spray on a regular basis. Heather believed those practices were extreme, and Steven’s hypervigilance concerned her because it caused the children to fear being sick. Heather testified that the children got excited when they were allowed to go to places without wearing a mask and that it made them more confident and willing to interact with people. She added that the children disdained being tested for COVID all the time. {¶ 44} Steven and Heather also disagreed about whether Steven’s mother should be allowed to watch their children. Heather did not want Steven’s mother to watch the children 18 because she had witnessed his mother engage in verbal and emotional abuse toward them. Steven testified that he had spoken with his mother multiple times about what she says to the children, and he said that he was not concerned about abuse and had no issue with his mother watching them. {¶ 45} Considering this evidence, we find that the trial court’s determination that the parties have different parenting philosophies and practices was supported by competent, credible evidence. {¶ 46} Lastly, the trial court found that Heather was the primary caregiver for the parties’ children. The evidence established that since March or April 2024, the children had spent Tuesday through Saturday with Heather and Saturday through Tuesday with Steven. Steven testified that when the children became sick with COVID for the first time in his care, he “felt very overwhelmed” and that Heather came and picked the children up. Tr. 111. The evidence established that Heather signed the children up for their sports activities and was the primary person who took the children to those activities. The evidence also established that Heather signed the parties’ daughter up for counseling and took the child to her counseling sessions. Heather registered the parties’ son in speech therapy and took him to his speech therapy sessions. {¶ 47} Steven testified that he took the children to their piano and violin lessons and that he had taken the children to their annual wellness visits with their primary care physician for the past two years. Steven provided the children’s dental insurance and took them to their regular dental cleanings. Steven and Heather were equally involved in the children’s homeschooling, but Heather was primarily responsible for enrolling the children enrolled in their current school. 19  {¶ 48} When considering all the evidence, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that Heather was the primary caregiver. {¶ 49} Because the trial court indicated that it had considered the statutory factors under R.C. 3109.04, and because the trial court’s findings align with the best-interest analysis required under R.C. 3109.04 and support the conclusion that shared parenting was not in the children’s best interest, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in designating Heather as the primary residential parent and legal custodian and granting Steven parenting time on alternating weekends. {¶ 50} Steven’s second assignment of error is overruled. Third Assignment of Error {¶ 51} Under his third assignment of error, Steven challenges the trial court’s division of the parties’ equity in their real estate. His primary argument is that the trial court erred by finding that the parties’ downpayment on the Yorkshire property was made up of entirely marital funds. He claims that $30,000 of the Yorkshire downpayment can be traced to inheritance funds that he deposited in the parties’ joint savings account. Steven argues that his inheritance funds were his separate property and that the trial court erroneously concluded that the inheritance funds were transmuted into marital property when he deposited them into the parties’ joint savings account. Steven traces the trial court’s error back to its purportedly incorrect determination that marital funds were used for the downpayment for the Williamsburg property, which was purchased before the Yorkshire property. Steven effectively challenges the trial court’s division of the parties’ equity in both the Yorkshire and Williamsburg properties. In addition, Steven tangentially argues that the trial court made an erroneous factual finding regarding the $20,000 disbursem