Lucas v. Brindle
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket26 BE 0014
JudgeS. Lynch
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Lucas v. Brindle, 2026-Ohio-4593.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
BELMONT COUNTY
DIANA L. LUCAS, EXECUTRIX
OF THE ESTATE OF
ETHEL MAE MCFARLAND,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL R. BRINDLE, ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellants.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case No. 26 BE 0014
Civil Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
Case No. 21 CV 44
BEFORE:
Scott Lynch, John J. Eklund, Eugene A. Lucci, Eleventh District Judges, sitting by
assignment.
JUDGMENT:
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
–2–
Atty. Richard O. Hamilton, Jr. and Atty. Adam J. Turer, Robbins, Kelly, Patterson &
Tucker, L.P.A., 312 Elm Street, Suite 2200, Cincinnati, OH 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland.
Atty. Joel A. Holt, Maguire Schneckenburger Legal Group, 190 East Avenue, Tallmadge,
OH 44278, for Defendants-Appellants, Michael Brindle and Terra Firma Energy & Land
Consults, L.L.C.
Atty. Carl A. Frankovitch, Frankovitch, Anetakis, Simon, DeCapio & Pearl, L.L.P., 337
Penco Road, Weirton, WV 26062, for Defendant-Appellee, Timothy Paul Miller.
Atty. W. Gus Saines, McDermott & Bonenberger, P.L.L.C., 1144 Market Street, Suite 101,
Wheeling, WV 26003, and Atty. David J, Berardinelli, DeForest Koscelnik & Berardinelli,
436 Seventh Avenue, 30th Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, for Defendants-Appellees,
American Mineral Solutions, L.L.C. and Daniel F. Spitznagel.
Dated: November 17, 2026
SCOTT LYNCH, J.
{¶1} Defendants-appellants, Michael Brindle and Terra Firma Energy & Land
Consults, LLC, appeal the orders of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas, denying
their Motion to Vacate a default judgment; entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-
appellee, Diana L. Lucas; adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law after the
entering of judgment; and dismissing their crossclaims against other defendants-
appellees, Timothy Paul Miller, American Mineral Solutions, LLC (“AMS”), and Daniel F.
Spitznagel.
{¶2} We find that Brindle failed to rebut the presumption of valid service and so
affirm the default judgment entered against him.
{¶3} We find that Lucas did not move for summary judgment against either
Brindle or Terra Firma and so reverse the summary judgment against them, including the
award of compensatory and punitive damages. Attorney fees, however, were determined
Case No. 26 BE 0014
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in a separate proceeding in which Brindle and Terra Firma received notice and had an
opportunity to be heard and so the award of attorney fees is affirmed. Brindle and Terra
Firma noted a minor discrepancy between the award of attorney fees and the evidence
at hearing and so we modify the award to conform with the evidence.
{¶4} We hold that, until a final appealable order was issued, the trial court had
authority to revise or modify prior non-final orders.
{¶5} Brindle and Terra Firma’s arguments against the dismissal of their
crossclaims against Miller, AMS, and Spitznagel were contingent on default judgment
being vacated. Since this did not happen, the dismissal of the crossclaims is affirmed.
{¶6} Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed in part, reversed in
part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Substantive and Procedural Background
{¶7} On March 19, 2021, Ethel Mae McFarland filed a Complaint against Brindle;
Terra Firma; AMS; Spitznagel; Gateway Royalty V, LLC; Ascent Resources – Utica, LLC;
Timothy Paul Miller; Paloma Partners III, LLC; Gulfport Energy Corporation (as successor
in interest to Paloma Partners); and XTO Energy Inc.
{¶8} According to the Complaint, McFarland was the owner of real estate and
the associated oil and gas rights (hereafter mineral rights) in Belmont County. The
mineral rights were subject to lease agreements with defendants, Ascent, Paloma,
Gulfport, and XTO. The Complaint alleged that Brindle, Terra Firma, Miller, AMS,
Sptiznagel, and Gateway had fraudulently conspired to deprive McFarland of her mineral
rights by forging deeds transferring the rights to Terra Firma. Thereafter, the mineral
rights were transferred to AMS and then to Gateway.
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{¶9} With respect to Brindle and Terra Firma, the Complaint raised claims of
Quiet Title, Fraud, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Equitable Disgorgement, Slander
of Title, Breach of Accounting / Specific Performance, Civil Conspiracy, and Punitive
Damages.
{¶10} On June 17, 2021, McFarland filed a Motion for Default Judgment Against
Brindle and Terra Firma.
{¶11} On June 16, 2022, a handwritten and pro se Motion to Dismiss was filed by
“defendants Michael R. Brindle (“Brindle”) and TERRA ENERGY AND LAND, TERRA
FIRMA ENERGY AND LAND CONSULTS, LLC, D/B/A MICHAEL R. BRINDLE SENIOR
LAND AGENT for American Mineral Solutions from February 2018 until February 2022.”
{¶12} On July 17, 2022, a handwritten and pro se Proposed Order on Motion to
Dismiss was filed. In this filing, inter alia, it was argued that the defendants’ conduct did
not establish a factual basis for the exercise of specific jurisdiction. This was supported
by attached exhibits which included a Confidential Settlement Agreement with Mutual Full
and Final Release and a Consent Judgment Entry Amongst Certain Parties filed in the
case of Gerritz v. Brindle, Belmont County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 20 CV 0274.
{¶13} On July 20, 2022, McFarland moved to strike the pro se filings as they were
not signed and did not contain certificates of service.
{¶14} On July 25, 2022, the trial court entered default judgment in favor of
McFarland against Brindle and Terra Firma:
As these matters have languished, most recently, those
defaulting Defendants [Brindle and Terra Firma] have attempted
several pro se filings. Based upon the record, the Court sustains
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike those attempted filings. Those Defendants
have not petitioned for leave, in any event.
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Therefore, the Court sustains Plaintiff’s Motions and renders
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Michael R.
Brindle and Terra Firma Energy & Land Consultants [sic], LLC, on all
of Plaintiff’s claims as pled in her Complaint. As one result, those
Defendants have no further interest in or right to claim an interest in
the real estate or any mineral rights or benefits associated therewith.
The Court will schedule a hearing on Plaintiff’s damages when
requested by Plaintiff.
{¶15} On October 18, 2022, a Suggestion of Death was filed on behalf of
McFarland. Thereafter, Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland,
was substituted as the new party plaintiff.
{¶16} On August 25, 2023, Brindle filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment on the
grounds that he “was not properly served with Plaintiff’s Complaint.” A Motion for Stay of
Execution Pending Motion to Vacate was also filed. Lucas filed a Memorandum Contra
the Motion to Vacate and Brindle filed a Reply in Support of the Motion.
{¶17} On April 26, 2024, the trial court denied the Motion to Vacate. The court
held:
The record contains a return receipt for certified mail service
upon Brindle at 436 Butler Street, Pittsburgh PA 15223 [Terra
Firma’s registered office on file with the Pennsylvania Secretary of
State]. Brindle attacks this on two grounds.
First, he swears that he neither signed nor printed his name
on that receipt.
Second, Brindle swears that his last day of work with
Defendant American Mineral Solutions, LLC, at 436 Butler Street,
was June 17, 2020. He swears that he then cleaned out his office,
returned his keys, and was escorted away.
The Court will consider these in the same order. The Court,
having reviewed the entire record, can not make a finding about
signature authentication. Especially after reviewing Brindle’s … pro
se presentments, no two signatures/printed names, are even similar.
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The Court can not give Brindle’s claims weight without an expert
opinion, or some more convincing evidence of Brindle’s credibility.
This statement relates to Brindle’s second sworn assertion
that he was never at 436 Butler Street after June 17, 2020.
As Brindle requested, the Court has taken judicial notice of all
of the records. This review included Common Pleas Court Case
Number 20-CV-274, titled Connie Jo Gerritz v. Michael R. Brindle, et
al.
In that case, Brindle was served with process by certified mail
at 436 Butler Street, the Defendant American Mineral Solutions,
LLC[’s] office, on November 13, 2020, almost five months beyond his
sworn termination and last presence. Brindle had competent legal
counsel in the Gerritz case. At no time, by pleading or otherwise, did
Brindle ever raise and/or contest the personal jurisdiction issue.
Some of the Defendants here were named in that case, too, although
this Court makes no present credibility finding as to them.
Thus, the Court can give no credibility to Brindle’s claim that
he did not sign the return receipt and was not served with process.
His Motion to Vacate is overruled. His Motion to Stay Execution is
overruled.
{¶18} On April 6, 2023, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Miller.
{¶19} On May 16, 2024, the trial court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment
filed by Lucas against Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway. The court, considering the
“evidence of the interconnections of Defendants Michael R. Brindle, Terra Firma Energy
and Land Consults, LLC, Daniel F. Spitznagel, American Mineral Solutions, LLC, and
Gateway Royalty V, LLC, and all of the other evidence,” concluded that Lucas was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law and rendered judgment “in favor of Plaintiff and against
those Defendants, jointly and severally, for precisely the relief sought by Plaintiff in her
said Motion.”
{¶20} Counsel for Lucas was ordered “to submit a proposed Judgment Journal
Entry containing Plaintiff’s recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
Case No. 26 BE 0014
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damage, and/or a hearing, if requested, for punitive damages as to Plaintiff’s ownership
of the subject mineral rights.”
{¶21} On July 2, 2024, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Spitznagel
and AMS.
{¶22} On July 31, 2024, Brindle and Terra Firma filed crossclaims against Miller
and against Spitznagel and AMS for Civil Liability for Criminal Conduct, Civil Conspiracy,
and Contribution / Indemnification.
{¶23} On September 5, 2024, an Agreed Entry involving all the parties was issued
and provided that “Plaintiff’s claims for equitable disgorgement, accounting/specific
performance, and punitive damages are hereby mooted to the extent that these are
remedies sought by Plaintiff, not additional claims against Defendants.”
{¶24} Also on September 5, 2024, Miller moved the trial court to dismiss Brindle
and Terra Firma’s crossclaims.
{¶25} On October 2, 2024, Spitznagel and AMS moved the trial court to dismiss
Brindle and Terra Firma’s crossclaims.
{¶26} On December 3, 2024, the trial court granted the separate Motions of Miller
and of Spitznagel and AMS to dismiss the crossclaims filed by Brindle and Terra Firma.
The court found that the claims for Civil Liability for Criminal Conduct and Civil Conspiracy
were contingent upon Miller, Spitznagel and AMS being found “liable” for criminal and/or
unlawful conduct against McFarland. Given that the claims against Miller, Spitznagel,
and AMS have been settled and these defendants released with prejudice, such liability
will never occur.
Case No. 26 BE 0014
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{¶27} With respect to the Contribution / Indemnification claims, the trial court
found that they were barred on several grounds, including R.C. 2307.25(A) (“[t]here is no
right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor against whom an intentional tort claim has
been alleged and established”) and R.C. 2307.28(B) (“[w]hen a release … is given in
good faith to one of two or more persons for the same injury … [t]he release … discharges
the person to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor”).
{¶28} On March 5, 2025, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, supplementing the earlier grant of summary judgment in Lucas’s favor. Inter alia,
the court held:
2. Defendants, Michael R. Brindle (“Brindle”) and Terra Firma
Energy & Land Consults, LLC (“Terra Firma”), are in default and have
failed to timely move or otherwise plead in response to the Complaint
and have further failed to enter an appearance herein. The Court
finds the allegations in the Complaint as to Brindle and Terra Firma
are true.
…
45. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that judgment is hereby
entered in favor of Substitute Plaintiff, Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of
the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland, and against Defendants, Michael
Brindle, Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC, and Gateway
Royalty V, LLC, jointly and severally, on Plaintiff’s claims for Quiet
Title, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Slander of Title, and Civil
Conspiracy, in the amounts set forth herein.
{¶29} The trial court awarded compensatory damages in the amount of
$658,860.30, representing $293,236.99 in royalty payments received by Gateway from
lessees of the mineral rights and $365,623.31 held in suspense by the lessees
themselves. The court also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $1,976,580.90
(three times the amount of actual damages) plus reasonable attorney fees and costs to
be determined later.
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{¶30} On April 22, 2025, Lucas filed a Motion to Determine Attorneys’ Fees and
Costs pursuant to the March 5, 2025 Journal Judgment Entry.
{¶31} On October 20, 2025, a hearing was held to determine Lucas’s attorney
fees and costs.
{¶32} On February 12, 2026, the trial court issued a Final Appealable Judgment
and Journal Entry. This Entry reduced the compensatory award to $628,860.30,
reflecting a setoff of $30,000.00 received by Lucas as settlement against Miller, AMS,
and Spitznagel, and accordingly reduced punitive damages to $1,886,580.90 (three times
the amount of actual damages). In addition, the court awarded Lucas reasonable attorney
fees and costs in the amount of $262,928.08 against Brindle, Terra Firma, and Gateway,
jointly and severally.
Assignments of Error
{¶33} On February 27, 2026, Brindle and Terra Firma filed a Notice of Appeal. 1
On appeal, they raise the following assignments of error:
[1.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by denying Brindle’s
Motion to Vacate.
[2.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by granting summary
judgment in McFarland’s favor against Appellants.
[3.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by ordering McFarland
to submit “a concluding journal entry as a final appealable order”
which would incorporate its prior decisions and journal including the
First MSJ [March 5, 2025] Order.
[4.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by improperly adopting
the Second MSJ [February 12, 2026] Order in toto even though it
included additional findings of fact and conclusions of law that
modified the First MSJ Order, which was already a final order.
1. The February 12, 2026 Final Appealable Judgment and Journal Entry is also the subject of appeals by
Gateway and Gateway’s trial counsel, Molly K. Johnson. See Lucas v. Brindle, Belmont App. Nos. 26 BE
0013 and 26 BE 0015.
Case No. 26 BE 0014
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[5.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by dismissing
Appellants’ crossclaims against AMS, Spitznagel, and Miller.
First Assignment of Error: The Motion to Vacate
{¶34} In the first assignment of error, Brindle2 argues that the trial court erred by
not vacating the default judgment. He contends the court disregarded the uncontroverted
testimony that he did not receive service of process and that it was improper for the court
to consider service records from another case.
Personal Jurisdiction: the Civil Rules and Constitutional Due Process
{¶35} “A trial court is without jurisdiction to render judgment or to make findings
against a person who was not served summons, did not appear, and was not a party in
the court proceedings.” State ex rel. Ballard v. O’Donnell, 50 Ohio St.3d 182 (1990),
paragraph one of the syllabus; Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984) (“[i]t is
rudimentary that in order to render a valid personal judgment, a court must have personal
jurisdiction over the defendant”).
{¶36} “[A] judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void
ab initio.” Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 (1988). “A person against whom such
judgment and findings are made is entitled to have the judgment vacated.” Ballard at
paragraph one of the syllabus. “[T]he authority to vacate a void judgment … constitutes
an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts.” Patton at 70.
{¶37} “When a plaintiff complies with the Rules of Civil Procedure, a rebuttable
presumption of proper service exists.” Bishop v. Bishop, 2025-Ohio-289, ¶ 30 (7th Dist.).
The Civil Rules provide for service by certified mail. “Evidenced by return receipt signed
by any person accepting delivery, service of any process shall be by United States
2. The Motion to Vacate was filed on behalf of Brindle only.
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certified or express mail …” Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a). “So long as the postal receipt is signed
and returned, service is effective ‘even if not delivered to the defendant or to a person
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process for defendant.’”
Youngstown City Demolition v. Rainy Day Rentals, Inc., 2023-Ohio-3601, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.).
{¶38} “[I]n the context of a motion to vacate a void judgment, the presumption of
service may be rebutted by evidence demonstrating nonservice.” Blon v. Royal Flush,
Inc., 2022-Ohio-1958, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), quoting Lundeen v. Turner, 2021-Ohio-1533, ¶ 22.
“Ohio courts have repeatedly considered claims of failed service even where service was
mailed to the correct address.” Ross v. Olsavsky, 2010-Ohio-1310, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.).
{¶39} As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “[t]he rule speaks primarily to how
service shall be made, rather than where, or to whom process may be served.” Akron-
Canton Regional Airport Auth. v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St.2d 403, 404-405 (1980). “In
drafting these rules it was believed that due process should determine the parameters for
proper service rather than create unduly restrictive rules prohibiting otherwise
constitutionally permissible service.” Id. at 405.
{¶40} “When it comes to service, the basic requirement is that the ‘notice [be]
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Hunt
v. Alderman, 2025-Ohio-2944, ¶ 14, quoting Mulane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “Because service under Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a) must comport with
due-process guarantees, sufficient service requires using an address that is reasonably
calculated to apprise the defendant of the lawsuit.” Id. at ¶ 16; Samson Sales, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 66 Ohio St.2d 290, 293 (1981) (“[s]ervice of process made at the
Case No. 26 BE 0014
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business address of an individual or a corporation [by certified mail] must comport with
the requirements of due process”).
Standard of Review
{¶41} This Court applies both an abuse of discretion and a de novo standard of
review as to whether a court has obtained personal jurisdiction over a defendant. “A trial
court’s ruling on a question of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo as a question of
law.” Youngstown City Demolition, 2023-Ohio-3601, at ¶ 7 (7th Dist.); Blon, 2022-Ohio-
1958, at ¶ 20 (7th Dist.) (“legal decisions (including whether the facts meet a legal test)
are reviewed de novo”). “However, a trial court’s findings regarding whether service was
proper are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Youngstown City Demolition at ¶ 7; Blon at
¶ 19 (“whether the service presumption was rebutted upon a motion to vacate default
judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion”).
Personal Service on Brindle
{¶42} In the present case, Brindle was served by certified mail on March 23, 2021,
at 436 Butler Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The return receipt contains a signature
and the name “Michael Brindle” in the space reserved for “Received by (Printed Name).”
The following documents, attesting 436 Butler Street as the business address for Brindle
and Terra Firma, were attached to the Complaint: a June 24, 2020 Mineral Deed in which
Terra Firma was the grantee; a July 27, 2020 Mineral Deed signed by Brindle as
“Managing Partner of Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC” in which Terra Firma
was the grantor; and a July 23, 2020 Corrective Mineral Deed in which Terra Firma was
the grantee. The foregoing was sufficient to raise the presumption of proper service.
Youngstown City Demolition at ¶ 14 (“[w]here a notice is sent by registered mail, with a
Case No. 26 BE 0014
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return receipt requested, and thereafter a signed receipt is returned, a prima facie case
is established of the fact of delivery of such notice to such address”) (citation omitted).
{¶43} In support of the Motion to Vacate, Brindle attached his affidavit in which he
averred that he did not sign or recognize the signature on the return receipt dated March
23, 2021. He further averred that between February 2018 and June 2020 he worked as
an independent contractor for AMS at the Butler Street address: “my last day at the Butler
Street office was June 17, 2020, at which time, I cleaned out my office, returned my keys,
and was accompanied out of the building by Defendant Spitznagel.”
{¶44} Lucas opposed vacating the default judgment by noting the following: 436
Butler Street was and continues to be the address of record for “Brindle’s business,” Terra
Firma, as evidenced by the Pennsylvania Secretary of State website. In Brindle’s pro se
filings on June 163 and July 7, 20224, 436 Butler Street was represented as his business
address.
{¶45} In addition to these arguments, the trial court took judicial notice of the fact
that, in the Gerritz case, Brindle was served by certified mail on November 13, 2020, at
436 Butler Street and that service was not challenged in that case.
Brindle Failed to Rebut the Presumption of Valid Service
{¶46} On appeal, Brindle argues that the denial of his Motion to Vacate was in
error on several grounds: the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion; consideration
of the Gerritz case and the pro se filings was improper; Brindle’s affidavit was
3. On June 16, 2022, Brindle filed a Proposed Motion to Dismiss “Filed on behalf of Defendants American
Mineral Solutions, and Michael R. Brindle[,] Senior Land Agent D/B/A Terra Firma Energy & Land[,] 436
Butler Street.”
4. On July 17, 2022, Brindle filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss “Filed on behalf of
Defendants TERRA FIRMA Energy & Land[,] 436 Butler Street[,] … D/B/A AMERICAN Mineral Solutions[,]
Michael R. Brindle[,] Senior Land AGENT[,] 436 Butler Street.”
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uncontroverted; and the court’s determination of Brindle’s credibility was influenced by
unfounded bias. None of these arguments are convincing.
{¶47} Initially, we observe that Brindle did not deny having an office at 436 Butler
Street, but claims that it was vacated after June of 2020, and, therefore, after that date,
service at the address was no longer reasonably calculated to apprise him of the
pendency of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the fundamental issue is Brindle’s credibility and
the abuse of discretion standard applies.
{¶48} Brindle argues the trial court erred by not holding a hearing on the Motion
to Vacate. It is the general rule that “where the affidavit [in support of vacating default
judgment] is self-serving, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether the
party asserting that he was not properly served was truthful in that allegation; failure to
hold the hearing amounts to error.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 2008-Ohio-
6588, ¶ 13 (7th Dist.). However, the requirement for a hearing is not absolute and, in the
present case, the trial court noted on the record that counsel for Brindle waived a hearing
on the Motion to Vacate: “Brindle requested an oral hearing. However, as one result of
the telephone status conference on April 15, 2024, Attorney Joel A. Holt, Brindle’s
counsel, withdrew that request.”
{¶49} This Court has found, in comparable situations, that a trial court may rule
on a motion to vacate default judgment without a hearing. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wilburn,
2022-Ohio-2026, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.) (“appellant specifically requested that the court not hold
the scheduled hearing”); Barrett at ¶ 16 (“[o]nce Barrett requested a motion for
continuance of the hearing, the determination of whether to vacate required a hearing or
if it should have been granted are not the central issues anymore”).
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{¶50} As to bias, Brindle points out several instances where the trial court
purportedly inferred or insinuated that he had actual notice of the pendency of action from
the time of the initial attempt at service. Brindle also notes that the court made “no finding”
with respect to these matters and that actual notice was “irrelevant” to whether service
was proper. Thus, there is no overt evidence of real bias toward Brindle. Moreover, as
demonstrated below, there was sufficient objective cause to question the credibility of
Brindle’s affidavit based on the record before the court without the imputation of bias as
a motivating factor.
The Service Record in the Gerritz Case
{¶51} Brindle argues it was improper for the trial court to judicially notice the
service record from the Gerritz case. We recognize that it is becoming widely accepted
that courts may take judicial notice of court records that are verifiable through the court’s
or clerk of court’s online docket. See State v. Fraley, 2026-Ohio-1964, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (“[w]e
may take judicial notice of such online court records [verifiable through the Butler County
clerk of court’s online docket]”); State ex rel. Curtis v. Turner, 2024-Ohio-2682, ¶ 12 (“[t]he
municipal-court docket is an online court record, which may be appropriate for judicial
notice”); In re M.L.-P., 2024-Ohio-5346, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.) (“[i]t is common practice for courts
to take judicial notice of publicly accessible online court dockets”) (citation omitted). State
ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 2007-Ohio-4798, cited by Brindle, is not to the contrary.
Everhart acknowledges that there is authority for the proposition that courts may not take
judicial notice of their own proceedings in other cases but also that courts take judicial
notice of public court records available on the internet but does not endorse either
position. Id. at ¶ 7-8.
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{¶52} This Court “has adhered to the principle that a trial court may not take
judicial notice of earlier proceedings, either in its own court or another court, except for
proceedings in the immediate case under consideration.” Dombelek v. Ohio Bur. of
Workers’ Comp., 2003-Ohio-5151, ¶ 26 (7th Dist.). Although it is over twenty years old
and diverges from the pronouncements of the Ohio Supreme Court in cases such as
Fraley and Curtis, Dombelek remains the law of this district.
{¶53} Nonetheless, we do not find Dombelek controlling in the present case. In
the first place, Brindle himself raised the issue of the Gerritz case and attached
documents therefrom in his pro se filings. See State v. Thomas, 2009-Ohio-1032, ¶ 23
(7th Dist.) (finding that the court did not take improper notice of remission motions filed in
other cases where “Appellant’s counsel himself referred to the other remission hearings”
and the court merely observed that such filings existed). One of the documents attached
to the pro se filings was also attached to the Complaint without objection.
{¶54} Moreover, this Court stated that the rationale for the rule against taking
notice “is that, if a trial court takes judicial notice of a prior proceeding, the appellate court
cannot review whether the trial court correctly interpreted the prior case because the
record of the prior case is not before the appellate court.” (Citation omitted.) Dombelek
at ¶ 26. This rationale has no application in the present case where the service record in
the Gerritz case is as available to this Court as it was to the trial court as it is to anyone
with internet access. See Evid.R. 201(B) (“[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is … capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”).
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{¶55} Not only is the service record available from a publicly accessible and
verifiable source, but the service record is not the sort of document that requires
interpretation. The lower court noticed that, according to the court records in Gerritz,
Brindle was served by certified mail at 436 Butler Street on November 13, 2020. There
is no dispute that this is what the records reflect. It is not necessary to go further into the
facts of the case.
{¶56} Lastly, the situation in Dombelek is materially distinguishable from the
present case. In Dombelek, the trial court granted summary judgment against workers
compensation claimants based on complaints filed in an unrelated case in another county.
The complaints were used as substantive evidence in disposing of the claims based on
the statute of limitations. Regardless of whether the complaints could be properly noticed,
the decision in Dombelek rests on the fact that the complaints did not constitute valid
evidence for summary judgment purposes: “Due to the fact that the Cuyahoga County
complaints are not the type of evidentiary materials specifically listed in Civ.R. 56(C), were
not incorporated by reference into an affidavit in either case, and because the lower courts
were not entitled to take judicial notice of the complaints, we cannot consider the
Cuyahoga County complaints as evidence in support of the Administrator's motions for
summary judgment.” Dombelek at ¶ 27.
{¶57} Brindle argues that, at most, the service record demonstrates that service
was obtained in Gerritz, not that service at the Butler Street address was reasonably
calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the lawsuit in the present case, i.e., that he
continued to maintain a “habitual, continuous or highly continual and repeated physical
presence” there. Continuum Transp. Servs., Ltd. v. Elite Internatl. Corp., LLC, 2024-Ohio-
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340, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.) (“service upon an individual that is sent to a usual place of business
can comport with due process requirements because the party being served has a
habitual, continuous, or highly continual and repeated physical presence at the business
address”).
{¶58} Brindle misinterprets the import of noticing service in the Gerritz case. The
issue here is whether Brindle’s affidavit was sufficient to rebut the presumption of proper
service which is essentially a credibility determination. Brindle averred that he vacated
the Butler Street office in June 2020. The fact that he was served in another lawsuit at
Butler Street after June of 2020 undermines the credibility of the affidavit.
The Pro Se Filings
{¶59} Brindle also challenges reliance on the pro se filings on the grounds that
they were not cited by the trial court in its ruling on the Motion to Vacate and that they
were stricken from the record. We find neither contention compelling.
{¶60} Brindle claims that because the trial court did not discuss the pro se filings,
this Court may not consider them: “appellate court[s] … do not take evidence or make
factual findings,” and “do not resolve the merits of factual disputes because that role is
reserved for the trier of fact.” Pierce v. Workman, 2023-Ohio-2022, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.).
{¶61} Brindle’s argument is unavailing because the issue before this Court does
not involve resolving the merits of a factual dispute. Rather, the issue is whether the trial
court abused its discretion in deciding that Brindle failed to rebut the presumption of
service. In reviewing this issue, we are not strictly bound by the court’s reasons for
reaching its decision. As long as the record before the lower court supports its decision,
the court of appeals should affirm. Even where a motion to vacate was based on
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erroneous reasons, the judgment was affirmed on the principle that “a reviewing court is
not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were
assigned as a basis thereof.” Aurora Loan Servs., L.L.C. v. Cart, 2012-Ohio-5024, ¶ 20
(11th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 1994-
Ohio-92, ¶ 12. “It inexorably follows that if a reviewing court is not authorized to reverse
an otherwise correct judgment because erroneous reasons were assigned as a basis of
the decision, it is not authorized to reverse an otherwise correct judgment
because no reasons were assigned as a basis of the decision.” Gunton Corp. v.
Architectural Concepts, 2008-Ohio-693, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.).
{¶62} In the present case, the trial court’s reasons for denying the Motion were
neither lacking nor erroneous, but simply failed to acknowledge everything in the record
that it could have in support of its decision. “[W]hile an appellate court may decide an
issue on grounds different from those determined by the trial court, the … basis upon
which the court of appeals decides [the] issue must have been adduced before the trial
court and have been made a part of the record thereof.” State v. Peagler, 1996-Ohio-73,
paragraph one of the syllabus. Here, the fact that Brindle used the Butler Street address
in the June and July 2022 pro se filings was raised in Lucas’s Memorandum Contra the
Motion to Vacate. The trial court’s failure to comment upon it does not preclude this court
from doing so. Patterson Tool & Supply Co. v. Kemper, 125 Ohio St. 632 (1932) (“[u]pon
examination of the entire record, we are unable to find that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in overruling the motion to vacate”).
{¶63} We now address Brindle’s contention that, the pro se filings having been
struck, they are not properly part of the record. Brindle cites Roefer v. Riley, 2025-Ohio-
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272 (8th Dist.), for the proposition that “the consequence of striking a filing from the record
is that it is no longer part of the record for purposes of appeal.” Id. at ¶ 9, fn. 5. Since the
stricken filings are no longer part of the record, they could not be considered by either the
trial court or this Court. We disagree.
{¶64} The statement from the footnote in Roefer, which is neither controlling nor
supported by citations to authority, overstates the effect of striking a filing. Generally, a
document that has been stricken is deemed to be a nullity or a legal nullity, i.e., without
legal effect. See Municipal Court of Toledo v. State, 126 Ohio St. 103, 112 (1933) (“these
orders of suspension of execution of the sentences were without authority in the first
instance, and therefore void, and, being void, may be set aside at any time,
or stricken from the record and treated as a nullity”); State v. Boyle, 2025-Ohio-860, ¶ 8
(2d D