Morgan v. Jones

[Cite as Morgan v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-2432.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO VICTORIA MORGAN, : APPEAL NO. C-250217 TRIAL NO. DR-1801556 Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : JUDGMENT ENTRY MARK G. JONES, : Defendant-Appellant. : : PRODIGY PROPERTIES, LLC, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : MARK G. JONES, : Trustee of the Mark G. Jones Revocable Trust dated July 30, 1998, : Defendant-Appellant, : and : VICTORIA MORGAN, : Trustee of the Victoria Morgan Revocable Trust dated April 20, 1999, as : amended September 10, 2002, : Defendant-Appellee. : This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs. Also before the court are Victoria Morgan’s December 19, 2025 “Motion Pursuant to Loc.R. 23 to Declare Mark G. Jones a Vexatious Litigator,” and the portion of her September 15,  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 2025 “Motion to Strike Appellant’s Brief and for Sanctions” that the court deferred in its order of October 10, 2025. For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and vacated in part. The court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal, allows no penalty, and orders that all costs be taxed to appellant Mark G. Jones. And the court orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial court for execution under App.R. 27. Further, for the reasons set forth in the same Opinion filed this date, the court denies the outstanding portion of appellee Victoria Morgan’s September 15, 2025 motion requesting sanctions against appellant Mark G. Jones, along with her December 19, 2025 motion to find appellant Mark G. Jones to be a vexatious litigator under Loc.R. 23(B). To the clerk: Enter upon the journal of the court on 6/26/2026 per order of the court. By:_______________________ Administrative Judge [Cite as Morgan v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-2432.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO VICTORIA MORGAN, : APPEAL NO. C-250217 TRIAL NO. DR-1801556 Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : OPINION MARK G. JONES, : Defendant-Appellant. : : PRODIGY PROPERTIES, LLC, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : vs. : MARK G. JONES, : Trustee of the Mark G. Jones Revocable Trust dated July 30, 1998, : Defendant-Appellant, : and : VICTORIA MORGAN, : Trustee of the Victoria Morgan Revocable Trust dated April 20, 1999, as : amended September 10, 2002, : Defendant-Appellee. : Civil Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed in Part and Vacated in Part; Motion for Sanctions Denied; Motion to Declare Appellant a Vexatious Litigator Denied  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 26, 2026 Law Office of M. Erin Wilkins, LLC, M. Erin Wilkins and Emily C. Robbins, for Plaintiff-Appellee Victoria Morgan, Mark G. Jones, pro se. [Cite as Morgan v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-2432.] CROUSE, Judge. {¶1} Appellee Victoria Morgan divorced appellant Mark G. Jones seven years ago. They have been embroiled in proceedings to divide up their marital assets, including the home they once shared, ever since. This appeal arises from the final chapters of that tale, in which the domestic-relations court finally discharged the receiver it had appointed to sell the house. {¶2} Jones now argues that the domestic-relations court’s order discharging the receiver was invalid, both because it contained unlawful terms and because Jones received insufficient notice and opportunity to be heard prior to the order’s entry. He also argues that the domestic-relations court should have granted his motion for a new trial on the receiver’s discharge. For her part, Morgan asks that we sanction Jones for citing a pair of fictitious cases in his brief, and that we declare him a vexatious litigator for filing numerous meritless appeals from their divorce proceedings. {¶3} For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the domestic-relations court’s order discharging the receiver, and we vacate as void its order denying Jones’s motion for a new trial. And while we acknowledge Morgan’s concerns about Jones’s conduct, we deny her motions for sanctions and to declare Jones a vexatious litigator. I. BACKGROUND A. Prior Proceedings {¶4} Morgan and Jones were once married and owned, as tenants in common, a residence in Mount Adams (“the house”). In 2018, Morgan filed for divorce. In 2019, the domestic-relations court entered a decree of divorce, which instructed the parties to place the house for sale, but allowed either party to exercise a right of first refusal to purchase the house pursuant to terms in their antenuptial agreement. Jones appealed, but we affirmed the decree. See Morgan v. Jones, 2020  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Ohio App. LEXIS 3200 (1st Dist. Sept. 2, 2020) (“Jones I”). {¶5} Getting the house up for sale proved difficult. The domestic-relations court found that Jones was “unwilling or unable to cooperate in the sale” of the property, and so placed the house in receivership and appointed Valerie Zummo as receiver with authority to sell it. Again Jones appealed, and again we affirmed in Morgan v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-1831 (1st Dist.) (“Jones II”). {¶6} Zummo hired Prodigy Properties, LLC, (“Prodigy”) to help sell the house. Eventually, Zummo withdrew as receiver, and the domestic-relations court substituted Prodigy, “by and through its Managing Director, Jeff Lane,” in her place. {¶7} When Jones did not remove certain encumbrances on the house, the receiver filed a “Complaint to Sell Real Estate” in the general division of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, in the case numbered A-2301388. That action was then consolidated with the divorce action in the domestic-relations division, numbered DR-1801556. The domestic-relations court entered an order authorizing the receiver to sell the property, free and clear of certain interests and encumbrances. The sale-authorization order also provided that “[a]ny personal property not removed from the Property at the time of the Closing shall be deemed abandoned.” {¶8} Jones appealed from the sale-authorization,1 attacking the domestic- relations court’s order substituting Prodigy as receiver, alleging that Jones had not received notice of the hearing on the sale order, and contending that the domestic- relations court had failed to enforce his antenuptial agreement. We rejected his arguments and affirmed both the sale-authorization and receiver-substitution orders. 1 Jones actually filed two appeals from this order. One of these, which Jones filed as trustee on behalf of the Mark G. Jones Revocable Trust Dated July 30, 1998, was dismissed on the ground that Jones was not a licensed and registered attorney permitted to represent the trust in court. See Entry of Dismissal, Morgan v. Jones, No. C-240067 (1st Dist. Feb. 21, 2024) (“Jones VI”). 6  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Morgan v. Jones, 2024 Ohio App. LEXIS 3994, *2-5 (1st Dist. Nov. 6, 2024) (“Jones VII”). {¶9} Throughout this time, the receiver was attempting to sell the house. The receiver found a buyer but could not obtain title insurance while Jones’s appeal of the sale-authorization order remained pending. But on November 15, 2024, nine days after this court affirmed the sale-authorization order in Jones VII, the receiver and buyers closed on the house. {¶10} Morgan filed a copy of the receiver’s final report in the domestic- relations court on November 27. Appended to the report was a copy of the closing statement and settlement sheet, which indicated the contract sale price for the house was $850,000. However, the proceeds were reduced by $843,290.89 to pay off a mortgage on the property held by Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, and by $20,476.49 to pay county property taxes that had accrued during 2024. In addition, Prodigy received a $34,000 commission and $5,623.79 in reimbursement for expenses. “Sibcy Cline Realtors (Hyde Park)” received a $17,000 commission. When added to the $6,287.75 in ordinary closing expenses (e.g., title insurance and recording fees), the expenses and obligations totaled $926,678.92—far more than the $850,000 sale price. To cover the difference, the settlement sheet indicates that the seller paid $73,006.67 cash at closing, and the buyers paid the remaining $3,672.25. {¶11} In its final report, the receiver indicated that, following the closing, the “receivership estate no longer contain[ed] any assets,” “was insolvent,” and “had no funds derived from income from the Property.” {¶12} Nothing further happened for several weeks. On December 16, Morgan filed a motion to discharge the receiver, which she acknowledges was never properly served on Jones. The domestic-relations court granted Morgan’s motion and 7  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS discharged the receiver in an entry two days later, on December 18, 2024 (the “discharge order”). {¶13} On January 15, 2025, Jones, through counsel, filed a “Motion for New Trial on 12/18/2024 Order Discharging Receiver.” Several weeks after that, Jones’s counsel sought leave to withdraw and asked that the domestic-relations court set a hearing on Jones’s new-trial motion (and a pending contempt charge2) “on or after 3/17/2025,” so that Jones would have time to prepare. The domestic-relations court granted the motion to withdraw and scheduled the hearing for March 17. In a later reply, Jones sought to withdraw his request for a hearing, but the domestic-relations court denied this request and stated that it would hold a hearing on March 19, 2025. Jones sought to continue the contempt portion of the hearing, but, when Morgan withdrew the contempt charge, the domestic-relations court denied his request for a continuance. Jones asked to appear remotely for what was now a hearing on the new- trial motion alone, but the domestic-relations court denied this request as well. {¶14} March 19 came, and Jones failed to appear at his hearing. Two days later, on March 21, the domestic-relations court entered an order dismissing Jones’s new-trial motion (the “new-trial order”). The court stated that it was dismissing Jones’s motion based on his failure to appear, but said that, even if the motion had “not [been] dismissed for his lack of appearance,” the court “would [have] den[ied] it on the merits.” 2 This contempt charge related to an incident in October 2024, in which neighbors observed Jones, a locksmith, a plumber, and his dog, attempting to enter the house without the receiver’s permission. The neighbors called the police, who took Jones into custody pursuant to an order attaching Jones’s body for a prior contempt of the domestic-relations court. On October 21, 2024, Morgan filed a new contempt charge based on Jones’s attempted entry into the house, which was to be heard on March 17, 2025. 8  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS B. This Appeal {¶15} Jones filed a notice of appeal on April 11, 2025, seeking to challenge both the December 18 discharge order and the March 21 new-trial order. {¶16} On September 15, 2025, Morgan filed a motion asking this court to strike Jones’s principal brief and impose sanctions. In it, Morgan identified two citations to “phantom cases,” which she suggested were a byproduct of hallucinatory artificial-intelligence software. On October 10, a motions panel of this court denied Morgan’s motion to strike Jones’s brief, explaining that the accuracy of his citations went to the merits of his arguments and was “not cause to strike the brief.” However, the motions panel did not resolve the request for sanctions, electing to defer the issue to this panel. {¶17} On December 19, 2025, after briefing was complete, Morgan filed a motion for this court to declare Jones a vexatious litigator pursuant to Loc.R. 23(B). Morgan argued that Jones’s repeated appeals from the divorce proceedings have been frivolous and/or filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. Jones filed a memorandum in opposition to that request. {¶18} Thus, this court now has before it (1) the merits of Jones’s appeal from the discharge and new-trial orders, (2) the outstanding portion of Morgan’s September 15 motion seeking sanctions, and (3) Morgan’s December 19 motion for this court to declare Jones a vexatious litigator. II. JONES’S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶19} We begin with Jones’s appeal. He raises two assignments of error: the first challenging the March 21, 2025 new-trial order, and the second challenging the December 18, 2024 discharge order underlying it. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the former as void and affirm the latter. 9  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS A. New-Trial Order {¶20} Like Jones, we will work backwards, beginning with the March 21 order denying Jones’s motion for a new trial. We lack the power to reach the merits of the new-trial order, however. Jones’s new-trial motion was a nullity from the beginning, and the order denying it therefore void ab initio. {¶21} A motion for a new trial under Civ.R. 59(B) “is a nullity unless it is filed after a trial has occurred.” See Fougere v. Estate of Fougere, 2017-Ohio-7905, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.); see also L.A. & D., Inc. v. Bd. of Lake Cty. Commrs., 67 Ohio St.2d 384, 387 (1981). Because Civ.R. 59 provides no definition of what constitutes a “trial,” we look to caselaw. In First Bank of Marietta v. Mascrete, Inc., 1997-Ohio-158, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, to determine whether a proceeding was a “trial” for purposes of Civ.R. 59, we should consider whether “the indicia of trial substantially predominate in the proceeding.” Id. at ¶ 25. Those indicia can include some or all of the following: (1) whether the proceeding was initiated by pleadings, (2) whether it took place in court, (3) whether it was held in the presence of a judge or magistrate, (4) whether the parties or their counsel were present, (5) whether evidence was introduced, (6) whether arguments were presented in court by counsel, (7) whether issues of fact were decided by the judge or magistrate, (8) whether the issues decided were central or ancillary to the primary dispute between the parties, (9) whether a judgment was rendered on the evidence. Id. at ¶ 26. {¶22} In general, Ohio courts have found a trial has taken place only in cases “where there has been an in-court hearing succeeded by a judgment ruling on the issues argued and evidence heard at the hearing.” Gallick v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of 10  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Revision, 2018-Ohio-818, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.), citing Fougere, 2017-Ohio-7905, at ¶ 15 (10th Dist.). Thus, in Wolf-Sabatino v. Sabatino, 2012-Ohio-6232, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.), the Tenth District held that a motion for a new trial was proper where a “hearing took place in court, in the presence of a judge, with the parties, their counsel, and their expert witnesses present,” and where, at that hearing, “parties’ counsel presented arguments to the court.” See also, e.g., Haase v. Haase, 64 Ohio App.3d 758, 760-762 (8th Dist. 1990). And in Mascrete itself, the Court held that an adversarial, in-person contempt hearing that led to a finding of contempt constituted a “trial” for purposes of Civ.R. 59(B). Mascrete at ¶ 27. {¶23} By contrast, courts have said that a Civ.R. 59 motion is improper where “no proceedings occurred [at which] the parties or counsel presented evidence and argument in court to a trial judge or magistrate.” Gallick at ¶ 21. Thus, they have held that a motion for new trial will not lie to challenge orders granting summary judgment, L.A. & D., 67 Ohio St.2d at 387; dismissing an action for failure to prosecute without a hearing, Fougere, 2017-Ohio-7905, at ¶ 7, 15 (10th Dist.); entering a default judgment following a “non-oral hearing,” Tipton v. Goodnight, 2006-Ohio-113, ¶ 9 (4th Dist.); or denying a motion to intervene, Earth Mobile, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 2023-Ohio- 3354, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), and Savage v. Cody-Zeigler, Inc., 2006-Ohio-2760, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.). {¶24} The determination of whether a proceeding constituted a “trial” is not a categorical one; it turns on the character of the proceedings that actually occurred. Even judgments or orders that might usually be entered following a “trial” cannot be challenged by a Civ.R. 59 motion if no trial in fact occurred. So the Tenth District held that a Civ.R. 59 motion would not lie to challenge the outcome of an administrative appeal where no hearings took place and “no proceedings occurred where the 11  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS parties or counsel presented evidence and argument in court to a trial judge or magistrate.” Galick at ¶ 21. And both the Eighth and Tenth Districts have held that Civ.R. 59 is unavailable to challenge a decree of divorce, if that decree was entered pursuant to a settlement agreement, rather than a trial. Shepherd v. Shepherd, 2018- Ohio-1037, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.); Diguilio v. Diguilio, 2003-Ohio-2197, ¶ 39-40 (8th Dist.). {¶25} In Jones’s case, the domestic-relations court held no hearing prior to discharging the receiver. No attorneys were present in court, and no evidence offered before a judge or magistrate. Indeed, the gravamen of Jones’s motion was that he never received a hearing. Because Civ.R. 59 focuses on whether a trial was actually held, and because nothing resembling a trial occurred prior to the discharge order, we hold that Jones’s January 15 motion for new trial was a legal nullity. {¶26} A litigant who never received a trial is not without a remedy. Appeal is available for errors appearing on the record, and Civ.R. 60(B) can accommodate certain challenges that require additional evidence. But Jones moved for a “new trial” where a first trial had never occurred. Because that motion was a nullity, so, too, was the domestic-relations court’s order denying it. We have no jurisdiction to review and reverse or affirm such an order. Instead, the appropriate remedy is to recognize that the order was void and vacate it. See State v. Johnson, 2019-Ohio-2024, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.) (court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review an order that was “a legal nullity,” but could vacate it as void ab initio). {¶27} Accordingly, we vacate the new-trial order, rendering Jones’s first assignment of error moot. B. Discharge Order {¶28} Jones’s second assignment of error challenges the December 18 order 12  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS discharging the receiver and terminating the receivership.3 {¶29} Receivers are officers of the court, appointed in equity to manage, preserve, and sometimes dispose of property in controversy during litigation. See 1 Clark, A Treatise on the Law and Practice of Receivers, § 11(a), at 13 (3d Ed. 1959) (hereinafter “Clark on Receivers”); Fontain v. Sandhu, 2021-Ohio-2750, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.). The decision whether to discharge a receiver is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See Fifth Third Bank v. Dayton Lodge, L.L.C., 2013-Ohio-5755, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.), citing Milo v. Curtis, 100 Ohio App.3d 1, 8 (9th Dist. 1994); Dyczkiewycz v. Tremont Ridge Phase 1 Ltd. Partnership, 2012-Ohio-5173, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). But discretion is always bounded by law, so a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it discharges or fails to discharge a receiver in a manner contrary to law. See Cincinnati, Sandusky & Cleveland RR. Co. v. Sloan, 31 Ohio St. 1, 13-14 (1876); see also Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 38-39. {¶30} We will divide Jones’s challenges to the discharge order into three groups: (1) those concerning his alleged lack of notice and a hearing prior to the discharge, (2) those challenging provisions of the discharge order itself, and (3) those addressing the domestic-relations court’s prior orders, decisions, and proceedings. 3 Ordinarily, we would lack jurisdiction to review the discharge order. The order was entered on December 18, 2024, and Jones did not appeal it until April 11, 2025. That delay far exceeds the usual 30 days allotted by App.R. 4(A)(1). And Jones’s new-trial motion could not have tolled his time to appeal under App.R. 4(B)(2)(b), because that motion was a nullity. Compare Fougere, 2017-Ohio-7905, at ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). But in this case, Jones’s deadline to appeal the December 18 order never began to run, because the record contains no indication Jones was ever served with that order. The order itself contained no instruction to the clerk to serve Jones, and we can find no contemporaneous certificate of service on the record. Thus, we must conclude that the clerk never “completed service of notice of the [December 18] judgment” upon Jones, so that the 30-day deadline to appeal did not begin to run under App.R. 4(A)(3). 13  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 1. Notice & Opportunity to Be Heard {¶31} Jones first contends that he was not given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before the domestic-relations court entered its discharge order. a. {¶32} As a threshold matter, Morgan contends that neither notice nor hearing were required prior to discharging the receiver. We disagree. {¶33} Civ.R. 66 provides that receiverships must be administered “in the manner provided by law and as provided by rules of court.” The “provided by law” requirement generally refers to R.C. Ch. 2735, which governs many aspects of receiverships, as well as any other relevant statutes. The “rules of court” piece empowers courts to adopt local rules to further structure receivership proceedings. Civ.R. 66 effectively incorporates such rules by reference. {¶34} R.C. 2735.01(A) provides the authority to appoint a receiver. Once appointed, their receivership continues until the court terminates it. See Milo, 100 Ohio App.3d at 6; Fifth Third, 2013-Ohio-5755, at ¶ 24 (2d Dist.); Hoover-Bond Co. v. Sun-Glow Indus., Inc., 57 Ohio App. 246, 252 (3d Dist. 1936). In general, discharge of a receiver and termination of the receivership are proper when, due to a change in circumstances, “there is no longer any necessity of continuing the receivership.” 3 Clark on Receivers, § 692.1(b), at 1276; see also 65 Am.Jur.2d, Receivers, § 93 (2024); State ex rel. Miller v. Kroger, 235 Ind. 556, 561-562 (1956). And although R.C. Ch. 2735 does not expressly provide authority to discharge a receiver, “the power to vacate the appointment is clearly implied in the power to appoint.” See Sloan, 31 Ohio St. at 12; accord Milo at 6. {¶35} Here the parties dispute what procedures are required when a court 14  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS terminates a receivership. Per Civ.R. 66, if a statute set forth procedures for discharging receivers, it would govern—so long as it satisfied the basic requirements of due process. But the Revised Code provides no procedures for discharging a receiver either generally or in the domestic-relations context. Further, courts could provide procedures for discharging receivers in local “rules of court.” Id. A number of Ohio’s courts of common pleas have done just that by promulgating rules that govern the discharge process.4 Unfortunately, neither the General Division nor the Domestic Relations Division of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas have done so. {¶36} In the absence of a controlling statute or local rule, the Ohio Supreme Court has said that the “usages of courts of equity” govern “the manner of . . . discharging receivers.” See Sloan at 12. And, as a leading treatise on receivers explains, equity requires that “[n]otice [of a proposed discharge] should be given to all parties to the suit and to creditors interested in the distribution, even in the absence of a statute or a court rule on the subject.” 3 Clark on Receivers, § 693, at 1277; see also Miller v. Everest, 212 N.W.2d 522, 524 (Iowa 1973), citing Farmers’ Savs. Bank v. Pomeroy, 211 Iowa 337, 339 (1930); Atty. Gen. ex rel. Commr. of Ins. v. Lapeer Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Assn., 318 Mich. 60, 76 (1947) (“Such an account would be acceptable to the court only after proper notice to interested parties who shall have an opportunity to be heard thereon.”). {¶37} Such notice is essential to ensure fundamental fairness and due process. 4 The local rules of the Butler County Court of Common Pleas provide commendable clarity to this area: “All receivers shall file a final report within 30 days from the time at which their trust and their duties may be regarded as performed and completed,” and any “[e]xceptions to the accounts of receivers . . . must be filed within 20 days after the accounts are filed.” Butler C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 5.19(L), (M). In Montgomery County, the local rules explicitly provide that a hearing to settle the receiver’s accounts should be held “within 30 days of the filing of the receiver’s final inventory.” Mont. Co. C.P.R. 6.10(D). And although the local rules in Franklin County do not include as clear a timeline for objections, they do set forth the manner and timing for filing a receiver’s “final report to the court and creditors,” along with a final fee application. Franklin C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R. 66.12. 15  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS Discharging a receiver traditionally involves (1) “fixing of the receiver’s fees,” (2) “distribution generally of the money in [the receiver’s] hands,” and (3) “accepting of the receiver’s final report.” 3 Clark on Receivers, § 693, at 1277; 3 id., § 699.1, at 1285 (“on his removal or discharge, the receiver must . . . report and account for all the property he has received”); Fifth Third, 2013-Ohio-5755, at ¶ 24 (2d Dist.) (“approval [of the receiver’s final account] ordinarily precedes the receiver’s discharge”). So, any individual with claims to or against the receivership assets, or who wishes to challenge the receiver’s fees, must bring their claims prior to discharge. Once discharge is finalized, such claims may be too late—there will be no more receiver to sue and no more assets in receivership from which to “satisfy and discharge any judgment that might be rendered against [the receiver] in his official capacity.” See 2 Clark on Receivers, § 422, at 708; see also High, A Treatise on the Law of Receivers, § 848, at 994 (4th Ed. 1910);5 Madorsky v. Suburban Homes Co., 45 Ohio App. 83, 85 (8th Dist. 1933); Norman v. Trison Dev. Corp., 1992 OK 67, ¶ 8; Brown v. Gay, 76 Tex. 444, 447 (1890); In re Weldon F. Stump & Co., Inc., 337 B.R. 636, 638 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 2005) (“the discharge of a receiver has the effect of releasing them from any further liability incident to the receivership”). {¶38} Morgan argues that notice would have been pointless in this case because the receivership estate was empty: the house was sold and no proceeds remained to satisfy any claims. But even where a receivership is insolvent, a court of equity has tools to redress a wayward receiver’s improper use of receivership assets. A court of equity could, for example, “surcharg[e] the receiver’s accounts for losses incurred through the receiver’s mismanagement or negligence,” and then withhold 5 Available at https://hdl.handle.net/2027/coo1.ark:/13960/t9h429164. 16  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS final approval until the receiver has balanced them by paying back the surcharged amount. See 80 Ohio Jur.3d, § 184 (2026), citing Shawnee Lumber Co. v. Phillips, 29 Ohio Dec. 58, 61-62 (C.P. 1917); 2 Clark on Receivers, § 419, at 706.6 {¶39} We therefore hold that, before a trial court finally discharges a receiver and terminates a receivership, it must at least provide interested parties notice of its incipient termination and an opportunity to object. This baseline, rooted in traditional notions of equity and due process, applies even in the absence of a statute or local rule providing for more specific procedures, and even if the receivership is insolvent. b. {¶40} The question, then, is whether Jones received adequate notice of the imminent discharge order and opportunity to raise his objections. On the facts of this case, we hold he did. {¶41} As we have already noted, both the Ohio Revised Code and the local rules of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas lack provisions governing the discharge of receivers. “[I]n the absence of statutory guidance” or a rule of court, “‘the constitutional due process principle supplies the rule’” for determining adequacy of notice. See Hunt v. Alderman, 2025-Ohio-2944, ¶ 15, quoting Knickerbocker Properties, Inc., XLII v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2008-Ohio-3192, ¶ 17. And 6 See also, e.g., Credit Mgrs. Assn. of S. Cal. v. Kennesaw Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 25 F.3d 743, 751 (9th Cir. 1994), quoting Aviation Brake Sys., Ltd. v. Voorhis, 133 Cal.App.3d 230, 235 (1982) (“‘upon the receiver’s final report and account, the receiver in his personal capacity may be surcharged for losses to the receivership estate based upon his misconduct or mismanagement’”); McPherson v. United States Physicians Mut. Risk Retention Group, 99 S.W.3d 462, 481 (Mo.App. 2003) (holding that “a trial court supervising an insurance company in receivership under the Insolvency Code has the inherent power to surcharge” the account of a “special deputy receiver”); Citizens’ Trust Co. v. Wheeling Can Co., 199 Ind. 311, 317 (1927) (“The court did not err in ordering the receiver to repay to the funds of the receivership the payments which the court found and adjudged to be unauthorized, and which were not approved.”); Haines v. Buckeye Wheel Co., 224 F. 289, 297-298 (6th Cir. 1915) (surcharging receiver’s account so that he would “repay and restore to the trust fund the sum of $2,000 heretofore allowed to him as compensation,” then ordering him to disburse those funds); State ex rel. Pope v. Germania Bank, 103 Minn. 129, 143 (1908). 17  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS the Constitution guaranteed Jones only “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” to apprise him of the need to present his objections, and a “reasonable time” in which to do so. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). In applying this rule, we must have “due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case.” Id. at 314; see also H3re, L.L.C. v. Anderson, 2020-Ohio- 4974, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.) (“Reasonable notice is determined on a case-by-case basis.”). The bottom line, as the United State Supreme Court recently reiterated (in a very different context), is that an individual at risk of losing property or liberty must “receive notice” of the risk they face “within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek . . . relief.” Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (per curiam); A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 95 (2025) (per curiam). {¶42} We begin by noting that, ideally, the domestic-relations court would have provided notice that was explicit and unambiguous. For example, the domestic- relations court could have set forth deadlines in its order appointing or describing the duties of the receiver. Or it might have issued an entry notifying the parties that the receiver had filed its final report and ordering them to object by a date certain or forever hold their peace. {¶43} The procedures in this case, however, were not ideal. Still, if Jones had (1) actual or constructive notice from which a reasonable person would have understood he needed to promptly object to the receiver’s discharge or account and (2) a reasonable time in which to raise such objections, then the requirements of due process were satisfied, and the domestic-relations court could discharge the receiver. {¶44} Morgan’s motion to discharge the receiver, which would ordinarily have constituted sufficient notice, was insufficient in this case. Morgan admits that she never properly served Jones with her December 16 motion, and the record does not 18  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS show that Jones actually received a copy in a timely manner. And even if Jones received actual notice of Morgan’s motion, the two days between it and the domestic- relations court’s December 18 discharge order would not have been sufficient opportunity to respond in this case. Compare Lindsay v. Jackson, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4043, *8 (1st Dist. Sep. 8, 2000) (“courts have held that notice provided on the same day as the hearing is insufficient to meet the requirements of due process”); A.A.R.P. at 95 (“Under these circumstances, notice roughly 24 hours before removal, devoid of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that removal, surely does not pass muster.”). {¶45} Rather, we hold that, on the particular facts and “peculiarities of [this] case,” the November 27, 2024 filing of the receiver’s final report provided Jones with the necessary notice. The document’s caption, “FINAL REPORT OF RECEIVER, CERTIFICATE AND REPORT OF SALE,” clearly indicated that the receiver believed there was nothing left for it to do. And its contents made clear that the logical next step was discharge, absent objections. {¶46} The final report indicated that the purpose of the receivership was complete and that no receivership assets remained for disbursal. The purpose of the receivership was to facilitate the division of marital property by selling the house. The house had been the only asset in receivership, and the report states that it was sold. And the final report explained that there were no proceeds to disburse: after paying the receiver, closing costs, and creditors, “[t]he receivership estate no longer contain[ed] any assets,” “was insolvent,” and contained “no funds derived from income from the Property.” {¶47} The report also settled the question of fees. The settlement statement detailed the outstanding fees owed to the receiver, which the statement indicated were 19  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS already paid. The fees set forth in the settlement statement aligned with the six percent commission the receiver had been promised in the appointment order.7 The statement indicated that the receiver claimed $5,623.79 in reimbursement for expenses. And the statement indicated that all of these fees and expenses had been fully paid. The receiver indicated no remaining balance. {¶48} Thus, the receiver’s final report indicated (1) that the purpose of the receivership had run its course, (2) that the receivership was insolvent and contained no assets, (3) that there were no assets for the receiver to disburse, and (4) that the receiver claimed fees of $51,000 (for itself and the real-estate broker) and expenses of $5,623.79, which were already paid. While the report may not have taken the final step of explicitly requesting discharge, a reasonable person under these circumstances would have known that approval and discharge were all that remained. By filing the final report, the receiver effectively put the question of discharge in play. {¶49} And unlike Morgan’s December 16 discharge motion, the final report was properly served on Jones. The certificate of service attached to Morgan’s notice of the receiver’s final report, which included the report itself as an attachment, indicated that Jones and his then-attorney were served by email on November 27, 2024. Jones concedes in his brief that “[o]n November 27, 2024, Morgan filed and served” the final report. {¶50} We hold that, on the facts of this case, Jones received adequate notice of the need to raise objections or request a more detailed accounting on November 27, 2024, when he was served with receiver’s final report. {¶51} We further hold that, under the same facts, the 21 days between the 7 The commissions paid to Prodigy and “Sibcy Cline Realtors (Hyde Park)” totaled $51,000, which is six percent of the $850,000 sale price. 20  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS November 27 final report and the December 18 discharge order constituted an adequate opportunity for Jones to file any objections. Although the domestic-relations court did not prescribe a set time for filing objections in advance, we find instructive Hamilton Cty. C.P., Gen.Div., Loc.R.