Full Opinion

[Cite as Henry v. Henry, 2026-Ohio-4603.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY MORGAN HENRY : : C.A. No. 30748 Appellee : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 DR 0043 v. : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- CHARLES HENRY : Domestic Relations) : Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION ........... Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on November 20, 2026, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Costs to be paid as follows: 50% by the appellee and 50% by the appellant. Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately send a copy of the court’s ruling to each party and note that action on the docket. Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note the service on the appellate docket. For the court, CHRISTOPHER B. EPLEY, JUDGE TUCKER, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30748 JUSTIN C. NIDIFFER, Attorney for Appellant MORGAN HENRY, Appellee, Pro Se EPLEY, J. {¶ 1} Charles Henry appeals from a final judgment and decree of divorce issued by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. He challenges the trial court’s award of spousal support to his former wife, Morgan, the amount of income imputed to Morgan, the allocation of debts, and the court’s contempt ruling relating to Morgan’s retrieval of personal property from the marital home. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part. I. Facts and Procedural History {¶ 2} According to the evidence at the parties’ divorce trial, Charles and Morgan met in Anderson, Ohio, in 2013. Morgan had a high school education and was earning money doing relaxation massage. Morgan had few means. She did not have savings, investment, or retirement accounts and did not own a car. Her only assets were small furniture and personal belongings. Morgan had several medical issues, including bipolar disorder, anxiety, depression, and ADHD. She stated that she informed Charles about her mental health diagnoses before their first date. {¶ 3} Charles enlisted in the military when he was in high school and, at the time of the divorce hearing, was a major in the Kentucky National Guard. After college, he was employed as a software engineer. Charles’s assets included a Thrift Savings Plan account, retirement and bank accounts, and three vehicles. He was also part owner of a private business, Century Security Solutions, which was not profitable. 2 {¶ 4} After Morgan and Charles moved to Dayton in early 2015, the two lived in a home that Charles purchased. The couple discussed marriage, but Morgan knew that Charles was unwilling to marry without a prenuptial agreement. During the divorce proceeding, the parties disputed the extent to which Morgan had been aware of Charles’s assets prior to the marriage. {¶ 5} Charles and Morgan married on November 15, 2015, in Washington Township, Ohio. Two days before the wedding, they executed a prenuptial agreement. Stated generally, the agreement provided that each party would retain their own assets and be responsible for their own liabilities, and neither party would receive spousal support in the event of a divorce. {¶ 6} According to Morgan, the marriage began to break down in 2020. The parties ultimately separated on January 11, 2024, after a domestic violence incident. The couple had no children. Morgan remained in the home and sought a domestic violence civil protection order; the petition was later dismissed by agreement of the parties. {¶ 7} On January 23, 2024, Morgan filed a complaint for divorce, seeking an equitable division of all personal property, assets, household goods, bank accounts, retirement accounts, and vehicles. Charles filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce. In his counterclaim, he alleged that the parties had executed a prenuptial agreement providing for the division of assets and liabilities and addressing spousal support in the event of divorce. {¶ 8} On January 26, 2024, the trial court issued a temporary order, based on the parties’ financial disclosures, requiring Charles to pay Morgan temporary spousal support of $1,780 per month, commencing January 1, 2024. Morgan was required to notify Charles’s attorney immediately upon obtaining employment. Four days later, Charles requested a hearing on the temporary spousal support order. On May 8, 2024, Charles moved to enforce 3 the prenuptial agreement. Morgan responded with a motion to invalidate the agreement. {¶ 9} On July 12, 2024, the magistrate began a hearing on the validity of the prenuptial agreement. The hearing was not completed that day, and the matter was continued. When the magistrate later became unavailable, the matter was placed back on the trial judge’s docket. {¶ 10} Numerous additional motions were filed during the pendency of the divorce proceeding. In July 2024, the parties filed cross-motions for sole occupancy of the marital residence, which Charles had purchased before the marriage. Morgan also sought interim attorney fees and an increase in temporary spousal support based on Charles’s documented wages in 2023. In September 2024, the temporary spousal support was reduced to $1,500 by agreement of the parties, in recognition of Charles’s payment of taxes, insurance, and utilities at the residence. Charles continued to challenge the request that he pay interim attorney fees. {¶ 11} On December 19, 2024, Morgan filed a motion for contempt, asserting that Charles had failed to pay temporary spousal support for January and September through December 2024. She also sought attorney fees and costs associated with her motion. {¶ 12} The trial court conducted a hearing on the validity of prenuptial agreement on February 5, 2025. Three weeks later, it held that the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable, except for the section related to spousal support. {¶ 13} On May 23, 2025, the trial court granted Charles exclusive use of the marital residence. Morgan was ordered to vacate the home no later than June 6, 2025. On June 26, 2025, after Charles regained possession of the home, Charles filed a motion requesting that the court find that Morgan had committed financial misconduct by neglecting and damaging the residence. 4 {¶ 14} The trial on the divorce complaint and counterclaim began on July 1, 2025, and continued on August 15 and 27, 2025. At the conclusion of the July 1 hearing, the parties and the court discussed a request by Morgan for access to the marital home to retrieve personal property that had been left there. On July 3, 2025, the trial court ordered that Morgan be permitted to enter the residence for no more than two hours “for the sole purpose of retrieving her personal property” under the supervision of the Mediation Response Unit (MRU). Prior to entry, Morgan was required to provide Charles with a written list of the specific items to be retrieved. No marital property was to be removed from the home. {¶ 15} On August 14, 2025, Morgan moved to hold Charles in contempt for failing to comply with the trial court’s temporary support order and the July 3, 2025 order allowing her supervised entry in the home. As to her attempt to retrieve her personal property, she stated that Charles had placed furniture and items in heavy plastic bags on the lawn, which frustrated her ability to recover her personal property, that both personal and marital property had been placed on the lawn, and that the volume was greater than what she could transport with her vehicle. Charles responded that he had gathered the items as a courtesy, given the limited time that Morgan could access the home. {¶ 16} On October 29, 2025, the trial court issued a lengthy decision addressing Morgan’s request for reconsideration of the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement, the division of personal property/household items, spousal support, Charles’s claim of financial misconduct, and Morgan’s motions for contempt of court. {¶ 17} The trial court issued its final judgment and decree of divorce on December 23, 2025. The court’s judgment reaffirmed that the prenuptial agreement was valid, except for the three-paragraph section addressing support, and it specified the ownership of the parties’ bank accounts and of Charles’s real property, vehicles, business interests, pension, 5 and investment accounts. The trial court set forth a procedure for the parties to resolve possession of specific items of personal property and for Morgan to retrieve those items from Charles’s home. {¶ 18} Additionally, the trial court ordered Charles to pay $2,022 per month in spousal support for 30 months, beginning July 1, 2025. The court retained jurisdiction over the spousal support arrearage created by the order and over the amount and duration of spousal support. The court indicated that it had determined spousal support based on income for Charles of $183,000 and imputed income for Morgan of $20,800. The judgment required that Charles be responsible for any outstanding medical or mental health debt incurred by Morgan on or before July 12, 2024 (a total of $571.42) and for any outstanding balance on the Star credit card that had been incurred by Morgan before July 12, 2024. The court also required Charles to pay six months’ worth of payments in the amount of $2,616 toward Morgan’s student loan debt within six months. Morgan was required to pay Charles $11,356.22 toward the restoration of the marital residence, but that amount was offset by $8,824 in spousal support arrearage that Charles owed Morgan. Charles was ordered to pay all court costs associated with the divorce proceeding. {¶ 19} The divorce decree also resolved two contempt motions and found Charles in contempt for failing to pay temporary spousal support in 2024 and violating the July 3, 2025 order. As to failure to pay temporary spousal support, the court sentenced Charles to an indefinite period of incarceration not to exceed 30 days, plus a fine of $250. Charles could purge the contempt by paying $1,500 to Morgan and attorney fees of $1,655 by December 5, 2025 [sic]. As to the violation regarding the court’s July 3, 2025 order, the court imposed an indefinite period of incarceration not to exceed 60 days and a $500 fine. Charles could 6 purge this contempt by paying $2,500 to Morgan and attorney fees of $1,215 by January 5, 2026. {¶ 20} Charles appeals from the trial court’s judgment and decree of divorce, raising six assignments of error. We will address them in a manner that facilitates our analysis. Morgan has not filed a responsive brief. II. Spousal Support {¶ 21} Charles’s first, second, and third assignments of error challenge the requirement that he pay Morgan spousal support. His first assignment of error claims that the trial court erred when it refused to enforce the support waiver in the prenuptial agreement. In his second assignment of error, Charles argues that the trial court erred in imputing only part-time income to Morgan. His third assignment of error asserts that the amount of spousal support was excessive and not supported by the record. We find the first assignment of error to be dispositive. {¶ 22} We begin with whether the trial court properly imposed a spousal support obligation, given the terms of the prenuptial agreement. Three paragraphs of the prenuptial agreement addressed the issue of spousal support: 13. The Parties agree that the investment of time or labor with respect to personal service in the property of the other, or otherwise, will be deemed to have been made gratuitously, and without expectation or right of compensation unless agreed to the contrary in writing. 14. It is the intention of the Parties to forever release each other from any alimony or support obligations now and in the future no matter how their circumstances may change. They will not apply now or in the future under any Federal or State legislation for support. They each waive any rights they may 7 have to proceed against the other under any law or statute for payments of alimony or support and rely upon the law of contract to govern in respect of this issue. 15. The Parties realize that their respective financial circumstances may be altered in the future by changes in their health, the cost of living, their employment, their marital status, the breakdown of their relationship, or otherwise. No such changes will give either Party the right to seek support under any legislation, Federal or State. It is understood by each Party that this Agreement represents a final disposition of all maintenance and support issues between them. {¶ 23} “It is well settled in Ohio that public policy allows the enforcement of prenuptial agreements.” Fletcher v. Fletcher, 68 Ohio St.3d 464, 466 (1994), citing Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d 99 (1984). “Such agreements are valid and enforceable (1) if they have been entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching; (2) if there was full disclosure, or full knowledge and understanding of the nature, value and extent of the prospective spouse’s property; and (3) if the terms do not promote or encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.” Gross at paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 24} When spousal support has been requested during divorce proceedings, contrary to the terms of a prenuptial agreement, the prenuptial agreement’s provisions regarding support “must meet the additional test of conscionability at the time of the divorce.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus. The Gross court reasoned that “the underlying state interest in the welfare of the divorced spouse, when measured against the rights of the parties to freely contract, weighs in favor of the court’s jurisdiction to review, at the time of a subsequent divorce, the terms in an antenuptial agreement providing sustenance alimony 8 for one of the parties.” Id. at 109. {¶ 25} A spousal support provision may become invalid “by reason of changed circumstances which render the provisions unconscionable as to one or the other at the time of the divorce of the parties.” Id. at 109. Examples of changed circumstances include “an extreme health problem requiring considerable care and expense; change in employability of the spouse; additional burdens placed upon a spouse by way of responsibility to children of the parties; marked changes in the cost of providing the necessary maintenance of the spouse; and changed circumstance of the standards of living occasioned by the marriage, where a return to the prior living standard would work a hardship upon a spouse.” Id. at 109, fn. 11. “Put simply, the conscionability analysis considers whether a couple’s circumstances have changed during the marriage to such a degree that the spouse seeking spousal support should be relieved of the agreement he or she made regarding spousal support.” Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 2014-Ohio-3652, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). {¶ 26} In determining whether it would be unconscionable to enforce the agreement’s provisions regarding spousal support, the trial must consider the same factors that govern the allowance of spousal support in R.C. 3105.18. Gross at 109-110. Those factors include (1) the parties’ income, (2) their relative earning abilities, (3) their ages and physical, mental, and emotional conditions, (4) their retirement benefits, (5) the duration of the marriage, (6) the extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party to seek employment outside the home due to being the custodian of a minor child, (7) the standard of living established during the marriage, (8) the relevant extent of education of the parties, (9) the parties’ relative assets and liabilities, (10) the contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of the other, (11) the time and expense for the spouse seeking support to acquire education, training, or job experience, (12) the tax consequences of a spousal support 9 award, (13) lost income production capacity of either party resulting from marital responsibilities, and (14) any other relevant factor. R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(n). The burden is on the party seeking support to establish unconscionability. Gross at 109. {¶ 27} Whether the spousal support provision in a prenuptial agreement is unconscionable is an issue of law which a court reviews de novo. Heimann v. Heimann, 2022-Ohio-241, ¶ 53 (3d Dist.); Saari v. Saari, 2009-Ohio-4940, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.), citing Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 2008-Ohio-938, ¶ 36 (applying de novo review to the determination of whether an arbitration provision was unconscionable and thus unenforceable). However, the trial court’s factual findings supporting its determination that a contractual provision “is or is not unconscionable should be reviewed with great deference.” Benfield at ¶ 37. {¶ 28} In its decision regarding the enforceability of the prenuptial agreement, the trial court concluded that the spousal support provision was invalid. The court emphasized that Morgan had regularly assisted in the maintenance of the couple’s home as well as Charles’s business and personal affairs. It further noted that Morgan had not agreed to the relinquishment of her entitlement to support in a pre-marital email regarding the prenuptial agreement’s potential terms. The trial court indicated that it was “not willing to remove the obligation of support, and have [Morgan] be on state assistance, even if the support provided is only short-term[,]” and that it would be unconscionable for her not to be compensated for the time that her efforts in support of Charles “took her away from her own business opportunities.” Decision (Feb. 26, 2025) at 12-13. {¶ 29} In its October 27, 2025 decision, the trial court again found that the prenuptial agreement’s spousal support provision was unenforceable. The court made extensive findings about Morgan’s work history and earning capacity, Morgan’s mental health and 10 medical diagnoses and Charles’s awareness of them, Morgan’s assistance to Charles during the marriage, and Charles’s income history. Decision (Oct. 29, 2025) at 11-17. It concluded: From the evidence and testimony provided, there is no question that Charles was the breadwinner, sustaining the household financially throughout the marriage. Even though Morgan may have been somewhat ignorant as to the earnings, she had helped in the past in preparing tax forms and understood her income was nowhere near his. She never had reportable income levels, has lifelong mental health and physical ailments, preventing her from working full-time, and even started and stopped pursuing her education multiple times during the marriage. Additionally, Charles knew that Morgan’s income – even if mostly cash – never totaled enough to establish a taxable income level or create an evidenced social security report. Decision (Oct. 29, 2025) at 16-17. The court thus found that, “when looking at the education, work history, mental/ physical ability of each of the parties, as well as the contribution that Morgan gave to Charles at the home and towards his businesses, she is not only entitled to an award of support, [it] is unconscionable for her to not have some support ordered.” Id. at 18. {¶ 30} On appeal, Charles argues that the trial court interpreted unconscionability too broadly and turned unconscionability “from a limited contractual safeguard into a general power to rebalance the parties’ finances whenever the trial court dislikes the economic result.” Charles emphasizes that the trial court was required to look at changed circumstances, not just circumstances, at the time of divorce. We similarly conclude that the trial court employed the wrong standard. 11 {¶ 31} In ruling on whether the spousal support provision of the parties’ prenuptial agreement was enforceable, the trial court did not consider whether the provision had lost its validity due to changed circumstances. Moreover, even accepting the trial court’s factual findings, the record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the parties’ agreement regarding spousal support was unconscionable. {¶ 32} First, Morgan’s education, income, and earning capacity were either unchanged or better at the time of divorce than when the marriage began. In 2011, Morgan had reportable income that required her to pay taxes. When Morgan met Charles in 2013, she was working for herself doing relaxation massage. Morgan’s counsel stressed, however, that in her entire work history, Morgan had only earned $7,456.00 at her highest point and did not have a Social Security “report.” Morgan moved to Dayton with Charles in February 2015, resulting in a loss of clientele. Giving deference to the trial court’s findings, Morgan had minimal income when the parties married in November 2015. At no time during the parties’ marriage did Morgan have reportable income that required her to pay taxes. {¶ 33} During the marriage, Morgan attended school for massage therapy on three or four occasions. She completed her schooling and obtained her certification in the spring of 2024, within months of filing her complaint for divorce. Morgan acknowledged that the certification “opens up the door to more money.” Since obtaining her certification, Morgan had held five jobs, which were discussed extensively at trial and in the trial court’s October 29, 2025 decision. A vocational expert testified that Morgan had a wage-earning capacity at the 10th percentile on a wage-earning scale and that she could earn approximately $30,760.00 in a full-time customer service position and up to $39,090.00 as a full-time massage therapist. However, the trial court believed that Morgan’s earning ability was limited to part-time work, and it found that she could earn $20,800 if she were working part-time, 12 significantly more than she had earned prior to the marriage. The trial court noted in its October 29, 2025 decision that “Morgan did attempt to work some since the divorce some [sic] but was unable to keep a job more than a few weeks.” Contrary to that finding, Morgan testified that she had gotten her first job before she graduated from massage school and that she worked there for six months. Tr. (July 1, 2025) at 116-117. {¶ 34} As for Morgan’s health, Morgan has had several mental health issues since childhood, including bipolar disorder, ADHD, and post-traumatic stress disorder. She testified that she had informed Charles that she “was bipolar and ADHD” before their first date. Morgan also has been diagnosed with anxiety, migraines, and TMJ, and she recently had been diagnosed with fibromyalgia. Morgan indicated that when she is experiencing a depressive episode, her PTSD intensifies. According to her testimony, she enters a debilitative state where she shuts down and ‘checks out’ or becomes difficult. The trial court found that Charles “was clearly aware of her several concerns, as he contributed to her counseling and covered the cost of treatment, even before they married.” Morgan testified that the trauma from the marriage had exacerbated her conditions, but she had been doing better since the parties separated. Tr. (Aug. 15, 2025) at 13. Although Morgan stated that her mental health impaired her ability to work, she testified that Charles “was aware of it [problems keeping consistent employment] before we even got married.” Tr. (July 1, 2025) at 67. {¶ 35} The parties presented no evidence of any material change to their standard of living during the marriage. Throughout the marriage, the parties resided in the house that Charles had purchased on January 28, 2015. See Pl.’s Ex. 18. According to Morgan, the house needed a lot of work when it was purchased: there were no flowers, paint was peeling, the garage door did not work, the porch was falling apart, the home needed a new roof, 13 plumbing was missing, the electrical was not up to code, there were no appliances, and the interior of the home had cracks, bullet holes, missing drywall, and unfinished floors. See also Pl.’s Ex. 75 (2016 quote for repairs). As part of her testimony on July 1, 2025, Morgan provided a list of the repairs she had performed, either by herself or with Charles, on the home. See Pl.’s Ex. 79. {¶ 36} In contrast, during the hearing on whether Morgan had significantly damaged the home between January 2024 (when the parties separated) and June 2025 (when Charles regained possession of it), Morgan presented evidence that few repairs and updates had been made during the marriage. The same contractor who had provided estimates for repair work in March 2016 testified that he was surprised by the lack of work that had been done to the house while the Henrys were living there. Tr. (Aug. 27, 2025) at 24. He noticed no major differences to many areas of the home. See id. at 15, 17, 18, 19, 23. Even accepting that several repairs have been made (such as upgrades to the electrical system, plumbing, yard, and windows, as well as the purchase of new appliances), the record does not reflect a significant change in the couple’s standard of living during the marriage. {¶ 37} The only significant change in circumstances was the increase in Charles’s income, which consisted mostly of the salaries from his employment and national guard service. When the parties married, Charles’s income was approximately $110,000 to $120,000. In October 2025, the trial court found that Charles’s income was $183,000. However, this increase alone was insufficient to find the spousal support provision unconscionable. See Menkhaus v. Menkhaus, 2022-Ohio-2369, ¶ 43 (1st Dist.). {¶ 38} The trial court emphasized the efforts Morgan had made to manage the household while Charles worked. Morgan’s efforts contributed to Charles’s purchase of vacant property adjacent to the home and, to some extent, his private business. However, 14 the record does not substantiate that Morgan’s marital responsibilities resulted in a significant loss in her earning capabilities or resulted in significant increases in Charles’s income. We further note that more than 18 months elapsed between Morgan’s licensure and the entry of the divorce decree. Morgan had a significant amount of time during the separation to gain employment experience as a licensed massage therapist. {¶ 39} “Whether enforcement is unfair is not the standard.” Id., citing Vanderbilt, 2013-Ohio-1222, at ¶ 40 (9th Dist.). While there is certainly a disparity between Charles’s assets and income and Morgan’s, the record does not demonstrate a change in circumstances that undermines the validity of the waiver of spousal support in the parties’ prenuptial agreement. The trial court erred in finding the spousal support provision unconscionable. {¶ 40} Charles’s first assignment of error is sustained. In light of that determination, his second and third assignments of error are overruled as moot. We emphasize that our conclusion has no effect on the trial court’s award of temporary spousal support to Morgan during the pendency of the divorce proceedings or on Charles’s duty to pay any temporary spousal support arrearage. III. Allocation of Debts {¶ 41} In his fourth assignment of error, Charles claims that the trial court erred in allocating debts to him, contrary to the terms of the prenuptial agreement. He argues that, in light of the prenuptial agreement, the trial court should have held that Morgan was solely responsible for her student loans and medical bills. We agree. {¶ 42} Debts, like assets, are considered property in a divorce proceeding. Montgomery v. Montgomery, 2019-Ohio-1803, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.). Consequently, orders assigning debt to one party or another are part of the property division. Id., citing Arnett v. 15 Arnett, 2004-Ohio-5274, ¶ 8 (2d Dist.); Kraft v. Kraft, 2014-Ohio-4852, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.) (“Since the court, pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(F)(2), must consider both the parties’ assets and liabilities, ‘an equitable division of marital property necessarily implicates an equitable division of marital debt.’”). {¶ 43} “‘Marital debt has been defined as any debt incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties or for a valid marital purpose.’” Paterchak v. Paterchak, 2013- Ohio-3043, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.), quoting Lucas v. Lucas, 2011-Ohio-6411, ¶ 33 (7th Dist.). Generally, “[w]hen a debt is incurred during marriage, the burden is on the spouse seeking to have the debt classified as separate debt to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt was the separate obligation of the other spouse.” Leary v. Leary, 2026-Ohio-1396, ¶ 107 (2d Dist.). {¶ 44} When considering provisions in a prenuptial agreement concerning the division or allocation of property, courts must apply the standards for the enforceability of the contract using the circumstances when the contract was executed, not at the time of the divorce. See Gross, 11 Ohio St.3d 99, at 109. “[I]f it is found that the parties have freely entered into an antenuptial agreement, fixing the property rights of each, a court should not substitute its judgment and amend the contract. A perfect or equal division of the marital property is not required to withstand scrutiny under this standard.” Id. The additional standard of review applicable to spousal support–unconscionability does not apply to property division. Id. {¶ 45} The trial court held that the prenuptial agreement was valid and enforceable – that the parties had entered into it freely. Morgan and Charles’s prenuptial agreement included provisions regarding the allocation of debts. It provided: 7. The Parties acknowledge that with respect to any determination of 16 responsibility of debts that may occur in the event of the Parties separating, or upon the death of a Party, all debts will be treated as separate debts owed solely by one Party (the “separate Debts”) unless there is proof of joint financial obligations. 8. Any Separate Debt owed by a Party will be and remain the debt of that Party and the other Party will have no financial obligations owing with respect to the debt. 9. All jointly acquired or jointly held debts or the debts listed in the attached Schedule “A”, however and whenever acquired, will remain the debts of and be owed by both Parties and will be treated as shared debts (the “Shared Debts”). 10. In the event of a separation or upon the death of a Party, all Shared Debt will be deemed to be owed equally and each Party will be financially responsible for 50% of any jointly acquired or jointly held debt, regardless of the initial or ongoing proportion of each Party’s borrowed amount, unless the Partes have agreed otherwise in writing. Prenuptial Agreement, p. 4. {¶ 46} Under the plain terms of the prenuptial agreement, Morgan and Charles would be responsible for their separate debts if the parties separated, and debts were presumed to be separate debts unless demonstrated otherwise. Having concluded that the prenuptial agreement was enforceable, the trial court initially found that “debts titled in a party’s name is that party’s separate . . . liability.” Decision (Oct. 29, 2025) at 5. The trial court nevertheless concluded that Charles was responsible for portions of Morgan’s student loan debt and medical bills. 17 {¶ 47} The court made extensive findings regarding Morgan’s student loans. Although the trial court recognized that student loans are typically the responsibility of the student, the court found that Morgan understood that Charles would pay for her loans, that Charles had told Morgan that she would need to find employment if she wanted a larger house, and that he knew that she could not offer medical massage without certification. The court further found that Charles had supported Morgan as she worked toward certification and establishing her business, even though she had stopped and started the process multiple times. The court emphasized that Charles had included Morgan’s student loans, a monthly debt of $436, on his affidavit of financial disclosure. See Def.’s Ex. X. Morgan asserted that Charles had stopped paying on the loans, but Charles countered that the loans were in forbearance. See Pl.’s Ex. 33. The court found that this status did not remove the obligation, just delayed it, and that it was Charles who was aware of the loan status when Morgan was not. Charles had threatened to stop paying the student loans during an argument with Morgan. {¶ 48} The trial court further discussed the parties’ allocation of responsibilities during the marriage, stating that the parties had “negotiated things in their marital relationship.” The court highlighted that when Morgan was not working or in school, she ran the matters at home and/or assisted with Charles’s business and performed work on the home. Charles, in turn, paid for the home and provided for their needs, including Morgan’s education. {¶ 49} The trial court thus concluded that both Morgan and Charles had treated Morgan’s loans as his debt while the couple was married. Despite the terms of the prenuptial agreement, it held that, “[w]hether his intent was for her to pay for another home or support herself after a divorce, he shall remain responsible for the amount prior to the July 12, 2024, hearing on the Prenuptial Agreement. The Court finds it equitable that Charles provide a 18 total of six (6) months’ worth of payments in the amount of $2,616.00 towards Morgan’s student loan debt. This would have been made had the loans not gone into administrative forbearance and could still have been paid. He shall pay this amount to Morgan within 6 months of the filing of the Final Decree. Morgan is responsible for any remaining amount owed in student loans.” Decision (Oct. 29, 2025) at 8. {¶ 50} As for Morgan’s medical debt, the court found that Charles had covered Morgan with his insurance and paid for her mental health treatment prior to marriage. It therefore ordered him to pay any outstanding mental health or medical debt incurred by Morgan on or before the July 12, 2024 hearing. {¶ 51} Although the trial court apparently believed that it was equitable for Charles to pay a portion of Morgan’s student loans and medical debt, the record does not support the conclusion that either the student loans or medical debt were jointly acquired or jointly held debts within the meaning of the parties’ prenuptial agreement. Morgan acknowledged that she was responsible for her student loans. Tr. (July 1, 2025) at 63. The fact that Charles had voluntarily paid the loans prior to their separation did not negate the fact that the loans were legally her obligation alone. {¶ 52} The same is true of Morgan’s medical debt. Morgan stated that she had been diagnosed with various mental health disorders in her childhood and teenage years and later developed migraines. She indicated that she had incurred medical expenses for therapy “during my marriage and before and after.” Id. at 53-55, 150. Charles’s mere payment of Morgan’s medical bills prior to and during the marriage did not convert the obligation to a jointly-owed debt. {¶ 53} The parties separated on January 11, 2024. Under the terms of the prenuptial agreement, the parties were responsible for their separate debt after that date. While it may 19 have been equitable for Charles to pay a portion of Morgan’s student loans and medical bills, the trial court was not permitted to substitute its judgment and disregard the terms agreed upon by the parties in their prenuptial agreement. The court thus erred in ordering Charles to pay $2,616 toward Morgan’s student loan debt, as well as any outstanding medical health or medical debt incurred by Morgan. {¶ 54} Charles’s fourth assignment of error is sustained. IV. Contempt {¶ 55} Charles’s fifth and sixth assignments of error challenge the court’s finding of civil contempt related to Morgan’s retrieval of personal property pursuant to the court’s July 3, 2025 order. He argues that his conduct did not constitute contempt and that the court’s penalty was excessive. {¶ 56} A person who is guilty of “[d]isobedience of, or resistance to, a lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a court or officer” may be punished for contempt. R.C. 2705.02(A); see Windham Bank v. Tomaszczyk, 27 Ohio St.2d 55 (1971), syllabus (defining contempt of court as disobedience of a court order). The essential element of a contempt proceeding is that the individual facing the contempt charge has obstructed the administration of justice in some way. Martin v. Martin, 2008-Ohio-6336, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). {¶ 57} Whether a contempt proceeding is civil or criminal depends largely on the character and purpose of the sanction. State v. Dean, 2007-Ohio-1031, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). “[C]ivil contempts are characterized as violations against the party for whose benefit the order was made, whereas crimin