Full Opinion

[Cite as Lucas v. Brindle, 2026-Ohio-4593.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT BELMONT COUNTY DIANA L. LUCAS, EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ETHEL MAE MCFARLAND, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL R. BRINDLE, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants. OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY Case No. 26 BE 0014 Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio Case No. 21 CV 44 BEFORE: Scott Lynch, John J. Eklund, Eugene A. Lucci, Eleventh District Judges, sitting by assignment. JUDGMENT: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. –2– Atty. Richard O. Hamilton, Jr. and Atty. Adam J. Turer, Robbins, Kelly, Patterson & Tucker, L.P.A., 312 Elm Street, Suite 2200, Cincinnati, OH 45202, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland. Atty. Joel A. Holt, Maguire Schneckenburger Legal Group, 190 East Avenue, Tallmadge, OH 44278, for Defendants-Appellants, Michael Brindle and Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, L.L.C. Atty. Carl A. Frankovitch, Frankovitch, Anetakis, Simon, DeCapio & Pearl, L.L.P., 337 Penco Road, Weirton, WV 26062, for Defendant-Appellee, Timothy Paul Miller. Atty. W. Gus Saines, McDermott & Bonenberger, P.L.L.C., 1144 Market Street, Suite 101, Wheeling, WV 26003, and Atty. David J, Berardinelli, DeForest Koscelnik & Berardinelli, 436 Seventh Avenue, 30th Floor, Pittsburgh, PA 15219, for Defendants-Appellees, American Mineral Solutions, L.L.C. and Daniel F. Spitznagel. Dated: November 17, 2026 SCOTT LYNCH, J. {¶1} Defendants-appellants, Michael Brindle and Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC, appeal the orders of the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas, denying their Motion to Vacate a default judgment; entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff- appellee, Diana L. Lucas; adopting findings of fact and conclusions of law after the entering of judgment; and dismissing their crossclaims against other defendants- appellees, Timothy Paul Miller, American Mineral Solutions, LLC (“AMS”), and Daniel F. Spitznagel. {¶2} We find that Brindle failed to rebut the presumption of valid service and so affirm the default judgment entered against him. {¶3} We find that Lucas did not move for summary judgment against either Brindle or Terra Firma and so reverse the summary judgment against them, including the award of compensatory and punitive damages. Attorney fees, however, were determined Case No. 26 BE 0014 –3– in a separate proceeding in which Brindle and Terra Firma received notice and had an opportunity to be heard and so the award of attorney fees is affirmed. Brindle and Terra Firma noted a minor discrepancy between the award of attorney fees and the evidence at hearing and so we modify the award to conform with the evidence. {¶4} We hold that, until a final appealable order was issued, the trial court had authority to revise or modify prior non-final orders. {¶5} Brindle and Terra Firma’s arguments against the dismissal of their crossclaims against Miller, AMS, and Spitznagel were contingent on default judgment being vacated. Since this did not happen, the dismissal of the crossclaims is affirmed. {¶6} Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Substantive and Procedural Background {¶7} On March 19, 2021, Ethel Mae McFarland filed a Complaint against Brindle; Terra Firma; AMS; Spitznagel; Gateway Royalty V, LLC; Ascent Resources – Utica, LLC; Timothy Paul Miller; Paloma Partners III, LLC; Gulfport Energy Corporation (as successor in interest to Paloma Partners); and XTO Energy Inc. {¶8} According to the Complaint, McFarland was the owner of real estate and the associated oil and gas rights (hereafter mineral rights) in Belmont County. The mineral rights were subject to lease agreements with defendants, Ascent, Paloma, Gulfport, and XTO. The Complaint alleged that Brindle, Terra Firma, Miller, AMS, Sptiznagel, and Gateway had fraudulently conspired to deprive McFarland of her mineral rights by forging deeds transferring the rights to Terra Firma. Thereafter, the mineral rights were transferred to AMS and then to Gateway. Case No. 26 BE 0014 –4– {¶9} With respect to Brindle and Terra Firma, the Complaint raised claims of Quiet Title, Fraud, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Equitable Disgorgement, Slander of Title, Breach of Accounting / Specific Performance, Civil Conspiracy, and Punitive Damages. {¶10} On June 17, 2021, McFarland filed a Motion for Default Judgment Against Brindle and Terra Firma. {¶11} On June 16, 2022, a handwritten and pro se Motion to Dismiss was filed by “defendants Michael R. Brindle (“Brindle”) and TERRA ENERGY AND LAND, TERRA FIRMA ENERGY AND LAND CONSULTS, LLC, D/B/A MICHAEL R. BRINDLE SENIOR LAND AGENT for American Mineral Solutions from February 2018 until February 2022.” {¶12} On July 17, 2022, a handwritten and pro se Proposed Order on Motion to Dismiss was filed. In this filing, inter alia, it was argued that the defendants’ conduct did not establish a factual basis for the exercise of specific jurisdiction. This was supported by attached exhibits which included a Confidential Settlement Agreement with Mutual Full and Final Release and a Consent Judgment Entry Amongst Certain Parties filed in the case of Gerritz v. Brindle, Belmont County Court of Common Pleas Case No. 20 CV 0274. {¶13} On July 20, 2022, McFarland moved to strike the pro se filings as they were not signed and did not contain certificates of service. {¶14} On July 25, 2022, the trial court entered default judgment in favor of McFarland against Brindle and Terra Firma: As these matters have languished, most recently, those defaulting Defendants [Brindle and Terra Firma] have attempted several pro se filings. Based upon the record, the Court sustains Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike those attempted filings. Those Defendants have not petitioned for leave, in any event. Case No. 26 BE 0014 –5– Therefore, the Court sustains Plaintiff’s Motions and renders judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants Michael R. Brindle and Terra Firma Energy & Land Consultants [sic], LLC, on all of Plaintiff’s claims as pled in her Complaint. As one result, those Defendants have no further interest in or right to claim an interest in the real estate or any mineral rights or benefits associated therewith. The Court will schedule a hearing on Plaintiff’s damages when requested by Plaintiff. {¶15} On October 18, 2022, a Suggestion of Death was filed on behalf of McFarland. Thereafter, Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland, was substituted as the new party plaintiff. {¶16} On August 25, 2023, Brindle filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment on the grounds that he “was not properly served with Plaintiff’s Complaint.” A Motion for Stay of Execution Pending Motion to Vacate was also filed. Lucas filed a Memorandum Contra the Motion to Vacate and Brindle filed a Reply in Support of the Motion. {¶17} On April 26, 2024, the trial court denied the Motion to Vacate. The court held: The record contains a return receipt for certified mail service upon Brindle at 436 Butler Street, Pittsburgh PA 15223 [Terra Firma’s registered office on file with the Pennsylvania Secretary of State]. Brindle attacks this on two grounds. First, he swears that he neither signed nor printed his name on that receipt. Second, Brindle swears that his last day of work with Defendant American Mineral Solutions, LLC, at 436 Butler Street, was June 17, 2020. He swears that he then cleaned out his office, returned his keys, and was escorted away. The Court will consider these in the same order. The Court, having reviewed the entire record, can not make a finding about signature authentication. Especially after reviewing Brindle’s … pro se presentments, no two signatures/printed names, are even similar. Case No. 26 BE 0014 –6– The Court can not give Brindle’s claims weight without an expert opinion, or some more convincing evidence of Brindle’s credibility. This statement relates to Brindle’s second sworn assertion that he was never at 436 Butler Street after June 17, 2020. As Brindle requested, the Court has taken judicial notice of all of the records. This review included Common Pleas Court Case Number 20-CV-274, titled Connie Jo Gerritz v. Michael R. Brindle, et al. In that case, Brindle was served with process by certified mail at 436 Butler Street, the Defendant American Mineral Solutions, LLC[’s] office, on November 13, 2020, almost five months beyond his sworn termination and last presence. Brindle had competent legal counsel in the Gerritz case. At no time, by pleading or otherwise, did Brindle ever raise and/or contest the personal jurisdiction issue. Some of the Defendants here were named in that case, too, although this Court makes no present credibility finding as to them. Thus, the Court can give no credibility to Brindle’s claim that he did not sign the return receipt and was not served with process. His Motion to Vacate is overruled. His Motion to Stay Execution is overruled. {¶18} On April 6, 2023, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Miller. {¶19} On May 16, 2024, the trial court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Lucas against Spitznagel, AMS, and Gateway. The court, considering the “evidence of the interconnections of Defendants Michael R. Brindle, Terra Firma Energy and Land Consults, LLC, Daniel F. Spitznagel, American Mineral Solutions, LLC, and Gateway Royalty V, LLC, and all of the other evidence,” concluded that Lucas was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and rendered judgment “in favor of Plaintiff and against those Defendants, jointly and severally, for precisely the relief sought by Plaintiff in her said Motion.” {¶20} Counsel for Lucas was ordered “to submit a proposed Judgment Journal Entry containing Plaintiff’s recommended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and Case No. 26 BE 0014 –7– damage, and/or a hearing, if requested, for punitive damages as to Plaintiff’s ownership of the subject mineral rights.” {¶21} On July 2, 2024, Lucas settled and dismissed her claims against Spitznagel and AMS. {¶22} On July 31, 2024, Brindle and Terra Firma filed crossclaims against Miller and against Spitznagel and AMS for Civil Liability for Criminal Conduct, Civil Conspiracy, and Contribution / Indemnification. {¶23} On September 5, 2024, an Agreed Entry involving all the parties was issued and provided that “Plaintiff’s claims for equitable disgorgement, accounting/specific performance, and punitive damages are hereby mooted to the extent that these are remedies sought by Plaintiff, not additional claims against Defendants.” {¶24} Also on September 5, 2024, Miller moved the trial court to dismiss Brindle and Terra Firma’s crossclaims. {¶25} On October 2, 2024, Spitznagel and AMS moved the trial court to dismiss Brindle and Terra Firma’s crossclaims. {¶26} On December 3, 2024, the trial court granted the separate Motions of Miller and of Spitznagel and AMS to dismiss the crossclaims filed by Brindle and Terra Firma. The court found that the claims for Civil Liability for Criminal Conduct and Civil Conspiracy were contingent upon Miller, Spitznagel and AMS being found “liable” for criminal and/or unlawful conduct against McFarland. Given that the claims against Miller, Spitznagel, and AMS have been settled and these defendants released with prejudice, such liability will never occur. Case No. 26 BE 0014 –8– {¶27} With respect to the Contribution / Indemnification claims, the trial court found that they were barred on several grounds, including R.C. 2307.25(A) (“[t]here is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor against whom an intentional tort claim has been alleged and established”) and R.C. 2307.28(B) (“[w]hen a release … is given in good faith to one of two or more persons for the same injury … [t]he release … discharges the person to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor”). {¶28} On March 5, 2025, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supplementing the earlier grant of summary judgment in Lucas’s favor. Inter alia, the court held: 2. Defendants, Michael R. Brindle (“Brindle”) and Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC (“Terra Firma”), are in default and have failed to timely move or otherwise plead in response to the Complaint and have further failed to enter an appearance herein. The Court finds the allegations in the Complaint as to Brindle and Terra Firma are true. … 45. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that judgment is hereby entered in favor of Substitute Plaintiff, Diana L. Lucas, Executrix of the Estate of Ethel Mae McFarland, and against Defendants, Michael Brindle, Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC, and Gateway Royalty V, LLC, jointly and severally, on Plaintiff’s claims for Quiet Title, Tortious Interference, Conversion, Slander of Title, and Civil Conspiracy, in the amounts set forth herein. {¶29} The trial court awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $658,860.30, representing $293,236.99 in royalty payments received by Gateway from lessees of the mineral rights and $365,623.31 held in suspense by the lessees themselves. The court also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $1,976,580.90 (three times the amount of actual damages) plus reasonable attorney fees and costs to be determined later. Case No. 26 BE 0014 –9– {¶30} On April 22, 2025, Lucas filed a Motion to Determine Attorneys’ Fees and Costs pursuant to the March 5, 2025 Journal Judgment Entry. {¶31} On October 20, 2025, a hearing was held to determine Lucas’s attorney fees and costs. {¶32} On February 12, 2026, the trial court issued a Final Appealable Judgment and Journal Entry. This Entry reduced the compensatory award to $628,860.30, reflecting a setoff of $30,000.00 received by Lucas as settlement against Miller, AMS, and Spitznagel, and accordingly reduced punitive damages to $1,886,580.90 (three times the amount of actual damages). In addition, the court awarded Lucas reasonable attorney fees and costs in the amount of $262,928.08 against Brindle, Terra Firma, and Gateway, jointly and severally. Assignments of Error {¶33} On February 27, 2026, Brindle and Terra Firma filed a Notice of Appeal. 1 On appeal, they raise the following assignments of error: [1.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by denying Brindle’s Motion to Vacate. [2.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by granting summary judgment in McFarland’s favor against Appellants. [3.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by ordering McFarland to submit “a concluding journal entry as a final appealable order” which would incorporate its prior decisions and journal including the First MSJ [March 5, 2025] Order. [4.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by improperly adopting the Second MSJ [February 12, 2026] Order in toto even though it included additional findings of fact and conclusions of law that modified the First MSJ Order, which was already a final order. 1. The February 12, 2026 Final Appealable Judgment and Journal Entry is also the subject of appeals by Gateway and Gateway’s trial counsel, Molly K. Johnson. See Lucas v. Brindle, Belmont App. Nos. 26 BE 0013 and 26 BE 0015. Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 10 – [5.] The Trial Court committed reversible error by dismissing Appellants’ crossclaims against AMS, Spitznagel, and Miller. First Assignment of Error: The Motion to Vacate {¶34} In the first assignment of error, Brindle2 argues that the trial court erred by not vacating the default judgment. He contends the court disregarded the uncontroverted testimony that he did not receive service of process and that it was improper for the court to consider service records from another case. Personal Jurisdiction: the Civil Rules and Constitutional Due Process {¶35} “A trial court is without jurisdiction to render judgment or to make findings against a person who was not served summons, did not appear, and was not a party in the court proceedings.” State ex rel. Ballard v. O’Donnell, 50 Ohio St.3d 182 (1990), paragraph one of the syllabus; Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.3d 154, 156 (1984) (“[i]t is rudimentary that in order to render a valid personal judgment, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant”). {¶36} “[A] judgment rendered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction is void ab initio.” Patton v. Diemer, 35 Ohio St.3d 68, 70 (1988). “A person against whom such judgment and findings are made is entitled to have the judgment vacated.” Ballard at paragraph one of the syllabus. “[T]he authority to vacate a void judgment … constitutes an inherent power possessed by Ohio courts.” Patton at 70. {¶37} “When a plaintiff complies with the Rules of Civil Procedure, a rebuttable presumption of proper service exists.” Bishop v. Bishop, 2025-Ohio-289, ¶ 30 (7th Dist.). The Civil Rules provide for service by certified mail. “Evidenced by return receipt signed by any person accepting delivery, service of any process shall be by United States 2. The Motion to Vacate was filed on behalf of Brindle only. Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 11 – certified or express mail …” Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a). “So long as the postal receipt is signed and returned, service is effective ‘even if not delivered to the defendant or to a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process for defendant.’” Youngstown City Demolition v. Rainy Day Rentals, Inc., 2023-Ohio-3601, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.). {¶38} “[I]n the context of a motion to vacate a void judgment, the presumption of service may be rebutted by evidence demonstrating nonservice.” Blon v. Royal Flush, Inc., 2022-Ohio-1958, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.), quoting Lundeen v. Turner, 2021-Ohio-1533, ¶ 22. “Ohio courts have repeatedly considered claims of failed service even where service was mailed to the correct address.” Ross v. Olsavsky, 2010-Ohio-1310, ¶ 14 (7th Dist.). {¶39} As noted by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “[t]he rule speaks primarily to how service shall be made, rather than where, or to whom process may be served.” Akron- Canton Regional Airport Auth. v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St.2d 403, 404-405 (1980). “In drafting these rules it was believed that due process should determine the parameters for proper service rather than create unduly restrictive rules prohibiting otherwise constitutionally permissible service.” Id. at 405. {¶40} “When it comes to service, the basic requirement is that the ‘notice [be] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Hunt v. Alderman, 2025-Ohio-2944, ¶ 14, quoting Mulane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). “Because service under Civ.R. 4.1(A)(1)(a) must comport with due-process guarantees, sufficient service requires using an address that is reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the lawsuit.” Id. at ¶ 16; Samson Sales, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 66 Ohio St.2d 290, 293 (1981) (“[s]ervice of process made at the Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 12 – business address of an individual or a corporation [by certified mail] must comport with the requirements of due process”). Standard of Review {¶41} This Court applies both an abuse of discretion and a de novo standard of review as to whether a court has obtained personal jurisdiction over a defendant. “A trial court’s ruling on a question of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo as a question of law.” Youngstown City Demolition, 2023-Ohio-3601, at ¶ 7 (7th Dist.); Blon, 2022-Ohio- 1958, at ¶ 20 (7th Dist.) (“legal decisions (including whether the facts meet a legal test) are reviewed de novo”). “However, a trial court’s findings regarding whether service was proper are reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Youngstown City Demolition at ¶ 7; Blon at ¶ 19 (“whether the service presumption was rebutted upon a motion to vacate default judgment is reviewed for an abuse of discretion”). Personal Service on Brindle {¶42} In the present case, Brindle was served by certified mail on March 23, 2021, at 436 Butler Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The return receipt contains a signature and the name “Michael Brindle” in the space reserved for “Received by (Printed Name).” The following documents, attesting 436 Butler Street as the business address for Brindle and Terra Firma, were attached to the Complaint: a June 24, 2020 Mineral Deed in which Terra Firma was the grantee; a July 27, 2020 Mineral Deed signed by Brindle as “Managing Partner of Terra Firma Energy & Land Consults, LLC” in which Terra Firma was the grantor; and a July 23, 2020 Corrective Mineral Deed in which Terra Firma was the grantee. The foregoing was sufficient to raise the presumption of proper service. Youngstown City Demolition at ¶ 14 (“[w]here a notice is sent by registered mail, with a Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 13 – return receipt requested, and thereafter a signed receipt is returned, a prima facie case is established of the fact of delivery of such notice to such address”) (citation omitted). {¶43} In support of the Motion to Vacate, Brindle attached his affidavit in which he averred that he did not sign or recognize the signature on the return receipt dated March 23, 2021. He further averred that between February 2018 and June 2020 he worked as an independent contractor for AMS at the Butler Street address: “my last day at the Butler Street office was June 17, 2020, at which time, I cleaned out my office, returned my keys, and was accompanied out of the building by Defendant Spitznagel.” {¶44} Lucas opposed vacating the default judgment by noting the following: 436 Butler Street was and continues to be the address of record for “Brindle’s business,” Terra Firma, as evidenced by the Pennsylvania Secretary of State website. In Brindle’s pro se filings on June 163 and July 7, 20224, 436 Butler Street was represented as his business address. {¶45} In addition to these arguments, the trial court took judicial notice of the fact that, in the Gerritz case, Brindle was served by certified mail on November 13, 2020, at 436 Butler Street and that service was not challenged in that case. Brindle Failed to Rebut the Presumption of Valid Service {¶46} On appeal, Brindle argues that the denial of his Motion to Vacate was in error on several grounds: the trial court did not hold a hearing on the motion; consideration of the Gerritz case and the pro se filings was improper; Brindle’s affidavit was 3. On June 16, 2022, Brindle filed a Proposed Motion to Dismiss “Filed on behalf of Defendants American Mineral Solutions, and Michael R. Brindle[,] Senior Land Agent D/B/A Terra Firma Energy & Land[,] 436 Butler Street.” 4. On July 17, 2022, Brindle filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss “Filed on behalf of Defendants TERRA FIRMA Energy & Land[,] 436 Butler Street[,] … D/B/A AMERICAN Mineral Solutions[,] Michael R. Brindle[,] Senior Land AGENT[,] 436 Butler Street.” Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 14 – uncontroverted; and the court’s determination of Brindle’s credibility was influenced by unfounded bias. None of these arguments are convincing. {¶47} Initially, we observe that Brindle did not deny having an office at 436 Butler Street, but claims that it was vacated after June of 2020, and, therefore, after that date, service at the address was no longer reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the fundamental issue is Brindle’s credibility and the abuse of discretion standard applies. {¶48} Brindle argues the trial court erred by not holding a hearing on the Motion to Vacate. It is the general rule that “where the affidavit [in support of vacating default judgment] is self-serving, the trial court must hold a hearing to determine whether the party asserting that he was not properly served was truthful in that allegation; failure to hold the hearing amounts to error.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 2008-Ohio- 6588, ¶ 13 (7th Dist.). However, the requirement for a hearing is not absolute and, in the present case, the trial court noted on the record that counsel for Brindle waived a hearing on the Motion to Vacate: “Brindle requested an oral hearing. However, as one result of the telephone status conference on April 15, 2024, Attorney Joel A. Holt, Brindle’s counsel, withdrew that request.” {¶49} This Court has found, in comparable situations, that a trial court may rule on a motion to vacate default judgment without a hearing. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wilburn, 2022-Ohio-2026, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.) (“appellant specifically requested that the court not hold the scheduled hearing”); Barrett at ¶ 16 (“[o]nce Barrett requested a motion for continuance of the hearing, the determination of whether to vacate required a hearing or if it should have been granted are not the central issues anymore”). Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 15 – {¶50} As to bias, Brindle points out several instances where the trial court purportedly inferred or insinuated that he had actual notice of the pendency of action from the time of the initial attempt at service. Brindle also notes that the court made “no finding” with respect to these matters and that actual notice was “irrelevant” to whether service was proper. Thus, there is no overt evidence of real bias toward Brindle. Moreover, as demonstrated below, there was sufficient objective cause to question the credibility of Brindle’s affidavit based on the record before the court without the imputation of bias as a motivating factor. The Service Record in the Gerritz Case {¶51} Brindle argues it was improper for the trial court to judicially notice the service record from the Gerritz case. We recognize that it is becoming widely accepted that courts may take judicial notice of court records that are verifiable through the court’s or clerk of court’s online docket. See State v. Fraley, 2026-Ohio-1964, ¶ 2, fn. 1 (“[w]e may take judicial notice of such online court records [verifiable through the Butler County clerk of court’s online docket]”); State ex rel. Curtis v. Turner, 2024-Ohio-2682, ¶ 12 (“[t]he municipal-court docket is an online court record, which may be appropriate for judicial notice”); In re M.L.-P., 2024-Ohio-5346, ¶ 22 (2d Dist.) (“[i]t is common practice for courts to take judicial notice of publicly accessible online court dockets”) (citation omitted). State ex rel. Everhart v. McIntosh, 2007-Ohio-4798, cited by Brindle, is not to the contrary. Everhart acknowledges that there is authority for the proposition that courts may not take judicial notice of their own proceedings in other cases but also that courts take judicial notice of public court records available on the internet but does not endorse either position. Id. at ¶ 7-8. Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 16 – {¶52} This Court “has adhered to the principle that a trial court may not take judicial notice of earlier proceedings, either in its own court or another court, except for proceedings in the immediate case under consideration.” Dombelek v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2003-Ohio-5151, ¶ 26 (7th Dist.). Although it is over twenty years old and diverges from the pronouncements of the Ohio Supreme Court in cases such as Fraley and Curtis, Dombelek remains the law of this district. {¶53} Nonetheless, we do not find Dombelek controlling in the present case. In the first place, Brindle himself raised the issue of the Gerritz case and attached documents therefrom in his pro se filings. See State v. Thomas, 2009-Ohio-1032, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.) (finding that the court did not take improper notice of remission motions filed in other cases where “Appellant’s counsel himself referred to the other remission hearings” and the court merely observed that such filings existed). One of the documents attached to the pro se filings was also attached to the Complaint without objection. {¶54} Moreover, this Court stated that the rationale for the rule against taking notice “is that, if a trial court takes judicial notice of a prior proceeding, the appellate court cannot review whether the trial court correctly interpreted the prior case because the record of the prior case is not before the appellate court.” (Citation omitted.) Dombelek at ¶ 26. This rationale has no application in the present case where the service record in the Gerritz case is as available to this Court as it was to the trial court as it is to anyone with internet access. See Evid.R. 201(B) (“[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is … capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”). Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 17 – {¶55} Not only is the service record available from a publicly accessible and verifiable source, but the service record is not the sort of document that requires interpretation. The lower court noticed that, according to the court records in Gerritz, Brindle was served by certified mail at 436 Butler Street on November 13, 2020. There is no dispute that this is what the records reflect. It is not necessary to go further into the facts of the case. {¶56} Lastly, the situation in Dombelek is materially distinguishable from the present case. In Dombelek, the trial court granted summary judgment against workers compensation claimants based on complaints filed in an unrelated case in another county. The complaints were used as substantive evidence in disposing of the claims based on the statute of limitations. Regardless of whether the complaints could be properly noticed, the decision in Dombelek rests on the fact that the complaints did not constitute valid evidence for summary judgment purposes: “Due to the fact that the Cuyahoga County complaints are not the type of evidentiary materials specifically listed in Civ.R. 56(C), were not incorporated by reference into an affidavit in either case, and because the lower courts were not entitled to take judicial notice of the complaints, we cannot consider the Cuyahoga County complaints as evidence in support of the Administrator's motions for summary judgment.” Dombelek at ¶ 27. {¶57} Brindle argues that, at most, the service record demonstrates that service was obtained in Gerritz, not that service at the Butler Street address was reasonably calculated to apprise him of the pendency of the lawsuit in the present case, i.e., that he continued to maintain a “habitual, continuous or highly continual and repeated physical presence” there. Continuum Transp. Servs., Ltd. v. Elite Internatl. Corp., LLC, 2024-Ohio- Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 18 – 340, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.) (“service upon an individual that is sent to a usual place of business can comport with due process requirements because the party being served has a habitual, continuous, or highly continual and repeated physical presence at the business address”). {¶58} Brindle misinterprets the import of noticing service in the Gerritz case. The issue here is whether Brindle’s affidavit was sufficient to rebut the presumption of proper service which is essentially a credibility determination. Brindle averred that he vacated the Butler Street office in June 2020. The fact that he was served in another lawsuit at Butler Street after June of 2020 undermines the credibility of the affidavit. The Pro Se Filings {¶59} Brindle also challenges reliance on the pro se filings on the grounds that they were not cited by the trial court in its ruling on the Motion to Vacate and that they were stricken from the record. We find neither contention compelling. {¶60} Brindle claims that because the trial court did not discuss the pro se filings, this Court may not consider them: “appellate court[s] … do not take evidence or make factual findings,” and “do not resolve the merits of factual disputes because that role is reserved for the trier of fact.” Pierce v. Workman, 2023-Ohio-2022, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.). {¶61} Brindle’s argument is unavailing because the issue before this Court does not involve resolving the merits of a factual dispute. Rather, the issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that Brindle failed to rebut the presumption of service. In reviewing this issue, we are not strictly bound by the court’s reasons for reaching its decision. As long as the record before the lower court supports its decision, the court of appeals should affirm. Even where a motion to vacate was based on Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 19 – erroneous reasons, the judgment was affirmed on the principle that “a reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned as a basis thereof.” Aurora Loan Servs., L.L.C. v. Cart, 2012-Ohio-5024, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 1994- Ohio-92, ¶ 12. “It inexorably follows that if a reviewing court is not authorized to reverse an otherwise correct judgment because erroneous reasons were assigned as a basis of the decision, it is not authorized to reverse an otherwise correct judgment because no reasons were assigned as a basis of the decision.” Gunton Corp. v. Architectural Concepts, 2008-Ohio-693, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). {¶62} In the present case, the trial court’s reasons for denying the Motion were neither lacking nor erroneous, but simply failed to acknowledge everything in the record that it could have in support of its decision. “[W]hile an appellate court may decide an issue on grounds different from those determined by the trial court, the … basis upon which the court of appeals decides [the] issue must have been adduced before the trial court and have been made a part of the record thereof.” State v. Peagler, 1996-Ohio-73, paragraph one of the syllabus. Here, the fact that Brindle used the Butler Street address in the June and July 2022 pro se filings was raised in Lucas’s Memorandum Contra the Motion to Vacate. The trial court’s failure to comment upon it does not preclude this court from doing so. Patterson Tool & Supply Co. v. Kemper, 125 Ohio St. 632 (1932) (“[u]pon examination of the entire record, we are unable to find that the trial court committed prejudicial error in overruling the motion to vacate”). {¶63} We now address Brindle’s contention that, the pro se filings having been struck, they are not properly part of the record. Brindle cites Roefer v. Riley, 2025-Ohio- Case No. 26 BE 0014 – 20 – 272 (8th Dist.), for the proposition that “the consequence of striking a filing from the record is that it is no longer part of the record for purposes of appeal.” Id. at ¶ 9, fn. 5. Since the stricken filings are no longer part of the record, they could not be considered by either the trial court or this Court. We disagree. {¶64} The statement from the footnote in Roefer, which is neither controlling nor supported by citations to authority, overstates the effect of striking a filing. Generally, a document that has been stricken is deemed to be a nullity or a legal nullity, i.e., without legal effect. See Municipal Court of Toledo v. State, 126 Ohio St. 103, 112 (1933) (“these orders of suspension of execution of the sentences were without authority in the first instance, and therefore void, and, being void, may be set aside at any time, or stricken from the record and treated as a nullity”); State v. Boyle, 2025-Ohio-860, ¶ 8 (2d D